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2015 DIGILAW 646 (CAL)

Bibhas Debnath v. State of West Bengal

2015-08-03

SUDIP AHLUWALIA

body2015
JUDGMENT : Sudip Ahluwalia, J. The petitioner in this case is the husband of the Opposite Party No. 2. An application under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. was filed against him in the Court of the Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bidhannagar, North 24-Parganas. During the course of those proceedings the Opposite Party wife filed an application for amendment of her original maintenance petition, which was allowed by the Learned Trial Court on 20.08.2014. The petitioner preferred revision against such order. But his Revisional Application No. 216 of 2014 was dismissed by the Learned Additional Sessions Judge, 6th Court at Barasat, and the order of the Learned ACJM was upheld. He has now approached this Court to challenge the same. 2. His contention is that there is no provision under the Code of Criminal Procedure for permitting amendments in the pleadings in the form of applications or replies before the concerned Court. 3. To support this contention, it has been stressed on behalf of the petitioner that in the absence of an appropriate provision within the codified law, it is not open for the Courts to transgress beyond the Statute for granting any such relief to a party, which is not covered within the Statute as, in such event, the Court would essentially be intruding into the Legislative domain. 4. He has placed before this Court the Judgment of the Supreme Court in "State of Uttar Pradesh v. Hari Ram" reported in (2013) 4 SCC 280 . In para 23 of the aforesaid judgment the Supreme Court had noted:- "23. In Jugal Kishore Saraf v. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd., S.R. Das, J. state: (AIR p.381, para 6) "6.....The cardinal rule of construction of statutes is to read the statute literally, that is by giving to the words used by the legislature their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. If, however, such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning the court may adopt the same. But if no such alternative construction is possible, the court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal interpretation......" 5. In "Eerati Laxman v. State of Andhra Pradesh" reported in (2009)3 SCC 337 it was held in relation to the Juvenile Justice Act:- ".......11. In our opinion, the High Court is not entirely correct in arriving at the said conclusion. The said Act is a beneficent legislation. In "Eerati Laxman v. State of Andhra Pradesh" reported in (2009)3 SCC 337 it was held in relation to the Juvenile Justice Act:- ".......11. In our opinion, the High Court is not entirely correct in arriving at the said conclusion. The said Act is a beneficent legislation. It, however, would not mean that the principle of literal interpretation thereof should not be resorted to....." 6. Again in "Sri Jeyaram Educational Trust and Other v. A.G. Syed Mohideen and Others" reported in (2010)2 SCC 513 it was held- ".....11. It is now well settled that a provision of a statute should have to be read as it is, in a natural manner, plain and straight, without adding, substituting or omitting any words. While doing so, the words used in the provision should be assigned and ascribed their natural, ordinary or popular meaning. Only when such plain and straight reading, or ascribing the natural and normal meaning to the words on such reading, leads to ambiguity, vagueness, uncertainty, or absurdity which were not obviously intended by the legislature or the lawmaker, a court should open its interpretation toolkit containing the settled rules of construction and interpretation, to arrive at the true meaning of the provision. While using the tools of interpretation, the court should remember that it is not the author of the statute who is empowered to amend, substitute or delete, so as to change the structure and contents. A court as an interpreter cannot alter or amend the law. It can only interpret the provision, to make it meaningful and workable so as to achieve the legislative object, when there is vagueness, ambiguity or absurdity. The purpose of interpretation is not to make a provision what the Judge thinks it should be, but to make it what the legislature intended it to be ....." (Emphasis added). 7. It can only interpret the provision, to make it meaningful and workable so as to achieve the legislative object, when there is vagueness, ambiguity or absurdity. The purpose of interpretation is not to make a provision what the Judge thinks it should be, but to make it what the legislature intended it to be ....." (Emphasis added). 7. The petitioner has also cited extracts from the Written opinion of Lord Diplock given in "Duport Steels Ltd and others v. Sirs and Others" reported in [1980] All England Law Reporter P. 541 which happens to be- ".........My Lords, at a time when more and more cases involving the application of legislation which gives effect to policies that are the subject of bitter public and parliamentary controversy, it cannot be too strongly emphasised that the British Constitution, though largely unwritten, is firmly based on the separation of powers: Parliament makes the laws, the judiciary interprets them. When Parliament legislates to remedy what the majority of its members at the time perceive to be a defect or a lacuna in the existing law (whether it be the written law enacted by existing statutes or-the unwritten common law as it has been expounded by the judges in decided cases), the role of the judiciary is confined to ascertaining from the words that Parliament has approved as expressing its intention what that intention was, and to giving effect to it. Where the meaning of the statutory words is plain and unambiguous it is not for the judges to invent fancied ambiguities as an excuse for failing to give effect to its plain meaning because they themselves consider that the consequences of doing so would be inexpedient, or even unjust or immoral, in controversial matters such as are involved in industrial relations there is room for differences of opinion as to what is expedient, what is just and what is morally justifiable. Under our Constitution it is Parliament's Opinion on these matters that is paramount. A statute passed to remedy what is perceived by Parliament to be a defect in the existing law may in actual operation turn out to have injurious consequences that parliament did not anticipate at the time the statute was passed; if it had, it would have made some provision in the Act in order to prevent them. A statute passed to remedy what is perceived by Parliament to be a defect in the existing law may in actual operation turn out to have injurious consequences that parliament did not anticipate at the time the statute was passed; if it had, it would have made some provision in the Act in order to prevent them. It is at least possible that Parliament, when the 1974 and 1976 Acts were passed, did not anticipate that so widespread and crippling use as has in fact occurred would be made of sympathetic withdrawals of labour and of secondary blacking and picketing in support of sectional interests able to exercise 'industrial muscle', But if this be the case it is for Parliament, not for the judiciary, to decide whether any changes should be made to the law as stated in the Acts, and if so, what are the precise limits that ought to be imposed on the immunity from liability for torts committed in the course of taking industrial action. These are matters on which there is a wide legislative choice, the exercise of which is likely to be influenced by the political complexion of the Government and the state of public opinion at the time amending legislation is under consideration. It endangers continued public confidence in the political impartiality of the judiciary, which is essential to the continuance of the rule of law, if judges, under the guise of interpretation, provide their own preferred amendments to statutes which experience of their operation has shown to have had consequences that members of the court before whom the matter comes consider to be injurious to the public interest. The frequency with which controversial legislation is amended by Parliament itself (as witness the 1974 Act, which was amended in 1975 as well as in 1976) indicates that legislation, after it has come into operation, may fail to have the beneficial effects which Parliament expected or may produce injurious results that Parliament did not anticipate. But, except by private or hybrid Bills, Parliament does not legislate for individual cases. But, except by private or hybrid Bills, Parliament does not legislate for individual cases. Public Acts of Parliament are general in their application; they govern all cases falling within categories of which the definitions are to be found in the wording of the statute, So in relation to Section 13(1) of the 1974 Act, for a judge (who is always dealing with an individual case) to pose himself the question, Can Parliament really have intended that the acts that were done in this particular case should have the benefit of the immunity?' is to risk straying beyond his constitutional role as interpreter of the enacted law and assume a power to decide at his own discretion whether or not to apply the general law to a particular case, The legitimate questions for a judge in his role as interpreter of the enacted law are, 'How has Parliament, by the words that it has used in the statute to express its intentions, defined the category of acts that are entitled to the immunity? Do the acts done in this particular case fall within that description?'......" (Emphasis added). 8. In this manner the sum and substance of the contention raised by the petitioner is that both the Ld. Courts below have acted illegally by granting such relief in favour of the Opposite Party/wife which was not contemplated within the Code of Criminal Procedure, and so the orders permitting her to amend her original maintenance application were without jurisdiction. 9. However, a co-ordinate Branch of this Court in "Sri Joyanta Shit v. Smt. Lakshmi Shit" reported in 1996 C Cr LR (Cal) 292 had held - "......7. It has been laid down by Kerala High Court in the case of Madhavi v. Thupran, (1987)3 Crimes at page 183, that proceedings under section 125, of the Code are not punitive. It is not a criminal proceeding at all. It serves a social purpose and only prescribes an alternative forum to get relief. Though the section appears in Criminal Procedure Code but it remains a proceeding of civil nature. Enquiries therein are only quasi criminal in nature. For all practical purposes the pleadings in a proceeding under section 125, Cr. P.C. are like pleadings in a civil case and the pleadings can be amended in a appropriate circumstances......" 10. Though the section appears in Criminal Procedure Code but it remains a proceeding of civil nature. Enquiries therein are only quasi criminal in nature. For all practical purposes the pleadings in a proceeding under section 125, Cr. P.C. are like pleadings in a civil case and the pleadings can be amended in a appropriate circumstances......" 10. Subsequently, the aforesaid decision was also relied upon in a judgment passed on 20th December, 2014 by His Lordship Justice Ashim Kumar Roy in "Abdul Latif Hazari v. Kamasunessa Bibi" in CRR No. 3584 of 2013 with the observations - ".....Although the decision of the other High Courts has a persuasive value so far this court is concerned but this court is bound by a co-ordinate Bench of its own court unless the court finds any sufficient reason to differ from the same. In this case in question, I find the decision of a co-ordinate bench of this High Court is well-reasoned and it was authoritatively held that in a proceeding under section 125 CrPC amendment is permissible. I therefore, find no merit in this criminal revision and same is dismissed." 11. This Court is also bound by the view taken earlier by the aforesaid coordinate Benches of this Court. The ratio of the cases relied upon by the petitioner would not appear to be applicable in the given facts and circumstances since none of those cases arose out of any proceedings under Section 125 of the Cr. P.C., in relation to which provision alone the view regarding permissibility of amendment was taken by the earlier Benches. This Court finds no reason to deviate from the same. 12. The revisional application is therefore, dismissed without costs. The Trial Court is now requested to complete the pending proceedings in terms of the directions contained in the ordering portion of Judgment and Order passed by the Learned Additional Sessions Judge 6th Court, Barasat in Criminal Revisional Application no. 216 of 2014.