JUDGMENT : Samapti Chatterjee, J. The petitioners filed the present writ petition for revaluing the order dated 16th September, 2011 passed by the Hearing Officer I of Rs.2,69,500/- with effect from 4/of 2006-07 in respect of premises no.127C, Raja S.C. Mullick Road, Kolkata-700 047. 2. The petitioners' case in brief is that the premises No.127C Raja Subodh Chandra Mullick Road, Kolkata, Kolkata-47 (hereinafter referred to as the said premises) originally belonged to Late Amulya Chandra Sadhukhan and after his demise on 2nd March 2009, the petitioner No.1 his widow and petitioner No.2 his only son became the owner of the said premises upon natural inheritance. Thereafter Late Amulya Chandra Sadhukhan during his lifetime obtained sanctioned building plan from Kolkata Municipal Corporation for construction of ground + three storied building B.S. No.183 dated 30.08.2003. Thereafter Late Amulya Chandra Sadhukhan entered into a development agreement dated 15.12.2004 with the developer for constructing the said ground+3 storied building as per the sanctioned plan and subsequently the said development agreement was amended on 7.2.2007 upon setting certain terms and conditions therein. On 7th February, 2005 Amulya Chandra Sadhukhan informed the Executive Engineer (Building) of KMC under Rule 21 of the said KMC Act, 1980. On 5th March, 2008 letter of possession was given by the developer to the said Amulya Chandra Sadhukhan. Thereafter on 14th October, 2009 KMC Authority assessed the entire premises as vacant land with effect from 4 of 2006-07 and also assessed as separate unit for 4 of 2008-09. Feeling aggrieved the petitioners filed writ petition being W.P No.8287 (W) of 2010 which was disposed of on 10th September, 2009 after setting aside the valuation of Rs. 2,89,500/- with effect from 4/2006-07 thus directing the Hearing Officer to consider the valuation afresh by passing a reasoned order. Pursuant to the direction of the Hon'ble Court the respondent authority issued a fresh hearing notice and upon hearing the petitioners the Hearing Officer I passed a reasoned order on 16th September, 2009 whereby the Hearing Officer I on the basis of presumption reached to a conclusion that the entire existing structure was demolished before construction and there was no existence of Diagnostic Center at the time of construction and vacant land existed during the period of 4/of 2006-07. 3. Ms. 3. Ms. Koyeli Bhattacharya, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner contended that during the impugned period of 4/2006-07 the work of the construction of the new building was under process. Therefore, it cannot be described that the premises at that material point of time was a vacant law. 4. Ms. Bhattacharya also contended that as some portion of the existing structure of the said premises is demolished whereby a vacant land was created for construction of the new building at the said premises. Therefore, the impugned assessment done by the respondent authority considering the entire premises as a vacant land is wholly illegal and patently bad in law. 5. Ms. Bhattacharya further vehemently urged that the Hearing Officer with closed mind passed the said order without considering the factual aspects the period of 4/2006-07 to January 2007 but the KMC Authority has assessed the said premises and raised bill with effect from 4/2008-09 i.e. December, 2009. 6. Ms. Bhattacharya further vehemently urged that as per provisions of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 and the rules and circulation framed thereunder the revaluation and reassessment of a premises cannot be done if no constructional or rental change occurs in the said premises. As per the provision of law reassessment of a premises can be done by the corporation only when some constructional or rental changes are done in the said premises. But in the instant subject matter reassessment and revaluation of the said premises has been done by the Kolkata Municipal Corporation arbitrarily in violation of the provision of Section 180 (2) of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980. But in the instant subject matter reassessment and revaluation of the said premises has been done by the Kolkata Municipal Corporation arbitrarily in violation of the provision of Section 180 (2) of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980. The same is quoted below :- "Section 180 (2) :- The Municipal Commissioner may cause any revision to be made in the annual valuation of any land or building in the following cases:- ii) When the nature of occupancy changes; or iii) When the nature of its use changes; or iv) When a new building is erected or an existing building is redeveloped or substantially altered or improved during the period the annual valuation remains in force; or v) When, on an application made in writing by the owner or the person liable to pay its [property tax] it is established that during the period of the annual valuation remaining in force its value has been reduced by reason of any substantial demolition or has suffered depreciation from any accident or any calamity proved to the satisfaction of the Municipal commissioner to have been beyond the control of such owner or such person; or vi) When any land or building or portion thereof is acquired by purchase or otherwise by the State Government or the Corporation or any statutory body mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (8) of section 171 during the period of the annual valuation remaining in force; vii) When any land or building or portion thereof, is sold or otherwise transferred by the State Government or the Corporation or any statutory body mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (8) of Section 171: Provided that all land used for roads and other public purposes shall be excluded from such revaluation; or viii) When, upon the acquisition or transfer of any land or building in part, a residual portion remains, ; or ix) When it becomes necessary so to do for any other reason to be recorded in writing." 7. Ms. Bhattacharya further strongly argued that in the previous assessment period of 4/2000-01 there has been no constructional change in the said premises, only that existing structure was demolished. 8. Ms. Ms. Bhattacharya further strongly argued that in the previous assessment period of 4/2000-01 there has been no constructional change in the said premises, only that existing structure was demolished. 8. Ms. Bhattacharya further contended that it is a settled position of law supported by catena of decisions passed by Hon'ble Apex Court as well as the Calcutta High Court that if no constructional or rental change is made in the concerned premises then no revaluation and/or reassessment of the said premises can be done by the KMC Authority. General revaluation of a premises only can be done after ever six years on the basis of the previous assessed period. Therefore, by reassessment and/or overvaluing the said premises the respondent has acted arbitrarily, illegally and mala fidely which should be looked into by this Hon'ble Court. 9. Ms Bhattacharya further contended that after obtaining prior permission from KMC the existing structure of the said premises was demolished and a new structure was erected on the said land. Therefore, revaluation of the said land for the period of two months in the said premises as have been done by the respondent authorities at the time of passing the impugned order is wholly illegal, irrational and not only arbitrary but also with the mala fide intention to extract undue tax from the petitioners in the guise of reassessment. 10. Ms. Bhattacharya further contended that the said premises is occupied by the commercial tenant. An agreement was entered into by the developer to develop the said premises and on 5th March, 2008 the developer handed over the possession. Therefore, vacant land tax charged by KMC by the impugned order is totally illegal as after completion of the said building in the year 2008-09, the said premises cannot be described as a vacant land during the assessment year of 2007-08. 11. Ms. Bhattacharya further contended that it is evident from the record that during July, 2007 the construction was going on and only on 5th March, 2008 the building was completed. Therefore, it cannot be treated that the said building was vacant from 4/of 2006-07. They could have claimed prior to 2005 but not from the 4/of 2006-07 when admittedly the land was not vacant land and the land was under process of construction. 12. Ms. Therefore, it cannot be treated that the said building was vacant from 4/of 2006-07. They could have claimed prior to 2005 but not from the 4/of 2006-07 when admittedly the land was not vacant land and the land was under process of construction. 12. Ms. Bhattacharya drew my attention to Page 45 of the second para of the impugned order where it has been presumed that after the demolition of the existing structure the status of the premises was in a vacant land without any structure which is not correct as submitted by Ms. Bhattacharya. 13. Ms. Bhattacharya also submitted that though there is a provision of regular appeal against illegal re-assessment but there is no bar to avail the jurisdiction of Article 226. In support of her contention that alternative remedy is not a bar Ms. Bhattcharya relied on 1998 (8) SCC Page-1 Paragraphs 14 and 15 (Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai And Others) which are quoted below:- "Para-14-The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provision of the Constitution. This power can be exercised by the High Court not only for issuing writ s in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights contained in Part-II of the Constitution but also for "any other purpose". Para-15- Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. There is a plethora of case-law on this point but to cut down this circle of forensic whirlpool, we would rely on some old decisions of the evolutionary era of the constitutional law as they still hold the field." And also relied on another decision reported in 2012 (2) Supreme Court Cases Page-108 Paragraphs-79 and 80 (Executive Engineer, Southern Electricity Supply Company of Orissa Limited (Southco) And Another v. Sri Seetaram Rice Mill) which are quoted below :- "Para-79-It may be noticed that admittedly the present respondent had not preferred any appeal against the provisional order of assessment dated 25.7.2009 and, in fact, had preferred a writ petition against the very issuance of a notice issued in terms of sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 126 of the 2003 Act. This brings us to the question as to what is the scope of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the face of the provisions of Section 127 of the 2003 Act. Para-80- It is a settled canon of law that the High Court would not normally interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India where statutory alternative remedy is available. It is equally settled that this canon of law is not free of exceptions. The courts, including this Court, have taken the view that the statutory remedy, if provided under a specific law, would impliedly oust the jurisdiction of the civil courts. The High Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can entertain writ or appropriate proceedings despite availability of an alternative remedy. This class of cases we are mentioning by way of illustration and should not be understood to be an exhaustive exposition of law which in our opinion, is neither practical nor possible to state with precision. The availability of alternative statutory or other remedy by itself may not operate as an absolute bar for exercise of jurisdiction by the courts. It will normally depend upon the facts and circumstances of a given case. The further question that would inevitably come up for consideration before the Court even in such cases would be as to what extent the jurisdiction has to be exercised." 14. Per Contra, Mr. It will normally depend upon the facts and circumstances of a given case. The further question that would inevitably come up for consideration before the Court even in such cases would be as to what extent the jurisdiction has to be exercised." 14. Per Contra, Mr. Biswajit Mukherjee, learned Advocate appearing for the KMC vehemently urged that it is a pure question of fact which should not be looked into by the writ court. 15. Mr. Mukherjee also drew my attention to some sections of the KMC Act namely Sub Section 2 of Section 174 Sub Section of Section 189 and Section 190. 16. Mr. Mukherjee further contended that Hearing Officer has passed a well reasoned order, therefore, the impugned order should not be entertained by this Hon'ble Court. 17. Mr. Mukherjee further contended that the petitioners can raise grievances under Section 189 (5) of the KMC Act, 1980 having an alternative remedy for appeal before the learned Tribunal. 18. Mr. Mukherjee further contended that the Hearing Officer considered all the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners in respect of their plea that the existing structure of the said premises was never fully demolished but was partly demolished for new construction and partly provided to the existing tenants for running their business and after going through the connected documents submitted on behalf of the petitioners the Hearing Officer concluded that petitioners failed to establish that there was a tenant at the time of construction and the construction was made without demolishing the tenanted portion and the owner herein demolished the entire structure as represented is not at all justified. 19. In support of his contention Mr. Mukherjee relied on a Supreme Court decision reported in AIR 2009 Supreme Court Cases Page-1761 Paragraph-16 (Mahavir Singh v. Khilai Ram & Ors) where it is held that correctness of decision making process is relevant for consideration by the Court, not the merit of the decision. Para 16 is quoted below:- "Para-16-The High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is basically concerned with the correctness of the decision making process and not the merit of the decision. It has not been found by the High Court that Collector in expressing his opinion as regards comparative merit of appellant vis-`-vis respondent No.1 committed an error in his decision making process. It has not been found by the High Court that Collector in expressing his opinion as regards comparative merit of appellant vis-`-vis respondent No.1 committed an error in his decision making process. The principles of natural justice have been complied with. Procedure laid down in the Rules had also been complied with. It is also not correct to say, as has been contended by Mr. Mahajan that the Collector had not taken into consideration the services rendered by the respondent No.1 to the State. He did acknowledge that the respondent No.1 had rendered the services to the State as a member of the Armed Forces. The Collector also took into consideration that the views of the respectable of the village were in favour of appellant as also the fact that he had participated in the collection work of the village and helped the Government officials at the time of their visit. He furthermore took into consideration the fact that the Naib Tehsildar, Hansi had also recommended his name. Even the Circle Revenue Officer had recommended therefor." 20. Therefore, in conclusion Mr. Mukherjee urged that the writ petition has no merit and therefore deserve to be dismissed for lack of merit. 21. Considering the submissions advanced by the learned Advocates appearing for the parties and after perusing the records and the relevant documents I find that the impugned order passed by the Hearing Officer dated 16th September, 2011 is full of discrepancies which creates some doubts in the mind of the Court as the Hearing Officer failed to establish that the premises was used by the tenant, so construction was made without demolishing the tenanted portion and the owner never demolished the entire old structure, therefore, it cannot be accepted by a person of ordinary prudence that entire premises was a vacant land. Not only that I cannot ignore the fact that the portion of the said premises was occupied by Roy Krishna Diagnostic Center at 127C Raja S.C. Mullick Road, Kol-47 and one Smt. Leena was occupying the said portion as a tenant. 22. It is evident from the electricity bill and telephone bill of the said Roy Krishna Diagnostic Center which was produced before the Hearing Officer that at that point of time the said Diagnostic Center was very much in occupation in some portion of the said premises as a tenant before the new construction was made. 22. It is evident from the electricity bill and telephone bill of the said Roy Krishna Diagnostic Center which was produced before the Hearing Officer that at that point of time the said Diagnostic Center was very much in occupation in some portion of the said premises as a tenant before the new construction was made. Therefore, it cannot be accepted that the entire building was demolished and the said premises was in a status of vacant land as has been described in the impugned order. 23. I cannot also ignore the fact that previously the writ petition was filed by the petitioners being W.P No.8287 (W) of 2010 challenging the illegal arbitrary valuation of Rs.2,89,500/- raised fromRs.20,740/- with effect from 4/of 2006-07. That writ petition was disposed of on 10th September, 2010 thus directing the respondent authority to consider the petitioners grievances after giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners after setting aside and quashing the impugned order. But curiously enough in the present impugned order the Hearing Officer has fixed the same amount as annual valuation treating the entire premises as a vacant land which is not acceptable considering the documents annexed to the petitioners. 24. I also find that the Hearing Officer on the basis of presumption has come to the conclusion that the entire premises was in a vacant state therefore, the huge amount was fixed as annual valuation treating the entire premises as a vacant land which is not correct. After perusing the case of Whirlpool Corporation (Supra) and Executive Engineer, Southern Electricity Supply Company (Supra) that the alternative remedy is not a bar to entertain the writ petition if there is some illegalities, irregularities established in the act on the part of the respondent authorities, I hold that the writ petition is maintainable. 25. I find that the impugned order of the Hearing Officer suffers from irregularities and only on the basis of his own assessment the Hearing Officer without any evidence has come to the conclusion that the land was a vacant land before construction and on the basis of such conclusion the Hearing Officer arbitrarily imposed market value ofRs.2,69,500/- with effect from 4/2006-07 which is wholly incorrect as it is found from the records that during the period of 4/2006-07 entire building was not demolished at all. Some portion of the building was very much in existence and was occupied by the tenants. That being the position I am of the view that the impugned order dated 16th September, 2011 issued by the Hearing Officer of the KMC with effect from 4/2006- 07 thus directing the petitioners to payRs.2,69,500/- in respect of the premises no.127 C, Raja S.C. Mullick Road, Kol-47 cannot be sustained in the eye of law. Therefore, the order dated 16th September, 2011 passed by the Hearing Officer I is hereby set aside and quashed. 26. I direct the respondent authority to hold a fresh hearing within six weeks from the date of communication of this order in respect of the said premises after giving an opportunity to the petitioners and two weeks thereafter communicate the decision to the petitioners. Needless to say the decision must be a reasoned one. 27. With these directions this writ petition is disposed of without any order as to costs. 28. Urgent photostat certified copy of this Judgment, if applied for be supplied to the parties after fulfilling all the formalities. Appeal disposed of.