JUDGMENT : Biswanath Rath, J. - This matter arises out of an order dated 21.9.2012 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Khurda rejecting an application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure at the instance of the plaintiff-petitioners in C.M.A.No.82 of 2012 arising out of C.S.No.26 of 2011 for awarding interim maintenance on the premises of maintainability of the same. 2. Fact involved in the case is that after the death of predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners, defendant nos.1 to 3, the father-in-law of the petitioner no.2 and his two other sons created disturbance and deprived the petitioners from the usufructs compelling the petitioners for instituting a suit for partition of the properties by filing C.S.No.26 of 2011. The defendant nos.2 and 3 on their appearance filed a joint written statement refuting the plaint averments and raising thereby the question of maintainability of the suit. During pendency of the suit the petitioners being a distress family, filed an application under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the Learned Judge, Family Court, Khurda and the said application was dismissed as not maintainable. The order was challenged in this Court. This Court even though did not interfere in the impugned order directed for early disposal of the suit with an observation to see that the widow survives and gets at least her share on usufructs by appointing her father-in-law, present opposite party, as the receiver. As admitted by the opposite party, the attempt for appointment of receiver has gone frustrated as there is nothing available to be filed as return. Having no other source of income, the petitioners remain constrained to file an application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for grant of monthly maintenance pending disposal of the suit, which application being rejected, the same is under challenge in the present writ petition. 3. Sri Dash, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in substantiating his claim repeated his stand as quoted herein above and further taking resort to the provisions under Sections 7 and 8 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 submitted that in view of the specific purpose of the Family Courts Act, the dispute between the parties before the Family Court confines to marriage and proceedings arising out of such marriage and there cannot be any restriction for filing such application without getting involved into the question of marriage. Further, relying on catena of decisions in the cases of Devaki Antharjanam v. Narayanan Namboodiri & Anr., AIR 2007 Kerala 38, Darshanaben & Ors. v. Shantibai Ratilal Parmar & Ors., AIR 2008 Gujarat 167, P. Srihari v. Kum.P.Sukunda and another, AIR 2001 Andhra Pradesh 169, G.Pentamma & Ors. v. G.Anjali, w/o G.Raghurameswar Rao & Anr., AIR.2010 Andhra Pradesh 224 contended that in view of the position settled by different Courts, the application at the instance of the petitioners was very much maintainable and it is in this view of the matter, the impugned order should be set aside. 4. Shri Misra, learned counsel for the opposite party on the other hand apart from filing a counter in seriously objecting to the challenge of the petitioners taking resort to the provisions contained in Sections 7 and 8 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 contended that under the specific provisions of the Family Court Act, 1984, such application is a clear bar and consideration of such application remain only within the domain of the Family Courts created under the Act, 1984. Further relying on a decision in the case of Srimati Nishamoni Kalita & Anr, v. Srimati Sarada Kalita & Ors, AIR 2009 Gauhati 62 contended that as per the decision, the application for maintenance is wholly not maintainable before a Civil Court. Relying a decision in the case of Sri Mayadhar Mallik v. Smt. Laxmi Mallik and others, 1999(I) OLR 37 on interpretation of ward 'proceeding' submitted that proceeding for maintenance in Civil & Criminal Court is not maintainable after the establishment of the Family Court. Similarly, relying on a decision involving Abdul Rahim Atar & others v. Atul Ambalal barot, AIR 2005 Bombay 120 and Padma Sen and another v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1961 SC 218 submitted that inherent power cannot be exercised to nullify the effect of the statutory provision. Learned counsel, Sri Mishra also relying on a decision in the case of Ramji Gir and others v. Elaichi Devi, AIR (1974) Patna 280 and in the case of Mulimani Sanna Basavarajappa v. Basavannappa, AIR 1959 Maysore 152 submitted that filing of petition under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not in consonance of provisions contained Section 19 of Hindu Adoption of Maintenance Act and as such, such application in the pending suit for partition is not at all maintainable. 5. 5. It is admitted that the main proceeding for partition in between the parties is pending before the Civil Court. It also remains undisputed that petitioner no.1 has lost her husband and she has filed the suit claiming for partition of the property in her and her children's favour on the allegation of non-maintenance of the petitioners' family after the sad demise of her husband. Before proceeding to decide on the main point involved in the matter, it is necessary to take into account the legal provisions of Sections 7 and 8 of the Family Courts Act, 1948, which are reflected as herein below: 7. Jurisdiction-(1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a Family Court shall- (a) have and exercise all the jurisdiction exercisable by any District Court or any subordinate civil Court under any law for the time being in force in respect of suits and proceedings of the nature referred to in the Explanation, and (b) be deemed for the purposes of exercising such jurisdiction under such law, to be a district Court or, as the case may be, such subordinate Civil Court for the area to which the jurisdiction of the Family Court extends. Explanation-The suits and proceedings referred to in this subsection are suits and proceedings of the following nature, namely- (a) a suit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage for a decree of nullity of marriage (declaring the marriage to be null and void or as the case may be, annulling the marriage) or restitution of conjugal rights or judicial separation or dissolution of marriage; (b) a suit or proceeding for a declaration as to the validity of a marriage or as to the matrimonial status of any person; (c) a suit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage with respect to the property of the parties or of either of them; (d) a suit or proceeding for an order or injunction in circumstances arising out of a marital relationship; (e) a suit or proceeding for a declaration as to the legitimacy of any person; (f) a suit or proceeding for maintenance; (g) a suit or proceeding in relation to the guardianship of the person or the custody of, or access to, any minor; 2. Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a Family Court shall also have and exercise- (a) the jurisdiction exercisable by a Magistrate of the first class under Chapter-IX (relating to other for maintenance of wife, children and parents) of the Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 (2 of 2974); and (b) such other jurisdiction as may be conferred on it by any other enactment. 8. Exclusion of jurisdiction and pending proceedings: Where a Family Court has been established for any area,- (a) no district Court or any subordinate civil Court referred to in Sub-Section (1) of Section 7 shall, in relation to such area, have or exercise any jurisdiction in respect of any suit or proceeding of the nature referred to in the Explanation to that sub-section; (b) no Magistrate shall, in relation to such area, have or exercise any jurisdiction or powers under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974); (c) every suit or proceeding of the nature referred to in the Explanation to Sub-section (1) of Section 7 and every proceeding under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),- (i) which is pending immediately before the establishment of such Family Court before any district Court or subordinate Court referred to in the sub-section or, as the case may be, before any Magistrate under the said Code; and (ii) which would have been required to be instituted or taken before or by such Family Court if, before the date on which such suit or proceeding was instituted or taken, this Act had come into force and such Family Court had been established, shall stand transferred to such Family Court on the date on which it is established." 6. The statement of object and reasons for bringing the family Courts Act, 1984 make it clear that the Act has been brought considering the need as a public interest to establish Family Courts for speedy settlement of family disputes and the Family Courts Act are established to exclusively provide within the jurisdiction of the Family Courts. The matters relating to (i) matrimonial relief including nullity, marriage judicial separation, divorce, restitution of conjugal rights or declaration to the nullity of marriage or as to the matrimonial status of any person; (ii) The property of spouses or of either of them. The matters relating to (i) matrimonial relief including nullity, marriage judicial separation, divorce, restitution of conjugal rights or declaration to the nullity of marriage or as to the matrimonial status of any person; (ii) The property of spouses or of either of them. So keeping in view the statement of objection and reasons behind the Family Courts Act, 1984, the provisions contained under Section 7 as well as Section 8 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 are to be applied remaining within the close compass of the statement of objects and reasons behind the Act. The question of bar of applications under such contingency to Civil Court has been the point of consideration of various courts. In deciding a similar contingency in a proceeding for partition on their father's property, at the instance of the deceased against the brother, a Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh in the case of P. Srihari (supra) taking into account the provisions contained under Section 7 of the Act came to held as follows: "In view of the above, the essential ingredient should be a dispute between the husband and the wife and the said dispute can be with regard to their marital status, divorce, restitution of conjugal rights, judicial separation, child custody, maintenance, as also properly sharing. But, in no event, the Family Court can have jurisdiction if the above dispute is absent. By no stretch of imagination, can the Family Court assume jurisdiction, if there is a dispute between the brothers, sisters, mothers, fathers etc. concerning property and the case on hand being one such, the Family Court had clearly no jurisdiction." In another instance, in the case of Devaki Antharjanam (supra), the Kerala High Court taking into account several other decisions of various Courts in paragraph-19 came to held as follows: "The next question to be considered is what is the meaning of the expression "with respect to the property of the parties' occurring in Explanation (c) to Section 7(1). Does it mean property of the parties to the proceedings or property of the parties to a marriage? The words "or of either of them" following the expression "with respect to the property of the parties" would unmistakably lead to the conclusion that the expression refers to parties to a marriage and not parties to the proceedings. Does it mean property of the parties to the proceedings or property of the parties to a marriage? The words "or of either of them" following the expression "with respect to the property of the parties" would unmistakably lead to the conclusion that the expression refers to parties to a marriage and not parties to the proceedings. In order to attract Clause (c), the litigation must be with respect to the property of either the husband or wife or both of them. It excludes any other person who has independent rights in respect of the property. Could it be said that the co-ownership property of the husband, wife and son is the property of "the parties' to a marriage or either of them"? Evidently not. Therefore, I am of the view that the ingredients of Clause (c) of the Explanation are not attracted in the present case. It cannot even be contended that the present case is covered by Clause (d) to the Explanation to Section 7(1). Therefore, I am of the view that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to decide the suit and that the decree is not a nullity. I respectfully follow the decisions in Krishnan Nomboodiri v. Thankamani, 1994 (1) KLT 607 : 1996 AIHC 1351 and Kamalasanan v. Valsala, 1994 (I) KLT 737 and Shyni v. Georgeand others, 1997 (1) KLJ 573 : AIR 1997 Ker 231 . Point No.1 is accordingly held against the appellant. Similarly, in another decision rendered by Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of G. Pentamma & Ors. (supra), taking note of a decision rendered by a Division Bench of Karnataka High Court in the matter of Genu @ Ganu v. Jalabai, LLR 2009 Kar 612 came to hold that it is clear that the Family Court has no jurisdiction to entertain and try a suit or proceeding claiming a property by persons other than the parties to the marriage. Further, the property in dispute should belong exclusively to the parties. If the persons other than the parties to the marriage have an interest in the said dispute, the Family Court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute and ultimately in paragraph 17, the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held as follows: "Viewed thus, it cannot be denied that the petitioners would be placed at a disadvantage if they have to face the subject suit proceeding before the Family Court. It is thus not for this Court to distort the express language of the provision in the name of purposive construction and thereby bring within its ambit matters which do not naturally fall thereunder." In another situation, specifically considering an application for maintenance during pendency of a suit, the Gujarat High Court in the case of Darshanaben (supra) has come to held as follows: "It is not in dispute that the appellants-original plaintiffs have filed Civil Suit No.1038 of 2004 in the City Civil Court at Ahmedabad seeking various reliefs inter alia for partition of the properties of Hindu Undivided Family of the defendants and for accounts. In the said suit, the plaintiffs have taken out notice of motion seeking temporary injunction restraining the defendants from transferring, alienating and/or assigning the movable and immovable suit properties and also seeking Rs. 10,000 per month towards interim maintenance during the pendency of the suit. Thus, the main relief sought in the suit is for partition of the properties of the Hindu Undivided Family of the defendants and for accounts. Incidentally and by way of interim relief, by taking out notice of motion, the plaintiffs have prayed for Rs. 10,000 per month towards their maintenance during the pendency of the suit. Thus, this Court fails to appropriate that how the suit for partition of the properties of the Hindu Undivided Family and for accounts, would fall within the purview of Sections 7 and 8 of the Family Courts Act. Sections 7 and 8 of the Family Courts Act would not be applicable at all with respect to the dispute and the relief sought in the suit for partition of the properties and accounts. It appears that what is weighed with the learned Chamber Judge is the maintenance amount sought by the plaintiffs during the pendency of the suit. The learned Chamber Judge has lost sight of the fact that the main reliefs in the suit is for partition of the properties of the Hindu Undivided Family and for accounts. Thus, the learned Chamber Judge has misread and misinterpreted the provisions of the Family Courts Act and has not properly appreciated and considered the main reliefs sought in the suit. Thus, the learned Chamber Judge has misread and misinterpreted the provisions of the Family Courts Act and has not properly appreciated and considered the main reliefs sought in the suit. The learned Chamber Judge has dismissed the notice of motion only on the aforesaid ground considering Sections 7 and 8 of the Family Courts Act, by observing that the suit for aforesaid relief is not maintainable in the City Civil Court at Ahmedabad and has not decided the notice of motion on merits. Under the circumstances and for the reasons stated above, the impugned orders passed by the learned Chamber Judge, City Civil Court at Ahmedabad below notice of motion requires to be quashed and set aside and the matter is to be remanded to the Chamber Judge for deciding the notice of motion on merits." 7. Now coming to the citation shown by the opposite party. This Court is of the view that in view of catena of decisions settling the position taking into varieties of account, the view taken by the Gauhati High Court in the case of Srimati Nishamoni Kalita & Anr. (supra) is not a correct view. Other citations shown at the instance of the opposite party are simply ignored as same are not relevant for discussion in the present case particularly in the present circumstance. Thus, while accepting the views of the other High Courts, such as Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Gujarat and in keeping in mind the statement of objects and reasons behind the Act, this Court is of the view that personal disputes not involving the disputes between the husband and wife cannot be brought under the adjudication process of the Family Court and as such dispute, as raised in the present proceeding arising out of the suit can only be resolved by the Civil Court in the pending proceeding. 8. In view of the legal provisions as indicated herein above, in view of the settled position of law and under the observations made by this Court herein above, this Court while declaring the impugned order dated 21.9.2012 passed in C.M.A.No.82 of 2012 as bad, directs the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Khurda to hear the application for maintenance at the instance of the petitioners afresh and pass order, as appropriate. 9. 9. In view of long pendency of the particular proceeding in the trial court, this Court further directs the trial court to also conclude the proceeding for maintenance within a period of two moths from the date of communication of this order. 10. In the result, the writ petition stands allowed but with no order as to cost. Final Result : Allowed