Hon'ble AHLUWALIA, J.—Yogendra Singh @ Bablu S/o Man Singhand Bhag Chand @ Pintu S/o Laxmi Narayan were tried by the court of Special Judge, SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act Cases, Ajmer and by impugned judgment dated 30th June, 2005, the trial court convicted accused appellant Bhag Chand @ Pintu for offence under Sections 366, 376, 376(2)(G), 394 and 323 IPC. Appellant Yogendra Singh @ Bablu was also convicted for offence under Sections 366, 376, 376(2) (G), 394 and 323 IPC and Sections 3(1)(xii) and 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities Act), 1989 (hereinafter referred to as `the SC/ST Act'). Having convicted the appellants for the aforesaid offences, the trial judge by order of even date sentenced both the appellants as under:- Offence Sentence Under Section 366 IPC To undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years and to a pay fine of Rs. 2000/- each. In default of payment of fine, to under go additional imprisonment for one month. Under Section 376 IPC To undergo Life Imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.5000/- each. In default of payment of fine, to undergo additional imprisonment for two months. Under Section 376(2) (G) IPC To undergo Life Imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.5000/-each. In default of payment of fine, to undergo additional imprisonment for two months. Under Section 394 IPC To undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of Rs.1000 each. In default of payment of fine, to undergo additional imprisonment for fifteen days. Under Section 323 IPC To undergo simple imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs.500/- each. In default of payment of fine, to undergo additional imprisonment for seven days. Appellant Yogendra Singh @ Bablu has been sentenced for offence under Section 3(1)(xii) of the SC/ST Act to undergo simple imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs.2000/-. In default thereof, he was to further undergo simple imprisonment for one month and under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act to undergo life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/-. In default thereof, he was to further undergo simple additional imprisonment for two months. 2. Aggrieved against their conviction and sentence, the appellants have filed two separate appeals. Yogendra Singh @ Bablu has preferred DB Criminal Appeal No.710/2005, whereas appellant Bhag Chand @ Pintu has instituted appeal through jail bearing DB Criminal Appeal No.1797/2007. In default thereof, he was to further undergo simple additional imprisonment for two months. 2. Aggrieved against their conviction and sentence, the appellants have filed two separate appeals. Yogendra Singh @ Bablu has preferred DB Criminal Appeal No.710/2005, whereas appellant Bhag Chand @ Pintu has instituted appeal through jail bearing DB Criminal Appeal No.1797/2007. We shall decide both these appeals by this common judgment. 3. In the present case, the prosecutrix (name withheld to protect her identity) on 10th March, 2004 submitted a written report (Ex.P.8) wherein she stated that she was going to the house of her teacher for obtaining important questions for examination. On 10th March, 2004 at 3.30 P.M. both the accused arrived by a Taxi. One of the accused caught hold of her hand and dragged her in the Taxi and another accused gagged her mouth. Both took her at a deserted place on Frezer Road. They snatched her Purse containing Rs.250/-, and after showing a knife, they had given her beating, and committed gang rape. The prosecutrix received a call on her mobile. When she attended the same, both the accused ran away from the spot giving a threat that in case she were to narrate the incident to any one, they would kill her with a knife and shall also throw acid on her. 4. The above written complaint (Ex.P.8) was submitted before the Investigating Officer on 10th March, 2004 at 11.30 P.M. and case was registered on 11th March, 2004 at 11.00 A.M. 5. The prosecutrix herself appeared in the court as PW.6 and reiterated as to what was stated by her in the written report. 6. Shri Vinay Pal Yadav, learned counsel appearing for the appellants, has urged that there is delay in lodging of the FIR and the prosecutrix had not raised noise even though the place where the alleged rape was committed is a densely populated locality. On observation made by us that no lady will put her reputation at stake and name anybody falsely, specially when as per the medico-legal report (Ex.P.12) multiple linear abrasions have been found on the back of the prosecutrix and there was presence of one bruise on the neck, to corroborate version of the prosecutrix. 7. On observation made by us that no lady will put her reputation at stake and name anybody falsely, specially when as per the medico-legal report (Ex.P.12) multiple linear abrasions have been found on the back of the prosecutrix and there was presence of one bruise on the neck, to corroborate version of the prosecutrix. 7. Shri Vinay Pal Yadav has fairly and candidly stated that since the medical evidence corroborate the version given by the prosecutrix, he will not assail the testimony of the prosecutrix, but shall pray to this Court that conviction of the appellant Yogendra Singh @ Bablu for offences under Sections 3(1)(xii) and 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act, be set aside, as the said offences are not made out in the present case. For the prosecutrix was not raped in order to humiliate her as a member of a Scheduled Caste. 8. Shri Vinay Pal Yadav submitted that he will further pray to this Court that the sentence awarded to both the appellants for offence under Section 376(2)(g) IPC be reduced from Life Imprisonment to ten years, which is the minimum prescribed by the statute. 9. To assail the conviction of appellant Yogendra Singh @ Bablu for offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act, Shri Vinay Pal Yadav, counsel for the appellants has relied upon the judgment rendered by us in DB Criminal Appeal No.945/2004 (Ram Karan vs. State of Rajasthan), decided on 25th November, 2014, wherein we have held as under:- “14. Mr. Mehla, the learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently urged that the application of offence under Section 3(2)(v) of 'the Act' is not attracted. The thrust argument of Mr. Mehla is while committing offence of rape, accused may intend to satisfy his lust, but there is no evidence or assertion by the witness that accused intended to humiliate a member of Scheduled Caste or the offence of rape was committed only on the ground that the prosecutrix belonged to Scheduled Caste community. 15. The argument raised by Mr. Mehla is not new to this Court. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Manohar Singh vs. State of Rajasthan reported in 2000(2) RCC 894, in similar circumstances, held as under:- “10. The doctor opined that from the external injuries, the possibility of rape being committed, cannot be denied. 15. The argument raised by Mr. Mehla is not new to this Court. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Manohar Singh vs. State of Rajasthan reported in 2000(2) RCC 894, in similar circumstances, held as under:- “10. The doctor opined that from the external injuries, the possibility of rape being committed, cannot be denied. The doctor also seized the 'ghaghra' of the prosecutrix on which spots of semen were detected. He further stated that the accused Manohar Singh was also examined on 19.12.1996. He was found fit for indulging in sexual intercourse. The prosecution has produced the FSL report dated 2.9.1997, which shows that human semen was found on the 'ghaghra'. Thus, on careful consideration, we find the testimony of P.W.8 Mst. Ramila as trustworthy. The learned Judge has rightly held the accused appellant guilty of rape. 11. The next question, which arises for consideration is whether the conviction of the appellant under Sec.3(2)(v) of the Act is justified and legal? 12. We have, recently in a case of Pappu Khan vs. State of Rajasthan, “D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 722/98 decided on 2.9.1999”, examined the scope and ambit of Sec.3(2)(v) of the Act. It is held therein that for the offence under Sec.3(2)(v) of the Act, beside the ingredients of respective offence of Indian Penal Code, the prosecution is further required to establish that the accused being a person of non S.C./S.T. has committed the crime on a person of S.C./S.T. for the reason that such person belonged to such community or tribe.” 16. The view taken by the Division Bench of this Court was subsequently followed by another Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sohan Singh & Anr. vs. State of Rajasthan reported in 2002(2) Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 1541. Their Lordships, while examining the law laid in Manohar Singh's case (supra) further to fortify had relied upon the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Masumsha Hasanasha Musalman vs. State of Maharashtra reported in 2000 SCC (Cri) 722. Since their Lordships relying upon the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court in a very lucid manner had answered the above question. With all reverence to Their Lordships, the relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced as under: “10. We have considered the rival submissions, and have also gone through the record carefully. Since their Lordships relying upon the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court in a very lucid manner had answered the above question. With all reverence to Their Lordships, the relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced as under: “10. We have considered the rival submissions, and have also gone through the record carefully. We may first take up the sustainability of the conviction u/s. 3(2)(v) of the Act. We may gainfully recapitulate the language of Sec. 3(2)(v) which reads as under:- “(v) committed any offence under the Indian Penal Code punishable with imprisonment for a term of ten years or more against a person or property on the ground that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or such property belongs to such member, shall be punishable with imprisonment for life and with fine.” 11. Our attention has been invited by the learned counsel for the appellants, to a recent judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Masumsha Hasanasha Musalman vs. State of Maharashtra reported in 2000 SCC (Cri) 722, which was a case relating to murder, wherein the accused was convicted for the offence u/s. 304-II IPC and Sec. 3(2)(v) of the Act, and under the former he was sentenced to 5 years rigorous imprisonment while under the later he was sentenced to life imprisonment. These convictions were confirmed by the High Court. In appeal the Hon'ble Supreme Court noticed that there was no dispute about the deceased dying homicidal death, and considering the nature of injuries, confirmed the conviction u/s. 304-II IPC. Facts in that case were that between 7.00 and 8.00 p.m. on the fateful day Saoji Gamaji Jadhav, a member of Scheduled Caste, who had returned to his house at dusk, and after some time had left the house informing his wife that he would be going out for some time, and would return soon, thereafter. After about half an hour of the deceased left his home, the appellant came to the house of the deceased and enquired from his wife about the deceased. At that time the appellant was carrying a 'jambiya'. On coming to know from her that her husband had gone out of the house, the appellant started running through the lane. The wife getting suspicious followed, and near the hospital of Dr. Kalwaghe, she saw the appellant stabbing the deceased who fell down and died. At that time the appellant was carrying a 'jambiya'. On coming to know from her that her husband had gone out of the house, the appellant started running through the lane. The wife getting suspicious followed, and near the hospital of Dr. Kalwaghe, she saw the appellant stabbing the deceased who fell down and died. It is on these facts Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held as under:- “To attract the provisions of Sec.3(2)(v) of the Act, the sine qua non is that the victim should be a person who belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and that the offence under the Indian Penal Code is committed against him on the basis that such a person belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. In the absence of such ingredients, no offence u/s. 3(2)(v) of the Act arises. In that view of the matter, we think, both the trial Court and the High Court missed the essence of this aspect.” 12. With the above findings the conviction u/s. 3(2)(v) was set aside. In our view, the judgment in Masumsha Hasanasha Musalman's case fully supports the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants, and since in the present case also, there is not an iota of material on record, even to indicate that, either of the offence was committed “on the basis” that the victim belongs to Scheduled Caste. Accordingly, the conviction for the offence, u/s. 3(2)(v) of the Act, is very much required to be set aside.” 10. We are of the view that on the facts of the case, we cannot record a divergent opinion and shall follow the judgment rendered by us in the case of Ram Karan (supra). Thus we are of the view that conviction of appellant Yogendra Singh @ Bablu under Sections 3(1)(xii) and 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act cannot be sustained; as such, the appellant Yogendra Singh @ Bablu is acquitted of the offences under the provisions the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, and the sentence awarded on these counts is set aside. 11. Thus we are of the view that conviction of appellant Yogendra Singh @ Bablu under Sections 3(1)(xii) and 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act cannot be sustained; as such, the appellant Yogendra Singh @ Bablu is acquitted of the offences under the provisions the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, and the sentence awarded on these counts is set aside. 11. Counsel has further relied upon the judgment rendered by us in the case of Chanda Lal @ Harchanda vs. State of Rajasthan , D.B. Criminal Appeal No.947/2005, decided on 26th November, 2014 to contend that no aggravating circumstances are available in the facts of the case to award life imprisonment to the appellants for offence of gang rape. 12. In the case of Chanda Lal (supra) we have held as under:- “Shri N.A.Naqvi, Senior Counsel has also very fairly stated that taking the entire perspective of the case, he will only urge and pray before this Court that there were no aggravating circumstances available with the trial Court to award maximum sentence i.e. life imprisonment. The learned counsel has stated that to award the maximum sentence, there must be compelling reasons for the trial Court and such reasons are to be stated in the order whereby sentence is awarded. The learned Counsel has stated that recently Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Sunil Dutt Sharma vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) reported as (2014) 4 SCC 375 while dealing with case of Section 304-B IPC had observed that Court should take notice of aggravating and mitigating circumstances while awarding sentence. The learned counsel for the appellant has also placed reliance upon Bavo @ Manubhai Ambalal Thakore V. State of Gujarat AIR 2012 Supreme Court 979 to contend that Hon'ble Apex Court considering the agony of protracted trial has awarded minimum sentence of ten years. The learned counsel states that in the present case, incident had taken place 11 years ago i.e. in the year 2003 and since then, appellant is in the corridors of the Court. It is contended before us that since, appellant was not released on bail during the trial and his sentence was also not suspended during appeal, thus he continue to languish behind the bars since 04th September, 2003, when his formal arrest was effected. It is contended before us that since, appellant was not released on bail during the trial and his sentence was also not suspended during appeal, thus he continue to languish behind the bars since 04th September, 2003, when his formal arrest was effected. The learned Public Prosecutor except age of the prosecutrix could not divulge any other reason to persuade us to maintain the sentence awarded by the trial Court. Hence, taking ratio of law laid in SunilDutt Sharma (supra) which in turn had relied upon Sangeet and Another vs. State of Haryana (2013) Volume 2 SCC 452 and taking aggravated circumstances i.e. age of the prosecutrix and the mitigating circumstance that the appellant is sole bread earner of the family, he is in the corridors of the Court from last 11 years, we follow the mandate of law laid in case of Bavo @ Manubhai Ambalal Thakore (supra) and while maintaining the conviction of the appellant, reduce the sentence of life imprisonment awarded upon the appellant by the trial Court to ten years rigorous imprisonment. However, we enhance the fine awarded by the trial Court from Rs.5,000/- to Rs. 10,000/- while maintaining the default clause prescribed by the trial Court.” 13. We will follow the view taken by us earlier. Since there is no compelling circumstance to award maximum sentence, while upholding conviction of both the appellants under Section 376(2)(G) IPC, we reduce the sentence on this count from life imprisonment to ten years' rigorous imprisonment. However, sentence of fine of Rs.5,000/- on this count is enhanced to Rs.10,000/- while maintaining the default clause. 14. Since the appellants have been convicted for offence under Section 376(2)(G) IPC, their conviction under Section 376 IPC is not called for and the same is, hereby, set aside. 15. Thus, to sum up, appellant Yogendra Singh @ Bablu is acquitted of the charge under Sections 3(1)(xii) and 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities), Act, 1989. 16. Conviction and sentence of both the appellants for offence under Section 376 IPC is set aside. However, their conviction for offence under Section 376(2)(G) IPC is, maintained. However, the sentence awarded is reduced from life imprisonment to ten years' rigorous imprisonment with enhancement of fine to Rs.10,000/- while maintaining the default clause. Conviction and sentence of the appellants on other counts recorded by the trial court are also upheld. However, their conviction for offence under Section 376(2)(G) IPC is, maintained. However, the sentence awarded is reduced from life imprisonment to ten years' rigorous imprisonment with enhancement of fine to Rs.10,000/- while maintaining the default clause. Conviction and sentence of the appellants on other counts recorded by the trial court are also upheld. As already ordered by the trial court, all the sentences shall run concurrently. 17. Both the appeals stand partly allowed in above terms.