JUDGMENT S.G. Shah, J. 1. Heard learned advocate Mr. Rajesh K. Shah for the appellants and learned APP Mr. K.L. Pandya for the respondent - State. Perused the record and proceeding in the form of paper-book. 2. The appellant No. 1 is son of appellant No. 2. They are convicted by impugned judgment and order dated 7.12.2009 by Sessions Judge, Porbandar and sentenced to undergo 3 years R.I with fine of Rs. 2000/-, and in default of payment of fine, additional R.I for three months u/s. 498A of the IPC and sentenced to under R.I for seven years with fine of Rs. 3000/-, and in default of payment of fine, further R.I for six months for the offence u/ss. 306 and 114 of the IPC. The sentence to both the appellants are similar and all the offences were ordered to run concurrently with further direction to extend set-off for the period of custody during trial. The jail report shows that they have already undergone imprisonment for almost five years out of seven years. 3. The case of the prosecution is to the effect that appellant No. 1 being husband of the victim and accused No. 2 being mother-in-law of the victim, had instigated the victim to commit suicide by torturing her, both physically and mentally and behaving cruelly with her. It is also alleged that appellants were doubting victim's character, and therefore, on the date of incident i.e. on 11.4.2009 at about 1.30 p.m., the victim has committed suicide because of such physical and mental torture and cruelty and because of allegations against her character. 4. The prosecution story and details of investigation is well described in the impugned judgment as well as in the pleading, and therefore, it would be futile exercise to reproduce the same story again. Hence, it is avoided. However, it would be necessary to scrutinize the evidence so as to ascertain that whether conviction is proper or not. To prove its case, the prosecution has examined as many as 13 witnesses and produced 38 documentary evidence. 5. PW-1 is Dr. Bharatbhai Tavri at Exh. 10. He was Medical Officer at Bhavsinhji Hospital, Porbandar, where the victim was taken after the incident and thereby he has examined the victim and performed postmortem of the dead-body and issued a postmortem note. 5. PW-1 is Dr. Bharatbhai Tavri at Exh. 10. He was Medical Officer at Bhavsinhji Hospital, Porbandar, where the victim was taken after the incident and thereby he has examined the victim and performed postmortem of the dead-body and issued a postmortem note. He proves relevant documents like police Yadi, viscera form, FSL report and PM note, which are at Exhs.11 to 17. Since the result of the incident is not disputed i.e. death of the victim by pouring kerosene on her own and ablazing herself, the basic and only issue, which requires consideration in this appeal is only limited, to examine that whether there was any physical and mental torture so as to lead the victim to commit suicide. Therefore, except proving the death of the victim, there is nothing to be discussed for such witness. 6. PWs-2 and 3 at Exhs.18 and 19 are panch witnesses of the place of the incident and they support the investigation, but as aforesaid, the issue before us is altogether different, and therefore, their evidence is also not much material, since there is no dispute so far as incident is concerned. 7. PW-4 at Exh. 21 is complainant - Nimuben, wife of Bhikhabhai and mother of the victim. It is her say that victim Shobana was her daughter and she was married with appellant No. 1 just before two months of the incident and that she is residing with her in-laws in joint family, and that on 11.4.2009, she died of burn injuries, which was the result of her own act of committing suicide because of ill-treatment as well as physical and mental torture by her in-laws, and more particularly, because of creating doubt about her character by the appellants. She narrated her social set-up and factum of marriage and incident as aforesaid and story of getting information about the incident, and thereafter, how she reached at the place and what she has seen. She has, therefore, after the incident, lodged a complaint with Madhavpur police station, where it was initially registered as Accidental Death No. 6 of 2009. It is her say that when she reached at Madhavpur after getting information from the brother-in-law of her daughter, she found the dead-body of her daughter in the house of the appellants. She has, therefore, after the incident, lodged a complaint with Madhavpur police station, where it was initially registered as Accidental Death No. 6 of 2009. It is her say that when she reached at Madhavpur after getting information from the brother-in-law of her daughter, she found the dead-body of her daughter in the house of the appellants. It is further stated by her that after the marriage when her daughter has came to her house, she has inquired about their marriage life, but her daughter has conveyed that her husband i.e. appellant No. 1 was beating her and that her husband, mother-in-law and brother-in-law were creating doubt about her character by naming different persons as if she was having illicit relation with such persons and because of such allegation, they are beating her. It is the say of the complainant that, thereupon, she has convinced the victim that she will be at her in-law's house and will convince her in-laws and thereby victim had been to her in-laws house on the next day with the appellant No. 1, but on one day thereafter she died because of burn injuries. It is her say that she does not know that her daughter had committed suicide and, hence, she lodged a complaint, which is proved at Exh. 22. However, though she did not want to admit in her first breath about the suicide by the victim, there is disclosure in the complaint itself that victim has committed suicide by ablazing herself, and therefore, ultimately she has admitted such fact in her examination before the Court. She has to admit that there is a custom of performing 'aanu' in their community, and accordingly, victim Shobana stayed at her in-laws house only for five days after the marriage, and thereafter, she was with her. However, she states that at that time, she stayed for 15 days, and thereafter, her 'aanu' was performed and thereby appellant had taken her back to his house. However, it is again admitted by the complainant that thereafter she was called back just within three days. She also admits that during the tenure of two months of marriage life of her daughter, appellant No. 1 i.e. her son-in-law was repeatedly visiting and staying at her house. However, it is again admitted by the complainant that thereafter she was called back just within three days. She also admits that during the tenure of two months of marriage life of her daughter, appellant No. 1 i.e. her son-in-law was repeatedly visiting and staying at her house. It is also admitted by her that two days before the incident, there was a religious function in her village i.e. "Ramdevpirno Prasad" and that victim and her husband had attended such programme, and thereafter, when they went to their village, the unhappy incident took place on the next day. However, she categorically admits that she does not know that what had happened in between i.e. the period before the incident and her daughter and son-in-law had left her house. However, in any case, the cross-examination of the witness as above, makes it clear that, practically, the marriage life of the husband and wife i.e. appellant No. 1 and the victim was only of 8 days and victim has not stayed with her in-laws for more than eight days and that on the contrary, she was at her parental house with her mother - complainant, where appellant was meeting them, and therefore, there is no scope or substance in the allegation by the complainant that there was physical or mental torture upon the victim and that too in the name of alleged illicit relation of the victim with some unknown person, more particularly, when appellant No. 1 being husband of the victim was repeatedly visiting the house of the complainant, certainly to meet the victim-his wife. However, the most important evidence is in the form of contradiction in the say of the complainant herself inasmuch as, in examination in chief, she has specifically stated that just before two days of the incident, when victim had been to her house, the victim has complained against her in-laws and complainant stated to the victim that she will come to victim's house to convince him and her in-laws; whereas in cross-examination, she has to admit that in fact appellant No. 1 was at her house only with the victim for 'Ramdevpirno Prasad' and they went together to Madhavpur at the house of the appellants. Thereafter she was cross-examined at length so far as history after the incident is concerned, wherein she has no option, but to admit that in fact her daughter - victim did not like the appellant No. 1 at all and she did not want to marry with him, but complainant has managed to get them married. She further admits that, in fact, her daughter - victim was not willing to go with appellant No. 1 at all before the date of incident, naturally because she does not like him, but complainant had sent her to her in-laws house. In addition to such factual admission, the complainant has specifically admitted in her deposition to the Court on oath that today she is alleging against appellants regarding ill-treatment, torture and cruelty to her daughter because prosecution has read-out the complaint to her before her deposition and she confirms that being illiterate, she does not know that what was written in her complaint. Therefore, though complainant has alleged against the appellant regarding ill-treatment and torture or cruelty upon victim, considering the evidence as aforesaid, the evidence of complainant alone cannot be made base for convicting a person, when there is material contradiction and admission that there is another possible reason for committing suicide by the victim i.e. victim does not like appellant No. 1 to be her husband and she does not want to stay with him and when their marriage life is only eight days, and more particularly, when her mother - complainant has not only got them married, but insisted and pressed the victim to go to the house of in-laws. Therefore, the evidence of the complainant is not trust-worthy or reliable so as to confirm the conviction as per the impugned judgment, more particularly in absence of other cogent, reliable and corroborating evidence to lead presumption of ill-treatment or cruelty on the appellants. 8. Pws-5 and 6 at Exhs.23 and 24 are brothers of the victim. There is nothing different or specific in their evidence except that they are following the version of his mother almost in verbatim. However, it does not confirm any cogent and reliable evidence to prove the offence. 9. PW-7 - Karabhai Sajanbhai, is having his Paan-shop near the house of the appellants. There is nothing different or specific in their evidence except that they are following the version of his mother almost in verbatim. However, it does not confirm any cogent and reliable evidence to prove the offence. 9. PW-7 - Karabhai Sajanbhai, is having his Paan-shop near the house of the appellants. It is his say that at the relevant time, after lunch, appellant No. 1 was at his Paan-shop for chewing tobacco and at that time, some other persons were present, but after some time, there was shouting near the house of the appellants and thereby they all had rushed to the appellants house where they found that victim has committed suicide by burning, upon which the appellants have disclosed the incident to the police. It is his say that there was no disturbance between the husband and wife and he has never heard that appellants were doubting the character of the victim, though he admits that when complainant - mother of the victim has reached the place, she was shouting against the appellants and his family members, but he denies that the complainant has conveyed him about cruelty and torture to the victim. 10. Similar is the evidence of Pws-8 and 9 at Exhs.26 and 27, who are belonging to the same caste as of complainant - victim. Though, they have narrated the same story like PW-7 regarding how he came to know about the incident, when they were passing nearby the house of the appellants, they do not support the case of the prosecution regarding torture and cruelty by appellants towards victim. Thereby, he is not supporting the case of the prosecution. On the contrary, he rebuts the prosecution evidence. 11. PW-10 at Exh. 28 is brother-in-law of appellant No. 1 and thereby son-in-law of appellant No. 2, who is also not supporting the prosecution case except disclosing the factual details about the incident. However, since he is relative of the appellants, his evidence in not material. 12. PW-11, Exh. 29 is A.S.P., Porbandar, who has recorded the complaint. Therefore, there is nothing in his evidence except disclosing his activity as such. 13. PW-12 at Exh. 30 is P.S.O. of Madhavpur police station, who has registered the complaint a I-C.R. No. 10/2009 u/ss.306, 498A and 114 of the IPC. 12. PW-11, Exh. 29 is A.S.P., Porbandar, who has recorded the complaint. Therefore, there is nothing in his evidence except disclosing his activity as such. 13. PW-12 at Exh. 30 is P.S.O. of Madhavpur police station, who has registered the complaint a I-C.R. No. 10/2009 u/ss.306, 498A and 114 of the IPC. Hence, he simply proves the relevant documentary evidence with reference to lodging of FIR and it is forwarded for further investigation etc. Thereby, there is nothing in his evidence, which proves or confirms commission of offence by the appellants. 14. PW-13 at Exh. 38 is investigating officer, and therefore, he has narrated his story of investigation, and therefore, defence could not prove anything from his cross-examination. However, only because of his evidence, appellants cannot be convicted. 15. The fact remains that though incident, place of incident and other investigation is proved on record by prosecution witnesses, may be because of the death of a person, when there is no other scope to deny the death, the fact remains that for confirming the commission of offence by the appellants as alleged, there is requirement of basic evidence regarding ill-treatment, torture and cruelty by the appellants to the victim. So far as such evidence is concerned, as aforesaid, the victim has stayed only for 8 days with her husband i.e. appellant No. 1, there is less chance of ill-treatment or cruelty or torture. It is hard to believe that there would be ill-treatment during first eight to ten days by husband or mother-in-law to a newly wedded girl. As against that there is specific admission by the complainant, who is mother of the victim that in fact victim does not like appellant No. 1 i.e. her husband and that she did not want to even marry with him and she got them married even though there was objection by the victim to perform such marriage and that, in fact, appellant No. 1 was visiting her place frequently during the period of relationship between them, which is only two months, and therefore, it is difficult to believe that there was such torturing by appellants, which dragged the victim to commit suicide. On the contrary, presumption would be against the victim herself that she was afraid of such marriage, but when her own mother was keen for such marriage, probably, she had committed suicide to get rid-off of the marriage when her mother has forced her for marriage, as also to go to matrimonial house with the appellant No. 1. In fact, the evidence leads to the presumption against complainant rather than accused. Emotions have no space in law, and therefore, only because an young girl has committed suicide within couple of months after her marriage, in absence of proper evidence against appellants, their conviction is not proper, irrespective of possibility of presumption against them that there must be a reason and thereby they should prove their innocence. I have reason to say so because except bare words of complainant - mother, there is no iota of evidence, which proves that there was any ill-treatment, torture or cruelty by the appellants to the victim. Even at the cost of repetition, it is to be recollected that, on the contrary, there is admission by the mother that victim was not ready to marry appellant No. 1, but she had to marry because of her force as the victim was not liking the appellant No. 1. In fact, this may be the cause of suicide, if at all it is suicide. Otherwise, the evidence shows that though it may be termed as an action by the victim herself, it amounts to accident rather than a pre-planned act of suicide. 16. I have also perused the impugned judgment. The learned trial Court has though discussed the evidence and legal issues in detail, fails to realise that emotions have no place in law and that one has to decide the issue purely upon the available evidence on record. 17. In view of above facts and circumstances, the conviction and sentence of the appellants by the trial Court is unwarranted. Therefore, the impugned judgment is required to be quashed and set-aside by acquitting the appellant No. 2, who is on bail. So far as appellant No. 1 is concerned, he has already undergone the sentence, and therefore, the appeal qua him becomes infructuous. Therefore, the appeal is allowed qua appellant No. 2. As the appellant No. 2 is on bail, her bail bond shall stand cancelled. 18. So far as appellant No. 1 is concerned, he has already undergone the sentence, and therefore, the appeal qua him becomes infructuous. Therefore, the appeal is allowed qua appellant No. 2. As the appellant No. 2 is on bail, her bail bond shall stand cancelled. 18. R & P be sent back to the trial Court forthwith.