JUDGMENT : Sudip Ahluwalia, J. These three Revisional applications are directed against the identical orders passed by the learned 2nd Court of the Civil Judge (Junior Division) at Alipore on 17-08-2013 in Title Suit Nos. 9011, 9017 and 9022 of 2012 of his Court. 2. By way of the aforesaid Orders, the learned Civil Judge was pleased to reject the applications filed on behalf of the original defendants, who are the petitioners here, under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code. The suits were filed by the opposite parties who happen to be two full brothers in their personal capacities, as well as members of an HUF, and Trustees, for protection of their alleged rights as Owners/Lessees or Trustees in respect of each individual Floor which is the subject matter of each the three separate suits, of the three-storied premises located at No. 13/1 Promotesh Barua Sarani, Calcutta - 700 019. They had sought negative declarations to the effect that the defendant No. 1 had no manner of right, title and interest in the said premises on the basis of any instruments or conveyance deeds executed in its favour by the other defendants who are the reversionary legatees of the Will of the deceased original owner namely K. K. Mitra. Their further claim in the three Suits was that the widow and legatee of the said K. K. Mitra, namely Smt. Reba Mitra, since deceased, who after having succeeded to the properties in question as the owner in her own right, had then conveyed the same in favor of the plaintiffs by way of a separate Will and other instruments/conveyance deeds during her lifetime. 3. The basis of the claim raised by the plaintiffs in relation to their own right, title and interest is contained in the following identical plea in paragraph No. 10 of the plaint in each of the aforesaid three Title Suits, which is set out as follows:- "10. In the circumstances, the plaintiffs state that Reba Mitra after she acquired the said premises, held the same as full owner thereof and not as limited owner inter alia by virtue of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. The plaintiffs therefore, state that Reba Mitra since deceased was the absolute owner of the said Premises and could deal with the same in any manner she so desired." 4. The plaintiffs therefore, state that Reba Mitra since deceased was the absolute owner of the said Premises and could deal with the same in any manner she so desired." 4. The suits were thereafter resisted by the petitioners/defendants who contended that Reba Mitra herself was incompetent to convey any right, title and interest in favour of the plaintiffs, or for that matter, any other party, since her own interest in the same was limited only for her own lifetime in terms of the Will executed by her deceased husband K.K. Mitra. Further, according to the defendants, in certain previous proceedings before this Court, as well as the Supreme Court, it was categorically recognised and concluded that the said Reba Mitra had only a limited interest for her lifetime in the disputed properties and therefore was incompetent to convey the same in favour of any other person beyond her lifetime, and as such the very root of the plaintiffs' case through which they claimed their own interest was scuttled by such earlier decisions, and so the suit ought to have been dismissed as being barred by res judicata. 5. The learned Civil Judge after hearing both sides rejected the contention of the defendants by observing inter alia- "In view of the discussions, I am of the opinion that on plain and meaningful reading of the plaint it cannot be ascertained whether the suit is barred by res judicata. Nevertheless, the materials cited by the defendant No. 1 appear to be relevant in this suit. As such, at the time of framing of the issues, the point as to whether the suit is barred by res judicata shall have to be framed for proper adjudication of the suit. Hence it is Ordered The application under Order 7, Rule 11 C.P. Code filed by the defendant No. 1 is hereby rejected on contest without costs." 6. The background of the matter preceding institution of the three Suits is that the Will of the deceased K.K. Mitra was sought to be probated by way of Testamentary Suit No. 88 of 1993 earlier in this Court. By the order passed on 15th of December 1999, in G. A. Number 4873 of 1999, the Ld. The background of the matter preceding institution of the three Suits is that the Will of the deceased K.K. Mitra was sought to be probated by way of Testamentary Suit No. 88 of 1993 earlier in this Court. By the order passed on 15th of December 1999, in G. A. Number 4873 of 1999, the Ld. Trial Judge had held that the plaintiff Sharad Subramanian, who was one of the Executors in the said Will of K.K. Mitra was incompetent to function as such to protect the interest of the estate of the testator, and was therefore restrained from acting any further since he was apparently acting contrary to the detriment of the estate. Subsequently on 16th of February 2000, the learned Trial Judge appointed Mr. Swarup Kr. Ghosh, Advocate as Administrator pendent lite in place of the earlier Joint Executors who accordingly stood discharged. 7. The plaintiff Sharad Subramanian in his capacity as an Executor to the Will of K.K. Mitra then challenged his ouster by filing an appeal in which a categorical contention was raised on his behalf which has been specifically taken note of by the Appellate Court/Division Bench in its judgment as- "Mr. P.K. Roy the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has raised a question as regards the locus of the applicants respondents to maintain the application. It was submitted that Mrs. Reba Mitra being the wife of Lt KK Mitra, had a right of maintenance in terms of the provisions of section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act and in that view of the matter any relief creating life interest in her favour by her husband, in terms of the provision of section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, shall become her absolute property and, thus, the applicants being not the heirs and legal representatives of Mrs. Reba Mitra, could not file the said application." (Emphasis Added). 8. It was in the light of such submission raised on behalf of the appellant that the Appellate Division Bench passed its judgment on 28th of June 2000, which had opened with the following observations:- "A question seemingly of some importance as regards interpretation of the provision of section 14 of the Hindu succession Act, 1956 vis-a-vis the provision of section 18 and 22 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 has arisen for consideration in this appeal." 9. The Division Bench thereafter on considering all the submissions and case laws cited in this regard on behalf of the contesting parties decided the matter by its detailed judgment and order dated 28th of June 2000 in APOT No. 256 of 2000 in G.S. Number 1285 of 2000 in G.A. number 4873 of 1999 with the following conclusions:- "In view of uncontroverted allegations, thus, in our opinion, the learned Trial Judge rightly appointed Joints Administrator pendent lite. However, he went wrong in directing eviction of a tenant which was not within the purview of Indian Succession Act. A tenant can be evicted only in accordance with law. There cannot, however, be any doubt that Reba Mitra having a life interest, she could not confer a right upon a third party which would extend beyond her own interest. The Joint Administrators appointed by the Court may, therefore, take steps for eviction of the tenant. Subject to the aforementioned modifications in the impugned order, the appeal is dismissed with costs. Counsels fee assessed at 200 Gms." (Emphasis Added). 10. Against the above judgment, the appellant preferred a Special Leave Petition in the Supreme Court of India being SLP (Civil) No. 14382 of 2000 between "Sharad Subramanyam v. Soumi Mazumdar & Ors.", which was however dismissed by the Supreme Court by its judgment dated 28th of April 2006. The details and ramifications of the decision finally arrived at by the Supreme Court in the light of the questions of law as well as the grounds made out in the aforesaid SLP will be taken up at the appropriate stage after first considering the submissions placed before this Court on behalf of the Plaintiffs/Opposite Parties. 11. It is also to be noted that the Will of deceased K.K. Mitra had already been probated by the Court in the meantime. A belated application for its revocation was subsequently filed along with an application for condonation of delay. But the condonation application was itself rejected by the Ld. First Court on account on which the revocation application automatically stood dismissed. The applicant thereafter preferred appeal against such dismissals. A belated application for its revocation was subsequently filed along with an application for condonation of delay. But the condonation application was itself rejected by the Ld. First Court on account on which the revocation application automatically stood dismissed. The applicant thereafter preferred appeal against such dismissals. The division bench dismissed such appeal by its judgment dated 25th of September, 2008 in "Taxation Service Syndicate Pvt. Ltd. v. Soumi Mazumdar & Ors." with the following observations:- "In the present situation and the facts of the case clearly show that the propriety and necessity of piercing the veil and find out the proper person or in fact that brothers are acting jointly in the matter only to dislodge the claim of the beneficiaries. In our considered opinion, we have been able to find out from the facts as well as from the documents and the materials placed before us that Sharad Subramanian is the master mind behind the challenge thrown in respect of the Will of Kamal Kumar Mitra, since deceased. After losing before the Hon'ble Supreme Court has filed the present proceeding which is nothing but a further step taken by the said Sharad Subramanyam through the appellant/petitioner. Therefore, it would not be incorrect to say that the controlling mind who is acting in the matter through the company is none, but, Sharad. We are further of the opinion that once the matter has been settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it should not be proper for us to allow the prayer of the appellant/petitioner to make the entire process which culminated in the conclusion by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and to make the order at naught or to reopen the matter for fresh adjudication. In these circumstances, we also hold that no case has been made out by the appellant that there was no connection between Vasant Subramanian and Sharad Subramanian. On the contrary, it appears that the said persons are residing at the same premises. Therefore, we do not find that the appellant/petitioner has been able to make out a case to undo the order passed by the Hon'ble First Court which has already settled the lis which continued for more than 16 years. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that the Hon'ble First Court has correctly dealt with the matter and came to the correct conclusion. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that the Hon'ble First Court has correctly dealt with the matter and came to the correct conclusion. We do not find any illegality or irregularity in the said order so passed by the Hon'ble First Court which can warrant us to interference with the said order. We, therefore, dismiss the application without any order as to costs. The appeal is also dismissed for the reasons stated above. After the order has been passed, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the costs which has been awarded by the Hon'ble First Court to the tune of 2000 G.Ms be modified. After considering the submission, and for the reasons stated hereinbefore, we think that in the present facts of the case no modification is required as prayed for by the learned counsel for the appellant since it appears to us that the appellant has filed this application in abuse of the process of law. Urgent Xerox certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties on usual undertaking." (Emphasis Added). 12. The thrust of the argument raised on behalf of the opposite parties/plaintiffs is that in deciding an application under Order 7, Rule 11 of the C.P. Code, the Court has to test the maintainability of the plaint only on the basis of its own contents and not by looking into the defence or documents to be placed from the side of the defendants. A couple of decisions in support of these contentions have also been cited on behalf of the Opposite Parties. 13. In "Kamala and Ors. v. K.T. Eshwara Sa and Ors." reported in AIR 2008 SC 3174 , the Supreme Court had laid down- "15. Order 7, Rule 11 (d) of the Code has limited application. It must be shown that the suit is barred under any law. Such a conclusion must be drawn from the averments made in the plaint. Different clauses in Order 7, Rule 11, in our opinion, should not be mixed up. Whereas in a given case, an application for rejection of the plaint may be filed on more than one ground specified in various sub-clauses thereof, a clear finding to that effect must be arrived at. What would be relevant for invoking clause (d) of Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code is the averments made in the plaint. Whereas in a given case, an application for rejection of the plaint may be filed on more than one ground specified in various sub-clauses thereof, a clear finding to that effect must be arrived at. What would be relevant for invoking clause (d) of Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code is the averments made in the plaint. For that purpose, there cannot be any addition or subtraction. Absence of jurisdiction on the part of a court can be invoked at different stages and under different provisions of the Code. Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code is one, Order 14, Rule 2 is another. 16. For the purpose of invoking Order 7, Rule 11 (d) of the Code, no amount of evidence can be looked into. The issues on merit of the matter which may arise between the parties would not be within the realm of the court at that stage. All issues shall not be the subject matter of an order under the said provision." 14. A Single Bench of this Court in "Mahamaya Paul v. Dipak Kumar Mukherjee and Others reported in 2013(1) ICC 610 (Cal.) in considering application of the principles of res judicata had also observed - "13. It is a settled proposition of law that the Court, at the time of considering an application under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code, shall confine itself to the averments made in the plaint and the documents annexed thereto. It shall not look into the defence of the defendants in order to find out as to whether the suit is barred by law. Therefore, the plaint cannot be rejected on the plea of being barred by principle of res judicata upon invocation of the provision contained under Order 7, Rule 11 (d) of the Code." 15. The Ld. Court below had rejected the application under Order 7, Rule 11 of the C.P.C Act by observing- "The Defendant No. 1 has filed a host of copies of documents to substantiate their claim that the issues in question in the instant suit have already been decided by the Hon'ble High Court on Hon'ble Supreme Court". However, these copies of documents filed by the defendant cannot be looked into while disposing of an application under Order 7, Rule 11 C.P.C. Act." 16. However, these copies of documents filed by the defendant cannot be looked into while disposing of an application under Order 7, Rule 11 C.P.C. Act." 16. This observation of the Court is in consonance with the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Para 16 of its decision in Kamal v. K.T. Eshwara Sa and Others (supra). Again, the refusal to reject the plaint on the plea on being barred by the principle of res judicata upon invocation of the provision contain under Order 7, Rule 11 (d) of the C.P.C Act, is also in consonance with the observation as of a Single Bench of this Court in Para 13 of the decision in Mahamaya paul v. Dipak Kumar Mukherjee & Ors. (supra). 17. At a superficial level therefore, the rejection of the application under Order 7, Rule 11 at the initial stage when the Learned Trial Judge was of the opinion that it could not be ascertained whether the suit is barred by res judicata on a plain reading of the plaint would appear to be in order. In fact the Learned Court has also recorded that the point as to whether the suit is barred by res judicata would be considered at the time of framing the issues. It was apparently an appropriate and balanced approach adopted by the Court. In all propriety, the issue of the suit being allegedly barred by res judicata ought to have been considered as a preliminary issue of law, in support of which the defendants/petitioners would have been well within their right to place on record all the documents in support of their contention, which otherwise could not be looked into for the purpose of rejection of plaint under Order 7, Rule 11 simpliciter. 18. But the Ld. Trial Court somehow lost sight of the fact that all the documents sought to be placed on record by the defendants/petitioners in support of their contentions were nothing other than the copies of the judgments passed by various benches of this Court as well as the Supreme Court in the previous proceedings involving the parties. The same could therefore have been conveniently looked into by the Court since all of these judgments and orders are public documents and do not require any formal proof of their authencity. The same could therefore have been conveniently looked into by the Court since all of these judgments and orders are public documents and do not require any formal proof of their authencity. Whether or not the ultimate decision were to be in favour of the defendants, still it was not proper for the Court to refuse to look into such judgments which undisputedly are public in nature and not ‘Private' documents which alone can be treated as controvertible ‘evidence' incapable of being looked into for deciding an application under Order 7, Rule 11. 19. To that extent therefore, rejection of the defendants' application by simply holding that the documents relied upon by the defendants could not be looked into in relation to an application under Order 7, Rule 11, would appear to be too simplistic and erroneous. 20. The opposite parties have also contended before this Court that any earlier observations by any Court including the Supreme Court of India regarding the alleged incompetence of Reba Mitra to convey the property in their favour on the ground that her own interest therein was limited only for her lifetime, has no bearing in the Suits as the same were made in the course of proceedings arising out of Testamentary/Probate jurisdiction. In fine, the contention is that any Court adjudicating a Testamentary matter cannot pass any value judgment on the substantive title, rights and obligations of the contesting parties and essentially the scope for the Probate Court is limited to testing the genuineness or otherwise of the execution of any given Testamentary instrument. It is, therefore, asserted that such earlier observations of this Court or the Supreme Court have no bearing for the purpose of the pending suits. To support these contentions, the opposite parties have relied upon various decisions which are now being taken note of in the following paragraphs. 21. Regarding the competence of a probate Court to deal with questions of title in an application for probate of a will, a division bench of this Court in a very old case "Arunmoyi Dasi v. Mohendra Nath Wadadar and Ors." reported in (1893) ILR 20 Cal 888 had observed- "13. 21. Regarding the competence of a probate Court to deal with questions of title in an application for probate of a will, a division bench of this Court in a very old case "Arunmoyi Dasi v. Mohendra Nath Wadadar and Ors." reported in (1893) ILR 20 Cal 888 had observed- "13. It has been held that in a proceeding upon an application for probate of a will, the only question which the Court is called upon to determine is whether the will is true or not, and that it is not the province of the Court to determine any question of title with reference to the property covered by the will (see Behary Lall Sandyal v. Juggo Mohun Gossain I.L.R 4 Cal. 1. And it is noteworthy that a proceeding under the Probate and Administration Act is not a suit properly so called, but takes the form of a suit according to the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code (see Section 83). That being so, we do not see how the judgment of the Allahabad High Court could be regarded as concluding the plaintiff as to the title to the estate either under Section 13 of the Civil Procedure Code, or under the general principles of res judicata [see in this connection Barrs v. Jackson 1 y & C., Ch. 585 and the Duchess of Kingston'' case (2 Sm. C.C, 8th ed., 7840)]." 22. A division bench of this Court in "Shoilesh Chandra Mustafi v. Amal Chandra Mustafi" reported in AIR 1958 Calcutta 701 (V 45 C 179) in deciding an appeal preferred by one of the defendants in a Probate Suit against the order passed by the learned District Judge, 24-Parganas appointing an Administrator pendentilite had observed- "4. As regards the first contention put forth, on behalf of the objector appellant we must say that ordinarily no probate Court should enter into a question of title, where conflicting claims of title are put forth in respect of any property covered by a will. But where a party applies for appointment of an administration pendente lite, and the objector to such an appointment puts forth a claim to the property apart from the will, such claim should be considered, at least prima facie, for the purpose of allowing or refusing the prayer for appointment of an administrator pendente lite. But where a party applies for appointment of an administration pendente lite, and the objector to such an appointment puts forth a claim to the property apart from the will, such claim should be considered, at least prima facie, for the purpose of allowing or refusing the prayer for appointment of an administrator pendente lite. Dangerous consequences may follow if the Court totally refuses to enter into the question of title altogether, because it would be very easy for a particular party to get an administrator pendente lite appointed in respect of the property of another person and to take it out of his possession simply because it may happen to be included in the will of a testator. 6. In this connection we may refer to a case reported in Atulabala Dasi v. Nirupama Devi. AIR 1951 Cal 561 (A). In that case it has been held that although it is not for the probate Court, while granting letters of administration, to interpret the will for the purpose of deciding the question of title, the Court will have to be satisfied, prima facie, that the will contains provisions which affect properties in respect of which a conflicting claim is made, if an application for appointment of an administrator pendente lite is made. On the analogy of that case we may say that the question of title and possession should also be considered prima facie in a limited way in connection with an application for appointment of an administrator pendente lite, if the objector to such an appointment sets up a title independently of the will. The first point raised by Mr. Manindra Nath Ghosh, therefore, succeeds, and we are of opinion that the appellant is entitled to raise the question of his title and possession, although in a limited way. As he was not allowed to do this by the Court below, he suffered prejudice." 23. In "Hem Nolini Judah (Since deceased) v. Isolyne Sarojbashini Bose and Ors." reported in AIR 1962 SC 1471 (V 49 C 215) it was held- "9. Turning now to the question of res judicata, learned counsel for the appellant has been unable to point out any judgment inter parties in which the question of title to this house has been decided and which would bar the plaintiff- respondent from raising the question of title which she has raised in the present suit. Turning now to the question of res judicata, learned counsel for the appellant has been unable to point out any judgment inter parties in which the question of title to this house has been decided and which would bar the plaintiff- respondent from raising the question of title which she has raised in the present suit. As we have already said questions of title are not decided in proceedings for the grant of probate or letters of administration. Whatever therefore might have happened in those proceedings would not establish the title to the house either of the appellant or of Mrs. Mitter" 24. Similarly the Punjab and Haryana High Court in "Darshan Singh v. Kuldip Singh" reported in AIR 1979 Punjab and Haryana 250 had also observed- "5. The learned counsel for the respondent referred to Mrs. Hem Nolini Judah v. Mrs. Isolyne Sarojbashini Bose, AIR 1962 SC 1471 and R. Viswanathan v. Rukn-ul-Mulk Syed Abdul Wajid, AIR 1963 SC 1 . In Mrs. Hem Nolini Judah's case (supra), the plaintiff-respondent claiming as a legatee under a will of which she had obtained letters of administration filed a suit for declaration of her title in regard to the property included in the will. She sought to establish that the ownership of that property vested in her testator as a legatee under a will executed in favour of her testator by another person. No probate or letters of administration had however been obtained in regard to that will. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of that case it was held that the questions of title are not decided in proceedings for the grant of probate or letters of administration." 25. Now the contention that the decisions against the plaintiff Sharad Subramanyam or the Company "Taxation Service Syndicate Pvt. Ltd." operated through the said Sharad Subramanyam & Ors, were all pronounced in proceedings arising out of a probate matter, and so the benches concerned were not competent to decide the substantive question of title such as the alleged incompetence of deceased Reba Mitra to transfer the properties, is taken up for consideration in the particular facts and circumstances of the present case. 26. 26. This contention needs to be considered in the light of the chequered history of litigations resorted to by the plaintiff/opposite party before the appellate for a as well as his own peculiar conduct which is otherwise a matter on record. This contention is certainly very reasonable so long as it remains limited to an assertion that the Trial Court which restrained and discharged him from the status of an executor to the Will of deceased K.K. Mitra, was not competent to adjudicate upon the question whether the life interest in favour of the said testator's wife was actually limited or absolute. However, the fact of the matter is that this question was not even considered by the Trial Court which had simply discharged the applicant Sharad Subramanyam from his status as an executor since he was apparently acting contrary to the detriment of the estate. But being dissatisfied with such decision he himself raised the plea before the Appellate Courts that the Will of K.K. Mitra actually was meant to transfer absolute right, title and interest in favour of his widow after his death in lieu of her entitlement to maintenance, and was therefore covered by Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act. This contention was extensively considered and then decided by the Division Bench of this Court, when in fact it was never urged at any stage before the Trial Court. The appellant being dissatisfied with the dismissal of his appeal, then approached the Supreme Court in its extraordinary Constitutional jurisdiction. In the opinion of this Court, by invoking such extraordinary jurisdiction, the appellant could not restrict the competence of the Apex Court within the narrow confines of a "Probate" matter alone. On the other hand, he had actually asserted the existence of a very substantial and independent mixed question of law and facts regarding the unfettered or limited interest of deceased Reba Mitra in relation to the properties acquired by her. This would become crystal clear when we see exactly what questions of law of general public importance the appellant had himself made out in his S.L.P. The relevant extracts from the same are set out below:- "2. This would become crystal clear when we see exactly what questions of law of general public importance the appellant had himself made out in his S.L.P. The relevant extracts from the same are set out below:- "2. The question of law of general public importance to be decided are as follows: A. Whether the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court ought to have considered that the life interest conferred upon the wife/widow-Smt. Reba Mitra, since deceased by virtue of the Will dated March, 19, 1991 executed by her husband-Kamal Kumar Mitra, since deceased, being in lieu of maintenance and in recognition of her pre-existing right, the said right became enlarged into absolute right/estate by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act. 1956? B. Whether the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court has erred in not taking into consideration that whatever kind of property, movable or immovable, by whichever mode of acquisition, would be covered by sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 whether acquired before or after commencement of the said Act, the object of the legislature being to wipe out the disability from a Hindu female suffered with regard to ownership of property under Shastric law so as to eliminate any abridgement of her proprietary right and to recognise her status as the independent and absolute owner of the property? C. Whether the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court ought to have considered the fact that Legatee- Smt. Reba Mitra, as the wife of Kamal Kumar Mitra, had the pre-existing right to receive the maintenance under the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act and as an heir in Category-I under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, and that when the property was given to Smt. Reba Mitra, for her life in lieu of her pre-existing right to maintenance and hence the property given in the Will should have accrued to the Legatee, Smt. Reba Mitra as full owner and that she is entitled to succeed as the absolute owner thereof as a consequence of the pre-existing right being enlarged into an absolute right. D. Whether the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court erred in not appreciating the difference and distinction between Section 14(1) and Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and erred in not applying to Smt. Reba Mitra the principles underlying Section 14(1) of the Act as consistently settled by this Hon'ble Court in a number of similar cases? E. Whether the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court erred in not considering the fact that the Estate of Kamal Kumar Mitra, since deceased, who died on 26th September, 1991 ceased to be in existence after the said Smt. Reba Mitra became the absolute owner of the said property then, and when she died on 27th November, 1998, there was no need for administration of the said Estate of Kamal Kumar Mitra at all, since here were no goods of the "Estate of Kamal Kumar Mitra" left after the assumption by Smt. Reba Mitra, as sole executrix of the properties of Kamal Kumar Mitra?" 27. Similarly the grounds mentioned in the SLP also leave no scope for doubt that the appellant/opposite party was invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by raising a distinct and independent controversy involving substantial questions of law and facts which in no circumstances could be restricted to the narrow confines of a simple probate proceeding, as would again be clear on perusal of the following "Grounds" set out in the SLP :- "IV. For that the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court should have considered or have failed to consider that the life interest granted to Smt. Reba Mitra, since deceased, by her husband, Kamal Kumar Mitra, since deceased by the Will dated March 19, 1991 is in recognition of the right to maintenance of a Hindu widow by her husband according to Shastric law and the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act. V. For that the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court should have considered or erred in not considering that the life interest conferred upon the wife/widow- Smt. Reba Mitra, since deceased, by virtue of the Will dated March 10, 1991 executed by her husband, Kamal Kumar Mitra, since deceased, being in lieu of maintenance and in recognition of the pre-existing right, the said right was transformed into the absolute right/estate by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. VI. VI. For that the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court should have considered or ought to have considered that whatever kind of property, movable or immovable and whatever the mode of acquisition, it would be covered by sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 whether acquired before or after commencement of the said Act, the object of legislature being to wipe out, the disability from which Hindu female suffered with regard to the ownership of the property under Shastric Law as also to abridge the stringent provisions against the proprietary right which are often regarded as evidence of her perpetual tutelage and to recognise her status as to the independent and absolute owner of the property. VII. For that the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court ought to have considered or erred in not considering that the provision made, giving life interest in the property in favour of a Hindu female is for the purpose of residence and maintenance and that the provision is made in lieu of a pre-existing right to maintenance and a Hindu female acquires more than adequate title by virtue of this right and the same is deemed sufficient to attract the provisions of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. VIII. For that the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court ought to have considered the fact that the Legatee Smt. Reba Mitra had the right to receive the maintenance under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act and as an heir of Category-1 under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act and that when the property was given to Smt. Reba Mitra in lieu of her pre-existing right to maintenance, the property given in the Will would be deemed to have been acquired by the Legatee Smt. Reba Mitra as the full owner thereof and that she is entitled to succeed to it as the absolute owner thereof. XI. For that the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court should have considered or erred in not considering that Smt. Reba Mitra by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 became the absolute owner of the immovable property left in her favour by her husband Kamal Kumar Mitra, deceased, which has been granted to her in lieu of her pre-existing right of maintenance. XII. XII. For that the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court erred in not appreciating that the said Smt. Reba Mitra the Executrix having given assent to the said legacy both movable and immovable properties left by Kamal Kumar Mitra, since deceased, the same became the assets of Smt. Reba Mitra by virtue of the Section 14(1) of the said Act of 1956 and the Section 14(2) of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 would not have any application to this case. XV. For that the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court erred in concluding and implying that Section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act 1956 shall override the provisions of Section 14(1) of the said Act and that he may confer grant in favour of another either absolutely or to a limited extent and that he may also deprive his heirs and legal representatives from enjoying the Estate left by him. XIX. For that it having been established that Smt. Reba Mitra had the pre-existing right of maintenance as Category 1 heir at all material times and that such pre-existing right confers on her the absolute right of ownership to deal with the properties left by her deceased husband in accordance with the decisions of the Supreme Court the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court fell into an error and mis-directed themselves in following a ruling which is no longer good law and in rejecting the plea of the appellant that Smt. Reba Mitra had the pre-existing right over the properties left by her deceased husband and had the right to deal with the same us absolute owner. 28. The Supreme Court then in the light of the aforesaid contentions and Grounds raised on behalf of the appellant pronounced its decision as follows:- "20. Thus, in view of the fact that there were no indications, either in the Will or externally, to indicate that the property had been given to the female Hindu in recognition of or in lieu of her right to maintenance, it was held that the situation fell within the ambit of sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act and that the restricted life estate granted to the female Hindu could not be enlarged into an absolute estate. Learned counsel for the respondents relied strongly on this judgment and contended that there was no proposition of law that all dispositions of property made to a female Hindu were necessarily in recognition of her right to maintenance whether under the Shastric Hindu Law or under the statutory law. Unless the said fact was independently established to the satisfaction of the court, the grant of the property would be subject to the restrictions contained therein, either by way of a transfer, gift or testamentary disposition. Learned counsel also distinguished the three cases cited by the learned counsel for the appellant that in each, the circumstances clearly indicated that the testamentary disposition was in lieu of the right of maintenance of the female Hindu. We think that this contention is well merited and needs to be upheld. 21. Turning to the facts of the present case, we notice that not only was there no material to indicate to the High Court that the property was given to Reba Mitra in lieu of her right of maintenance, but such an argument was not even advanced before the Court. Even the impugned judgment of the High Court observes: "It is not the case of the appellant that at the time when K.K. Mitra executed the Will, his wife was entitled to enforce her right of maintenance under the provisions of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance or otherwise. She had been undisputedly living with her husband upon her husband's death till the Will was probated, she was enjoying the property as her own. Even in terms of the Will dated 19.3.1991 she had a right of enjoyment in respect of the entire property." 22. The High Court then noticed Section 30 of the Act which empowers a Hindu possessed of any property to execute a Will; and confer a grant in favour of another either absolutely or to a limited extent; even to the extent of depriving his natural heirs from enjoying the estate left by him. We think that the High Court was right in taking this view. The High Court also took notice of the fact that there was no material on record from which it could be concluded that the disposition of life estate in favour of Reba Mitra in the Will of her husband, Kamal Kumar Mitra, was in lieu of or in recognition of her right of maintenance. The High Court also took notice of the fact that there was no material on record from which it could be concluded that the disposition of life estate in favour of Reba Mitra in the Will of her husband, Kamal Kumar Mitra, was in lieu of or in recognition of her right of maintenance. Consequently, we agree with the finding of the High Court that Reba Mitra had only a limited right, namely, life interest in the Suit Property. Thus, she could not have created a long-term lease as she has purportedly done. (Emphasis added). Discharge of Executor 23. Learned counsel for the respondents then referred to the provisions of the Indian Succession Act. He urged that under Section 301 of the Indian Succession Act: "The High Court may, on an application made to it, suspend, remove or discharge any private executor or administrator" and appoint another person in his place where continuance of the executor is detrimental to the estate of the deceased. Further it was pointed out that, under Section 317 of the Indian Succession Act, an executor had to make an inventory and file periodical accounts of the estate. It is contended that the appellant had failed to do so and was also liable to be removed under Section 301 of the Indian Succession Act. Finally, it is urged that the appellant as an executor had set up a claim in the estate, which was inconsistent with the deed of the executor and, therefore, he was unfit to function as an executor; the High Court had rightly discharged him from his office and appointed an Administrator pendente lite. Conclusion 24. From the factual circumstances, while the High Court's appointment of an Administrator pendente lite appears to be correct, we need not finally decide as to whether the appellant was unfit to act as an executor of Kamal Kumar Mitra's Will. We are cognizant of the fact that the High court is still seized of the matter and the order passed is only an interlocutory order based on prima facie considerations. In our view, there was sufficient justification for the High Court to make the order for appointment of the Administrator pendente lite to protect the estate during the pendency of the petition before it. In our view, there was sufficient justification for the High Court to make the order for appointment of the Administrator pendente lite to protect the estate during the pendency of the petition before it. The question as to whether the appellant as the executor has breached his fiduciary duty, can only be determined at the end of the trial. In our view, therefore, the impugned judgment of the High Court is not liable to be interfered with. 25. We see no merit in the appeal, which is hereby dismissed. No costs." 29. The plaintiffs now seek to avoid the consequences of the aforesaid judgment by raising a novel contention that it was passed in relation to proceedings arising out of a simple probate matter, and so the decision of the Apex Court is not binding in the matter of deciding the actual rights and obligations of the parties. However, this contention would appear to be not merely fallacious, but also motivatedly perverse. The previous conduct and tactics adopted by the plaintiff Sharad Subramanium were condemned in no uncertain terms by an Appellate Court in "Taxation Service Syndicate Pvt. Ltd. v. Soumi Mazumdar & Ors." in its judgment dated 25th of September, 2008, already quoted above. But his conduct after dismissal of even the aforesaid appeal again does not inspire much commendation. It needs to be remembered that the Supreme Court's Extraordinary Constitutional jurisdiction of granting Special Leave to Appeal under Article 136 is not just unique, but also all-encompassing and totally unfettered in its extent and scope in relation to the matter entertained under the same. A party invoking such extraordinary jurisdiction by first raising a bogey of question of law of general public importance arising in a particular case cannot just be permitted to avoid the effect of an adverse verdict coming forth in such case, with an excuse that the question was decided in the context of the jurisdictional limitation of the lower Courts, and so, would not be binding between the same parties in future proceedings, even if the losing side had himself invoked such Extraordinary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 30. 30. This Court is therefore of the opinion that the scope of the aforesaid pronouncement of the Apex Court in its extraordinary Constitutional jurisdiction is much larger and wider than a mere cursory observation to be restricted within the limited confines of a simple "probate proceeding" as asserted by the plaintiffs. Even otherwise it is seen that the Apex Court has passed a separate and specific direction in relation to the appellant's grievance of his discharge as an executor in Para 23 of its judgment, which is altogether distinct and independent of the finding regarding the limited interest of Reba Mitra, which has been separately and specifically covered in the earlier Para Nos. 21 and 22. 31. Besides, as already noted earlier, the revocation application filed after the Will of K. K. Mitra was probated, had been dismissed very long ago by the concerned First Court, and even the appeal preferred against such dismissal was dismissed by the Division Bench as far back as on 25th of September, 2008, with some scathing comments on the conduct of the appellant Sharad Subramanyam. But on perusal of the plaints filed in the Learned Court below as late as in the year 2012, it is seen that the plaintiffs/opposite parties had altogether suppressed the fact of such Will having been probated, and have on the other hand sought to impeach the title of the petitioners/defendants on the strength of their subsequent alleged deeds of conveyance only, after conveniently failing to mention the fact of K.K. Mitra's Will having already been probated. On the contrary a copy of the aforesaid Will was simply made an annexure to the plaint, with the remark, "The authenticity of this document is not admitted" (Para 7 of the plaint in each of the three suits). 32. Furthermore, on the face of it, the basis of the claims made by the opposite parties in their plaints even at the level of plain commonsense are manifestly contradictory when considered with a little application of mind. On the one hand, it has been asserted that the Will executed by K.K. Mitra in favour of his wife was in lieu of her right of maintenance, and so after her acquisition of the premises, she became a full owner thereof and not a limited owner for her life time, by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act. But on the other hand, it is a matter of record and has also been noted by the Learned Trial Judge in the impugned order that, "K.K. Mitra and Reba Mitra were childless." As such, undoubtedly Reba Mitra would have been the only Class I legal heir to the estate of K.K. Mitra and would have automatically acquired full right, title and interest in his properties after his demise since the couple were childless. In this situation, if the genuine intention of K.K. Mitra was to pass on absolute title to his properties in favour of his widow in lieu of her right of maintenance, he would not have needed to even execute any Will in her favour, since by automatic devolution she would have become the absolute owner. But the fact that K.K. Mitra being conscious of the fact that he had no other Class I legal heirs apart from his wife Reba Mitra, still chose to give her full interest in the properties only for her own life time in itself shows that his intention was to ensure her personal maintenance only for her life-time from the rental incomes generated from the properties, and to further ensure that after her death, the properties would go back to his own distant relations (nieces and their offspring) in preference to any legal heirs from his wife's parental side. In this light, it does not need rocket science to understand the simple fact that the stipulation in the Will regarding the limited life time interest of Reba Mitra was actually meant to be what it was stated to be. Suffice it to say, it is unfortunate that the plaintiff Sharad Subramanyam, in spite of being an original executor to the Will of K.K. Mitra, has been consciously attempting to create and manipulate facts and contentions which are not only absent in the testament, but even in direct contradiction with the express wishes of the testator in his Will. 33. Another aspect to be taken note of is that in none of the plaints the plaintiffs have alleged anywhere that the principal defendants ever actually attempted or threatened to illegally dispossess the plaintiffs from the properties which are held by them as lessees since the lifetime of K.K. Mitra himself. It is interesting to see what apprehension has been expressed by the plaintiffs to justify filing of the suits in the Ld. It is interesting to see what apprehension has been expressed by the plaintiffs to justify filing of the suits in the Ld. Court below. These apprehensions have been mentioned in paragraphs 22 and 23 in each of the three plaints which are set out as under:- "22. If the premises is mutated in favour of defendant No. 1, the defendant No. 1 would use the same as a ground for harassing the plaintiffs and obstructing the plaintiffs' right to peaceful possession and enjoyment of the said premises. 23. The defendants are thus invading and/or threatening to invade the relevant rights of the plaintiffs as owners/lessee as the case may be in respect of the said premises. Prior to the defendant No. 1 having the deeds of conveyance executed in its favour, there was no attempt of forceful dispossession of the plaintiffs from the said premises. The invasion is such that compensation in money shall not afford adequate relief." 34. On reading the entire plaints also, it is seen that nowhere the plaintiffs made any direct allegation that there was any actual attempt or threat on the part of any defendant to interfere with the peaceful possession of the plaintiff's in the suit properties. On the other hand, they have expressed a patently absurd proposition that simple mutation of the properties in favour of the defendant No. 1 would become a "ground for harassing the plaintiffs and obstructing the plaintiffs' right to peaceful possession and enjoyment of the said premises." On top of this, the Will allegedly executed by Reba Mitra in favour of the plaintiffs in respect of some of the disputed properties had itself not been probated before or even after filing of the suits, and continues to await its probate even till date. 35. In view of the observations put on record in the preceding paragraphs, the suits filed by the plaintiffs/opposite parties clearly appear to be manifestly speculative proceedings resorted to, after having lost in all the previous proceedings. 35. In view of the observations put on record in the preceding paragraphs, the suits filed by the plaintiffs/opposite parties clearly appear to be manifestly speculative proceedings resorted to, after having lost in all the previous proceedings. In these very peculiar facts and circumstances, it would not be entirely out of place to revisit the decision of the Apex Court in "T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal" reported in AIR 1977 SC 2421 , wherein was held - "The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful not formal reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he should exercise his power under Order 7 R. 11, C.P.C. taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clear drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under O.X. C.P.C. An activist Judge is the answer to irresponsible law suits. The trial Courts would insist imperatively on examining the party and the first hearing so that bogus litigation case be shot down at the earliest stage." 36. For the aforesaid reasons the impugned order passed by the Learned Court below is set aside and the three pending suits stand dismissed as being barred by the principles of res judicata in view of the categorical decisions of the Division Bench of this Court dated 28th of June 2000 in APOT No. 256 of 2000, and of the Supreme Court in SLP No. 4153 SLP No. of 2002, decided on 28th April, 2006. 37. No orders as to costs. LATER 38. After pronouncement of the judgment, learned Counsel for the opposite Parties/plaintiffs prays for staying the operation of the same for a period of four weeks in order to enable them to take further appropriate steps in accordance with law. 39. In view of such submission, operation of the said judgment is stayed till the end of August, 2015 after which it will automatically revive. 40. Urgent Photostat Certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties on compliance of usual formalities.