JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner has filed this criminal misc. petition under section 482 Cr.P.C. for being aggrieved of the registration of FIR No. 472/2014 at police station Gandhi Nagar, Jaipur (East), Jaipur, for the offences under sections 420, 409, 467, 471 and 120-B IPC.Accordingly, the petitioner has prayed that FIR No. 472/2014 (Annexure-1) dated 07.10.2014 registered at police station Gandhi Nagar, Jaipur (East), Jaipur be quashed and set aside.The petitioner has also sought for quashing of the order dated 01.10.2014, copy of which has not been filed along with the misc. petition but only extract has been given therein, which is not supported by any affidavit.Further, the petitioner has prayed to quash and set aside the complaint, as far as it pertains to the petitioner. 2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that Suresh Chand Sharma, respondent no. 2, had filed an application before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate No. 2. Jaipur Metropolitan, on 30.08.2014 with the following prayer: " vr% ifjokn i= izLrqr dj fuosnu gS fd ifjokn vUrxZr /kkjk 156 ( 3 ) n.M izfdz;k lafgrk ds rgr iqfyl Fkkuk xka/kh uxj dks izsf"kr dj eqdnek ntZ dj vuqlU/kku djus ds funsZ'k iznku djus dh d`ik djsaA " 3. The matter was taken up by the learned Magistrate on 04.09.2014 and 10.09.2014. On 15.09.2014, the arguments of the respective parties were over and the case was posted for 20.09.2014. It was on 01.10.2014 that the learned Magistrate passed an order under section 156(3) Cr.RC. by sending the original application, filed by the complainant, with the direction to the SHO police station Gandhi Nagar (East) to register it as a report; commence the investigation and to send the result to the court, at the earliest. 4. It was averred in the aforesaid application filed by the petitioner that after reserving a plot, measuring 23 acres (24145.20 sq.m.) in Sector 5 of the Vidhyadhar Nagar Scheme, the Jaipur Development Authority started construction of a hospital and had spent about Rs. 1,47,00,000/-, up to the year 1997. It was in the year 1997 that a decision was taken to hand over the said incomplete hospital to Sawai Man Singh Medical College, an institution of the State of Rajasthan. The State of Rajasthan had on 23.04.1997 sanctioned an amount of Rs. 1,60,00,000/- which was given by the Medical & Health Department to the Jaipur Development Authority. It was in the year 1997 that a decision was taken to hand over the said incomplete hospital to Sawai Man Singh Medical College, an institution of the State of Rajasthan. The State of Rajasthan had on 23.04.1997 sanctioned an amount of Rs. 1,60,00,000/- which was given by the Medical & Health Department to the Jaipur Development Authority. On 31.03.1997, the Medical S Health Department had taken possession of the incomplete building and for he purpose of further construction, handed over the same to the Executive Engineer, Public Works Department on 16.01.1998. From January, 1998 to December, 1998, the Public Works Department/State Government had spent Rs. 02,02,83,000/- for construction of the building, as per the letter dated 21.01.1999 written by the Executive Engineer, PWD, City Division.In the month of December, 1998, after Assembly Elections, another party had formed the Government. Shri Chandra Bhan, accused no. 3, had become a Minister. It is averred in the application that Dr. Chandra Bhan and Dr. Vimal Rai Soni are close friends as they were contemporary as students of Sawai Man Singh Medical College. The Jaipur Development Authority had issued an allotment order on 04.03.1999, in favour of the Medical & Health Department in respect of the land measuring 24145 sq.yds @ Rs. 2100/- per sq.yds. which was half of the reserve price for institutions in accordance to the Rajasthan Disposal of Urban Properties Rules, 1974. Accordingly, the price was determined as Rs. 05,07,4920/- and the total amount to be paid was fixed as Rs. 05,32,40,191/-. In the said allotment, condition nos. 8, 9 and 11 are note-worthy, according to which the land would be used only for trauma hospital; would not authorise construction for any business purpose and it shall not be used for commercial or any other purpose of earning profit. Another condition was that without the permission of Jaipur Development Authority, the constructed building shall not be sold, mortgaged etc. and in no manner it shall be transferred. The next condition was that the allotment shall be considered to have been made in accordance to the Rajasthan Improvement Trust/Disposal of Urban Land Rules, 1974 and the Jaipur Development Authority Rules, 1982 which may be amended from time to time and the orders/directions Issued therein.By the year 2001, the State Government has, for the purpose of construction of the building spent Rs. 5,91,00,000/- which Is clear from the letter of RIICO dated 29.08.2001. 5. The relevant extract of the application wherein the allegations against the accused persons have been levelled for having committed the aforesaid offences, are as under: 9 ;g fd MkW0 foeyjkW; lksuh ts0,y0,u0 ekxZ] ij lksuh vLirky ds uke ls ( ftldh feYdh;r ;k dEiuh fdldh Fkh bl fo"k; esa tkudkjh ugha gS ) ,d NksVk lk vLirky pykrs Fks] MkW0 pUnzHkku ds lkFk feydj fo|k/kj uxj esa bl 24145 oxZxt tehu rFkk bl ij 5]91]00]000@& :i;s ( ikap djksM+ bdkuesa yk[k :i;s ) ls fufeZr gq, Hkou dks gM+ius dk "kM~;U= fd;kA 10 ;g fd vpkud vfHk;qDrx.k dh lkft'k ds rgr jkT; ljdkj }kjk vLirky ds fuekZ.k dk;Z dks jksd fn;k x;k tcfd vLirky yxHkx iw.kZ gks pqdk FkkA 11 ;g fd 08 ekpZ] 2001 dks rRdkyhu eq[; ea=h Jh v'kksd xgyksr ftuds fd ea=heaMy esa MkW0 pUnzHkku egRoiw.kZ ea=h Fks us "kM~;U= iwoZd ch0Mh0 dh ehfVax esa ;g fu/kkZfjr fd;k fd pwafd jkT; ljdkj ds ikl /ku dk vHkko gS blfy, fo|k/kj uxj esa cu jgs V~ksek vLirky dk futhdj.k dj fn;k tkosA bl ehfVax dh v/;{krk Jh v'kksd xgyksr us dh rFkk mUgha ds }kjk ,slk izLrko fy;k x;kA tcfd vLirky ds fuekZ.k ls ch0Mh0 dk dksbZ lEcU/k ugha Fkk rFkk fpfdRlk ,oa LokLF; foHkkx ds ctV esa ljIyl jkf'k 'ks"k FkhA ijUrq tkucw>dj ;g QthZ fjdkWMZ cuk;k x;k fd ctV dk vHkko gSA rc Jh pUnzHkku m|ksx ea=h cu x;s Fks rFkk fnukad 01 vxLr] 2001 dks iqu% ch0Mh0 dh ehfVax gqbZ ftldh v/;{krk MkW0 pUnzHkku }kjk dh x;hA 12 ;g fd pwafd ;fn fdlh lEifRr dks uhyke fd;k tkrk gS rks mlds fy, fu;ekuqlkj vk/kkj ewY; fu/kkZfjr fd;k tkuk vko';d gksrk gSA tks fd de ls de rRdkyhu nj ds lkFk 30 izfr'kr tksM+dj rFkk cktkj nj dks /;ku esa j[kdj fd;k tkrk gSA ;fn bl izdkj ewY; dk fu/kkZj.k fd;k tkrk rks rRdkyhu laLFkkfud {ks= dh vkjf{kr nj ds vuqlkj flQZ Hkwfe dk ewY; yxHkx 25 djksM+ :i;s gksrk rFkk blesa jkT; ljdkj }kjk fuekZ.k esa [kpZ fd;s x;s 5]91]00]000@& :i;s ikap djksM+ bdkuesa yk[k :i;s dks tksM+k tkrk rks ;g jkf'k 31 djksM+ :i;s gksrhA bl fo"k; esa Raj. Improvement Trust (Disposal of Urban Land) Rules, 1974 ds fu;e 6 fuEu izdkj gSa%& 13 ;g fd pwafd ;g Hkou o Hkwfe MkW0 foeyjk; lksuh dks "kM~;U= iwoZd nsuh Fkh blfy, t;iqj rRdkyhu ts0Mh0lh0 Jh ,u0lh0 xks;y ds lkFk lkaB xkaB dj MkW pUnzHkku us fnukad 01-08-2001 dh ehfVax esa ;g fu.kZ; djok;k fd Hkwfe dks igys fpfdRlk ,oa LokLF; foHkkx] lokbZ ekuflax vLirky dks vUrfjr dj fn;k tkos rFkk mlds ckn bldh uhykeh dh tkosA bldk mn~ns'; ;g Fkk fd lEifRr dks fof/k fo:) rjhds ls yqVk;k tk ldsA 14 ;g fd lEifRr dh yht MhM dHkh Hkh lokbZ ekuflag fpfdRlky; ds uke tkjh ugha gqbZA lokbZ ekuflag fpfdRlky; ds uke ek= vkoaVu i= fnukad 04-03-1999 dks tkjh fd;k x;k FkkA bl izdkj fof/kd :i ls dHkh Hkh Hkwfe lokbZ ekuflag fpfdRlky; dks vUrfjr ugha gqbZ rFkk vykVesUV ds 'krksZa ds vuqlkj Hkwfe dk fdlh Hkh izdkj dk vUrj.k lokbZ ekuflag fpfdRlky; }kjk ugha fd;k tk ldrk Fkk rFkk pwafd nks o"kZ rd fuekZ.k dk;Z iw.kZ Hkh ugha gqvk Fkk blfy;s Hkwfe oSls gh iqu% ts0Mh0,0 esa fufgr gks xbZ FkhA tSlk fd vkoaVu i= fnukad 04-03-1999 dh 'krksZa eas Li"V gS tks fd fuEu izdkj gS%& Hkw[k.M dk fuekZ.k dk;Z vkoaVu i= dh frfFk ls 6 ekg dh vof/k esa izkf/kdj.k }kjk Lohd`r ekufp=ksa ds vuqlkj izkjEHk fd;k tkosxk ,oa 2 o"kZ dh vof/k esa iw.kZ dj fy;k tkosxkA Hkou ekufp= vuqeksnu djokus dh ftEesnkjh Lo;a laLFkk dh gksxhA ;fn vkoaVu dh frfFk ls Hkwfe dk mi;ksx 2 o"kZ dh vof/k esa ugha fd;k x;k rks Hkw[k.M o ml vk/ks v/kwjs Hkou] ;fn dksbZ gS rks vf/keghr dj fy;k tkosxk o eqvkotk ns; ugha gksxkA Hkw[k.M dsoy V~ksek vLirky cukus gsrq dke esa fy;k tkosxk ,oa fdlh Hkh izdkj ds O;olkf;d fuekZ.k dh Lohd`fr ugha nh tkosxh vkSj u gh fdlh izdkj dk okf.kfT;d fuekZ.k dh Lohd`fr ugha nh tkosxh vkSj u gh fdlh izdkj dk okf.kfT;d ,oa ykHk dekus dh n`f"V ls bldk mi;ksx fd;k tk ldsxkA Hkw[k.M ,oa bl ij fufeZr Hkou fdlh Hkh vU; dks izkf/kdj.k dh iwoZ Lohd`fr ds fcuk fodz; ca/kd] nku f'kdeh ,oa vU; fdlh Hkh :i ls gLrkarfjr ugha fd;k tk ldsxkA Hkw[k.M ,oa bl fufeZr Hkou dks iquxZghr dj fy;s tkus ij bldks iqu% vkoaVu@fodz; djus dk izk/khdj.k dks iw.kZ vf/kdkj gksxkA 15 ;g fd fof/k vuqlkj Hkwfe dh uhykeh jhdks }kjk ugha dh tk ldrh Fkh o u gh ;g dk;Zokgh ch0Mh0 dh ehfVax esa r; dh tk ldrh Fkh D;ksafd Hkwfe ts0Mh0,0 dh Fkh rFkk ,l0,e0,l0 vLirky dks Hkh fj;k;rh njksa ij Hkwfe dk vkoaVu fd;k x;k Fkk rFkk fj;k;rh njksa ij vkoafVr Hkwfe dks voaVudrkZ }kjk Hkh fdlh Hkh izdkj ls vUrfjr ugha fd;k tk ldrk gS tSlk fd mijksDr of.kZr fu;eksa o vkoaVu vkns'k esa Hkh Li"V gSA 16 ;g fd rRdkyhu fpfdRlk ,oa LokLF; lfpo us crk;k fd ;fn vkoklh; nj ls Hkh Hkwfe dh dher fudkyh tkos rFkk mlesa fuekZ.k dk;Z dh jkf'k tksM+h tkos rks ;g jkf'k de ls de 16]14]00]000@& :i;s vkrh gSA ijUrq euekus <+ax ls flQZ MkW0 foeyjk; lksuh dks ykHk nsus dh fu;r ls fu;e ds foijhr bl jkf'k dks vk/kkjHkwr dher dks ?kVk dj 8]50]00]000@& :i;s ( vkB djksM+ ipkl yk[k :i;s ) dj fn;k x;kA tSlk fd rRdkyhu dk;Zdkjh funsZ'kd jhdks ds i= fnukad 29-08-2001 ds lkFk layXu 01-08-2001 dh ehfVax dh dk;Zokgh ds laf{kIr uksV esa vafdr gSA 17 ;g fd uksV'khV ds vuqlkj 8]50]00]000@& :i;s ( vkB djksM+ ipkl yk[k :i;s ) ewy jkf'k j[krs gq, foKkiu jhdks dh Hkwfe gh ugha Fkh rFkk Hkwfe ts0Mh0,0 dh FkhA blesa vfUre frfFk 16-10-2001 crkbZ xbZA ,slk izrhr gksrk gS fd bruh utnhdh frfFk blfy, j[kh rkfd dksbZ Hkh O;fDr mfpr :i ls fcM ugha Mky ldsA 18 ;g fd vkxs dh uksV'khV crkrh gS fd 16-10-2001 rd dksbZ Hkh fufonk izkIr ugha gqbZA 19 ;g fd fnukad 10-01-2002 dks iqu% ch0Mh0 dh uoh ehfVax gqbZ rFkk euekus <+ax ls U;wure jkf'k 5]00]00]000@& :i;s ( ikap djksM+ :i;s ) djrs gq, iqu% fufonk;sa fudky nh x;h tcfd 5]91]00]000@& :i;s dk fuekZ.k gh gks pqdk Fkk rFkk fnukad 12-04-2002 dks iqu% foKkiu tkjh fd;k x;k ftlesa vfUre frfFk 27-05-2002 j[kh x;h ,oa 29-05-2002 dks fufonk;sa [kksy Hkh yhA 20 ;g fd VsaMj izLrqr djus dh vfUre frfFk 27-05-2002 Fkh lksuh gkWfLiVy fyfeVsM dEiuh dk xBu fnukad 02-05-2002 dks fd;k x;k rFkk bl dEiuh ds ikl viuh 3 o"kZ dk foRrh; ugha Fkk foRrh; fjdkWMZ ,d nwljh dEiuh lksuh gsYFk ds;j fyfeVsM dks fn;k x;k fQj Hkh voS/k :i ls bl dEiuh dks vLirky ns fn;k x;k FkkA 21 ;g fd Jh foeyjk; lksuh us feyh&Hkxr dj pkj fufonk;sa igys gh cuk;h x;kh Fkh ds uke 6]11]00]000@& :i;s ( N% djksM+ X;kjg yk[k :i;s ) esa fufonk izkIr dj yhA 22 ;g fd fnukad 07-03-2003 dks Jh fugky pUn xks;y tks fd rc uxjh; fodkl lfpo cu pqds Fks us vkns'k fudkyk fd ts0Mh0,0 }kjk yht MhM cukbZ tkos rFkk izFke fd'r ds lkFk gh Hkou esa Hkwfe dk dCtk ns fn;k tkos vFkkZr~ ;g "kM~;U= igys ls gh dj fy;k x;k Fkk fd ;g 6]11]00]000@& :i;s N% djksM+ X;kjg yk[k :i;s dh jkf'k Hkh 3 o"kZ ds vUnj 12 fd'rksa esa yh tkosxhA blls ;g Hkh Li"V gS fd Hkwfe ts0Mh0,0 dh Fkh ijUrq "kM~;U= dj QthZ nLrkost cukdj vlR; feuV~l cukdj ljdkjh lEeifr dks yqVk fn;k rFkk vkijkf/kd U;kl Hkax fd;k D;ksafd jktdh; deZpkjh o ea=h ljdkj dh lEifRr ds U;klh gSaA 23 ;g fd vkns'k fd;k x;k fd yhtMhM dk fu"iknu ts0Mh0,0 }kjk fd;k tkosxk tcfd iwoZ esa ;g izLrko fy;k x;k Fkk fd Hkwfe lokbZ ekuflag vLirky dks vUrfjr gks pqdh gS blls ;g Li"V gS fd Hkwfe ts0Mh0,0 dh ijUrq MkW0 Jh foeyjk; lksuh dks nsus ds fy;s ;g QthZ fjiksVZ MkW0 pUnzHkku ds funsZ'k esa cuk;h x;h fd Hkwfe o Hkou dh yht MhM lokbZ ekuflag vLirky dks dj nh tkos rFkk mlds ckn jhdks ls uhykeh djok;h tkos rkfd cs'kdherh Hkou MkW0 foeydqekj lksuh dks eqQ~r esa fn;k tk ldsA D;ksafd ts0Mh0,0 ds fu;eksa ds vuqlkj fuykeh djok;h tkrh rks bldk vk/kkj ewY; de ls de 31]00]00]000@& :i;s bdRrhl djksM+ :i;s djuk gksrkA 24 ;g fd t;iqj fodkl izkf/kdj.k }kjk yht ij Hkwfe fn;s tkus dh 'krsZa lqfu'fpr gSa rFkk vkjf{kr nj ls de nj ij Hkwfe flQZ pSfjVscy baLVhV~;wV dks gh nh tk ldrh gS rFkk lksuh gkWfLiVy izk0fy0 dksbZ /kekZFkZ laLFkku ugha gSA blfy, vkoaVu i= tkjh djus ds LFkku ij fnukad 14-05-2013 dks yht MhM iathd`r djokbZ djokbZ xbZA yht MhM esa ;g Li"V vafdr gS fd Hkwfe o Hkou t;iqj fodkl izkf/kdj.k ds LokfeRo esa gS vr% ;g yhtMhM Hkh voS/k :i ls jftLVMZ djokbZ xbZA 25 ;g fd 20 ebZ] 2008 dks iqu% lksuh gkWfLiVYl }kjk ts0Mh0,0 dks i= fy[kk x;k ftlesa ,Q0,0vkj0 dks 2-0 djus mapkbZ 125 rd c<+kus rFkk lsV csd ,fj;k esa 3 cslesUV ikfdZax cukus dh vuqefr ekaxh ftlls Li"V gS fd lkjh izfdz;k dk mn~ns'; okf.kfT;d o O;olkf;d :i ls mi;ksx djus gsrq turk dh lEink dks gM+iuk gSA 26 ;g fd lksuh vLirky esa iw.kZr;k O;kikfjd ,oa O;kolkf;d xfrfof/k;ka gks jgh gSa rFkk fu;eksa ds foijhr bldks ,d vU; i{kdkj jktu iknqdks.kksa dks vUrfjr Hkh dj fn;k x;k gS ftldh jftLV~h yxHkx 123 djksM+ :i;s esa o"kZ 2014 esa djokbZ xbZA 27 ;g fd ts0Mh0,0 }kjk fj;k;rh njksa ij vkoafVr dksbZ Hkh Hkwfe dk u gks vUrj.k gh fd;k tk ldrk gS u gh mldk cspku fd;k tk ldrk gS ijUrq fj;k;rh njksa ij nh x;h Hkwfe o vLirky dks voS/k :i ls vUrfjr fd;k x;k gS rFkk V~ksek vLirky dh 'krksZa dk ikyu Hkh ugha fd;k x;k gSA blesa O;olkf;d ,oa O;kikfjd xfrfof/k;ksa dh xbZ gSa rFkk fu/kZuksa dks fof/kuqlkj fu%'kqYd mipkj Hkh miyC/k ugha djok;k x;k gSA 28 ;g fd fdlkuksa ls bl Hkwfe dk vf/kxzg.k lkoZtfud dk;Z ds fy, fd;k x;k Fkk ijUrq bls csbZekuh iwoZd mi;ksx esa fy;k x;k gSA 29 ;g fd vfHk;qDrx.k dk d`R; /kkjk 420] 409] 467] 468] 471 lifBr /kkjk 120 ch Hkkjrh; n.M lafgrk ds v/khu vijk/k gSA 30 ;g fd vfHkdka'kr% vkijkf/kd dk;Zokgh o fjdkWMZ esa gsjk Qsjh ts0Mh0,0 dk;Zky; esa gqbZ tks fd iqfyl Fkkuk xka/khuxj ds {ks=kf/kdkj esa vkrk gSA 31 ;g fd vfHk;qDrx.k izHkko'kkyh O;fDr gS blfy, buds fo:) iqfyl Fkkuk xka/khuxj o mPp vf/kdkfj;ksa }kjk eqdnek ntZ ugha fd;k x;k gSA vr% ifjokn i= izLrqr dj fuosnu gS fd ifjokn vUrZxr /kkjk 1563 n.M izfdz;k lafgrk ds rgr iqfyl Fkkuk xka/khuxj dks izsf"kr dj eqdnek ntZ dj vuqla/kku djus ds funsZ'k iznku djus dh d`ik djsaA " 6. The thrust of the argument and the primary contention raised by the counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner is a member of the Indian 15 Administrative Services and, therefore, he is a public servant, the accusation made against the petitioner for the alleged offences relates to the acts undertaken by him in discharge of his official duty as Commissioner, Jaipur Development 'Authority ,and as Secretary, Urban Development Housing Department, Government of Rajasthan. Further he 21 has submitted that the learned Magistrate had no jurisdiction too order tor Investigation against the petitioner, in absence of the previous sanction under section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. An argument has also been raised that the order dated 01.10.2014 was passed by the learned Magistrate without application of mind. In support of his 5 submissions, the counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the case of Maksud Saiyed v. State of Gujarat & Ors.- (2008)5 SCC 668 , State of Uttar Pradesh v. Paras Nath Singh- (2009) 6 SCC 372 , Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh & another- (2012)3 SCC 64 , Anil Kumar & others v. M.K. Ajyappa & another- (2013) 10 SCC 705 and Manzoor Ali Khan v. Union of India & Ors.- (2015)2 SCC 33 . 7. Learned Public Prosecutor representing the State of Rajasthan, as well as, the counsel for the complainant has contested the petition with equal force and has submitted that there is no illegality in the direction issued by the learned Magistrate on the application submitted by respondent no.2, to the SHO police station Gandhi Nagar (East), Jaipur for registration of a case and to investigate the same. Further he has submitted that for the work done and orders passed, the petitioner is not entitled for any protection, as the same cannot be said to have been done in discharge of his official duty. Therefore, according to the learned public prosecutor, sanction under section 197 Cr.P.C. was not required in the present case. The learned Magistrate had thoroughly looked into the application filed by the complainant by taking his own time since the filing of the application and after judicious application of mind, has rightly passed the order dated 01.10.2014. The learned public prosecutor has submitted that the instant misc. petition deserves to be rejected for having no merits. The learned Magistrate had thoroughly looked into the application filed by the complainant by taking his own time since the filing of the application and after judicious application of mind, has rightly passed the order dated 01.10.2014. The learned public prosecutor has submitted that the instant misc. petition deserves to be rejected for having no merits. They have relied on the cases of General Officer Commanding Rashtriya Rifles v. Central Bureau of Investigation- (2012)6 SCC 28 ; Chindan Kumir Bntu v. State of Bihar- (2014) 13 SCC 70 ; and State of Bihar v. Rajmangal Ram AIR 2014 SC 1674 . 8. At the out-set and before considering the grievance of the petitioner against registration of the FIR and the commencement of Investigation thereof on the ground of want of sanction, It would be appropriate to consider the contention raised by the petitioner and the relief sought, that the complaint be quashed and set aside. As mentioned above, the application filed by the complainant Suresh Chand Sharma, which has been termed as complaint Suresh Chand Sharma, which has been termed as complaint by the petitioner, has a specific prayer for the Magistrate to exercise power under section 156(3) Cr.RC. so as to direct the SHO of the police station concerned to register the case and commence the Investigation. Therefore, the application filed by the complainant was for a limited purpose, to seek Indulgence of the concerning Magistrate, for Issuing direction to the police to register a case and Investigate a cognisable offence, which Is disclosed from the contents of It, 9. Therefore, the application filed by the complainant was for a limited purpose, to seek Indulgence of the concerning Magistrate, for Issuing direction to the police to register a case and Investigate a cognisable offence, which Is disclosed from the contents of It, 9. The provision of Section 158(3) Cr.P.C, are contained In CHAPTER XIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure which deals with the Information to the police officers and their powers for Investigation, Section 2(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure defines 'complaint' as under: "2(d) 'Complaint' means any allegation made orally or In writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under this Code, that some person, whither known or unknown, has committed ah offence, but does not Include a police report." The Ingredient no, (II) mentioned above, for taking action by the Magistrate himself under the Code la sine-qua-non for any Magistrate to take action on a complaint, The Complainant makes an express or Implied Intention to the Magistrate to take action himself, The Ingredient no, (iv) makes It crystal clear that a complaint does not include a police report, A police report Is defined under section 2(r) of the Code. The action which Is required to be taken by a Magistrate on a complaint Is provided under CHAPTER XV of the Code, If a complainant makes any other prayer, then the one mentioned In the aforesaid definition, it does not fall under the category of complaint, It may be mentioned here that every application is not a complaint which does not empower the Magistrate to take cognisance on It under section 190(1)(a) Cr.RC, An application under section 156(3) Cr.P.C, falls within the category of such applications, which Is not a complaint under the Code, This view finds support In the case of Dinesh Chandra & Ors. v. State of U.P.- 2001(1) JIC 942 (Allahabad) , Bharat Kishore Lal Singh Dev v. Judhistir Modak- AIR 1929 Patna 473 and Subodh Chandra v. Jamser Mandal- AIR 1949 Cal 86 . 10. Thus, there lies a distinction between a complaint as defined under section 2(d) Cr.RC, which Is filed under section 190 Cr.RC and an application for direction to the police for registering a case is under section 156(3) Cr.RC, Both the provisions are In different Chapter of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which relates to different stages and purposes. 10. Thus, there lies a distinction between a complaint as defined under section 2(d) Cr.RC, which Is filed under section 190 Cr.RC and an application for direction to the police for registering a case is under section 156(3) Cr.RC, Both the provisions are In different Chapter of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which relates to different stages and purposes. The proceeding on a complaint la Initiated on filing of the same before a competent court of law and :he moment the concerning court takes notice and applies Its mind on the same, It amounts to taking of cognisance, But an application moved by a person with the purpose that police be directed to register the same as first Information report and to Investigate the matter and at that time when 1 directions are so Issued, It cannot be said that he has taken cognisance of the time. Of course, the court concerned has to look Into the application, apply Us mind so as to see whether the cognisable offence (ale.) Is made out.The basic difference Is with regard to the Intention and prayer of the ' applicant, When an applicant desires that the Magistrate should take action against the persons then It Is a 'complaint'. But when no cognisance is to be liken by the Magistrate and the Intention Is for taking some other kind of steps, such as direction to the police, then It will certainly not amount to a complaint', In other words, an application with a prayer for direction to Register an FIR for Investigation cannot be registered as a complaint by the Magistrate himself because, doing so, would be contrary to law, The purpose of complaint and an application under section 156(3) Cr.RC, are totally different. 11. 11. In a case where an aggrieved person flies an application under 1 notion 158(3) Cr.RC., then It Is to be proceeded In accordance to the prayer made therein and within the relevant provisions of law which have been mentioned above, The Magistrate Is not to go beyond the scope of the aforesaid section, It Is the aggrieved person who has to start the Ms In the form and forum which he deems fit and proper Sometimes, It may be difficult for the complainant to prosecute, The complainant may not be able to lead evidence because of number of reasons, socially or otherwise and he would not be able to bring the witnesses to the Court, In such cases, the complainant may not be able to establish his case, Therefore, It Is the aggrieved person who has to choose and decide the form and forum, In his own way, when he starts the lis. 12. In the Instant case, there remains no room of doubt that the application filed by the complainant Suresh Chand Sharma was In the form of in application to Invoke the powers of the Magistrate under section 156(3) Cr.RC. and in this regard a specific prayer has also been made therein, The ' application In original, with an order under section 156(3) Cr.RC, was sent to the concerning police station where the same was registered, as It is, as first information report, Therefore, this court Is of the considered opinion that the application filed by the complainant Is not a complaint within the meaning of section 2(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, The contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner and the prayer made that the complaint should be quashed and set aside Is rather misconceived as the same Is an application made with a view that the Magistrate is not to take an action but seeking direction to the police for registering a report and to commence the investigation, The application so filed by the complainant has the specific purpose to seek Indulgence of the concerning court of Magistrate for Issuing direction to the police to register a case and to Investigate the cognisable offence which Is disclosed from the contents of such application, Therefore, the submission made by the counsel for the petitioner for quashing the complaint has no substance and deserves to be rejected. 13. 13. Now we proceed to take note of the relevant provisions of law In respect of grant of sanction, as given under section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, In case of prosecution of public servants, The extract of section 197 Cr.PC, Is as under: "197, Prosecution of Judges and public servants:- (1) When any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate or a public servant not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government is accused for any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no court shall take cognisance of such offence except with the previous sanction- (a) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of the Union, of the Central Government; (b) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of a State, of the State Government. (2) No Court shall take cognisance of any offence alleged to have been committed by any member of the armed forces of the Union while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, except with the previous sanction of the Central Government." In other words, the aforesaid provision reveals that there are three mandatory requirements, namely; (a) that the accused is a public servant; (b) that the public servant can be removed from the post by or with the sanction either of Central or State Government, as the case may be; and (c) the acts giving rise to the alleged offence had been committed by the public servant in the actual or purported discharge of his official duties.The section falls in the CHAPTER XIV dealing with the conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings. In case of public servants, the cognisance of any offence, by any court, is barred by Section 197 of the Code unless sanction is obtained from the appropriate authority, if the offence, alleged to have been committed, was in discharge of official duty. In case of public servants, the cognisance of any offence, by any court, is barred by Section 197 of the Code unless sanction is obtained from the appropriate authority, if the offence, alleged to have been committed, was in discharge of official duty. The section not only specifies the persons to whom the protection is afforded but it also specifies the conditions and circumstances in which it shall be available and the effect in law If the conditions are satisfied. Then the question which arises is as to how the expression, 'any offence alleged to have been committed by an officer while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty' is to be understood and what is its meaning. In the case of B. Saha v. M.S. Kochar, (1979)4 SCC 177 , it was held in para 17, as follows: (17) "The words 'any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty' employed in Section 197(1) of the Code, are capable of narrow as well as a wide interpretation. If these words are construed too narrowly, the section will be rendered altogether sterile, for, 'it is no part of an official duty to commit an offence, and never can be'. In the wider sense, these words will take under their umbrella ever act constituting an offence, committed in the course of the same transaction in which the official duty is performed or purports to be performed. The right approach to the import of these words lies between two extremes. While on the one hand, it is not every offence committed by a public servant while engaged in the performance of his official duty, which is entitled to the protection of Section 197 (1), an Act constituting an offence, directly and reasonably connected with his official duty will require sanction for prosecution and the said provision." The expression 'official duty' implies that the act or omission must have been done by the public servant in the course of his service and that it should have been in discharge of his duty. Meaning thereby that the section does not extend the protection to every act or omission done by a public servant in service. Meaning thereby that the section does not extend the protection to every act or omission done by a public servant in service. The provision does rather restricts its scope of operation only to the acts or omissions which are done by a public servant in discharge of his official duty. The scope of the section is sometimes understood by extending the protection to even those acts or omissions which are done in purported exercise of official duty i.e. under the colour of the office. In case the official duty implies that the act or omission must have been done by the public servant in the course of his service and such act or omission must have been performed as part of duty which should be officially in the nature. Therefore, the provision is to be construed strictly while determining it applicability to any act or omission in the course of service. The operation has to be limited to those duties which are discharged in the course of official duty. A public 1 servant is not entitled to indulge in criminal activities and in that respect the provision is to be construed narrowly and in a restricted manner. However, if the act or omission was done by the public servant while discharging his duty, then the scope of its being official should be given wide construction. The extent of act or omission performed by a public servant in discharge of his duty, can be deemed to be official was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari, AIR 1956 SC 44 ., as under: "17........... The offence alleged to have been committed (by the accused) must have something to do, or must be related in some manner, with the discharge of official duty.... 19........... There must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty; the act must bear such relation to the duty; that the accused could lay a reasonable (claim), but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty." 14. The requirement of sanction becomes necessary when an act complained of has a reasonable connection with the discharge of official duties by the Government servant. The requirement of sanction becomes necessary when an act complained of has a reasonable connection with the discharge of official duties by the Government servant. The dividing line between an act in discharge of official duty and an act which is not so is very thin and it often gets blurred by which unjustified claims are raised on behalf of public servant so as to derive un-due advantage of requirement of sanction. In this regard, it is to be noted that the specific provisions have been incorporated in section 465 Cr.P.C. which makes it clear that any error, omission or irregularity in the grant of sanction will not effect any finding, sentence or order passed by a competent court unless the court is of the view that a failure of justice has occasioned. 15. The next question which requires consideration by this court is, whether sanction under section 197 of the Code is a condition precedent for launching the prosecution for the offences under sections 406 and 409 read 1 with 120-B IPC. 15. The next question which requires consideration by this court is, whether sanction under section 197 of the Code is a condition precedent for launching the prosecution for the offences under sections 406 and 409 read 1 with 120-B IPC. Hon'ble Supreme Court had considered this question in the case of Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli v. State of Bombay- AIR 1955 SC 287 and also in the case of Amru Singh v. State of Pepsu- AIR 1955 SC 309 , wherein the legal proposition propounded is that it is not every offence committed by a public servant which requires sanction for prosecution under section 197 Cr.RC, nor even every act done by him while his is actually engaged In the performance of his official duties, Lateron, In the case of Harihar Prasad v. State of Bihar- (1972)3 SCC 89 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court had held In para 66 as under: "66 As far an the offence of criminal conspiracy punishable under Section 120-B, read with Section 409, Indian Penal Code Is concerned and also Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act Is concerned, they cannot be said to be of the nature mentioned In Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, To put is shortly, It Is no part of the duty of a public servant, while discharging his official duties, to enter Into a criminal conspiracy or to Indulge In criminal misconduct, Want of sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Is, therefore, no bar," Likewise the said principle was reintegrated In the case of State of Kerala v. Padmanabhan Nair- (1999)6 SCC 690. Sections 467, 466 and 471 IPC relates to dorgery of valuable security, will, etc,; forgery for the purpose of cheating and using as genuine a forged document respectively, It is no part of the duty of a public servant while discharging his official duties to commit forgery of the type covered by the aforesaid offences. Therefore, want of sanction under section 197 CrPC, Is no bar, The said question was further elaborately dealt with In the case of State of H.P. v. M.P. Gupta- (2004)2 SCC 349 . Therefore, want of sanction under section 197 CrPC, Is no bar, The said question was further elaborately dealt with In the case of State of H.P. v. M.P. Gupta- (2004)2 SCC 349 . Lately, In the case of Chandan Kumar Basu (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has, In para 9, held that, 'It can be no part of the duty of a public servant or acting In the discharge of his official duties to commit any of the offences covered by Sections 406, 409, 420 etc, and the official status of the public servant can, at best, only provide an opportunity for commission of the offences, Therefore, no sanction for prosecution of the public servant for such offences would be required under Section 197 of the Code..." In the case of General Officer Commanding, Rashtriya Rifle v. Central Bureau of Investigation , (supra), It has been observed In para 43 as follows: "43, The question to examine as to whether the sanction is required or not under a statute has to be considered at the time of taking cognisance of the offence and not during enquiry or Investigation." Further, In para 47, It has been observed, 'This Court after considering Its earlier judgments Including Jamuna Singh v. Bhadal Shah- AIR 1964 SC 1541 , State of A.P. v. N. Venugopal- AIR 1964 SC 33 , State of Maharashtra v. Narhar Rao- AIR 1966 SC 1783 , State of Maharashtra v. Atma Ram- AIR 1966 SC 1786 and Prof. Sumer Chand v. Union of India- (1994) 1 SCC 64 , came to the conclusion that the prosecution has been Initiated on the basis of FIR and It was the duty of the police officer to Investigate the matter and to file a charge-sheet, If necessary." 16. In this context, It also needs to be made clear that there Is a distinction between a sanction granted under section 197 Cr.RC, and under section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and they operate In different fields. In the case of Kalicharan Mahapatra v. State of Orissa- (1988)6 SCC 411 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court had compared the provisions of Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and that sanction 197 of the Code. In the case of Kalicharan Mahapatra v. State of Orissa- (1988)6 SCC 411 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court had compared the provisions of Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and that sanction 197 of the Code. After taking Into consideration several decisions, Section 6 of the old Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and the noting of the Law Commission Report, had held In para 13 as under: "13. It must be remembered that In spite of bringing such a significant change to section 197 of the Code In 1973, the Parliament was circumspect enough not to change the wording in Section 19 of the Act which deals with sanction. The reason Is obvious. The sanction contemplated In Section 197 of the Code concerns a public servant who "Is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act In the discharge of his official duty", whereas the offences contemplated in the PC. Act are those which cannot be treated as acts either directly or even purportedly done in the discharge of his official duties. Parliament must have desired to maintain the distinction and hence the wording in the corresponding provision in the former PC. Act was materially Imported In the new PC. Act, 1988 without any change In spite of the change made in section 197 of the Code." Subsequently, the aforesaid principle of law laid down in Kalicharan's case had been quoted in the case of Lalu Prasad @ Lalu Prasad Yadav v. State of Bihar through CBI (AHD) Patna- (2007)1 SCC 49 and in para 10 it was held that 'Section 197 of the Code and Section 19 of the Act operate In conceptually different fields.' 17. Another aspect of Sanction In respect of section 197 of the Code is that the same can be raised at any time after cognisance had been taken and may have to be determined at different stages of proceedings/trial. In the case of Matajob Dobey v. H.C. Bhari- AIR 1956 SC , In para 21, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had laid down as under : "The question may arise at any stage of the proceedings. In the case of Matajob Dobey v. H.C. Bhari- AIR 1956 SC , In para 21, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had laid down as under : "The question may arise at any stage of the proceedings. The complaint may not disclose that the act constituting the offence was done or purported to.be done in the discharge of official duty; but facts subsequently coming to light on a police or judicial inquiry or even in the course of the prosecution evidence at the trial, may establish the necessity for sanction. Whether sanction is necessary or not may have to be determined from stage to stage. The necessity may reveal itself in the course of the progress of the case." Thereafter, the case of P.K. Pradhan v. State of Sikkim- (2001)6 SCC 704 , para 15 reads as under: "15. It is well settled that question of sanction under Section 197 of the Code can be raised at any time after the cognisance; may be immediately after cognisance or framing of charge or even at the time of conclusion of trial and after conviction as well. But there may be certain cases where it may not be possible to decide the question effectively without giving opportunity to the defence to establish that what he did was in discharge of official duty. In order to come to the conclusion whether claim of the accused, that the act that he did was in course of the performance of his duty was reasonable one and neither pretended nor fanciful, can be examined during the course of trial by giving opportunity to the defence to establish it. In such an eventuality, the question of sanction should be left open to be decided in the main judgment which may be delivered upon conclusion of the trial." In the case of Prakash Singh Badal & anr. v. State of Punjab & Ors.- (2007) 1 SCC 1 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court had in para 27 laid down as under ''The question relating to the need of sanction under Section 197 of the Code is not necessarily to be considered as soon as the complaint is lodged and on the allegations contained therein. This question may arise at any stage of the proceeding. The question whether sanction is necessary or not may have to be determined from stage to stage." 18. This question may arise at any stage of the proceeding. The question whether sanction is necessary or not may have to be determined from stage to stage." 18. We may now revert back to the facts and circumstances of the present case. After taking into consideration the contents of the impugned first information report as well as the nature of allegations levelled against the accused petitioner, it does not leave any room of doubt that the sanction for prosecution is not required in the present case. The very nature of offences alleged under sections 420, 409, 468, 471 and 120-B IPC goes to show, as has been laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, sanction under section 197 Cr.P.C. is not a condition precedent for launching prosecution. The grant of sanction for prosecution by a competent authority in case of public servant is a mixed question of fact and law which can be considered only at the stage of prosecution. They very words of section 197, that no court shall take cognisance of such offences, goes to show that the sanction in these offences is not sine qua non for initiating criminal proceedings against the public servant. Whether the act or omission is in discharge of official duty or is connected with it is to be considered during trial, after evidence having come on record. The legal position has also been clarified by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgments that the question of sanction can be raised at any time and may have to be determined at different stages of proceedings/trial. 19. The entire case of the petitioner as revealed from the petition and the submissions made by his counsel is on the premise that the ground of sanction is a condition precedent in the present case and in absence of it, the impugned first information report is not maintainable and no action in furtherance thereof can be taken. Further the case of the petitioner has been built up, the arguments advanced and the case law cited on the ground as if the provisions in respect of sanction under the Code of Criminal Procedure is same as the one under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The principle of law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases relied upon by the petitioner are those under the Prevention of Corruption Act. 20. The principle of law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases relied upon by the petitioner are those under the Prevention of Corruption Act. 20. The last argument raised by the counsel for the petitioner is that the order dated 01.10.2014 passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate on the application filed by the informant, Suresh Chand Sharma, seeking to invoke the powers under section 156(3) Cr.P.C., is not sustainable as the same has been passed without application of mind.Once again reiterating the facts of the case, it is to be noted that the informant Suresh Chand Sharma had moved an application in the court concerned with the specific prayer to issue direction, under section 156(3) Cr.RC., to the police for registering a case and to investigate the same. The said application was filed on 30.08.2014. Thereafter, the application was processed and the matter was kept for 04.09.2014. Again the matter was posted for 10.09.2014. The arguments in the matter were over on 15.09.2014. The case was then ordered to be listed on 20.09.2014. The order impugned was ultimately passed on 01.10.2014 by the learned court below, in exercise of its powers under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. In other words, usual time required in the procedure was taken, full opportunity was given to the party and the learned court below had taken its own time in passing the order which it had done on 01.10.2014.These sequence of events clearly goes to show that the learned court below had proceeded on the application filed by the informant, in the normal course and no steps was taken in haste. Even after hearing the arguments, the learned court had considered the matter by keeping it on further two dates of hearing and ultimately on 01.10.2014 the court had decided to issue directions to the police, as requested by the applicant. A bare look to the order passed on 01.10.2014 also reveals that the learned court below had fully considered the matter by perusing the application and hearing the counsel for the applicant. It was in exercise of the powers under section 156(3) Cr.RC. that the learned court had sent the original application to police station Gandhi Nagar with the direction that it may register a case and investigation may be started. It was also ordered that conclusion of the investigation be submitted before the court, at the earliest. 21. It was in exercise of the powers under section 156(3) Cr.RC. that the learned court had sent the original application to police station Gandhi Nagar with the direction that it may register a case and investigation may be started. It was also ordered that conclusion of the investigation be submitted before the court, at the earliest. 21. In view of the facts which are revealed from the material on record and the manner in which the learned court below had proceeded on the application filed by Suresh Chand Sharma, it cannot be said that the case was not properly considered or that there was absence of application of mind. So far as drawing of an order is concerned, the same is bound to defer from person to person. It is also not the requirement of law that at the stage of sending of an application to the police for registering a case that a detail order should be passed. This view of the court finds support in the observation made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Anil Kumar & Ors. (supra), where in para 11 it has been observed, "....a detailed expression of his views is neither required nor warranted..." Therefore, this court is of the considered opinion that the manner in which the application of Suresh Chand Sharma was taken up,'and proceeded with, the order passed by the learned court below, does not suffer from any infirmity or illegality. Therefore, the contention raised by the counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order dated 01.10.2014 suffers from non-application of mind, has no force and also deserves to be rejected. 22. On careful perusal of the case law relied upon by the petitioner, in the light of the facts and circumstances of the present case, this court is of the view that the same do not support him. It may be mentioned that the present case relates to an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.; it contains the allegations with regard to commission of the offences under the Indian Penal Code and the question to be considered is with regard to sanction as provided under section 197 Cr.RC. The case law sought to be relied upon by the petitioner is in respect of Prevention of Corruption Act. The case law sought to be relied upon by the petitioner is in respect of Prevention of Corruption Act. Needless to say, the matter relating to grant of sanction under the Prevention of Corruption Act and for the offences under the Indian Penal Code are totally different. The requirement of sanction under the provisions of two statues are distinct and operating In different fields.In the case of Anil Kumar (supra), the core question which was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court was, whether the Special Judge/Magistrate is justified In referring a private complaint made under section 200 Cr.RC. for Investigation by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Karnataka Lokayukta, In exercise of powers conferred under section 156(3) Cr.RC. without production of a valid sanction order under section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. It Is to be noted that In the said case, the appellant had filed a private complaint under section 200 Cr.RC. The High Court had taken the view that the Special Judge could not have taken notice of the private complaint unless the same was accompanied by a sanction order. Even the case laws which were considered in that case were relating to a private complaint filed under section 190 Cr.RC. and in cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act.The case of Manzoor All Khan (supra) was a public interest litigation seeking direction to declare Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 as unconstitutional. Further, the writ petition sought direction for prosecution of all cases registered and investigated under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act against politicians, MLAs, M.Ps and Government officials, without sanction as required under section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. It was in the light of the provisions of sanction under the Prevention of Corruption Act and to prosecute corrupt Government officials and dishonest politicians that the said petition was considered and decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.In Maksud Saiyed (Supra), the appellant was Chairman cum Managing Director of Dena Bank, the allegations against him were in respect of issuance of prospectus published for the purpose of public issue and that it contained some false and misleading information. As mentioned in para 14, one of the material facts of that case was that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, had not gone through the complaint as he had stated therein that accused 1 to 10 are Manager and Branch Manager of Dena Bank. As a matter of fact, accused 1 was Ex-Chairman and Managing Director of Dena Bank and accused 2 was Executive Director. Accused 3 to 10 were Directors of Dena Bank. None of the persons were Manager or Branch Manager. Even then, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate had mentioned in its order that they were Manager and Branch Manager. After taking note of such circumstances in the order passed by the learned Magistrate, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had decided the case.The case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Paras Nath Singh (supra) also does not support the petitioner. A bare consideration of the facts of that case and the principle of law which has been discussed therein, goes to show that the impugned order passed by the High Court was set aside and direction was issued that the appeal be decided on merits. The High Court had dismissed the appeal filed by the State and the only factor which was taken into consideration was that the person who granted sanction for initiation of the criminal proceedings was not the authority to do so. In the trial of the case, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sitapur had held that the accused was guilty for the offences under sections 409, 420, 461 and 468 IPC.Similarly, the case of Subramanian Swamy (supra) was decided by the c Supreme Court in a different situation. The question involved therein was (a) whether a complaint can be filed by a citizen for prosecuting a public servant for offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988: (b) whether the authority competent to sanction prosecution of a public servant for offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is required to take an appropriate decision within the time specified in clause (1)(5) of the directions contained para 58 of the judgment in the case of Vineet Narain v. Union of India- (1998) 1 SCC 226 ; and (c) guidelines issued by the Central Government, Department of Personnel and Training and the Central 1 Vigilance Commission (CVC). Answering the said questions, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had held that the initiation of the private citizen to obtain sanction is permissible. The sanction should be granted within certain period There is no restriction on a private citizen from filing a private complaint against a public servant. The right of locus standi and obtaining sanction by a 1 private citizen flows from rule of law. A private citizen seeking a sanction should be informed of the decision on sanction application so as to enable him to avail appropriate remedy, if not satisfied with the decision. Therefore, looking to the nature of petition and the fact that the question considered revolved around the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, leaves no room of : doubt that none of the principle of law laid down therein gives any support to the petitioner. 23. From the aforesaid discussion, it is revealed that the informant Suresh Chand Sharma had filed an application before the Magistrate for invoking the powers under section 156(3) Cr.RC. with the specific prayer that the matter be sent to the police station concerned for registration of the same and to start the investigation. The contents of the application and the prayer made therein gives out the specific purpose with which it was filed. As per the relevant provisions of law, there is a distinction between a complaint filed by a person and an application with regard to the direction for a particular purpose The action of the court in sending such application to the police and consideration of a complaint under section 200 Cr.RC. is with different object as in the former case the court orders the police to register a case and report the matter after investigation but in the later the court decides, after considering a complaint, to proceed in the matter under the subsequent provisions for calling upon the complainant tor statement and his witnesses. Thereafter, the process is issued to call upon the accused.After having followed the relevant provisions of law, the learned Magistrate, in the present case, issued directions on On 10.2014, in exercise of the powers under section 156(3) Cr.RC. Thereafter, the process is issued to call upon the accused.After having followed the relevant provisions of law, the learned Magistrate, in the present case, issued directions on On 10.2014, in exercise of the powers under section 156(3) Cr.RC. In furtherance thereof, the application so sent was registered as first information report and the investigation started A close look to the proceedings undertaken by the Magistrate and the orders passed by him goes to show that as with due application of mind and in accordance to law. On behalf of the petitioner much emphasis was laid and the primary submission was that the impugned report would not have been registered and the investigation started without a sanction by a competent authority. 24. After considering the relevant provisions of law, here in above, for grant of sanction under the Code of Criminal Procedure which mandates certain requirements including that the alleged offences had been committed by public servant in actual or purported discharge of duties and the manner in which the said expression is to be understood, brings us to the conclusion that the public servant is entitled to protection under Section 197(1) Cr.P.C. where an act constituting an offence is directly and reasonably connected with his official duty but considering the facts and the allegations made in the first information report, the present matter Is not of such nature. It is not every offence committed by a public servant or even every act done by him while he is actually engaged in performance of his duties, requires sanction for prosecution under section 197 Cr.P.C. There lies a difference between a sanction granted under section 197 Cr.P.C. and under section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and both operate in different fields. Therefore, the requirement and nature of sanction to be obtained under the Indian Penal Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act are not to be mis-understood as being one and the same. Therefore, the requirement and nature of sanction to be obtained under the Indian Penal Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act are not to be mis-understood as being one and the same. The case law cited by the petitioner is in respect of the matters relating to the Prevention of Corruption Act but a study to the relevant provisions of both the Acts and the principle of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court clearly lays down the distinction.In the facts and circumstances of the present case, the nature of allegation against the petitioner and the offences alleged are said to be under the Indian Penal Code, the registration of the first information report without any sanction is in accordance to law and no interference what-so-ever is required to be called for in the order passed by the learned Magistrate on 01.10.2014. None of the arguments raised by the counsel for the petitioner are sustainable. 25. Consequently, this criminal misc. petition is dismissed as being devoid of merit. *******