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Karnataka High Court · body

2015 DIGILAW 646 (KAR)

C. K. Rama Murthy v. State Election Commission

2015-06-22

body2015
Order : When this Court renders judgments, it does so with great care and responsibility. The law declared by this Court is binding on all courts. All authorities in the territory of India are required to act in aid of it. Any interpretation of a law or a judgment, by this Court, is a law declared by this Court. The wider the power, more onerous is the responsibility to ensure that nothing is stated or directed in excess of what is required or relevant for the case, and to ensure that the Court’s orders and decisions do not create any doubt or confusion in regard to a legal position in the minds of any authority or citizen, and also to ensure that they do not conflict with any other decision or existing law. Som Mittal v. Government of Karnataka [ (2008) 3 SCC 574 ]. The aforesaid observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court are being tested by the State and other impleading applicants, after conclusion of litigation before the Hon’ble Supreme Court arising out of these writ petitions, by seeking impleadment and modification of certain directions issued by this Bench, by order dated 30/03/2015, which have been affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 2. The details of I.A. Nos. I to IX/2015 are as under: I.A.No.I/2015: By respondent – State, for modification of order dated 30/03/2015 I.A.No.II/2015: By impleading applicant, praying to implead as additional respondent. The Karnataka State Commission for SC & ST Rep. by its Member Secretary, 14/3, Near Reserve Bank, Nrupathunga Road, Bengaluru-1. I.A.No.III/2015: By impleading applicants, praying to implead as additional respondents. Sri. M.K. Gunashekar, Aged about 54 yrs, S/o. Late M.K. Krishnappa, R/at.No.19/20, Ward No.63, 1st Cross, Shivaji Road, W.K. Palya, Shivajinagar, Bengaluru – 68. Sri B.N.Manjunatha Reddy, Aged about 54 yrs, S/o.Narayana Reddy, R/at.No.84/19, 1st Main Road, 6th Cross, Maruthinagar, Madivala, Bengaluru – 68. Sri O.Manjunath, Aged about 51 yrs, S/o.Obaiah, R/at.No.22, Ward No.185, Manjunatha Layout, Kanakanagar, Yelachenahalli, J.P.Nagar Post, Bengaluru – 78. Sri. S. Gangadhar, Aged 47 yrs, S/o. Siddalingappa, R/at.Mohan Mansion Konankunte, Kanakapura Main Road, Konanakunte, Bengaluru South, Bengaluru – 62. I.A.No.IV/2015: By impleading applicant, praying to implead as additional respondent. Namma Bengaluru Foundation, A registered office at 3rd No.3J, NA Chambers, 7th ‘C’ Main, Cross, 3rd block, Koramangala, Bengaluru – 34. I.A.No.V/2015: By impleading applicant, praying to implead as additional respondent. S. Gangadhar, Aged 47 yrs, S/o. Siddalingappa, R/at.Mohan Mansion Konankunte, Kanakapura Main Road, Konanakunte, Bengaluru South, Bengaluru – 62. I.A.No.IV/2015: By impleading applicant, praying to implead as additional respondent. Namma Bengaluru Foundation, A registered office at 3rd No.3J, NA Chambers, 7th ‘C’ Main, Cross, 3rd block, Koramangala, Bengaluru – 34. I.A.No.V/2015: By impleading applicant, praying to implead as additional respondent. Sri Keshava Murthy, Aged 49 yrs, S/o. K.N. Srinivasa Murthy, R/at.No.19/K, Ward No.68, 14th Cross, Rajajinagar, Bengaluru – 560 010. Sri R. Narayana Swamy, aged 53 yrs, s/o. late Ramaiah, R/at.291, Ward No.16, 3rd Cross, 2nd Phase, Rajamahalvilas 2nd Stage, Bengaluru – 560 094. I.A.No.VI/2015: Filed by the Karnataka State Commission for SC & ST, Rep. by its Member Secretary, 14/3, Near Reserve Bank, Nrupathunga Road, Bengaluru, for modification of order dated 30/03/2015. I.A.No.VII/2015: Filed by Sri M.K. Gunashekar and others for modification, clarification and review of the directions issued by order dated 30/03/2015. I.A.No.VIII/2015: By impleading applicants, praying to implead as additional respondents. Sri G.N.R. Babu, Aged 46 yrs, S/o. late G. Narayana Swamy Reddy, R/at.No.858, Ward No.176, 6th Main, J.P. Nagar, 3rd Phase, Bengaluru – 76. Sri S.M. Murugesh Mudaliyar, Aged 51 yrs, S/o. late Ramaiah, R/at.No.200, Ward No.147, 2nd ‘C’ Main, 8th Block, Koramangala, Bengaluru – 34. I.A.No.IX/2015: By impleading applicant, praying to implead as additional respondent. Sri Satish P. Chandra, S/o. V. Praphulla Chandra, Aged about 62 yrs, R/at. Apartment No.5, Mantri Altius, No.17, Cubbon Road, Bengaluru – 1. 3. The factual background to the aforesaid applications could be succinctly stated. These writ petitions were filed before this Court seeking a direction to the State Election Commission to hold election to the respondent-Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike (BBMP) on or before 22/04/2015. A direction was also sought to redetermine the wards and reservation of seats for the purpose of holding election on completion of the term of Corporation on 22/4/2015. The writ petitions were allowed by order dated 30/03/2015 with certain directions, which are extracted as under: “53. Keeping in mind the Constitutional provisions as well as the judgments and orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and for reasons stated above, writ petitions would have to be allowed with the following directions: i) The respondents are directed to complete the process of election to BBMP on or before 30.5.2015. ii) The said election shall be conducted on the existing delimitation of wards and updated electoral rolls. ii) The said election shall be conducted on the existing delimitation of wards and updated electoral rolls. iii) The State Government shall publish notification regarding rotation of seats meant for reserved category on or before 13.4.2015 and on such publication the Commission shall issue calendar of events so as to conclude the entire electoral process on or before 30.5.2015. iv) In the event, the State Government does not publish notification regarding rotation of seats wardwise, it would be open to the Commission to proceeded on the basis of the reservation of seats as are presently existing.” 54. Writ petitions are allowed in the aforesaid terms. 55. Parties to bear their respective costs.” 4. That order was assailed by the State in W.A. Nos.1225/2015 and 1234-36/2015. By judgment dated 24/04/2015, writ appeals were allowed and order dated 30/03/2015 was set aside. Being aggrieved by judgment of the 1st Division Bench, the respondent State Election Commission as well as petitioners herein and petitioner, who had filed a Public Interest Litigation before the Division Bench of this Court filed independent Special Leave Petitions before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. By Order dated 05/05/2015, leave was granted and Special Leave Petitions were converted into Civil Appeals and the appeals were allowed. The relevant portion of that Order reads as under: “3. The learned Single Judge directed to complete the election process of the BBMP on or before 30.05.2015 on the existing delimitation of wards and updated electoral rolls. 4. Aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Single Judge, the respondent – State had filed Writ Appeals before the Division Bench of the High Court. Also, during the pendency of the Writ Appeals before the High Court, the respondent – State has passed an order dated 18.04.2015 dissolving the BBMP. 5. The Division Bench of the High Court while setting aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge held that in view of dissolution of the BBMP on 18.04.2015, six months time is available for conducting elections to BBMP as per Article 243U(3)(b) of the Constitution of India. Aggrieved by the said judgment and order passed by the Division Bench, the appellant – State Election Commission is before us in these Civil Appeals. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties to the lis. 7. Aggrieved by the said judgment and order passed by the Division Bench, the appellant – State Election Commission is before us in these Civil Appeals. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties to the lis. 7. Shri Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel, appearing for the respondent No.1 – State of Karnataka on instructions, would submit that the State Government has no objection if the election for the BBMP is held and requests us to grant three months’ time to the Appellant – State Election Commission for the same. 8. In view the submission made by the learned senior counsel, we are of the opinion that if the request made by learned senior counsel is accepted, it would not cause any prejudice to either of the parties. Accordingly, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, we set aside the judgment and order passed by the Division Bench and restore the order passed by the learned Single Judge. However, we grant three months time to the Appellant – State Election Commission to complete the process of election to the BBMP. 9. The appeals are allowed, accordingly.” 5. Thereafter, the impleading applicants in I.A. No. II/15 and I.A. No. III/15, V/15 and VIII/15 had filed W.P. No. 23041/2015 and W.P. Nos. 23054-23092-98/2015, before this Court seeking a direction to the respondents therein to provide reservation as envisaged under Article 243T by taking into account the population Census Report of 2011 in terms of 243T of the Constitution. A direction was also sought to hold election to BBMP after conducting the exercise of delimitation of wards. Those writ petitions were heard by another learned Single Judge of this Court. In those matters the State through learned Additional Advocate General submitted that State intended to conduct delimitation of wards and reservation of seats in accordance with the census figures of 2011. Those writ petitions were disposed with the following observations: “However, as the direction issued by the learned Single Judge is creating an obstacle for carrying out delimitation and for reservation of seats on the basis of Census of 2011, the Government undertakes to immediately file an application for clarification before the learned Single Judge. In light of the undertaking given by the learned AAG, no further order is to be passed by this Court. Therefore these writ petitions are hereby disposed”. 6. In light of the undertaking given by the learned AAG, no further order is to be passed by this Court. Therefore these writ petitions are hereby disposed”. 6. It is in the above background that these applications have been filed seeking impleadment and also modification/clarification/review of the directions issued by this Bench by order dated 30/03/2015 at Para 53 so that the election to BBMP is conducted as envisaged in Article 243T by taking into account the population Census Report of 2011. Also, State has filed I.A.1/15 seeking modification of the directions issued by order dated 30/03/2015 by permitting the State Government to carry out delimitation exercise as per the latest Census Report and thereafter provide reservation of wards on that basis. 7. One more application (I.A.No.IV/2015), has been filed by the petitioner, who had filed public interest litigation before this Court namely, Namma Bengaluru Foundation (W.P.Nos.16665-66/2015) seeking impleadment in these writ petitions on the premise that although the Division Bench of this Court had dismissed their writ petitions, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had allowed its appeals by order dated 05/05/2015. 8. Objections have been filed to these applications on behalf of the petitioners as well as by the State Election Commission. 9. Since the applicants seek modification of order dated 30/03/2015, which has been affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, on the issue of delimitation of wards and reservation of seats for the purpose of carrying out election to BBMP in time, it would be relevant at this stage to extract those portions of order dated 30/03/2015 having a bearing on these applications. “47. Having regard to the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court made on 1.2.2013 with regard to rotation of constituencies for the reserved categories not being prepared in time and the direction issued to proceed with the existing electoral rolls and without reference to the census figures of 2011 elections were conducted to 209 urban bodies. I am of the view that those observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court are squarely applicable to the present case for two reasons: firstly, because elections cannot be postponed by contending that delimitation of the constituencies has not been made and reservation of wards has not been determined. That would be contrary to the mandate of Article 243U of the Constitution. That would be contrary to the mandate of Article 243U of the Constitution. Secondly, if the State Government intends to modify the territorial jurisdiction of BBMP by exclusion of certain areas, then initiating an exercise with regard to delimitation of constituencies at this stage, would be futile insofar as BBMP is concerned. Even though these two steps have not been taken, election to BBMP could be held on the existing delimitation of wards and updated voters list. Further, at this juncture it is difficult to predict as to whether indeed the proposal of the State Government to divide the BBMP would fructify. But that cannot be the reason to postpone the election. As already held, the existence of the Civic Body for the metropolis is not only a constitutional requirement, but also a necessity for local Governance. In case, the State Government decides to divide BBMP, then on the process of division being completed, there would be re-determination of delimitation of wards as the territorial jurisdiction of the present Body as well as BBMP the new Body/Bodies to be formed would have to be determined. But till then, there cannot be a vacuum as far as Municipal Governance is concerned. 48. Thus, despite the reasons assigned by the State for not holding election in time to the BBMP, I am of the considered view that having regard to constitutional mandate and the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court on the point, elections to BBMP must be held on the expiry of the present term. Also having regard to the proposed division of BBMP mooted by the State Government, election must be held on the existing delimitation of wards. The voters list has been updated from time to time and the election would have to take place based on the updated voters list. Of course, one may opine that such a view would be giving a gobye to the census figures of 2011 published in the year 2013. It may be so, but as already stated, those are not considerations or reasons which can weigh with the Court for postponing the elections. In fact, State Election Commission ought not to yield to any vested interest to postpone the elections which would have to be held within the stipulated time. It may be so, but as already stated, those are not considerations or reasons which can weigh with the Court for postponing the elections. In fact, State Election Commission ought not to yield to any vested interest to postpone the elections which would have to be held within the stipulated time. Delimitation of constituencies, reservation of wards and revision of electoral rolls had to be carried out by now and if it has not been done, that cannot be a reason to postpone election. Election would have to be conducted on the existing electoral rolls, delimitation of wards. In fact, the Commission in consultation with the State ought to have taken up the aforesaid exercise in time. Not having done so cannot be a reason to violate the mandate of Article 243U of the Constitution. Reiterating Kishansingh Tomar, the reasons cited for postponing elections must be “exceptional circumstances”, but the very fact that there could be certain reasons to postpone the election cited by the State Government would not empower the Commission to justify delaying the election. In fact, the two reasons given by the State Government to postpone the holding of election to BBMP are not in my view exceptional circumstances. 49. The object of Article 243U is to ensure that there is no delay in the process of election and thereby allow Municipal Bodies to continue beyond the period of five years. As the State Election Commission has power of superintendence, direction and control of elections and preparation of electoral rolls as well and as that power is coupled with a duty, being an independent authority, it must be exercised scrupulously. In case the State Election Commission is not receiving cooperation in the matter of timely conduct of elections for Municipal bodies, then the Hon’ble Supreme Court has opined, it could approach the High Court for a writ of mandamus or other appropriate directions for necessary cooperation and assistance to be rendered by the State Government so as to enable the Commission to fulfill its constitutional obligations. 50. In the instant case, the Commission has not approached this Court. On the other hand, it is pleading helplessness in the matter. A Constitutional body cannot so plead when it a matter of carrying out the vision and mandate of the Constitution. 50. In the instant case, the Commission has not approached this Court. On the other hand, it is pleading helplessness in the matter. A Constitutional body cannot so plead when it a matter of carrying out the vision and mandate of the Constitution. No reason is assigned as to why the Commission has not approached this Court in time for seeking appropriate directions for holding election to BBMP. The Commission is well aware of the orders passed by this court since 2008 with regard to holding of election on completion of the term in the year 2006. Election had to be held to BBMP in the year 2006, ultimately it was held in the year 2010 after this Court’s intervention leading to issuance of several positive directions to hold election in time which were approved by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The Commission cannot be apologetic and state that it is not receiving cooperation from the State Government in the matter of delimitation of wards and reservation of wards for the purpose of holding election. 51. Therefore, having regard to the fact that the State Government is thinking of dividing BBMP and a Committee in that regard has been set up for the purpose of submission of its Report, election could be held on the existing delimitation of wards and already updated electoral rolls. Helplessness pleaded on the part of the Commission cannot also be a reason in the absence of any exceptional circumstance to postpone election. 52. In case the decision to divide BBMP is not taken to its logical conclusion then the State has to be directed to carry out the exercise of delimitation of wards for the subsequent election to be held in the year 2020, in an expeditious manner. It is needless to observe that in case, the proposal to divide BBMP is fructified, then new circumstances would emerge which would have to be taken note of by the State Government as well as the Commission. Then again delimitation of wards and reservation of wards and revision of electoral rolls would have to take place before constitution of civic bodies of smaller urban areas. Till those bodies are constituted, there cannot be any hiatus or vacuum so far as the constitution of BBMP is concerned.” 10. Then again delimitation of wards and reservation of wards and revision of electoral rolls would have to take place before constitution of civic bodies of smaller urban areas. Till those bodies are constituted, there cannot be any hiatus or vacuum so far as the constitution of BBMP is concerned.” 10. The aforesaid reasoning was followed by directions as extracted above, wherein it was directed that election ought to be conducted on the existing delimitation of wards, updated electoral rolls. The State Government was directed to publish Notification regarding rotation of seats on or before 13/04/2015 and on such publication, the State Election Commission was to issue calendar of events so as to complete the entire election process on or before 30/05/2015. In the event, the State Government did not publish the Notification regarding rotation of seats wardwise, it was open to the State Election Commission to proceed on the basis of reservation of seats as was presently existing. Subsequent to the directions issued on 30/03/2015, State Government issued Notification on 13/04/2015 with regard to rotation of seats on the basis of the census figures of 2011. It is however submitted at the Bar that the said Notification was withdrawn on 25/04/2015 after disposal of writ appeals arising from the order dated 30/03/2015. 11. I have heard learned counsel for respective parties. 12. Learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State submitted that application filed on behalf of the State is not for a review of order dated 30/03/2015, but only permission is being sought to carry out delimitation of wards afresh and that the election to BBMP would be held within the time frame stipulated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. He contended that delimitation exercise had commenced, but had not been completed, as the State Government had intended to trifurcate BBMP but now that issue is no longer in existence on account of the directions issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court therefore, election would be held after carrying out fresh delimitation of wards and on the basis of the population figures of 2011 census rotation of wards and reservation of seats would be notified. He candidly admitted that though the directions of this Court in order dated 30/03/2015 with regard to conduct of election on the basis of existing delimitation of wards, was a contention raised in the appeals filed by the State, the same was not urged before the Division Bench of this Court or before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 13. Drawing my attention to the time frame which has been stipulated by the State Government for conducting the delimitation exercise and for notifying the constituencies to be reserved for certain category of candidates, he contended that this exercise would not be beyond the time frame stipulated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court for holding of election. He also submitted that this Court being a Court of record under Article 215 of the Constitution, had a duty to rectify any mistake in its order. 14. Supporting the aforesaid submissions, learned senior counsel, Sri Udaya Holla, appearing for the impleading applicants who had filed W.P.Nos.23041/2015 and W.P.Nos.23054-23092-98/2015, subsequent to the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, submitted that the population of Bengaluru had increased between the decade 2001 to 2011. There has also been an increase in Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe population and therefore reservation of seats have to be made in terms of Article 243T of the Constitution, but in view of the directions issued by this Court by order dated 30/03/2015, Article 243T would not be complied with. The impleading applicants were not parties to these writ petitions in which order dated 30/03/2015 was passed and that the said order has been restored by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. But nothing would prevent this Court from modifying the directions issued in the order dated 30/03/2015. 15. To a query raised by the Court on the doctrine of merger, learned senior counsel relying on certain decisions contended that the doctrine of merger is not of an universal application and in order to protect and uphold the rights and interests of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe, this Court may modify the directions issued by order dated 30/03/2015. Learned counsel for other impleading applicants, Sri Prashant, has adopted the aforesaid submissions. 16. Learned counsel for the State Election Commission Sri Phanindra, on the other hand, with reference to his statement of objections strongly objected to the maintainability of the applications as well as to consider the same on merits. Learned counsel for other impleading applicants, Sri Prashant, has adopted the aforesaid submissions. 16. Learned counsel for the State Election Commission Sri Phanindra, on the other hand, with reference to his statement of objections strongly objected to the maintainability of the applications as well as to consider the same on merits. While adverting to the ground realities and practical difficulties which the Commission would face, in case prayers sought by the impleading applicants were granted, he submitted that delimitation exercise itself would take about three months and thereafter another two months would be required for preparation of voters list, but as of now the voters list in terms of the existing wards has been made ready by the Commission and sufficient expenditure has been incurred for printing the voters list in terms of the existing wards. All steps have been taken for holding election in terms of the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The only step which remains is to notify the election date and issue calendar of events and at this stage, the State and the impleading applicants cannot reopen the matter and seek fresh directions, which if granted, would ultimately result in the State Election Commission violating the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. He also contended that totally there are 198 wards and in terms of the Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act, 1976 (‘KMC Act 1976’, for short) the total number of wards stipulated for the Corporation is only 200. Therefore, delimitation exercise cannot increase the number of wards and the number of seats would remain the same i.e. 198. There can only be an alteration in the reservations of seats having regard to the population census of 2011. He contended that there is no increase in the Scheduled Caste population vis-à-vis the General population and that the Scheduled Tribe population has doubled. He submitted that in the election held in 2010, 23 seats were reserved for Scheduled Caste and 2 seats were reserved for Scheduled Tribe, but in view of the 2011 population figures, the seats to be reserved for Scheduled Caste would remain the same namely, 23 seats and the seats to be reserved for Scheduled Tribe would be increased from 2 to 4. He said that only the urban population of Bengaluru, would have to be considered, as rural areas of Bengaluru are governed by Gram Pancayats. He said that only the urban population of Bengaluru, would have to be considered, as rural areas of Bengaluru are governed by Gram Pancayats. He also drew my attention to the fact that the State Government had issued Notification dated 13/04/2015 with regard to reservation of constituencies which was on the basis of population census figures of 2011. The State Government had withdrawn that Notification on 25/04/2015 and therefore what remains now is for issuance of the Notification regarding reservation of seats on the basis of census figures of 2011. Therefore, the applicants can have no grievance at all. When once that is issued, the calendar of events would be issued by the Commission after notifying the date of election to be held for BBMP. He reiterated that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has given only three months time from 05/05/2015 for concluding the process of election after restoring order dated 30/03/2015 and at this stage, the State Government and the impleading applicants cannot jeopardize the duties and obligations of the Commission by seeking modification of order dated 30/03/2015. He therefore sought for dismissal of the applications. 17. Learned senior counsel Sri D.N. Nanjunda Reddy, appearing for the petitioners at the outset raised a preliminary objection with regard to the maintainability of the applications. Drawing my attention to the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, arising from this matter, it was contended that the Special Leave Petitions were converted into appeals as leave to appeal was granted. While allowing the appeals, the judgment of the Division Bench was set aside and order dated 30/03/2015 was restored. That the doctrine of merger applied in the instant case, as order dated 30/03/2015 was extinguished and merged with the judgment of the Division Bench in the first instance and later with that of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Therefore, any application that could be filed subsequent to the order of the Apex Court was only before that Court and not before this Bench. Drawing my attention to various judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court on the doctrine of merger, which would be considered later, he contended that the question of modification/review of order dated 30/03/2015 would not arise, as now it is only the order of the Apex Court which would prevail. Drawing my attention to various judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court on the doctrine of merger, which would be considered later, he contended that the question of modification/review of order dated 30/03/2015 would not arise, as now it is only the order of the Apex Court which would prevail. The order of the Apex Court was on merits and not a case of dismissal of the Special Leave Petitions; rather Special Leave Petitions were admitted and the appeals were allowed. Therefore, this Court does not have jurisdiction to meddle with its order dated 30/03/2015, which no longer exists. 18. Referring to Article 243C, which is in Chapter – IX of the Constitution which deals with the composition of Panchayaths, he contended that a provision similar to proviso to sub – clause (1) of Article 243C is conspicuous by its absence in Chapter IX A and that a fresh delimitation of the constituencies of wards is not a condition precedent for holding election to an urban body. He also contended that the reservation of wards under Article 243T of the Constitution has nothing to do with delimitation of wards and that reservation of seats have to be made depending on the proportion of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe population of Bangalore Urban area which is in respect of 198 wards and that their interests are in no way prejudiced by holding election on the existing delimitation of wards so long as the number of seats to be reserved on the basis of the census figures of 2011 is maintained. 19. He contended that the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe Commission, one of the impleading applicants, has no cause to espouse in the matter and that these impleading applicants had earlier filed writ petitions and they did not pursue those petitions to their logical conclusion but they have instead filed these applications although no liberty was given to the impleading applicants to file these applications in the writ petitions filed by them. According to learned senior counsel, on the submission made by learned Additional Advocate General, writ petitions filed by the impleading applicants were disposed. In fact, even the State was also not given any liberty to file these applications. 20. According to learned senior counsel, on the submission made by learned Additional Advocate General, writ petitions filed by the impleading applicants were disposed. In fact, even the State was also not given any liberty to file these applications. 20. According to learned senior counsel appearing for petitioners, the conduct of the State in this matter has not been straight forward, despite being a party to the proceedings before this Court as well as before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The State, while on the one hand, is admitting that order dated 30/03/2015 has been restored by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, at the same time, is seeking modification of that order, which is impermissible. Therefore, the learned senior counsel contended that the applications may be rejected on the ground of maintainability and in limine. 21. Learned counsel for impleading applicants in I.A.No.4/15 has adopted the submissions of the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners. 22. In response to a query of this Court, learned Additional Advocate General candidly admitted that before the Hon’ble Supreme Court while seeking three months time to conduct election to BBMP, no submission was made with regard to delimitation of wards. That, although, the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court would be complied with by the State Government, nevertheless the mandate of the Constitution as well as the provisions of the KMC Act, 1976 would have to be followed. He also submitted that first Notification dated 13/04/2015 had been withdrawn by the State Government on 25/04/2015 and that steps would be taken to notify the reservation of constituencies shortly, in terms of census figures of 2011 and that every attempt would be made to conduct election within the time frame stipulated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 23. To this submission, learned counsel for the State Election Commission reiterated that if any direction is to be given by this Court with regard to carrying out the exercise of delimitation of constituencies, then election cannot be conducted by the State Election Commission by 05/08/2015 and thereby the direction of the Hon’ble Supreme Court would be violated which the State Election Commission cannot afford to do so, particularly, when the Commission was one of the appellants before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and a specific direction has been issued to the Commission to conduct the election within three months from 05/05/2015. It was therefore submitted that it must be endeavored to comply with the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 24. Having heard the learned counsel for respective parties, the following points would arise for my consideration: No arguments were advanced on behalf of B.B.M.P. on these applications. 1) Whether the applications filed by the State and the impleading applicants are maintainable? 2) If the answer to point No.1 is in the affirmative, whether the order dated 30.3.2015 would call for any modification? Reg. Point No.1: 25. As already noted, the applications are filed by the State and others seeking modification/clarification/ amendment of the directions issued by this Court by order dated 30/03/2015 which order was set aside by the Division Bench of this Court in intra court appeals filed by the State. The judgment of the Division Bench of this Court was set aside by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in four batches of civil appeals filed by the petitioners herein, the State Election Commission as well as the petitioners in the Public Interest Litigation. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while setting aside the judgment of the Division Bench and granting three months time to the State Election Commission to conduct election to BBMP on the submission of the State, also restored order dated 30/03/2015. In fact, the relevant portion of the order has been extracted above, from which it becomes clear that the Apex Court at Para 3 has noted that order dated 30/03/2015 passed in the writ petitions was in the nature of directions to the respondent/authorities to hold elections on the existing delimitation of wards and updated electoral rolls. While allowing civil appeals, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “Accordingly, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, we set aside the judgment and order passed by the Division Bench and restore the order passed by the learned Single Judge. However, we grant three months time to the Appellant – State Election Commission to complete the process of election to the BBMP. 9. The appeals are allowed, accordingly.” 26. When the matter was considered by the Apex Court, there were two judgments of this Court. One, of the Division Bench and the other, of this Bench dated 30/03/2015 passed in these writ petitions. 9. The appeals are allowed, accordingly.” 26. When the matter was considered by the Apex Court, there were two judgments of this Court. One, of the Division Bench and the other, of this Bench dated 30/03/2015 passed in these writ petitions. While setting aside the judgment passed by the Division Bench, the Apex Court restored the order passed by the single judge in these writ petitions. While considering the issue of maintainability of the applications, the significant expression of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, “restore the order passed by the learned single Judge” has to be understood and the point to be considered is as to whether the order of the Apex Court passed in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction would prevail over the order of an inferior Court i.e., this Court. While considering this aspect, not only the doctrine of merger is relevant, but the importance of Article 141 of the Constitution would also have to be borne in mind. Of course, learned senior counsel appearing for the impleading applicants placed reliance on a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab reported in AIR 1963 Supreme Court 1909, to contend that there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. Reliance was also placed on the decision in the case of Major General Kapil Mehra v. Union Of India [(2015) 2 Supreme Court Cases 262], to contend that any dismissal of Special Leave Petition by the Hon’ble Supreme Court would not be an impediment to parties to pursue their appeals independently. But the aforesaid decisions are not applicable to the present case. The first of the decisions did not take into consideration the aspect of the Apex Court dealing with a matter and rendering its judgment and subsequently, the same matter being considered by the High Court. In the second decision, the question was as to whether the parties to a case could independently seek relief from the Apex Court although certain other parties to the very case had been unsuccessful in their Special Leave Petitions. 27. The factual aspects in the present matter is quite distinct. The impleading applicants were not parties at all in this matter. 27. The factual aspects in the present matter is quite distinct. The impleading applicants were not parties at all in this matter. Further, they did not challenge order dated 30/03/2015 with the leave of this Court by filing an appeal; neither were they parties before the Hon’ble Supreme Court which rendered its order on 05/05/2015. It is after the culmination of the above proceedings that the impleading applicants who have filed I.A.3/15 and I.A.5/15, have sought modification of order dated 13/03/2015. 28. In this context, learned senior counsel Sri. Holla, while adverting to another decision of the Apex Court in Kunhayammed And Others v. State Of Kerala in [(2000) 6 Supreme Court Cases 359], contended that the doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of rigid or universal application which can always be applied wherever there are two orders, one, by the inferior and other, by the superior Court or authority, passed in an appeal or a revision or when there is a fusion or merger of two orders, irrespective of the subject matter of the appeal or revisional order. That the scope of the appeal or revision contemplated by the particular statute has to be considered. He contended that the application of doctrine depends on the nature of the appellate or revisional jurisdiction in each case and the scope of the statutory provisions conferring the appellate or revisional jurisdiction. That in the instant case, the doctrine does not apply, was the submission. 29. On the other hand, learned counsel, Sri.Reddy, appearing for the petitioners relying upon the very same judgment drew my attention to certain paragraphs of that judgment. He contended that having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case, the doctrine of merger would squarely apply and that the applications are not maintainable. In this regard, it would be useful to extract following paragraphs of the said judgment: “41. Once a special leave petition has been granted, the doors for the exercise of appellate jurisdiction of this Court have been let open. The order impugned before the Supreme Court becomes an order appealed against. Any order passed thereafter would be an appellate order and would attract the applicability of doctrine of merger. It would not make a difference whether the order is one of reversal or of modification or of dismissal affirming the order appealed against. The order impugned before the Supreme Court becomes an order appealed against. Any order passed thereafter would be an appellate order and would attract the applicability of doctrine of merger. It would not make a difference whether the order is one of reversal or of modification or of dismissal affirming the order appealed against. It would also not make any difference if the order is a speaking or nonspeaking one. Whenever this Court has felt inclined to apply its mind to the merits of the order put in issue before it though it may be inclined to affirm the same, it is customary with this Court to grant leave to appeal and thereafter dismiss the appeal itself (and not merely the petition for special leave) though at times the orders granting leave to appeal and dismissing the appeal are contained in the same order and at times the orders are quite brief. Nevertheless, the order shows the exercise of appellate jurisdiction and therein the merits of the order impugned having been subjected to judicial scrutiny of this Court. 42. “To merge” means to sink or disappear in something else; to become absorbed or extinguished; to be combined or be swallowed up. Merger in law is defined as the absorption of a thing of lesser importance by a greater, whereby the lesser ceases to exist, but the greater is not increased; an absorption or swallowing up so as to involve a loss of identity and individuality. (See Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol.LVII, pp. 106768.) 43. We may look at the issue from another angle. The Supreme Court cannot and does not reverse or modify the decree or order appealed against while deciding a petition for special leave to appeal. What is impugned before the Supreme Court can be reversed or modified only after granting leave to appeal and then assuming appellate jurisdiction over it. If the order impugned before the Supreme Court cannot be reversed or modified at the SLP stage obviously that order cannot also be affirmed at the SLP stage. 44. What is impugned before the Supreme Court can be reversed or modified only after granting leave to appeal and then assuming appellate jurisdiction over it. If the order impugned before the Supreme Court cannot be reversed or modified at the SLP stage obviously that order cannot also be affirmed at the SLP stage. 44. To sum up, our conclusions are: (i) Where an appeal or revision is provided against an order passed by a court, tribunal or any other authority before superior forum and such superior forum modifies, reverses or affirms the decision put in issue before it, the decision by the subordinate forum merges in the decision by the superior forum and it is the latter which subsists, remains operative and is capable of enforcement in the eye of law. (ii) The jurisdiction conferred by Article 136 of the Constitution is divisible into two stages. The first stage is upto the disposal of prayer for special leave to file an appeal. The second stage commences if and then the leave to appeal is granted and the special leave petition is converted into an appeal. (iii) The doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of universal or unlimited application. It will depend on the nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subjectmatter of challenge laid or capable of being laid shall be determinative of the applicability of merger. The superior jurisdiction should be capable of reversing, modifying or affirming the order put in issue before it. Under Article 136 of the Constitution the Supreme Court may reverse, modify or affirm the judgmentdecree or order appealed against while exercising its appellate jurisdiction and not while exercising the discretionary jurisdiction disposing of petition for special leave to appeal. The doctrine of merger can therefore be applied to the former and not to the latter. (iv) An order refusing special leave to appeal may be a nonspeaking order or a speaking one. In either case it does not attract the doctrine of merger. An order refusing special leave to appeal does not stand substituted in place of the order under challenge. All that it means is that the Court was not inclined to exercise its discretion so as to allow the appeal being filed. In either case it does not attract the doctrine of merger. An order refusing special leave to appeal does not stand substituted in place of the order under challenge. All that it means is that the Court was not inclined to exercise its discretion so as to allow the appeal being filed. (v) If the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking order, i.e., gives reasons for refusing the grant of leave, then the order has two implications. Firstly, the statement of law contained in the order is a declaration of law by the Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. Secondly, other than the declaration of law, whatever is stated in the order are the findings recorded by the Supreme Court which would bind the parties thereto and also the court, tribunal or authority in any proceedings subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline, the Supreme Court being the Apex Court of the country. But, this does not amount to saying that the order of the court, tribunal or authority below has stood merged in the order of the Supreme Court rejecting the special leave petition or that the order of the Supreme Court is the only order binding as res judicata in subsequent proceedings between the parties. (vi) Once leave to appeal has been granted and appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court has been invoked the order passed in appeal would attract the doctrine of merger; the order may be of reversal, modification or merely affirmation. (vii) On an appeal having been preferred or a petition seeking leave to appeal having been converted into an appeal before the Supreme Court the jurisdiction of High Court to entertain a review petition is lost thereafter as provided by sub—rule (1) of Rule 1 of Order 47 CPC.” 30. In fact, the aforesaid observations have been reiterated in the case of Union Of India v. West Coast Paper Mills Limited [(2004) 2 Supreme Court Cases 747] while quoting Para 12 of Kunhayammed’s case, wherein it was observed that once the subject matter of the lis is determined by the last court, it would have attained finality. The relevant portion reads as under: “23. In Kunhayammed this Court held: (SCC p. 370, para 12) “12. The relevant portion reads as under: “23. In Kunhayammed this Court held: (SCC p. 370, para 12) “12. The logic underlying the doctrine of merger is that there cannot be more than one decree or operative orders governing the same subject-mater at a given point of time. When a decree or order passed by an inferior court, tribunal or authority was subjected to a remedy available under the law before a superior forum then, though the decree or order under challenge continues to be effective and binding, nevertheless its finality is put in jeopardy. Once the superior court has disposed of the lis before it either way – whether the decree or order under appeal is set aside or modified or simply confirmed, it is the decree or order of the superior court, tribunal or authority which is the final, binding and operative decree or order wherein merges the decree or order passed by the court, tribunal or the authority below. However, the doctrine is not of universal or unlimited application. The nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject-matter of challenge laid or which could have been laid shall have to be kept in view.” 31. In A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Govt. of A.P. and others [(2007) 4 Supreme Court Cases 221], the Apex Court culled out an exception to the doctrine of merger and held that where an order has been obtained by a successful party by practicing fraud, such an order is vitiated and has to be treated as non est by every Court, superior or inferior. While dealing with the concept of merger and the exception to the said doctrine, it has been observed as under: “38. The matter can be looked at from a different angle as well. Suppose, a case is decided by a competent court of law after hearing the parties and an order is passed in favour of the plaintiff applicant which is upheld by all the courts including the final court. Let us also think of a case where this Court does not dismiss special leave petition but after granting leave decides the appeal finally by recording reasons. Such order can truly be said to be a judgment to which Article 141 of the Constitution applies. Likewise, the doctrine of merger also gets attracted. Let us also think of a case where this Court does not dismiss special leave petition but after granting leave decides the appeal finally by recording reasons. Such order can truly be said to be a judgment to which Article 141 of the Constitution applies. Likewise, the doctrine of merger also gets attracted. All orders passed by the courts/authorities below, therefore, merge in the judgment of this Court and after such judgment, it is not open to any party to the judgment to approach any court or authority to review, recall or reconsider the order. 39. The above principle, however, is subject to exception of fraud. Once it is established that the order was obtained by a successful party by practicing or playing fraud, it is vitiated. Such order cannot be held legal, valid or in consonance with law. It is nonexistent and non est and cannot be allowed to stand. This is the fundamentally principle of law and needs no further elaboration. Therefore, it has been said that a judgment, decree or order obtained by fraud has to be treated as a nullity, whether by the court of first instance or by the final court. And it has to be treated as non est by every court, superior or inferior.” 32. In the above case, reference was made to Abbai Malige Partnership Firm v. K. Santhakumaran [ (1998) 7 SCC 386 ]. In that case, after dismissal of the Special Leave Petitions by the Apex Court, review petition was entertained by the High Court and earlier judgment was recalled. When the matter reached the Apex Court, while setting aside the order passed by the High Court in review, it was observed as under: “4. The manner in which the learned Single Judge of the High Court exercised the review jurisdiction, after the special leave petitions against the selfsame order had been dismissed by this Court after hearing learned counsel for the parties, to say the least, was not proper. Interference by the learned Single Judge at that stage is subversive of judicial discipline. The High Court was aware that the SLPs against the orders dated 711987 had already been dismissed by this Court. The High Court, therefore, had no power or jurisdiction to review the selfsame order, which was the subject-matter of challenge in the SLPs in this Court after the challenge had failed. The High Court was aware that the SLPs against the orders dated 711987 had already been dismissed by this Court. The High Court, therefore, had no power or jurisdiction to review the selfsame order, which was the subject-matter of challenge in the SLPs in this Court after the challenge had failed. By passing the impugned order on 741994, judicial propriety has been sacrificed. After the dismissal of the special leave petitions by this Court, on contest, no review petitions could be entertained by the High Court against the same order. The very entertainment of the review petitions, in the facts and circumstances of the case, was an affront to the order of this Court. We express our strong disapproval and hope there would be no occasion in the future when we may have to say so. The jurisdiction exercised by the High Court, under the circumstances, was palpably erroneous. The respondents who approached the High Court after the dismissal of their SLPs by this Court, abused the process of the court and indulged in vexatious litigation. We strongly deprecate the manner in which the review petitions were filed and heard in the High Court after the dismissal of the SLPs by this Court. The appeals deserve to succeed on that short ground. The appeals are, consequently, allowed and the impugned order dated 741994 passed in the review petitions is hereby set aside. The respondents shall pay Rs.10,000 as costs. (underlining by me) 33. The aforesaid judgments were considered in Meghamala & Others v. G. Narasimha Reddy & Others reported in [ (2010) 8 SCC 383 ], in the context of filing a review petition if the lis had been considered by the higher forum. It was observed that law on the issue was crystallized to the effect that in case the litigant filed a review petition before filing Special Leave Petition before the Apex Court and it remains pending till Special Leave Petitions stand dismissed, review petition deserved to be considered, but in case, it is filed subsequent to dismissal of the Special Leave Petitions, the process of filing a review petition amounts to abuse of process of the Court. But, in Gangadhara Palo v. Revenue Divisional Officer and another, reported in [(2011) 4 Supreme Court Cases 602], the Hon’ble Supreme Court has struck a different note and it has been opined as under: “4. But, in Gangadhara Palo v. Revenue Divisional Officer and another, reported in [(2011) 4 Supreme Court Cases 602], the Hon’ble Supreme Court has struck a different note and it has been opined as under: “4. The aforesaid order of this Court dismissing the special leave petition simply states “The special leave petition is dismissed”. Thus, this order gives no reasons. In support of his submission, the learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon a decision of this Court in K. Rajamouli v. A.V.K.N. Swamy and has submitted that there is a distinction between a case where the review petition was filed in the High Court before the dismissal of the special leave petition by this Court, and a case where the review petition was filed after the dismissal of the special leave petition by this Court. 5. We regret, we cannot agree. In our opinion, it will make no difference whether the review petition was filed in the High Court before the dismissal of the special leave petition or after the dismissal of the special leave petition. The important question really is whether the judgment of the High Court has merged into the judgment of this Court by the doctrine of merger or not. 6. When this Court dismisses a special leave petition by giving some reasons, however meager (it can be even of just one sentence), there will be a merger of the judgment of the High Court into the order of the Supreme Court dismissing the special leave petition. According to the doctrine of merger, the judgment of the lower court merges into the judgment of the higher court. Hence, if some reasons, however meagre, are given by this Court while dismissing the special leave petition, then by the doctrine of merger, the judgment of the High Court merges into the judgment of this Court and after merger there is no judgment of the High Court. Hence, obviously, there can be no review of a judgment which does not even exist.” (underlining by me) 34. The aforesaid observations, which are in the context of dismissal of Special Leave Petitions, would apply with greater force where the Special Leave Petitions are converted to appeals, which are then allowed. Even in such a case, the doctrine of merger would apply is the view of the Apex Court. The aforesaid observations, which are in the context of dismissal of Special Leave Petitions, would apply with greater force where the Special Leave Petitions are converted to appeals, which are then allowed. Even in such a case, the doctrine of merger would apply is the view of the Apex Court. Thus, in a situation where a judgment attains finality between rival parties, it is not only incorrect, but also wholly improper to reopen the issue. This would be so even for correcting an error which may emerge from subsequent adjudication, is the view of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 35. In the instant case, an attempt was made by the State to point out that a learned single judge of this Court in W.P.No.23041/2015 and W.P.Nos.23054-23092-98/2015, by his order dated 05/06/2015 recorded submissions of counsel for the impleading applicants to the effect that an anomalous situation had arisen on account of there being a direction to conduct election on the basis of existing delimitation of wards and it is in that context, these applications have been filed. It was submitted that the holding of election on the existing delimitation was an anomaly in the order dated 30/03/2015 and therefore in order to rectify the same, the applications were maintainable and had to be allowed. But having regard to the aforesaid dicta of the Hon’ble Supreme Court on various facets of doctrine of merger, which in my considered view, is squarely applicable to the present case, I do not think that the applications could be considered on the strength of order dated 05/06/2015 passed in W.P.No.23041/2015 and W.P. Nos. 23054-23092-98/2015. In that order neither has this Court accepted any anomalous situation arising from order dated 30/03/2015 nor has it reserved any liberty to the applicants, much less the State, to file any application in these writ petitions for rectification of any anomaly. 36. The reason as to why direction was issued to conduct election on the existing delimitation of wards and updated electoral rolls was having regard to the fact that the term of Civic Body was coming to an end on 22/04/2015 and rather than taking steps for holding election in time, the State Government had taken a decision not to hold election by 22/04/2015 and had given two reasons for the same, which were not accepted and which are evident from order dated 30/03/2015 and need not be highlighted again. 37. In order dated 30/03/2015 while answering as to how those reasons were not relevant for holding election in time particularly, having regard to the mandate of Article 243U of the Constitution, directions were issued for holding election by 30/05/2015. Therefore, the direction to conduct election on the existing delimitation of wards and updated electoral rolls must be read in the context of the reliefs sought by the petitioners and the rejection of reasons cited by the State Government in the context of the Constitutional mandate. If the State was so concerned with upholding Constitutional mandate, then it ought to have taken requisite steps for holding elections by 22/04/2015. The rejection of the reasons cited by the State Government for not holding election in time to the civic body by order dated 30/03/2015 has found favour with the Apex Court. Having regard to the circumstances of the case and the provisions of the Constitution and the earlier decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court applicable to the case, order dated 30/03/2015 was restored and the judgment of the Division Bench was set aside by the Apex Court. 38. The expression ‘restored’ is the quintessence of the ratio of the order dated 05/05/2015 passed by the Apex Court. Restoration of order dated 30/03/2015 passed in these writ petitions without any observations made by the Apex Court is in fact a complete restoration or restoration in toto and not a partial restoration of the said order. Having regard to the lapse of time and the practical difficulties involved in conducting an election, the date for conducting the election was extended by granting three months time to the State Election Commission from 05/05/2015 to complete the entire process. Except that aspect, no other portion of the order dated 30/03/2015 was interfered with by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In fact, at paragraph 3 of the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it has been noticed that a direction was issued in these writ petitions to conduct the election on the existing delimitation of wards and updated electoral rolls. The Hon’ble Supreme Court did not deem it necessary to interfere with those directions when order dated 30/03/2015 passed by this Bench was restored. Hence in my considered view, the doctrine of merger fully applies in the present case. The Hon’ble Supreme Court did not deem it necessary to interfere with those directions when order dated 30/03/2015 passed by this Bench was restored. Hence in my considered view, the doctrine of merger fully applies in the present case. Order dated 30/03/2015 of this Bench is subsumed in the appellate order of the Apex Court dated 05/05/2015 and therefore, this Court cannot at this stage amend/modify/clarify the order in any manner as that order has attained finality. 39. Moreover, by filing these applications, the applicants are in an orchestrated manner seeking review of order dated 30/03/2015. When once the parties to the lis have approached the superior Court and in the instant case, the Apex Court and the appeals have been allowed, there cannot be any resort to review of the order. It is a settled position of law that the remedy of review could be availed by a party to the lis only when there has been no appellate proceedings arising from the said lis. In this case, the State had filed the appeals before the Division Bench of this Court and when the intra court appeals were allowed, order dated 30/03/2015 passed in these writ petitions had merged with the order of the Division Bench and it was in fact substituted and the order passed in these writ petitions was no longer operational. Thereafter order dated 30/03/2015 has merged with the order of the Apex Court. Therefore, the State had no right and in fact, was barred from filing I.A.1/15 and therefore the said application is liable to be rejected with costs. 40. Further, as already noted when the Apex Court restored order dated 30/03/2015 passed in these writ petitions, it is only the Apex Court order, which is an order on merits, which would prevail and if at all any amendment/clarification or review has to be sought, it is only at the hands of the Apex Court. After the decision of the Apex Court, this Court has been denuded of its jurisdiction to entertain any application to modify the order passed by it. After the decision of the Apex Court, this Court has been denuded of its jurisdiction to entertain any application to modify the order passed by it. In this context, reliance could be placed on the following decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court: (a) In Rapti Commission Agency v. State of U.P. and others [ (2006) 6 SCC 522 ], it has been held that correctness of decisions of the Supreme Court cannot be subject to adjudication by the High Court and the High Court cannot sit in judgment over the correctness of the judgments of the Supreme Court. (b) In U.P.State Road Transport Corporation v. State of U.P. and another [2005 (1) SC 444], it has been held that the High Court cannot examine and redecide an issue already decided by the Supreme Court in an earlier proceeding. While alluding to the principles of res judicata, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has also opined that res judicata applies also as between the two stages in the same litigation to this extent that the Court, whether the trial Court or a High Court having at an earlier stage decided a matter in one way, cannot allow parties to reagitate the matter again at a subsequent stage of the same proceeding. 41. In the instant case, the applications are in substance, seeking review of the directions given in the order dated 30/03/2015, which order on being affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court has attained finality and in my view, cannot be interfered with. 42. The maxim ‘interest Republicae ut sit finis litium’ means that it is for the public good that there should be an end to litigation after a hierarchy of appeals. At some stage, it is necessary to put a quietus, which means, that it is for the public good that there should be an end of litigation after a long hierarchy of appeals. 43. When a judgment is rendered by the Supreme Court, which is after the case has gone through a hierarchy of Courts and once the Supreme Court renders its decision, the controversy between the parties must end. Filing of applications before the High Court after the judgment of the High Court has been affirmed by the Supreme Court, is contrary to the doctrine of finality. In a country governed by a rule of law, finality of the judgment is absolutely imperative. Filing of applications before the High Court after the judgment of the High Court has been affirmed by the Supreme Court, is contrary to the doctrine of finality. In a country governed by a rule of law, finality of the judgment is absolutely imperative. Permitting parties to reopen concluded judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court by filing applications before an inferior Court, is clearly an abuse of the process of law and would have far reaching adverse impact on the dispensation of justice. 44. In fact, even a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a Special Leave Petition cannot be assailed by way of a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution before that very Court vide Gurbachan Singh v. Union of India [ (1996) 3 SCC 117 ]. 45. On the doctrine of finality, in the case of M.Nagabhushana v. State of Karnataka and Others ( (2011) 3 SCC 408 ), it has been observed as under: “That principle of finality of litigation is based on high principle of public policy. In the absence of such a principle great oppression might result under the color and pretence of law inasmuch as there will be no end of litigation and a rich and malicious litigant will succeed in infinitely vexing this opponent by repetitive suits and actions. This may compel the weaker party to relinquish his right. The doctrine of res judicata has been evolved to prevent such an anarchy. That is why it is perceived that the plea of res judicata is not a technical doctrine but a fundamental principle which sustains the rule of law in ensuring finality in litigation. This principle seeks to promote honesty and a fair administration of justice and to prevent abuse in the matter of accessing court for agitating on issues which have become final between the parties.” 46. In Rupa Ashok v. Ashok Hurra [(2002) 4 SCC 388], Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the law declared by the court is the law of the land; it is precedent for itself and for all the courts/tribunals and authorities in India (Article 141 of the Constitution). In a judgment there will be declaration of law and its application to the facts of the case to render a decision on the dispute between the parties to the lis. 47. In a judgment there will be declaration of law and its application to the facts of the case to render a decision on the dispute between the parties to the lis. 47. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also observed that apart from the doctrine of finality, the concept of certainty and continuity are essential ingredients of rule of law. 48. Then, question would arise as to whether merely because applicants, other than State, who were not parties in these writ petitions, could agitate the matters afresh by filing separate writ petitions and therefore, seek impleadment in these disposed of matters and seek modification of order dated 30/03/2015. In my view, these applicants have no locus standi to file these applications particularly, when these writ petitions are disposed by order dated 30/03/2015 which order has been affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. If they were aggrieved by order dated 30/03/2015 they could have resorted to the appellate remedy. Not having done so, they have no right to implead themselves in these writ petitions which have been disposed and seek modification of the order passed in these writ petitions on the strength of another order passed by a learned single judge of this Court. This is not a case where these impleading applicants were necessary parties to these writ petitions and therefore they ought to have been heard before deciding the question relating to Article 243U of the Constitution. That question was considered in the context of the relief sought by the petitioners herein and having regard to the mandate of the Constitution and judgments of the Supreme Court on the point. Any person who is a stranger to a proceeding cannot complain that he or she was not heard in the matter. It is for that reason courts have held that a stranger to lis cannot file a review petition. It is only a person or a party who necessarily had to be heard before passing the order or judgment who could file a review or an appeal as of right and assail an order or judgment. In the circumstances, these applicants not having any locus standi to maintain these applications, the same have to be dismissed with costs. 49. It is only a person or a party who necessarily had to be heard before passing the order or judgment who could file a review or an appeal as of right and assail an order or judgment. In the circumstances, these applicants not having any locus standi to maintain these applications, the same have to be dismissed with costs. 49. Therefore Point No.1 is answered against the applicants and the applications for impleadment as well as for modification of order dated 30/03/2015, would have to be dismissed on the ground that they are not maintainable. 50. In view of the above, application for impleadment filed by the petitioner, who had filed the Public Interest Litigation and who succeeded before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, would not survive for consideration and the same is also dismissed. Reg. Point No.2: 51. In view of answer to Point No.1 being in the negative, Point No.2 would not survive for consideration and is accordingly answered. 52. It is a matter of regret that the applicants particularly, the State, by filing the applications seeking modification of order dated 30/03/2015, which has merged with the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, have attempted to subvert judicial discipline. This Court has no power or jurisdiction to modify or review the order, which was the subject matter of challenge before the Division Bench in an intracourt appeal and thereafter, before the Hon’ble Supreme Court after the challenge made by the petitioners herein has succeeded. Judicial propriety and discipline which are the hallmarks of dispensation of justice cannot be compromised at the instance of any party. Any entertainment of the applications herein, would be an affront to the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The filing of these applications by the applicants is an abuse of the process of this Court and contrary to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court arising from this very matter. The principle of finality of litigation is based on public policy, which cannot be diluted on account of misconceived applications. The State has been a party throughout the proceedings in this matter at various levels. After being unsuccessful before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, an attempt is being made to reopen the order passed by this Court and seek fresh directions which would inevitably lead to violation of the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The State has been a party throughout the proceedings in this matter at various levels. After being unsuccessful before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, an attempt is being made to reopen the order passed by this Court and seek fresh directions which would inevitably lead to violation of the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. If the prayers sought by the applicants were to be granted, then it would be an instance of not only judicial indiscipline but also, lead to violation of the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court issued in the very matter. It would also be contrary to Article 141 of the Constitution. 53. Judicial pronouncements, unlike sand dunes, are known for their stability and finality – Meghamala and others v. G.Narasimha Reddy and others [ (2010) 8 SCC 383 ]. 54. Therefore, all the applications [except I.A.No.IV/2015], are dismissed with costs, as these applications filed by the applicants including the State, are not only an abuse of the process of this Court but contrary to the principle of finality of litigation and have taken up considerable time of this Court. Applicants in I.A.Nos.V/2015, VIII/2015 and IX/2015, have only filed impleading applications without seeking any further prayers, which in my view, is not only frivolous but an instance of taking this Court for granted, which is deprecated. I.A.I/2015 filed by the State is dismissed with cost of Rs.10,000/[Rupees ten thousand only], payable to each petitioner. The applications filed by the other applicants are dismissed with cost of Rs.1,000/[Rupees one thousand only], payable by each of the applicants to each petitioner, on every application filed by them, other than the applicant in I.A.No.IV/2015. 55. Respondentauthorities are directed to comply with the spirit of the order dated 30/03/2015 and the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court dated 05/05/2015, by issuing the necessary notifications and taking requisite steps for holding the election in terms of the time stipulated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The directions at Para No.53(ii), (iii) and (iv) of order dated 30/03/2015 are reiterated, except the dates mentioned therein, so as to comply with the direction of the Hon’ble Supreme Court given to the State Election Commission. State Election Commission to particularly, ensure that the election to B.B.M.P. is held within the time stipulated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The directions at Para No.53(ii), (iii) and (iv) of order dated 30/03/2015 are reiterated, except the dates mentioned therein, so as to comply with the direction of the Hon’ble Supreme Court given to the State Election Commission. State Election Commission to particularly, ensure that the election to B.B.M.P. is held within the time stipulated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Operative portion of this order to be made available to all learned counsel for the parties, for taking necessary action in the matter, under the signature and seal of the Court Officer of this Court. Sd/JUDGE. msu/*mvs