JUDGMENT : Akil Abdul Hamid Kureshi, J. 1. This Revision Petition is filed by original defendant No. 2 to challenge an order dated 26-12-2014 passed by learned Additional Senior Civil Judge, Gandhinagar, below application Exh. 33 in Special Civil Suit No. 85 of 2008. Brief facts are that opponent Nos. 1 and 2 are the original plaintiffs as heirs of deceased Joitaram Ranchhoddas Patel. They have filed the said suit for a declaration that they are the owners and in possession of the suit lands by virtue of a registered sale-deed dated 3-2-1981. They have also prayed for a declaration that subsequent sale-deed of the said land dated 2-5-2003 between defendant Nos. 1 and 2 is ab initio void and the same may be cancelled. They have also prayed for permanent injunction against the defendants from transferring, selling or in any manner alienating the suit property. Defendant No. 2 appeared and filed the said application Exh. 33 seeking rejection of the plaint in exercise of powers under Order 7, Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Such application came to be dismissed by the trial Court by impugned order, hence this revision petition. 2. Case of the plaintiffs as stated in the plaint is that said Joitaram Ranchhoddas Patel had purchased an agricultural land bearing Survey No. 69/1, admeasuring 31 hectares and 77 gunthas, of village Sugad, District Gandhinagar, from the original owner Ramanlal Jamnadas Shah (whose heirs are shown as defendant Nos. 1/1 to 1/5) by a registered sale-deed dated 3-2-1981. Since then, the plaintiffs have been enjoying the ownership and the possession of the suit land. However, due to certain reasons, names of the plaintiffs could not be entered in the revenue records and that of Ramanlal Jamnadas Shah continued and after his death,. names of his legal heirs were entered on 5-8-1996. Taking advantage of such situation, defendant Nos. 1 and 2 got the name of defendant No. 2 entered in the revenue records pertaining to the suit land. This was never communicated to the plaintiffs. Recently when the plaintiffs went to the farm house situated at such land, the representative of defendant No. 2 obstructed their entry upon which they verified the revenue records and learned about sale-deed executed between defendant Nos. 1 and 2. They have therefore, filed the suit on 28-3-2008 seeking prayers noted above. 3. This was never communicated to the plaintiffs. Recently when the plaintiffs went to the farm house situated at such land, the representative of defendant No. 2 obstructed their entry upon which they verified the revenue records and learned about sale-deed executed between defendant Nos. 1 and 2. They have therefore, filed the suit on 28-3-2008 seeking prayers noted above. 3. Defendant No. 2 filed the said application Exh. 33 and contended that though the suit land was sold by Ramanlal Jamnadas Shah to Patel Joitaram Ranchhoddas on 3-2-1981 since Joitaram Patel was not an agriculturist and did not have agricultural land within radius of 8 kms. from the suit land, his entry in the revenue record was cancelled. Subsequently, Joitaram Ranchhoddas also accepted the return of the sale consideration from Ramanlal Jamnadas Shah and the possession was also handed over back to the original owner. Nearly 26 years later the plaintiffs have filed the suit and in the meantime Joitaram Ranchhoddas also passed away. It was contended that the sale-deed was executed on 3-2-1981 and the present suit which is filed on 28-3-2008 is barred by limitation. The plaintiffs have not indicated in what manner the suit would fall within the period of limitation. Inter alia on such grounds, defendant No. 2 requested the Court to reject the plaint in exercise of powers under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 4. The application Exh. 33 filed by defendant No. 2 came to be dismissed by the impugned order in which the learned Judge observed that the application is to be judged on the basis of averments made in the plaint. The contention of the plaintiffs that upon recently obtaining the copies of revenue records they came to know about the developments, cannot be rejected at this stage without verification. The plaintiffs' contention that the subsequent sale-deed is null and void, and that therefore, any challenge would not be barred by limitation is also required to be examined. The contentions that when earlier sale-deed is in existence, subsequent sale could not have been effected and that the plaintiffs have come to know about the same recently, are required to be gone into. Primarily on such grounds, the application of the defendants came to be dismissed. 5. The contentions that when earlier sale-deed is in existence, subsequent sale could not have been effected and that the plaintiffs have come to know about the same recently, are required to be gone into. Primarily on such grounds, the application of the defendants came to be dismissed. 5. Learned Counsel Shri M.B. Gandhi for the petitioner original defendant No. 2 submitted that after the execution of the sale in the year 1981, the revenue entries could not be certified since the purchaser was not an agriculturist. Sale in his favour was invalid by virtue of Sec. 63 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act. The petitioner is a bona fide purchaser in whose favour a registered sale-deed dated 2-5-2003. The present suit which is filed in the year 2008 for a declaration that the plaintiffs are owners by virtue of sale-deed dated 3-2-1981 and for cancellation of subsequent sale-deed dated 2-5-2003, is clearly barred by limitation. Subsequent sale being a registered document, the plaintiffs must be deemed to have knowledge thereof. Any suit for declaration that the sale is invalid must be brought within three years from the date of registration. In support of the contention that registration of document would amount to deemed notice, Counsel drew my attention to the decision of Supreme Court in case of Dilboo (Smt.) (Dead) by L.Rs. vs. Dhanraji (Smt.) (Dead), 2000 (7) SCC 702 and to the decision of learned Single Judge of this Court in case of Becharbhai Zaverbhai Patel vs. Jashbhai Shivabhai Patel, 2013 (1) GLR 398. 6. On the other hand, learned Counsel Ms. Trusha Patel for the original plaintiffs opposed the petition contending that the plaintiffs had purchased the suit land by a registered sale-deed. Merely because the revenue entry was not certified, would not amount to cancellation of the sale-deed. Such sale-deed was never cancelled. No proceedings have been instituted either by the original seller or by the Government under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act. She submitted that the purchaser Joitaram Ranchhoddas was an agriculturist by birth, and therefore, by virtue of retrospective amendment in the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, requirement of having agricultural land within the radius of 8 km. of the land in question would no longer be relevant. She further submitted that the original landowner could not have executed another sale-deed in favour of defendant No. 2. of the land in question would no longer be relevant. She further submitted that the original landowner could not have executed another sale-deed in favour of defendant No. 2. Such sale was ab initio void. The plaintiffs were in possession of the suit property by virtue of a registered sale-deed in their favour. Subsequent purchaser must be treated to be within the knowledge of such transaction. The plaintiffs came to know about the sale transaction shortly before filing the suit when the representative of defendant No. 2 obstructed their entry upon which the plaintiffs made inquiries and learned about the execution of the sale-deed. Upon which without any delay, the suit was filed. The suit, is therefore, within limitation. In any case, such questions need to be gone into at the time of trial. The Court below therefore, committed no error in rejecting application of the defendant No. 2. In support of her contentions, she relied on several decisions, to which I would refer at a later stage. 7. The averments emerging from the plaint which would be of prime consideration while deciding the application for rejection of plaint under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure are that Joitaram Ranchhoddas, predecessor-in-title of the plaintiffs, had purchased the suit land by a registered sale-deed dated 3-2-1981 from erstwhile owner Ramanlal Jamnadas Shah. With this aspect of the matter, even the defendants have not raised any dispute. As per the plaintiffs such sale-deed has never been set aside or challenged. Nothing contrary has been averred or pointed out by the defendants. In that view of the matter, the question of validity of subsequent sale of the same land by heirs of Ramanlal Jamnadas Shah, the land owners, would be a relevant question. It may be that the revenue entries certifying the sale in favour of the plaintiffs dated 3-2-1981 was cancelled. It prima facie appears that same was since the purchasers could not produce certificate of being agriculturists. Whether they were not agriculturists at all or whether they were agriculturists but having agricultural land outside of radius of 8 km from the suit land is not clear from the record at least at this stage. Both these aspects may have slightly different repercussions. Whether they were not agriculturists at all or whether they were agriculturists but having agricultural land outside of radius of 8 km from the suit land is not clear from the record at least at this stage. Both these aspects may have slightly different repercussions. As per Sec. 63 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, any sale of agricultural land in favour of a person who is not an agriculturist would be invalid. In terms of the definition of agriculturist then prevailing, even if a person held agricultural land, but such land was situated outside the radius of 8 km. from the land purchased by him, qua such land he would be considered as non-agriculturist. However, such requirement of holding agricultural land within a radius of 8 km. was done away with by amendment in the said Act brought in the year 1999 and which would apply to all pending proceedings also. However, at this stage, it is not necessary for me to dwell into these aspects of the matter. What is of importance is in face of such sale-deed, a subsequent sale-deed was effected by the heirs of erstwhile owners of the suit land. Prayer of the plaintiffs therefore, for a declaration that they were the owners by virtue of sale-deed dated 3-2-1981 and continued to be so, cannot be stated to be barred by limitation. Obviously, the period of limitation cannot be computed from the date of the sale-deed. The requirement of filing the suit for such declaration would only arise in case of need when cause of action can be stated to have arisen. In other words, only when such title is questioned or challenged the cause of action for filing such a suit for declaration would arise. As per the plaintiffs they had been in possession of the suit land and only shortly before filing the suit they were obstructed from its use and enjoyment. Going by such averments, the first prayer obviously cannot be stated to be barred by limitation. 8. Question that requires more elaborate answer is of limitation with respect to the plaintiffs' second prayer for declaration that sale-deed dated 2-5-2003 in favour of defendant No. 2 is invalid and void. Going by such averments, the first prayer obviously cannot be stated to be barred by limitation. 8. Question that requires more elaborate answer is of limitation with respect to the plaintiffs' second prayer for declaration that sale-deed dated 2-5-2003 in favour of defendant No. 2 is invalid and void. As noted, Shri Gandhi vehemently contended that any suit for declaration that the sale-deed dated 2-5-2003 is invalid must be brought within a period of three years thereof since a registered document would put the plaintiffs to deemed notice thereof. He relied on Art. No. 59 to the schedule to the Limitation Act which pertains to a suit to cancel or set aside an instrument or decree or for the recession of a contract. Period of limitation prescribed is three years and time when the period would begin to run is stated to be "when the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument or decree cancelled or set aside or the contract rescinded first become known to him". 9. According to the plaintiffs, they were not aware about the subsequent sale executed on 2-5-2003. Only shortly before filing of the suit, they were prevented from use and enjoyment of the property upon which they inquired and learned about the execution of the sale. For the purpose of deciding the defendants application under Order 7, Rule 11, I would have to proceed on such basis, particularly, in absence of any clinching and irrefutable indication to the contrary presented before me or before the Court below by the defendants. If these averments are therefore, at this stage to be accepted, the suit which was filed within a short period of such knowledge, would not ordinarily be hit by limitation. However, it is in this context that Mr. Gandhi's contention regarding deemed notice assumes significance. The question therefore, is can the suit be declared as barred by limitation on the concept of deemed knowledge in view of the fact that sale-deed was a registered one? 10. In this context Ms. However, it is in this context that Mr. Gandhi's contention regarding deemed notice assumes significance. The question therefore, is can the suit be declared as barred by limitation on the concept of deemed knowledge in view of the fact that sale-deed was a registered one? 10. In this context Ms. Patel drew my attention to several decisions to which I may presently refer: "(1) In case of Surjit Kaur Gill vs. Adarsh Kaur Gill, 2014 AIR SC 1476, in which while dealing with the issue of rejection of plaint under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Supreme Court allowed the trial to proceed observing that the issue of limitation is always a mixed question of facts and law, and it can therefore, not be held that no case was made out for proceeding further with the trial. (2) My attention was also drawn to the decision of Supreme Court in case of C. Natrajan vs. Ashim Bai, 2007 (14) SCC 183 in which again in the context of application under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure in which the Supreme Court made the following observations: "18. We have noticed hereinbefore that the defendant, inter alia, on the plea of identification of the suit land vis-à-vis the deeds of sale, under which the plaintiff has claimed his title, claimed possession. The defendant did not accept that the plaintiff was in possession. An issue in this behalf is, therefore, required to be framed and the said question is, therefore, required to be gone into. Limitation would not commence unless there has been a clear and unequivocal threat to the right claimed by the plaintiff. In a situation of this nature, in our opinion, the application under Order 7, Rule 11(d) was not maintainable. The contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the respondent may have to be gone into at a proper stage. Lest it may prejudice the contention of one party or the other at the trial, we resist from making any observations at this stage." (3) Heavy reliance was placed on decision in case of P.V. Guru Raj Reddy Rep. by Gpa Laxmi Narayan Reddy vs. P. Neeradha Reddy, 2015 JX (SC) 66. Lest it may prejudice the contention of one party or the other at the trial, we resist from making any observations at this stage." (3) Heavy reliance was placed on decision in case of P.V. Guru Raj Reddy Rep. by Gpa Laxmi Narayan Reddy vs. P. Neeradha Reddy, 2015 JX (SC) 66. In context of challenge to a registered sale-deed, the contention of the plaintiffs with respect to limitation was that the suit was filed within three years from the date of knowledge. The sale-deed in question was executed in the year 1979. However, according to the plaintiffs they came to know about the same only in the year 1999 and after issuance of legal notice, the suit was filed in the year 2002. In this context, Supreme Court observed as under: "9. Both the suits were filed in July, 2002 which is well within three years of the date of knowledge, as claimed by the plaintiffs, of the fact that the property had not been transferred in the name of plaintiff No. 2 by the defendant Nos. 1 and 2. The aforesaid averments made in the plaint will have to be accepted as correct as for the purposes of consideration of the application under Order VII, Rule 11 filed by the defendant Nos. 1 and 2. If that be so, the averments in the plaint would not disclose that either of the suits is barred by limitation so as to justify rejection of the plaint under Order 7, Rule 11 of the C.P.C." Thus in this case the Supreme Court accepted the principle of starting point of limitation from the date of knowledge of a sale-deed. However, the question of deemed notice of registered document was not raised. (4) In support of her contention that the principle of deemed notice contained in Sec. 3 of the Transfer of Property Act cannot be imported in case of subsequent sale against the original purchaser, she relied on the following passage of decision of Supreme Court in case of Ram Niwas (Dead) through L.Rs. vs. Bano, 2000 (6) SCC 685 : "5. It may be noted here that 'notice' may be (i) actual, (ii) constructive or (iii) imputed. 6. vs. Bano, 2000 (6) SCC 685 : "5. It may be noted here that 'notice' may be (i) actual, (ii) constructive or (iii) imputed. 6. Sec. 3 of the Transfer of Property Act defines, inter alia, "a person is said to have notice" of a fact when he actually knows that fact, or when but for wilful abstention from an enquiry or search which he ought to have made, or gross negligence, he would have known it. And Explanation-II appended to this definition clause says : "Any person acquiring any immovable property or any share or interest in any such property shall be deemed to have notice of the title, if any, of any person who is for the time-being in actual possession thereof. 7. Thus, it is seen that a statutory presumption of 'notice' arises against any person who acquires any immovable property or any share or interest therein of the title, if any, of the person who is for the time-being in actual possession thereof. 8. The principle of constructive notice of any title which a tenant in actual possession may have, was laid down by Lord Eldon in Daniels vs. Davison, 1809 (16) Ves. 249 at p. 254. The learned law Lord observed, "Upon one point in this cause there is considerable authority for the opinion I hold; that, where there is a tenant in possession under a lease or an agreement, a person, purchasing part of the estate, must be bound to inquire, on what terms that person is in possession. 9. That principle has been followed by various High Courts in India. (Faki Ibrahim vs. Faki Gulam Mohidin, AIR 1921 Bom. 459; Mahadeo Keshav Lingarkar vs. S.B. Kesarkar, AIR 1972 Bom. 100 ; Tiloke Grand Surana vs. J.B. Bettie and Co. AIR 1926 Cal. 204; Parthasarathy Aiyar vs. Subbaraya Gramany, AIR 1924 Mad. 67 and Mummidi Reddi Papannagari Yella Reddy vs. Salla Subbi Reddy, AIR 1954 Andh. 20)." (5) For the same purpose, she also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in case of R.K. Mohammed Ubaidullah vs. Hajee C. Abdul Wahab (Dead) by L.Rs. 2000 (6) SCC 402 , in which it was held as under: "15. Notice is defined in Sec. 3 of the Transfer of Property Act. It may be actual where the party has actual knowledge of the fact or constructive. 2000 (6) SCC 402 , in which it was held as under: "15. Notice is defined in Sec. 3 of the Transfer of Property Act. It may be actual where the party has actual knowledge of the fact or constructive. "A person is said to have notice" of a fact when he actually knows that fact, or when, but for willful abstention from an inquiry or search which he ought to have made, or gross negligence, he would have known it. Explanation-II of said Sec. 3 reads: Explanation II:-- Any person acquiring any immovable property or any share or interest in any such property shall be deemed to have notice of the title, if any, of any person who is for the time-being in actual possession thereof." Section 3 was amended by the Amendment Act of 1929 in relation to the definition of 'notice'. The definition has been amended and supplemented by three explanations, which settle the law in several matters of great importance. For the immediate purpose Explanation-II is relevant. It states that actual possession is notice of the title of the person in possession. Prior to the amendment there had been some uncertainty because of divergent views expressed by various High Courts in relation to the actual possession as notice of title. A person may enter the property in one capacity and having a kind of interest. But subsequently while continuing in possession of the property his capacity or interest may change. A person entering me property as tenant later may become usufructuary mortgagee or may be agreement holder to purchase the same property or may be some other interest is created in his favour subsequently. Hence, with reference to subsequent purchaser it is essential that he should make an inquiry as to title or interest of the person in actual possession as on the date when sale transaction was made in his favour. The actual possession of a person itself is deemed or constructive notice of the title if any, of a person who is for the time-being in actual possession thereof. A subsequent purchaser has to make inquiry as to further interest, nature of possession and title under which the person was continuing in possession on the date of purchase of the properly. In the case on hand, defendant Nos. A subsequent purchaser has to make inquiry as to further interest, nature of possession and title under which the person was continuing in possession on the date of purchase of the properly. In the case on hand, defendant Nos. 2 to 4 contended that they were already aware of the nature of possession of the plaintiff over me suit property as a tenant and as such there was no need to make any inquiry. At one stage, they also contended that they purchased the property after contacting the plaintiff, of course, which contention was negatived by the learned trial Court as well as the High Court. Even otherwise, the said contention is self-contradictory. In view of Sec. 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act and definition of 'notice' given in Sec. 3 of the Transfer of Property Act read along with Explanation-II, it is rightly held by the trial Court as well as by the High Court that the defendant Nos. 2 to 5 were not bona fide purchasers in good faith for value without notice of the original contract." 11. Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, is an interpretation clause explaining different terms used in the said Act. The expression "a person is said to have notice" is explained as under: "A person is said to have notice" of a fact when he actually knows that fact, or when, but for wilful abstention from an inquiry or search which he ought to have made, or gross negligence, he would have known it. The expression "a person is said to have notice" is explained as under: "A person is said to have notice" of a fact when he actually knows that fact, or when, but for wilful abstention from an inquiry or search which he ought to have made, or gross negligence, he would have known it. Explanation I:-- Where any transaction relating to immoveable property is required by law to be and has been effected by a registered instrument, any person acquiring such property or any part of, or share or interest in, such property shall be deemed to have notice of such instrument as from the date of registration or, where the property is not all situated in one sub-district, or where the registered instrument has been registered under sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 30 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908, from the earliest date on which any memorandum of such registered instrument has been filed by any Sub-Registrar within whose sub-district any part of the property which is being acquired, or of the property wherein a share or interest is being acquired, is situated: Provided that - (1) the instrument has been registered and its registration completed in the manner prescribed by the Indian Registration Act, 1908, and the rules made thereunder. (2) the instrument (or memorandum) has been duly entered or filed, as the case may be, in books kept under Sec.51 of that Act, and (3) the particulars regarding the transaction to which me instrument relates have been correctly entered in the indices kept under Sec. 55 of that Act. Explanation II:-- Any person acquiring any immovable property or any share or interest in any such property shall be deemed to have notice of the title, if any, of any person who is for the time-being in actual possession thereof. Explanation III:-- A person shall be deemed to have had notice of any fact if his agent acquires notice thereof whilst acting on his behalf in the course of business to which that fact is material: Provided that, if the agent fraudulently conceals the fact, the principal shall not be charged with notice thereof as against any person who was a party to or otherwise cognizant of the fraud." 12. Upon perusal of the said portion of Sec. 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, it can be seen that knowledge of a fact is attributed to a person either when he actually knows that fact, or when, but for wilful abstention from an inquiry or search, he ought to have made, or gross negligence, he would have known it. Explanation-I to the said clause inter alia provides that where any transaction relating to immoveable property is required by law to be and has been effected by a registered instrument, any person acquiring such property or any part thereof, or share or interest in, such property shall be deemed to have notice of such instrument as from the date of registration. This is subject to the conditions provided in provisions contained to the said Explanation. Explanation-I, thus refers to deemed notice and relates to the notice of instrument relating to a transaction of immovable property which is required by law and has also been so registered and such deemed knowledge is imputed to the person acquiring such property or any share or interest in such property. Such provision therefore, cannot be applied in case of a subsequent sale of an immovable property to impute deemed knowledge of such transaction on the erstwhile purchaser/owner merely on the strength of Sec. 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, unless facts and attendant circumstances suggest that the person in question was reasonably expected to make search or inquiry which he failed to do, thus suggesting wilful act, negligence or lack of due diligence i.e. prudence, expected of a reasonable man. Any such interpretation being quite contrary to the language used in the provision, would also put an unreasonable onus on a owner or a purchaser of an immovable property to be constantly vigilant and apprise himself of any subsequent registered transaction with respect to such immovable property or face unpleasant consequences of his challenge to a totally invalid or even a fraudulent or a bogus sale-deed being barred by law of limitation after the statutory period commencing from the date of registration on the principle of deemed knowledge. In plain terms said provision of Sec. 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, applies in case of a person acquiring an immovable property or a share or interest therein of a transaction which would be an existing and not a future transaction which by law is required and indeed been registered. 13. In case of Tilakdhari Lal vs. Khedan Lal, AIR 1921 PC 112 , the Privy Council noted with approval observations in case of Lakshmandas Sarupchand vs. Dasrat, 1880 (6) Bom. 168 and held as under: "This decision depended in part upon the consideration of whether registration was equivalent to possession, every subsequent purchaser being deemed to have notice of such title as a person in possession may possess, but in the main it followed a statement of Mr. Justice Storey as to the law in America that the registration of a conveyance operates as constructive notice to all subsequent purchasers of any estate legal or equitable in the same property. It is important to observe that in that case the real question as to notice did not necessarily arise for determination, since the point that was there determined was whether an unregistered mortgage that was optionally registrable was overridden by a mortgage subsequent in date which was compulsorily registrable and was in fact registered. It was decided that it was not, since the registration of the subsequent deed could not operate as notice to the earlier mortgagee at the date when he took his mortgage. None-the-less, the very careful and exhaustive judgment of the learned Judges upon the point demands close attention." In the later portion of the judgment it was held as under: "After giving all the authorities quoted the fullest consideration, in their Lordships' opinion the true position was best stated in the quotation made from the judgments of Mr. Justice Brett, Mr. Justice Mittra, and Sir Lawrence Jenkins. The real purpose of registration is to secure that every person dealing with property, where such dealings require registration, may rely with confidence upon the statements contained in the register as a full and complete account of all transactions by which his title may be affected, unless indeed he has actual notice of some unregistered transaction which may be valid apart from registration. In England, such notice would prevent the registered document having priority over that which was unregistered. In England, such notice would prevent the registered document having priority over that which was unregistered. In India, this would not be the result if it were a mortgage for over Rs. 100/- or if the unregistered document was one brought within the provisions of Sec. 49 of the Registration Act. In either case, the object of registration is to protect against prior transactions. If, however, the view contended for by the appellants be correct, it has a more extended effect. If after a first mortgage has been obtained a second mortgage were registered and the mere tact of registration constituted notice, the first mortgagee would be bound to search the register before he dealt with the proceeds of the mortgage. Such an extension would go beyond even the dictum of Chief Justice Storey, who expressly limited the doctrine of notice to notice' of previous transactions." 14. In case of Parbhu Lal vs. Chattar, AIR 1925 All. 557, Learned Single Judge held and observed as under: "Two points have been taken in the memorandum of appeal. The first is that registration is notice. This point has been fully and finally settled by the case of Tilakdhari Lal vs. Khedan Lal, AIR 1921 PC 112 , by their Lordships of the Privy Council, who held that a registration of subsequent transactions was no notice to persons who were parties to earlier transactions. In the case before their Lordships of the Privy Council, it was urged that a prior mortgagee should be charged with the notice of a subsequent registered transfer. Their Lordships repelled the argument. On the same principle it cannot be said that the original mortgagors would have notice of the transfer in favour of their respective plaintiffs merely by reason of the fact that the transfers in their favour were registered. This argument therefore fails." 15. In case of Azhar Sultana vs. B. Rajamani, 2009 (17) SCC 27 , the Supreme Court was considering a case where the plaintiff had sought specific performance of agreement to sale. The suit property was in the meantime already sold by registered sale-deed and they were also put in possession of the suit property. Subsequent purchasers were arraigned as defendants at a later stage in the suit. The suit property was in the meantime already sold by registered sale-deed and they were also put in possession of the suit property. Subsequent purchasers were arraigned as defendants at a later stage in the suit. In context of question whether in such case discretionary relief of specific performance of agreement to sale should be granted or not, the Apex Court observed that the plaintiff would be deemed to have notice of the registered sale-deed. It was further observed that: "27. It may be true that the name of the purchaser was not disclosed but then it was open to the plaintiff to ask for other and better particulars of the said statements. Why she had to wait for a period of more than three years for impleading the subsequent purchasers as parties has not been explained. Even an application for injunction was filed only in September, 1985. According to her husband, she came to learn about the sale of property in the name of defendant No. . 5 only on 29-9-1986. Why an inquiry was not made in the Registration Office although the deed of sale was a registered one again defies anybody's comprehension. Readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff, therefore, is required to be considered from the aforementioned backdrop of events." 16. In case of Janardhanam Prasad vs. Ramdas, 2007 (15) SCC 174 , High Court once again in context of granting discretionary relief of specific performance of agreement to sale noted that the plaintiff had waited for more than two years from the date of execution of registered sale-deed. Observing that the plaintiff would be deemed to have notice of registration of document as also the possession of the appellant, refused to grant specific performance. It was further observed that "Even if the suit was not barred by limitation on that account, it was a fit case, where the Court should have refused to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Sec. 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963." 17. In case of Ram Niwas (Dead) through L.Rs. vs. Bano, 2000 (6) SCC 685 , the Supreme Court applying Explanation-II to Sec. 3 of the Transfer of Property Act held that: "A person may not have actual knowledge of a fact but he may have notice of it having regard to the aforementioned definition and Explanation-II thereto. In case of Ram Niwas (Dead) through L.Rs. vs. Bano, 2000 (6) SCC 685 , the Supreme Court applying Explanation-II to Sec. 3 of the Transfer of Property Act held that: "A person may not have actual knowledge of a fact but he may have notice of it having regard to the aforementioned definition and Explanation-II thereto. If the purchasers have relied upon the assertion of the vendor or on their own knowledge and abstained from making enquiry into the real nature of the possession of the tenant, they cannot escape from the consequences of the deemed notice under Explanation-II to Sec. 3 of the Transfer of Property Act." 18. Likewise in case of R.K. Mohammed Ubaidullah v. Hajee C. Abdul Wahab (Dead) by L.Rs., (supra), as noticed earlier, the Supreme Court observed that with reference to subsequent purchaser it is essential that he should make an inquiry as to title or interest of the person in actual possession as on the date when sale transaction was made in his favour. The actual possession of a person itself is deemed or constructive notice of the title, if any, of a person who is for the time-being in actual possession thereof. A subsequent purchaser has to make inquiry as to further interest, nature of possession and title under which the person was continuing in possession on the date of purchase of the property. 19. It can thus be seen that consistently the provision of Sec. 3 of the Transfer of Property Act in context of deemed notice is applied in case of subsequent purchaser acquiring any immovable property or interest therein of the rights of the existing owner. Analogy flowing from this provision is applied in case of rights and interests subsequently created when the facts and attendant circumstances indicating either negligence, lack of due diligence or willful lack of inquiry or the like. 20. In case of Becharbhai Zaverbhai Patel vs. Jashbhai Shivabhai Patel, 2013 (1) GLR 398, relied upon by Shri Gandhi, the learned Single Judge did not rely solely on the factor of deemed notice of a registered document. Several other factors were relied upon such as the suit was filed in the year 2010 challenging the registered sale-deed dated 25-8-1975. 20. In case of Becharbhai Zaverbhai Patel vs. Jashbhai Shivabhai Patel, 2013 (1) GLR 398, relied upon by Shri Gandhi, the learned Single Judge did not rely solely on the factor of deemed notice of a registered document. Several other factors were relied upon such as the suit was filed in the year 2010 challenging the registered sale-deed dated 25-8-1975. Thus the suit was filed 35 years after the date of sale and significantly mutation entries were also made in the revenue records on the basis of such registered sale-deed immediately after the sale. It was in this background that Learned Single Judge basing reliance on decision of Supreme Court in case of Dilboo (Smt.) (Dead) by L.Rs. 2000 (7) SCC 702 , attributed knowledge to the plaintiffs of the registered sale-deed which they had challenged after 35 years. 21. In case of Dilboo (Smt.) (Dead) by L.Rs. 2000 (7) SCC 702 , also relied by Shri Gandhi, the facts were that the plaintiffs had filed the suit for redemption of a mortgage created by persons whom they claimed to be their predecessors. In the meantime, suit property was sold once again. Without challenging such sale-deed, the suit for redemption of mortgage was filed. It was in this background the Supreme Court held that suit was barred by limitation. Following observations made in the process need to be noted: "Thus a suit for redemption of mortgage could be filed within 60 years. But if the mortgagee had created an interest in excess of the right enjoyed by him then to recover possession against the third party the suit had to be filed within 12 years of the transfer becoming known to the plaintiff. The rational in cutting down the period of 60 years to 12 years is clear. The 60 years period is granted as a mortgagee always remains a mortgagee and thus the rights remain the same. However when an interest in excess of the interest of the mortgagee is created then the third party is not claiming under the mortgagee. The position of such a person could not be worse than that of a rank trespasser who was in open and hostile possession. As the title of the rank trespasser would get perfected by adverse possession on expiry of 12 years so also the title of such transferee would get perfected after 12 years. The position of such a person could not be worse than that of a rank trespasser who was in open and hostile possession. As the title of the rank trespasser would get perfected by adverse possession on expiry of 12 years so also the title of such transferee would get perfected after 12 years. The period of 12 years has to run from the date of knowledge by the plaintiff of such transfer. It is always for the party who files the suit to show that the suit is within time. Thus, in cases where the suit is filed beyond the period of 12 years, the plaintiff would have to aver and then prove that the suit is within 12 years of his/her knowledge. In the absence of any averment or proof, to show that the suit is within time, it is the plaintiff who would fall. Whenever a document is registered the date of registration becomes the date of deemed knowledge. In other cases, where a fact could be discovered by due diligence then deemed knowledge would be attributed to the plaintiff because a party cannot be allowed to extend period of limitation by merely claiming that he had no knowledge." 22. It is true that in the said case, the Supreme Court did apply the principle of deemed knowledge on a plaintiff who claimed to be having preexisting right when the suit land was subsequently sold. However, such observations cannot be read in isolation and cannot be seen as the Court laying down a ratio that in case of every registered instrument of transfer of immovable property, the world at large would be deemed to have notice of such transaction and period of limitation to question legality thereof would commence from the date of registration of the instrument. In fact, the Supreme Court adopted the analogy and applied the principles flowing from Sec. 3 of the Transfer of Property Act in facts of the case where the plaintiffs could and ought to have discovered with due diligence regarding the subsequent sale transaction. It was in this context, the Supreme Court held that in absence of any averment or proof to show that the suit is within time, the plaintiff would fail. It was in this context, the Supreme Court held that in absence of any averment or proof to show that the suit is within time, the plaintiff would fail. It was further observed that when a document is registered the date of registration becomes the date of deemed knowledge, and in other cases where a fact could be discovered by due diligence then deemed knowledge would be attributed to the plaintiff because a party cannot be allowed to extend period of limitation by merely claiming that he had no knowledge. Thus, even in case of a registered document, to any situations which are not covered under Sec. 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, it is always open for the plaintiff to point out as to the manner and source of knowledge of the transaction and to establish that such fact could not have been discovered by due diligence and that therefore, the plaintiff cannot be attributed deemed knowledge of the offending transaction. 23. In the result, revision petition is dismissed. Interim relief, if any, stands vacated. 24. At the request of Shri M.B. Gandhi, this order shall stand stayed till 31-7-2015. All in all, all these issues would require thorough examination and full-fledged trial.