JUDGMENT 1. By way of this petition, the petitioner has prayed to quash and set aside the order (1) dated 25.03.2011 passed by Respondent No.1- Secretary (Appeals), Revenue Department, in Revision Application No. 10/2009, (2) order dated 22.09.2009 passed by Respondent No.2-Collector, Vadodara, in Appeal No. 4/2009 as well as order dated 12.01.2009 passed by Respondent No.3-Dy. Collector in Case No.11/2005. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner become owner of an immovable property by virtue of a will and an entry to that effect came to be made in Revenue Record vide Entry No.2685 on 15.02.1990. Pursuant thereto, the petitioner made an application for N.A. Permission to Respondent No.2 on 06.12.2004. According to the petitioner, as per proviso to Section 65 of Code, the N.A. permission was deemed to be granted. However, on 10.08.2005, Respondent No.2 passed an order rejecting the application of the petitioner. The petitioner was, then, issued a notice by Respondent No.3 on 22.12.2005 under Section 79A of the Code and same was registered as Case No.11/2005 and Respondent No.3 rejected the contentions taken by the petitioner and passed an order to vest the land with the Government. Being aggrieved with the same, the petitioner preferred an appeal before Respondent No.2, who dismissed the appeal of the petitioner. Against the order of Respondent No.2, the petitioner approached Respondent No.1 by way of Revision, who also dismissed the same. Hence, the present petition. 3. At the outset, Mr. Sanjanwala, learned Sr. Advocate, vehemently relied on a decision of the Division Bench of this Court rendered in Letters Patent Appeal No. 2117 of 2011, Dated :08.11.2012, in the case of “CHANDULAL GORDHANDAS RANODRIYA AND ORS. VS. STATE OF GUJARAT THROUGH SECRETARY AND ORS.”. In Paragraph-22 of the aforesaid judgment, this Court has observed as under; “22. At this stage, we may now consider the second part of Mr.Majmudar's submissions that his clients i.e. the appellants, are ready and willing to deposit the amount of premium which the authorities may fix for the purpose of getting the land converted from new tenure to old tenure. At this stage, we may now consider the second part of Mr.Majmudar's submissions that his clients i.e. the appellants, are ready and willing to deposit the amount of premium which the authorities may fix for the purpose of getting the land converted from new tenure to old tenure. If the appellants want to put the land in question to a Non Agricultural Use, then it is mandatory for them to get the land converted from new tenure to old tenure and for that purpose ordinarily the original owner has to prefer such an application i.e. in the present case Babarbhai, who was the protected tenant holding the land in question. However, almost 28 years have elapsed and we do not know whether as on date Shri Babarbhai is alive or not and what is the position so far as his legal heirs are concerned. In such circumstances, we permit the appellants to prefer an appropriate application before the competent authority with a prayer that the new tenure land be converted to old tenure land by fixing the amount of premium payable as on today. If such an application is preferred by the appellants in accordance with law within a period of four weeks from today, then the competent authority shall determine the amount of premium due and payable as on today and inform about the same to the appellants. The appellants on being informed about the amount of premium to be paid shall immediately deposit the requisite amount with the competent authority. On such amount of premium being deposited by the appellants, the competent authority shall thereafter proceed to consider the application of the appellants for putting the land for Non-Agricultural use.” 4. Following sections are involved in this litigation, namely Sections 43, 63 and 84-C of the Gujarat Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act and Sections 65, 66 and 79-A of the Bombay Land Revenue Code. On the plank of the submission, Mr. Sanjanwala contended that the impugned orders are nonest, non-speaking and are not based on germane facts. It is submitted that the entries which are mutated in the year 1990 were taken-up in sue moto challenge in the year 2005, despite the facts that in the year 1991, some proceedings like notice etc. On the plank of the submission, Mr. Sanjanwala contended that the impugned orders are nonest, non-speaking and are not based on germane facts. It is submitted that the entries which are mutated in the year 1990 were taken-up in sue moto challenge in the year 2005, despite the facts that in the year 1991, some proceedings like notice etc. were initiated, which were never fully acted upon for a period of about 14 years and all of a sudden in the year 2005 proceedings were initiated and the petitioner was being subjected to all these technical hurdles for a noble cause, like opening a medical facilitation centre in a small village like Bhaili. 5. Per Contra, Mr. Raval, learned AGP for the Respondents, submitted that Section 79-A would squarely apply and the proceedings under Section 43-A of the Bombay land Revenue Code is properly initiated. He, further, submitted that this is a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and the petitioner cannot get any benefit as he became owner of the land by virtue of a will, though, he is not an agriculturalist. Therefore, the mutation entry, itself, being nonest was taken-up in sue moto revision by the competent authorities in a reasonable time, since, the petitioner wanted to get his land converted into non-agricultural land, though, it was a new tenure land. 6. Heard. From a perusal of the material on record it appears that the present petitioner came into possession of the land in question by way of a will executed by one Babubhai Melabhai, who was the original owner. From the record it also transpires that on the basis of the said will, an entry was mutated in the record of rights in favour of the present petitioner, being Revenue Entry No.2685, on 15.02.1990. Not only that, even Talati certified the said entry on 21.03.1990, observing that there was no breach of law. Then, the petitioner applied for conversion of land from agriculture to non-agriculture one and upto that stage, the competent authority did not raise any objection against the Revenue Entry No. 2685. So far as the application of the petitioner for conversion of land is concerned, here, it would be relevant to refer to the provisions of Section 65 of the Code, which reads as under; “65. So far as the application of the petitioner for conversion of land is concerned, here, it would be relevant to refer to the provisions of Section 65 of the Code, which reads as under; “65. Uses to which occupant of land for purposes of agriculture may put his land - (1) Any occupant, of land [assessed or held for the purpose of agriculture] is entitled by himself, his servants, tenants, agents, or other legal representatives, to erect farm-buildings, construct wells or tanks, or make any other improvements thereon for the better cultivation of the land, or its more convenient [use for the purpose aforesaid]. Procedure if occupant wishes to apply his land to any other purpose.-But, if any occupant [wishes to use his holding or any part thereof for any other purpose] the Collector’s permission shall in the first place be applied for by the occupant. [The Collector, on receipt of such application, (a) shall send to the applicant a written acknowledgment of its receipt, and (b) may, after due inquiry, either grant or refuse the permission applied for; Provided that, where the Collector fails to inform the applicant of his decision of the application with a period of three months, the permission applied for shall be deemed to have been granted; such period shall, if the Collector sends a written acknowledgment within seven days from the date of receipt of the application, be reckoned from the date of acknowledgment, but in any other case it shall be reckoned from the date of receipt of the application. Unless the Collector shall in particular instances otherwise direct, no such application shall be recognized except it be made by the occupant. …” 7. Thus, as stated above, the provisions of Section 65 of the Code lays down that, if, the Collector fails to communicate his decision on such an application within a period of three months, then, the permission shall be deemed to have been granted. Admittedly, in the instant case, the Collector did not communicate his decision to the petitioner within three months and instead passed an order dated 10.08.2005, rejecting the application of the petitioner for N.A. Permission. Admittedly, in the instant case, the Collector did not communicate his decision to the petitioner within three months and instead passed an order dated 10.08.2005, rejecting the application of the petitioner for N.A. Permission. Thus, there is clear breach of provisions of Section 65 of the Code by the Collector, since, he failed to take any decision on the application of the present petitioner for N.A. Permission within three months, and therefore, the passing of the impugned order after expiry of three months is bad in law. Thus, once it becomes clear that the order dated 10.08.2005 passed by the Collector was in contravention of the relevant provisions of the Code, all the subsequent proceedings initiated by the competent authorities of issuance of notice under Section 79A of the Code etc. cannot be sustained in the eye of law. Therefore, though, provisions of Section 79-A are vehemently pressed into service by the Respondent-State, they ought to have been invoked once the State authorities came to know that the petitioner was not entitled or entitled to hold the land in question at the very first instance. Having relinquished their right for a period of about 25 years, i.e. the period from 1991 till 2005, the State cannot, now, invoke the aforesaid provisions in view of the above stated decision of this Court. Hence, the submission made by Mr. Raval in that regard falls to the ground. 8. This takes this Court to the provisions of Section 84-C. Section 84-C was never invoked by the State authorities, despite the fact that the State could have invoked the same. Therefore, it does not lie for the State to now take resort to provisions of Section 84-C and the submission of Mr. Raval in that regard also falls to the ground. 9. So far as the provisions of Section 43 are concerned, the State has taken no clear stand. Therefore, the main plank on which this petition requires to be allowed is that there is belated exercise of power by the State, once having relinquished their right after giving notice to the petitioner in the year 1991. The fact that the petitioner came into possession of the land in question by way of a will was also never objected to, though, initial objection was tried to be raised by issuing a notice to the petitioner in the year 1991, as stated above. The fact that the petitioner came into possession of the land in question by way of a will was also never objected to, though, initial objection was tried to be raised by issuing a notice to the petitioner in the year 1991, as stated above. But, thereafter, the State relinquished its right till 2005 and did not do anything in the matter. Hence, mutation entry cannot be said to be bad in law. There is genuine lack of jurisdiction with the authorities concerned in passing the impugned orders and the notice issued to the petitioner is bad in law. However, it goes without saying that in light of the decision of the Division Bench of this Court referred to herein above, since, the present petitioner has shown willingness to pay the premium, the authority shall determine the same. 10. In the result, this petition is ALLOWED. The orders dated 25.03.2011, 22.09.2009 and 12.01.2009 are QUASHED and set aside. The petitioner will make a FRESH application to the authorities concerned to determine the amount of premium and the authorities will consider and decide the same ON MERITS and in accordance with law, at the earliest. Rule is made absolute, accordingly.