JUDGMENT : S.C. Sharma, J. The petitioner before this Court, M.P. State Road Transport Corporation, has filed this present writ petition being aggrieved by the order dated 19.6.2014 passed by the Principal Judge, Industrial Court, Indore in C.A. No. 11/MPIR/14. The learned Member Judge has affirmed the order dated 7.10.2010 passed in Case No. 18/1999. Facts of the case reveal that the sole respondent who is present before this Court is partially paralysed, was terminated by order dt. 21.11.1998. The respondent employee assailed the aforesaid order by filing an application under section 31(3) of the MP Industrial Relations Act before the Labour Court and the Labour Court has finally directed reinstatement of the workman by order dt. 18.9.2002 with full backwages. Thereafter an appeal was preferred by the M.P. Road Transport Corporation and the Industrial Court by order dt. 7.7.2005 upheld the order of reinstatement, however, the order relating to grant of backwages was modified and the present petitioner was directed to pay 50% of the backwages to the workman. The order passed by the Industrial Court and the Labour Court were subjected to judicial scrutiny by filing a Writ Petition and this Court, vide order dt. 1.2.2010 has remanded the matter back to the Labour Court. The Labour Court has once again decided the matter by order dt. 7.12.2010 and has directed reinstatement of the workman with full backwages. 2. The present petitioner has thereafter preferred an appeal against the order dt. 7.10.2010 passed by the learned Labour Judge in Case No. 18/1999 in the year 2014, meaning thereby, after a lapse of 4 years and the Industrial Tribunal has dismissed the appeal as barred by limitation. 3. In the present case, the document enclosed at page 20 dated 22.1.1994 reflects that Shivsingh the sole respondent was assigned a duty on 1.9.1993 in respect of Truck No. 2340 and he was required to tow vehicle No. MBO 932 upto Mhow workshop, the same was done by him, however, it was alleged that in the workshop Mr. Shivsingh drove the truck over a sharp object which resulted in bursting of the front tyre and also reported on duty with delay. Shivsingh drove the truck over a sharp object which resulted in bursting of the front tyre and also reported on duty with delay. He was charge sheeted for the aforesaid act and has been dismissed from service, meaning thereby, he was charge sheeted because of bursting of front tyre of truck and reporting on duty with delay, the respondents after holding a Departmental Enquiry, have dismissed him from service. The order of dismissal was subjected to judicial scrutiny and the Labour Court by order dt. 18.9.2002 has arrived at a conclusion that he was not responsible in the matter and the Departmental Enquiry was not conducted in consonance with the statutory provisions governing the field. 4. As already stated earlier, an appeal was preferred and the Industrial Court by order dt. 7.7.2005 has affirmed reinstatement of the workman. The matter was heard by this Court in Writ Petition No. 2108/2007 (s) and the matter was remanded back to the Labour Court. It is pertinent to note that certain documents which were enclosed along with the Writ Petition were relating to the domestic enquiry, were not before the Labour Court and in those circumstances, the matter was remanded back to the Labour Court. The Labour Court has again decided the matter. The order passed by the Labour Court is on record as Annexure P/5 dt. 7.10.2010. The order passed by the Labour Court reflects that on 4.9.2010 both the parties including the present petitioner - MP State Road Transport have stated before the Labour Court that they do not want to lead any further evidence. It was also stated that the workman was not responsible in late coming of the vehicle and for the alleged misconduct. The Corporation was also not able to prove the misconduct before the Labour Court and in those circumstances, the Labour Court has directed reinstatement of the workman with backwages. Though the order was passed on 7.10.2010, the appeal was preferred by the present petitioner Corporation in the year 2014 for the reasons best known to the Corporation and the appeal has been dismissed as barred by limitation. 5. In the present case, it is pertinent to note that the order of the Labour Court was passed by Mr. P.R. Trivedi as a Labour Judge and the order passed by the Industrial Court has been passed again by Mr. 5. In the present case, it is pertinent to note that the order of the Labour Court was passed by Mr. P.R. Trivedi as a Labour Judge and the order passed by the Industrial Court has been passed again by Mr. P.R. Trivedi, Presiding Officer and, therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, the order passed by the Industrial Court deserves to be set aside and is accordingly set aside. 6. Normally, this Court would have relegated the matter to the Industrial Court for decision of the same, however, it has been brought to the notice of this Court that there is only one Member i.e., Mr. P.R. Trivedi. 7. The Apex Court in the case of B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India and others, (1995) 6 SCC 749 , The Apex Court, in paragraphs 22 to 26 has held as under: "22. The aforesaid has, therefore, to be avoided and I have no doubt that a High Court would be within its jurisdiction to modify the punishment/penalty by moulding the relief, which power it undoubtedly has, in view of long line of decisions of this Court, to which reference is not deemed necessary, as the position is well settled in law. It may, however, be stated that this power of moulding relief in cases of the present nature can be invoked by a High Court only when the punishment/penalty awarded shocks the judicial conscience. 23. It deserves to be pointed out that the mere fact that there is no provision parallel to Article 142 relating to the High Courts, can be no ground to think that they have not to do complete justice between the parties, the same cannot be ordered. Absence of provision like Article 142 is not material, according to me. This may be illustrated by pointing out that despite there being no provision in the Constitution parallel to Article 137 conferring power of review on the High Court, this Court held as early as 1961 in Shivdeo Singh and Others Vs. State of Punjab and Others, AIR 1963 SC 1909 , that the High Courts too can exercise power of review, which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction. State of Punjab and Others, AIR 1963 SC 1909 , that the High Courts too can exercise power of review, which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction. I would say that power to do complete justice also inheres in every Court, not to speak of a Court of plenary jurisdiction like a High Court of course, this power is not as wide which this Court has under Article 142 . That, however, is a different matter. 24. What has been stated above may be buttressed by putting the matter a little differently. The same is that in a case of dismissal, Article 21 gets attracted. And, in view of the inter-dependence of fundamental rights, which concept was first accepted in the case commonly known as Bank Nationalisation case, 1970 (3) SCR 530 which thinking was extended to cases attracting Article 21 in Mrs. Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, (1978) 1 SCC 248 , the punishment/penalty awarded has to be reasonable; and if it be unreasonable. Article 14 would be violated. That Article 14 gets attracted in a case of disproportionate punishment was the view of this Court in Bhagat Ram Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and Others, (1983) 2 SCC 442 , also. Now if Article 14 were to be violated, it cannot be doubted that a High Court can take care of the same by substituting, in appropriate cases, a punishment deemed reasonable by it. 25. No doubt, while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Courts have to bear in mind the restraints inherent in exercising power of judicial review. It is because of this that substitution of High Court's view regarding appropriate punishment is not permissible. But for this constraint, I would have thought that the law makers do desire application of judicial mind to the question of even proportionality of punishment/penalty. I have said so because the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was amended to insert section 11-A in it to confer this power even on a Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal. It may be that this power was conferred on these adjudicating authorities because of the prevalence of unfair labour practice or victimisation by the management. Even so, the power under section 11-A is available to be exercised, even if there be no victimisation or taking recourse to unfair labour practice. It may be that this power was conferred on these adjudicating authorities because of the prevalence of unfair labour practice or victimisation by the management. Even so, the power under section 11-A is available to be exercised, even if there be no victimisation or taking recourse to unfair labour practice. In this background, I do not think if we would be justified in giving much weight to the decision of the employer on the question of appropriate punishment in service matters relating to Government employees or employees of the public corporations. I have said so because if need for maintenance of office discipline be the reason of our adopting a strict attitude qua the public servants, discipline has to be maintained in the industrial sector also. The availability of appeal etc. to public servants does not make a real difference, as the appellate/revisional authority is known to have taken a different view on the question of sentence only rarely. I would, therefore, think that but for the self-imposed limitation while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution, there is no inherent reason to disallow application of judicial mind to the question of proportionately of punishment/penalty. But then, while seized with this question as a writ Court interference is permissible only when the punishment/penalty is shockingly disproportionate. 26. I had expressed my unhappiness qua the first facet of the case, as Chief Justice of the Orissa High Court in paras 20 and 21 of Krishna Chandra Pallai Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, AIR 1992 Ori 261 , by asking why the power of doing complete justice has been denied to the High Courts? I feel happy that I have been able to state, as a Judge of the Apex Court, that the High Courts too are to do complete justice. This is also the result of what has been held in the leading judgment." 8. In the present case, even though an order has been passed in favour of the petitioner on 18.9.2002, he is running from pillar to post. Earlier also this Court has remanded the matter back to the Labour Court for deciding the matter afresh and the Labour Court has decided it afresh. There is no Forum available to the present petitioner as the only Member available in the Industrial Tribunal is Mr. Earlier also this Court has remanded the matter back to the Labour Court for deciding the matter afresh and the Labour Court has decided it afresh. There is no Forum available to the present petitioner as the only Member available in the Industrial Tribunal is Mr. P.R. Trivedi and, therefore, as an exceptional case, in the light of the judgment delivered in the case of B.C. Chaturvedi (supra), in order to reach to a logical conclusion, this Court is deciding the legality and validity of the order passed by the Labour Court. 9. The order of the Labour Court dated 7.12.2010 reflects that the Corporation was not able to establish the misconduct levelled against the workman. Not only this, the misconduct as reflected from the document which is on record dt. 22.1.94 and the allegation that he was responsible for delay of a bus in not a very serious misconduct. The Corporation was not able to establish the misconduct before the Labour Court also and in those circumstances, the Labour Court has directed reinstatement of the workman with full backwages. 10. Opportunity was also granted to the Corporation to establish misconduct on account of documentary evidence, however, the Corporation was not able to establish misconduct before this Court also. 11. This Court is of the considered opinion that the order of the Labour Court which is based upon findings of fact does not warrant any interference. Resultantly, order dt. 7.12.2010 passed by the Labour Court is upheld. Respondents are directed to comply order of the Labour Court as well as the order passed by this Court within 30 days, especially keeping in view that the matter dates back to the year 2002. The Writ Petition stands partially allowed.