JUDGMENT MANINDRA MOHAN SHRIVASTAVA, J. 1. This appeal is directed against impugned judgment of conviction and sentence dated 7-4-98 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Sakti in Sessions Trial No. 128/07 whereby the appellants have been convicted and sentenced as described below :- 2. As per prosecution story, Navdha Bai was married to appellant-Ramayandas. For marriage of brother of Navdha Bai, a loan was taken from the appellants, which was not being repaid. Navdha Bai was being repeatedly subjected to harassment, cruelty and she was left behind in her parental house, pregnancy was aborted. The loan amount of Rs. 6,000/- was repaid with interest, total amounting to Rs. 9,075/- on 24-9-1996 in the presence of witnesses in Panchayat meeting. After three months, on 18-12-1996, Navdha Bai was found dead in the village well near her house. A merg intimation in Ex. P/16 was recorded on the information given by Bagwan Das. Police, after arriving at the scene of occurrence, gave notices to the witnesses and inquest over dead body was prepared and dead body was sent for post-mortem. Dr. D. D. Mishra (PW14) conducted post-mortem and prepared post-mortem report in Ex. P/14 wherein he stated the cause of death to be Asphyxia as a result of consumption of insecticide found in the stomach. Thereafter, FIR in Ex. P/17 was recorded in the Police Station, followed by investigation and filing of charge-sheet alleging commission of offence under Section 304-B and Section 498-A of IPC against the appellants and Phuleshwari, the mother-in-law. Relying upon the evidence led by the prosecution, learned trial Court held the appellants guilty of commission of offence under Section 304-B and Section 498-A of IPC and sentenced as described above which has been assailed by the appellant by filing instant appeal. 3. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that conviction of the appellants under Section 304-B, IPC is not sustainable in law as the prosecution has failed to prove, by leading cogent and reliable evidence, that the alleged cruelty was in connection with demand of dowry. According to him, the prosecution witnesses have stated that after marriage, there was some dispute. For marriage of the brother of the deceased, loan was taken and as the loan was not being repaid by the parents and family members of the deceased, she was being harassed and subjected to cruelty. According to him, the prosecution witnesses have stated that after marriage, there was some dispute. For marriage of the brother of the deceased, loan was taken and as the loan was not being repaid by the parents and family members of the deceased, she was being harassed and subjected to cruelty. The entire evidence of the prosecution, even if taken as it is, there is no iota of evidence that cruelty, if any, was in connection with demand of dowry. Therefore, one of the essential ingredients of commission of offence under Section 304-B of IPC i.e. cruelty in connection with demand of dowry is not proved and therefore, the appellants could not be convicted for the alleged offence. Learned counsel for the appellants argued that merely on proof of cruelty, no presumption can be drawn that the cruelty was in connection with demand of dowry. All the essential ingredients are required to be proved by the prosecution and it is only when the ingredients are proved beyond reasonable doubt that presumption of dowry death having been caused can be drawn under the law. It is next contended that even the allegation of cruelty is not proved by clinching and reliable evidence. The evidence of the brother-Sukhdas (PW1) and mother-Punibai (PW4) suffers from contradiction and omission and no specific overt act constituting cruelty has been stated but vague and general allegations have been made. In the background of admitted position that loan was taken and that was not being repaid, there might be some displeasure or scolding by the appellants but that would not be sufficient to constitute cruelty so as to prove commission of offence under Section 498-A, IPC. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the appellants relied upon judgments in Appasaheb and Another vs. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 9 SCC 721 : AIR 2007 SC 763 ; Vipin Jaiswal (A-1) vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2013) 3 SCC 684 : AIR 2013 SC 1567 and Modinsab Kasimsab Kanchagar vs. State of Karnataka and Another, (2013) 4 SCC 551 : AIR 2013 SC 1504 . 4. 4. Per contra, learned counsel for the State supported the judgment of conviction and argued that soon after marriage of the deceased, till her death, within a short span of less than one year, the deceased was subjected to cruelty in many ways and it related to demand of money as has been stated by her brother-Sukhdas (PW 1) and mother-Punibai (PW 4) as also other prosecution witnesses who are not interested but respectable inhabitants of the locality of the parties. Merely because, there was some money taken which was repaid in the month of September, 1996, the allegations of demand of money, which obviously were in connection with dowry, cannot be said to be after-thought. The deceased died in suspicious circumstances. Her dead body was found in a well just outside the house in the village square and death was caused by consumption of insecticide as has been reported by the doctor. The deceased was also subjected to abortion of her 3-4 months pregnancy. The incident happened within one year of her marriage. Therefore, these prove facts make out commission of offence both under Section 304-B and Section 498-A, IPC. 5. As the pivotal issue arising for consideration in this case is whether evidence led by the prosecution proves all the ingredients of commission of offence under Section 304-B, IPC, it is opposite to examine the statutory provisions and the principles judicially evolved and settled by the Courts. 6. In the case of Manohar Lal vs. State of Haryana, (2014) 9 SCC 645 : AIR 2014 SC 2555 the Supreme Court examined the scope and ambit of provisions contained under Section 304-B of IPC and the necessary ingredients which are required to be proved before conviction can be ordered. It was held as under : 18. For the purpose of the said section, a presumption can be raised only on proof of the following essentials : (a) Death of a woman was caused by burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under a normal circumstance. (b) Such death took place within seven years of her marriage. (c) The woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives. (d) Such cruelty or harassment was for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry. (e) Such cruelty or harassment was soon before her death. (b) Such death took place within seven years of her marriage. (c) The woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives. (d) Such cruelty or harassment was for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry. (e) Such cruelty or harassment was soon before her death. In this connection, we may refer the decision of this Court in Kaliyaperumal vs. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2003 SC 3828 . 7. In the case of Sunil Bajaj vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2001 (9) SCC 417 : AIR 2001 SC 3020 , pp. 3021-3022, Paras 5-6) the Supreme Court held: (SCC pp. 420-421 paras 5 and 6) 5. We have given our attention and consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. Normally this Court will be slow and reluctant, as it ought to be, to upset the order of conviction of the trial Court as confirmed by the High Court appreciating the evidence placed on record. But in cases where both the courts concurrently recorded a finding that the accused was guilty of an offence in the absence of evidence satisfying the necessary ingredients of an offence, in other words, when no offence was made out, it becomes necessary to disturb such an order of conviction and sentence to meet the demand of justice. In order to convict an accused for an offence under Section 304-B, IPC, the following essentials must be satisfied : (1) The death of a woman must have been caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under normal circumstances. (2) Such death must have occurred within 7 years of her marriage. (3) Soon before her death, the woman must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or by relatives of her husband. (4) Such cruelty or harassment must be for or in connection with demand of dowry. 6. It is only when the aforementioned ingredients are established by acceptable evidence such death shall be called dowry death and such husband or his relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. It may be noticed that punishment for the offence of dowry death under Section 304-B is imprisonment of not less than 7 years, which may extended to imprisonment for life. It may be noticed that punishment for the offence of dowry death under Section 304-B is imprisonment of not less than 7 years, which may extended to imprisonment for life. Unlike under Section 498-A, IPC, husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty shall be liable for imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Normally, in a criminal case the accused can be punished for an offence on establishment of commission of that offence on the basis of evidence, may be direct or circumstantial or both. But in case of an offence under Section 304-B, IPC, an exception is made by deeming provision as to nature of death as dowry death and that the husband or his relative, as the case may be, is deemed to have caused such death, even in the absence of evidence to prove these aspects but on proving the existence of the ingredients of the said offence by convincing evidence. Hence, there is need for greater care and caution, that too having regard to the gravity of the punishment prescribed for the said offence, in scrutinizing the evidence and in arriving at the conclusion as to whether all the abovementioned ingredients of the offence are proved by the prosecution. In the case on hand, the learned counsel for the appellant could not dispute that the first two ingredients mentioned above are satisfied. 8. The expression soon before her death used in Section 304-B of IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act was also considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Hira Lal vs. State of NCT of Delhi, 2003 (8) SCC 80 : AIR 2003 SC 2865 , pp. 2867-2868, Para 8) which reads as under (SCC pp. 85, 86, Para 8). 8. 2867-2868, Para 8) which reads as under (SCC pp. 85, 86, Para 8). 8. Section 304-B, IPC which deals with dowry death, reads as follows : 304-B. Dowry death - (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called dowry death- , and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation - For the purpose of this sub-section, dowry- shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961). (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life. The provision has application when death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relatives of her husband for, or in connection with any demand for dowry. In order to attract application of Section 304-B, IPC, the essential ingredients are as follows : (i) The death of a woman should be caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under normal circumstance. (ii) Such a death should have occurred within seven years of her marriage. (iii) She must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband. (iv) Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand of dowry. (v) Such cruelty or harassment is shown to have been meted out to the woman soon before her death. Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is also relevant for the case at hand. Both Section 304-B, IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act were inserted as noted earlier by Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act 43 of 1986 with a view to combat the increasing menace of dowry deaths. Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is also relevant for the case at hand. Both Section 304-B, IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act were inserted as noted earlier by Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act 43 of 1986 with a view to combat the increasing menace of dowry deaths. Section 113-B reads as follows : 113-B. Presumption as to dowry death - When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation - For the purposes of this section, dowry death- shall have the same meaning as in Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860). The necessity for insertion of the two provisions has been amply analysed by the Law Commission of India in its 21st report dated 10-8-1988 on Dowry Deaths and Law Reform. Keeping in view the impediment in the pre-existing law in securing evidence to prove dowry-related deaths, the legislature thought it wise to insert a provision relating to presumption of dowry death on proof of certain essentials. It is in this background that presumptive Section 113-B in the Evidence Act has been inserted. As per the definition of dowry death in Section 304-B, IPC and the wording in the presumptive Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, one of the essential ingredients, amongst others, in both the provisions is that the woman concerned must have been soon before her death subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with the demand of dowry. Presumption under Section 113-B is a presumption of law. On proof of the essentials mentioned therein, it becomes obligatory on the Court to raise a preumption that the accused caused the dowry death. The presumption shall be raised only on proof of the following essentials : (1) The question before the Court must be whether the accused has committed the dowry death of the woman. (This means that the presumption can be raised only if the accused is being tried for the offene under Section 304-B, IPC.) (2) The woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives. (This means that the presumption can be raised only if the accused is being tried for the offene under Section 304-B, IPC.) (2) The woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives. (3) Such cruelty or harassment was for or in connection with any demand for dowry. (4) Such cruelty or harassment was soon before her death. 9. The evidence on record is required to be examined, keeping in view the aforesaid principles and the ingredients of commission of offence under Section 304-B, IPC. 10. There is overwhelming evidence on record that deceased Navdha Bai died in suspicious circumstances. Merg intimation proved by the Investigation Officer - S. D. Mahant (PW21) in Ex. P/16 has been recorded at the instance of one of the appellants-Bhagwan Das wherein, it has been stated that some of the villagers gave a call that Navdha Bai jumped into the well whereafter Ramlal, Surendralal and Mevalal arrived at the spot, Navdha Bai was taken out from the well and she was found dead. Postmortem report (Ex. P/14) has been proved by Dr. D. D. Mishra (PW 14), who has stated in his evidence before the Court that upon internal examination, insecticide was found in the stomach and cause of death was asphyxia due to the consumption of insecticide. The doctor also opined that this could be a case of suicide. Therefore, it is proved that Navdha Bai died unnatural death in suspicious circumstances. 11. In order to prove commission of offence under Section 304-B, IPC, prosecution is required to prove all the ingredients, which have been elaborately discussed hereinabove. One of the essential ingredients is that there must have been cruelty in connection with demand of dowry soon before death. Thus, in addition to proof of the fact of cruelty and such cruelty having been practiced soon before death, the prosecution is required to prove beyond reasonable doubt that such cruelty was in connection with dowry. The presumption of dowry death can be drawn only upon proof of all these ingredients which necessarily includes cruelty in connection with demand of dowry. Thus, cruelty for any other reason, would not bring the criminal overt act within the mischief of provision contained in Section 304-B, IPC, though such an overt act may render the accused liable for commission of offence under Section 498-A, IPC. 12. Thus, cruelty for any other reason, would not bring the criminal overt act within the mischief of provision contained in Section 304-B, IPC, though such an overt act may render the accused liable for commission of offence under Section 498-A, IPC. 12. The word dowry- has not been defined in the Act and the definition, meaning and import of the word dowry- has been borrowed from the provisions of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 which defines the word dowry. This is clear from the explanation given under Section 304-B, IPC. The Supreme Court considered the ambit and scope of definition of dowry as defined under Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 in the case of Appasaheb (supra) and it was held thus - 11. In view of the aforesaid definition of the word dowry any property or valuable security should be given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly at or before or any time after the marriage and in connection with the marriage of the said parties. Therefore, the giving or taking of property or valuable security must have some connection with the marriage of the parties and a co-relation between the giving or taking of property or valuable security with the marriage of the parties is essential. Being a penal provision it has to be strictly construed. Dowry is a fairly well-known social custom or practice in India. It is well-settled principle of interpretation of statute that if the Act is passed with reference to a particular trade, business or transaction and words are used which everybody conversant with that trade, business or transaction knows or understands to have a particular meaning in it, then the words are to be construed as having that particular meaning. (Union of India vs. Garware Nylons Ltd. (1996) 10 SCC 413 : AIR 1996 SC 3509 and Chemical and Fibres of India Ltd. vs. Union of India, (1997) 2 SCC 664 : AIR 1997 SC 558 . A demand for money on account of some financial stringency or for meeting some urgent domestic expenses or for purchasing manure cannot be termed as a demand for dowry as the said word is normally understood. A demand for money on account of some financial stringency or for meeting some urgent domestic expenses or for purchasing manure cannot be termed as a demand for dowry as the said word is normally understood. The evidence adduced by the prosecution does not, therefore, show that any demand for dowry as defined in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was made by the appellants as what was allegedly asked for was some money for meeting domestic expenses and for purchasing manure. Since an essential ingredient of Section 304-B, IPC viz. demand for dowry is not established, the conviction of the appellants cannot be sustained. In another decision in the matter of Vipin Jaiswal ( AIR 2013 SC 1567 ) (supra), relying upon the judgment in the case of Appasaheb ( AIR 2007 SC 763 ) (supra), it was held - 11. In any case, to hold an accused guilty of both the offences under Sections 304-B and 498-A, IPC, the prosecution is required to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by the accused. From the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, and in particular PW 2 and PW 4, we find that they have made general allegations of harassment by the appellant towards the deceased and have not brought in evidence any specific acts of cruelty or harassment by the appellant towards the deceased and have not brought in evidence any specific acts of cruelty or harassment by the appellant on the deceased. In yet another decision in the case of Modinsab ( AIR 2013 SC 1504 ) (supra), it was held that demand made by the accused to the deceased for repayment of loan had no connection with the marriage and therefore, could not be said to be demand in connection with dowry and the offence under Section 304-B, IPC was not attracted. 13. Sukhdas (PW1), brother of the deceased has stated that after 4-5 months of marriage, the appellants started harassing his sister and indulged in quarrelling and then left her in the parental house. After some time, they had come to take her back on the assurance that she will be given proper treatment but at that time, she was taken to Bilaspur and four months pregnancy was aborted. After some time, they had come to take her back on the assurance that she will be given proper treatment but at that time, she was taken to Bilaspur and four months pregnancy was aborted. Thereafter, his sister (the deceased) was left outside the village by the appellant- Ramayandas and falsely stated that she ran away. Thereafter, at one point of time, an attempt was made to set her ablaze also and then again she was sent back to her parental house. A panchayat meeting was organized in the village. As he had taken a loan of Rs. 6,000/- from the appellant-Ramayandas and apprehended that his sister was being harassed and subjected to cruelty in the name of non-payment of the said loan amount in the presence of the witnesses in panchayat, a total amount of Rs. 9,000/- along with interest was repaid to Ramayandas. He has further stated that his mother owns land in village and in order to grab that land, his sister (the deceased) was being harassed by the appellants. He has further deposed that his mother-Punibai had, thereafter, taken Navdha to the matrimonial house and after 3 months, they received information regarding her death by jumping into well. Thereafter, he got the written report (Ex. P/1) lodged in the Police Station. This witness has been subjected to detailed cross-examination. In the entire evidence of this witness, there is no whisper that the cruelty to which deceased Navdha Bai was subjected was in connection with demand of dowry. On the contrary, the evidence of this witness only proves that the main operative reason for cruelty, if any, was that certain amount was taken as loan during marriage of this witness and he apprehended that his sister was being harassed because of non-repayment of loan to the appellant-Ramayandas. 14. Punibai (PW4), mother of the deceased has deposed that her daughter was kept properly for 2-4 months after marriage, but thereafter, there used to be quarrel. However, she has not stated regarding any specific incident of torture or cruelty in the name of any demand bearing any connection with marriage. Learned State counsel, referring to the evidence of this witness, as stated in para 2, has stated that there is a hint that the deceased told her mother that quarrel used to take place because something was not given. 15. Learned State counsel, referring to the evidence of this witness, as stated in para 2, has stated that there is a hint that the deceased told her mother that quarrel used to take place because something was not given. 15. This statement, by itself, is not specific allegation of cruelty in connection with demand of dowry to specify the rigour of high standard of proof required in a criminal case before holding a person guilty of commission of offence under Section 304-B, IPC. The other part of the evidence of this witness also deals with taking loan for marriage of Sukhdas (PW1) and its return in presence of witnesses in the month of September, 1996. During this period, it is stated, her daughter was left in the matrimonial house but she was not taken back, as promised. She was shunted out from the matrimonial house and was living in her parental house till she was again returned to matrimonial house after return of loan amount to Ramayandas. She has stated that Navdha Bai asked her to give money and she held her back for one month till money was arranged and thereafter, she went to matrimonial house along with her daughter and money, where, in the presence of witnesses, loan amount was given, transaction was reduced into writing in Ex. P/4 and Ex. P/5 and after 2-3 months, information was received that her daughter died by jumping into the well. Looking to the condition of her daughter, she suspected something wrong, therefore, sent her son for lodging report. In her cross-examination, she has not stated regarding demand of dowry. There is nothing in her evidence of even remotely suggest that in connection with marriage, some demand was made, which was not being fulfilled due to which, her daughter was subjected to cruelty. Her version was also on the same line as that of her son-Sukhdas (PW1) that loan was taken and loan was not repaid and during this period, her daughter was left behind in the parental house and after arranging money, daughter and money both were taken to the matrimonial house, where, money was given to Ramayandas. 16. In the considered opinion of this Court, the entire evidence, even accepted as it is, does not contain any iota of evidence of cruelty in connection with demand of dowry. 17. 16. In the considered opinion of this Court, the entire evidence, even accepted as it is, does not contain any iota of evidence of cruelty in connection with demand of dowry. 17. Jogidas (PW 3) has deposed in his evidence that appellants-Ramayandas and Parsandas along with Nathhu brought Navdha Bai to Raipura and said that they cannot keep Navdha with them. Then the panchayat meeting was held in the presence of appellants-Ramayandas and Parsandas and other villagers, where again they stated that they would not keep Navdha with them and left her. Thereafter, Navdha Bais mother took her to Patrapali and again Ramayandas left her in the outskirts of village-Raipura where, Navdha Bai stayed for 15 days. At that time, Navdha Bai told her that she is being harassed in connection with loan which was taken from Ramayandas, her husband, during marriage of her brother and she insisted her mother to return the money. This witness further deposed that thereafter, with money, he along with Mahetar Das, Agni Das and mother of Navdha Bai, went to Patrapali. A total amount of Rs. 9,000/- was given to Ramayandas and Navdha Bai was left there. He returned and then heard regarding death of Navdha Bai. In his cross-examination, he has stated that he was told by Navdha Bai regarding loan taken and harassment in connection with that loan. 18. Motiram (PW 5) has stated that after 7-8 months of marriage, Navdha Bai was left in her parental house by Ramayandas stating that he is not in good tune with her. When she was taken to her matrimonial house, her in-laws refused to keep her there and she was again left behind in the parental house by Ramayandas. Upon enquiry, Navdha Bai stated that her pregnancy was aborted. In order to re-pay the loan taken for marriage of her brother, Jogi, Mahetar, Punibai, Agni Das went to Navdha- s matrimonial house along with Navdha. 19. Mahetar (PW 6) has stated that Navdha was taken to her matrimonial house in village-Patrapali by her mother, Jogi Das and Agni Das and on the presence of number of villagers, Rs. 9,000/- was given by Punibai to Ramayandas and Navdha was left in the matrimonial house. He has proved his signature of panchayat proceedings in Ex. P/4 and Ex. P/5. 9,000/- was given by Punibai to Ramayandas and Navdha was left in the matrimonial house. He has proved his signature of panchayat proceedings in Ex. P/4 and Ex. P/5. Ramlal (PW 7) has not supported the case of the prosecution and has stated that relations between the deceased and Ramayandas were cordial in nature. Gheesalram (PW 9) has also not supported the case of the prosecution and declared hostile. Nathhuram (PW 11) has also not supported the story of the prosecution and declared hostile. Saudagar (PW 16) has also been declared hostile. 20. Jalhaldas (PW 18) has stated that when the deceased went to her village, she stated that she was being harassed by her husband - Ramayandas in connection with loan of Rs. 6,000/- taken from Ramayandas by her mother. Thereafter, panchayat meeting was held in which, Ramayandas claimed that Rs. 6,000/- was given towards purchase of land recorded in the name of Punibai. As the land was recorded in the name of Punibai- s brother, he did not allow Punibai to sell the land to the appellant. Thereafter, Punibai returned money to Ramayandas and Ramayandas claimed interest and a total amount of Rs. 9,000/- was returned to Ramayandas. Ramayandas had executed an agreement assuring proper treatment to his wife. This witness has signed the agreement Exhibited as Ex. P/4 and Ex. P/5 and has further deposed that Ramayandas signed the agreement Ex. P/4 and Navdha signed Ex. P/5 in his presence. The two agreements were recovered and seized from him by the police during the course of investigation. 21. The aforesaid evidence led by the prosecution, as discussed above, only proves that the deceased-Navdha was being harassed and mal-treated in many ways by her in-laws and that too mainly by her husband which was in connection with Rs. 6,000/- given by Ramayandas to her mother Punibai. In one panchayat meeting, Ramayandas stated that money was claimed towards purchase of land which was not recorded in the name of Punibai. The other version, as stated by the brother of the deceased is that they had taken loan to meet out expenses in the marriage of Sukhdas. However, all the witnesses, mentioned hereinabove have stated that later on, loan amount was returned by Punibai to Ramayandas and Navdha was finally left in the matrimonial house. The other version, as stated by the brother of the deceased is that they had taken loan to meet out expenses in the marriage of Sukhdas. However, all the witnesses, mentioned hereinabove have stated that later on, loan amount was returned by Punibai to Ramayandas and Navdha was finally left in the matrimonial house. After about three months, the incident of Navdha dying and dead body found in the well happened. This evidence does not prove that the appellants subjected the deceased to cruelty in connection with demand of dowry. According to the testimony of prosecution witnesses, the deceased was being harassed and tortured in connection with loan which was taken for marriage of her brother which was not being returned to Ramayandas. For this reason, deceased-Navdha Bai was being ill-treated and time and again she was left in the parental house and thereafter, demands were made by sending her to matrimonial house time and again and ultimately, the loan amount was re-paid to Ramayandas and agreement was also exhibited in Ex. P/4 and Ex. P/5 but there is no evidence that cruelty was in connection with demand of dowry. 22. In view of the above evidence, one of the essential ingredients to bring home the guilt of the accused person under Section 304-B, IPC has not been proved by the prosecution. In the absence of there being any material evidence to prove cruelty in connection with demand of dowry, cruelty for any other reason would not satisfy the requirement of commission of offence under Section 304-B, IPC. The aforesaid penal provision has been introduced to punish in-laws who subjected to cruelty, the daughter-in-law in the matrimonial house, in connection with demand of dowry. The presumption of the appellants having caused dowry death cannot be drawn under the law unless essential ingredients of commission of offence under Section 304-B, IPC have been proved by the prosecution. 23. The above analysis of the evidence on record leads to conclusion that though, the deceased was being subjected to some kind of cruelty, the cruelty was not in connection with demand of dowry, but in the background that loan of Rs. 23. The above analysis of the evidence on record leads to conclusion that though, the deceased was being subjected to some kind of cruelty, the cruelty was not in connection with demand of dowry, but in the background that loan of Rs. 6,000/- was taken by the mother of the deceased from the appellant-Ramayandas and as that loan was not being returned despite repeated demands, the appellants started harassment and subjected the deceased to cruelty in many ways which has come in the evidence of Sukhdas (PW 1), Jogidas (PW 3), Punibai (PW 4), Motiram (PW 5) and Jalhaldas (PW 18). 24. In the result, the appeal is allowed in part. While appellants conviction under Section 304-B, IPC is set aside and the appellants acquitted of those charges. As the appellants have been found subjecting the deceased to cruelty, their conviction under Section 498-A, IPC is affirmed. 25. As all the appellants have already undergone more than one year of R.I. for commission of offence under Section 498-A, IPC, bail bonds furnished by the appellants stand discharged. Appeal partly allowed.