JUDGMENT : K.R. Mohapatra, J. - In this reference under Section 82B(3) of the Gold (Control) Act, 1968 (for short, ?the Act?), the petitioner calls in question the correctness of the order dated 26-7-1993 passed by the Customs, Excise & Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, East Regional Bench, Calcutta (for short, ?CEGAT?) in Appeal G-3/93 and Appeal G-7/93 thereby allowing the Appeal No. G-3/93 filed by one Kamala Rani Ray and dismissing the Appeal No.G-7/93 filed by the Collector of Central Excise, Bhubaneswar (for short, ?the Department?). 2. Brief description of facts necessary for adjudication of the reference is as follows :- On 4-2-1974, the Central Excise Preventive Officer of Cuttack searched the residential premises of one Sri Krishna Ballav Ray of Madhapur, Kendrapara in the undivided District of Cuttack (now in the District of Kendrapara). In course of the search operation, the officers heard a sound of throwing some metals into the open well in the courtyard of the residential premises of said Krishna Ballav Ray. On verification, a cloth bag was recovered from the well containing 34 pieces of circular slab of gold in crude form of uneven shape and size. Accordingly, the Officers seized the said primary gold weighing 1171.500 grams in a cotton bag containing said gold on 4-2-1974, under a Panchanama. Said Sri Ray did not volunteer to give any statement on that. However, the independent Panchas, namely, Sri Babaji Charan Behera and Maheswar Sahu, who were present and had witnessed search operation, gave such statements which were recorded to be considered in the adjudication proceeding. Accordingly, show cause notice was issued to Sri Ray on 28-6-1974, from whose possession the gold in question was seized. Sri Ray, in reply to the show cause notice, sent a letter to the Additional Collector of Customs and Central Excise, Bhubaneswar on 10-7-1974. Taking into consideration the submissions of Sri Ray made in the said letter, the Department vide its order dated 5-10-1974 (Annexure-1) held the gold seized to be primary gold and Sri Ray as the owner of the said gold. Consequently, the seized gold was confiscated for violation of Section 8 of the Act and penalty of Rs. 1,000/- was imposed on said Sri Ray under Section 74 of the Act. Being aggrieved by the said order under Annexure-1, Sri Ray moved the appellate authority, i.e., Collector, Customs and Central Excise, Bhubaneswar. Consequently, the seized gold was confiscated for violation of Section 8 of the Act and penalty of Rs. 1,000/- was imposed on said Sri Ray under Section 74 of the Act. Being aggrieved by the said order under Annexure-1, Sri Ray moved the appellate authority, i.e., Collector, Customs and Central Excise, Bhubaneswar. The Appellate Authority vide its order No. 29/Bhubaneswar/1977, dated 21-6-1976 (Annexure-2) rejected the appeal and upheld the order of the learned Additional Collector. Thus, Sri Ray moved the Revisional Authority, i.e., Government of India in a Revision which also came up to be rejected confirming the order under Annexures-1 and 2. Against the said revisional order, no reference was filed. 3. In the meantime, Smt. Kamala Rani Ray (opposite party), wife of Sri Krishna Ballav Ray filed T.S. No. 76/74 in the Court of the learned sub-judge, Kendrapara for a direction to the defendants, namely, Union of India and one Brundaban Kissan, Inspector of Central Excise and Customs to deliver possession of 34 pieces of gold bangles weighing 1171.500 grams wrongfully taken away by Inspector of Central Excise and Customs (defendant No. 2) from her possession and in the alternative, prayed for decree of Rs. 50,000/- as well as for compensation for depriving the plaintiff from enjoyment of those ornaments. In the said suit, Smt. Ray claimed ownership of the gold seized by the Central Excise Officer on 4-2-1974. She contended that she was using the seized gold as her ornaments. The same were not primary gold and did not belong to her husband, namely, Krisha Ballav Ray. Learned sub-judge, Kendrapara vide his judgment dated 23-2-1977 (Annexure-4) dismissed the suit holding the same to be not maintainable in view of Section 84 of the Act. Assailing the said judgment and decree, the opposite party preferred FA No. 122 of 1977 before this Court. This Court vide judgment dated 17-10-1989 [ 1990 (49) E.L.T. 52 (Ori.)] allowed the appeal holding as under :- "14. From the aforesaid discussion, I am satisfied that the suit is to be decreed to the extent that gold seized cannot be confiscated without giving opportunity to plaintiff under Section 79 and defendants are directed to take steps so that the adjudicating authorities dispose of the proceeding for confiscation after giving notice to the plaintiff. Till then, the gold seized cannot be disposed of in any manner. 15. In the result, First Appeal is allowed. Till then, the gold seized cannot be disposed of in any manner. 15. In the result, First Appeal is allowed. No costs. Trial Court shall return M.O. I to the plaintiff after the period of appeal against this judgment expires." 4. In obedience to the direction in the aforesaid F.A., the Department issued fresh show cause notice on 14-5-1990 (Annexure-7) to Smt. Kamala Rani Ray, wife of Krishna Ballav Ray as well as to said Krishna Ballav Ray in terms of the direction of this Court. On hearing the parties, the Additional Collector vide his order dated 13-8-1990 (Annexure-8) directed confiscation of those 34 pieces of gold weighing 1171.500 grams under Section 71 of the Act. However, he refrained from imposing any penalty on Smt. Ray. Assailing the said order, the opposite party preferred Appeal No. 4/GC/BBSR/92 before the Collector of Central Excise (Appeals), Kolkata, who by his order dated 30-4-1992 (Annexure-9) set aside the order under Annexure-8 and remanded the case for de novo adjudication by obtaining expert?s opinion as to whether the seized gold bangles were ornaments or not. Being aggrieved, the Department filed appeal before the CEGAT in G-7/93 against the order under Annexure-9 and the opposite party also preferred an appeal against said order in G-3/93. Both the appeals were heard together and CEGAT vide its Order No. A-434 and 435/CAL/93, dated 26-7-1993 allowed the appeal No. G-3/93 filed by the present opposite party and dismissed the appeal in G-7/93 filed by the Department holding that the gold seized are gold ornaments. Against the said judgment, the present reference is filed. 5. This Court vide order No. 10, dated 2-12-1998 framed the following questions for adjudication of the reference. "(i) Whether the learned CEGAT is correct in concluding that the show cause notice dated 14-5-1990 is hit by limitation under Section 79 of the Gold (Control) Act considering decision not by statutory authority taking into consideration the judgment dated 17-10-1989 and not the decree dated 25-1-1990 when decree is also a part of the order of the Court and for drawing the decree, it was only Court?s duty and the act of judgment is incomplete without decree? (ii) Whether the learned CEGAT is correct in concluding that the primary gold were only ornaments, when it was not an issue before CEGAT and if the conclusion of the Tribunal is otherwise perverse? (ii) Whether the learned CEGAT is correct in concluding that the primary gold were only ornaments, when it was not an issue before CEGAT and if the conclusion of the Tribunal is otherwise perverse? (iii) Whether the Hon?ble Tribunal is correct in concluding that the purity test cannot be relied upon, since it was not mentioned in the show cause notice specially when purity was established by test in Government mint, which is not disputed and if the reasonings of the Tribunal are otherwise perverse?" 6. In course of hearing, this Court felt it necessary to examine the seized gold for effective adjudication of question Nos. (ii) and (iv) and accordingly vide order dated 10-9-2015 directed as follows. "....Accordingly, the matter stands adjourned to 25-9-2015 for orders on which date, the opposite parties are directed to produce the seized gold before this Court by providing necessary security as may be appropriate??" Pursuant to the direction of this Court, the seized gold was produced before this Court on 8-10-2015 through Sri B.K. Swain, Superintendent of Central Excise Division, Cuttack for inspection. After inspection, the gold and ornaments were returned to Sri Swain for safe custody. 7. Arguing on the question No. (i), Mr. J.K. Mishra, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner referring to the explanation to the second proviso of Section 79 of the Act submitted that notice of confiscation should be given to the owner of the gold within six months from the date of seizure of the gold or within such further period as the Collector of Central Excise or of Customs may allow. Where a fresh adjudication under the Act is initiated, the period of limitation would be six months from the date of order of fresh adjudication or as extended by the Collector. In the instant case, there is no direction for fresh adjudication by any authority under the Act. Further, this Court in F.A. No. 122/77 [ 1990 (49) E.L.T. 52 (Ori.)] in exercise of Civil Appellate jurisdiction directed to give a chance of hearing to Smt. Kamalarani Ray, which at any stretch of imagination, can be construed to be a direction for fresh adjudication. Thus, the limitation provided under Section 79 of the Act is not applicable to the instant case. 8. Mr. Thus, the limitation provided under Section 79 of the Act is not applicable to the instant case. 8. Mr. Acharya, learned Counsel for the opposite party, on the other hand, submits that explanation to the second proviso to Section 79 of the Act clearly provides for an order directing initiation of fresh adjudication. Thus, the limitation period should be computed from the date of judgment because the decree is only a formal expression of final adjudication. The effective direction is made only in the judgment. In the instant case, pursuant to the judgment of this Court dated 17-10-1989 in F.A. No. 122/77 [ 1990 (49) E.L.T. 52 (Ori.)] notice was issued on 14-5-1990, which is clearly barred by limitation. Hence, the question raised by the petitioner has no force and should be answered in the negative. 9. In order to analyse the rival contentions of the parties on question No. (i), it would be profitable to reproduce Section 79 of the Gold (Control) Act, 1968, which reads as follows :- "79. Giving of an opportunity to the owner of gold, etc. - No order of adjudication of confiscation or penalty shall be made unless the owner of the gold, conveyance, or animal or other person concerned is given a notice in writing :- (i) informing him of the grounds on which it is proposed to confiscate such gold, conveyance or animal or to impose a penalty; and (ii) giving him a reasonable opportunity of making a representation in writing within such reasonable time as may be specified in the notice against the confiscation or imposition of penalty mentioned therein and if he so desires, of being heard in the matter : Provided that the notice and the representation referred to in this section may, at the request of the owner or other person concerned, be oral : Provided further that where no such notice is given within a period of six months from the date of the seizure of the gold, conveyance or animal or such further period as the Collector of Central Excise or of the Customs may allow, such gold, conveyance or animal shall be returned after the expiry of that period to the person from whose possession it was seized. Explanation : - Where any fresh adjudication is ordered under this Act, the period of six months specified in the second proviso shall be computed from the date on which such order for fresh adjudication is made." Section 79 provides that no order of adjudication of confiscation or penalty shall be made unless the owner of the gold, etc., is given a notice in writing. Second proviso to the said Section provides that where no such notice is given within a period of six months from the date of seizure of the gold or such further period as the Collector may allow such gold, etc., shall be returned after expiry of that period to the person from whose possession it was seized. The explanation to second proviso further makes it clear that where a fresh adjudication under the Act is directed, the period of limitation is six months from the date of such order for adjudication. Mr. Mishra submitted that since there is no order of fresh adjudication by any authority under the Act and the notice in question was only issued pursuant to the direction of this Court in exercise of power under Section 96 of the CPC, the period of limitation is applicable to the case at hand. The submission is not acceptable for the reason that the explanation as referred to above does not speak of ?order? by the authority. Moreover, the word ?order? in the explanation to second proviso of Section 79 of the Act refers to ?order for fresh adjudication?. Thus, it no doubt includes the direction for fresh adjudication made by this Court in exercise of civil appellate jurisdiction. Admittedly, the process of fresh adjudication was initiated pursuant to the direction of this Court in F.A. No. 122/77 [ 1990 (49) E.L.T. 52 (Ori.)] without assailing the judgment in any higher forum or raising any objection to the competency of this Court to give such a direction in exercise of civil appellate jurisdiction. The authority after initiating the proceeding pursuant the direction of this Court, cannot possibly raise any objection to such direction after pronouncement of the impugned order. In addition to the above, the limitation is always computed from the date of the judgment and not from the date of decree because decree is only a formal expression of final adjudication of the suit. In addition to the above, the limitation is always computed from the date of the judgment and not from the date of decree because decree is only a formal expression of final adjudication of the suit. This view gets support from a decision in the case of S.K. Jalil & Anr. v. Gopal Charan Mohanty & Ors., reported in 1975 (1) CWR 182 : 41 (1975) CLT 359, wherein this Court relying upon a Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Sri Ramachandra Mardaraj Deo v. Bhalu Patnaik & Ors, reported in AIR 1950 Ori. 125 , held as under : "8. Order 20, Rule 7, Code of Civil Procedure lays down that the decree shall bear the date on which the judgment was pronounced. As the date of decree under this Rule is the date of the judgment, the date of the decree as legally understood is not the date on which it was signed and sealed in the office. My above view gets support from the decisions reported in Arjun Ch. Patnaik v. Purnananda Patnaik and Anr., 36 (1968) C.L.T. 472; Sri Ramachandra Mardaraj Deo v. Bhalu Patnaik and Ors., AIR 1950 Ori. 125 (FB). The principle on which the above view is taken is, as stated by their Lordships of the Full Bench, that once a judgment is pronounced the drawing up of the decree is only a matter of course within the power of the Court. Therefore the legislature made express provision directing that the decree shall bear the date of the judgment. As the law on the point has been well settled as stated above, the petitioners? suit, admittedly instituted beyond a period of 3 years after the date of the decree, i.e. after the passing of the judgment on 20-9-1962 in the aforesaid suit (Title Suit No. 36 of 1961), was clearly barred by limitation. Accordingly, the finding of the Courts below to this effect is well founded and is hereby confirmed." 10. In the case at hand, the direction for fresh adjudication was made vide judgment dated 17-10-1989 [ 1990 (49) E.L.T. 52 (Ori.)] of this Court and the notice was admittedly issued on the opposite party on 14-5-1990. Accordingly, the finding of the Courts below to this effect is well founded and is hereby confirmed." 10. In the case at hand, the direction for fresh adjudication was made vide judgment dated 17-10-1989 [ 1990 (49) E.L.T. 52 (Ori.)] of this Court and the notice was admittedly issued on the opposite party on 14-5-1990. Applying the principles laid down in the reported decisions supra the notice is clearly beyond the six months from the date of the order and no direction for extension of such period of limitation was obtained from the Collector as envisaged in second proviso to Section 79 of the Act. Hence, this question is answered in the negative against the petitioner. 11. Arguing on the question No. (ii), Mr. Mishra, learned Senior Advocate for the Department strenuously contended that the question as to whether the seized articles were primary gold or ornaments is not an issue before the CEGAT and thus, any finding of the CEGAT to the effect that the seized gold was the ornaments, is vitiated. Mr. Acharya, learned counsel for the opposite party refuting the same contended that the question as to whether the seized gold was primary gold or ornaments was the sole issue to be determined in the entire proceeding and all the Courts have discussed it in detail on the said issue and gave their respective findings. Thus, the contention of Mr. Mishra is baseless and needs no consideration. 12. To ascertain the correctness of the submission of Mr. Mishra, learned Senior Advocate for the opposite party we perused the entire case record, more particularly the orders annexed to this petition, including the impugned order. On perusal of the record, it appears that the main contention of the Department in the entire proceeding including the suit filed by the opposite party as well as in the First Appeal arising therefrom, the primary contention of the Department was that the seized gold were round shaped primary gold of uneven shapes and not fit to be used as ornament. Thus, the contention of Mr. Mishra is wholly misconceived and baseless so far as the finding of the CEGAT to the effect that the seized gold was ornaments is perverse, does not hold good. 13. Thus, the contention of Mr. Mishra is wholly misconceived and baseless so far as the finding of the CEGAT to the effect that the seized gold was ornaments is perverse, does not hold good. 13. In respect of the finding to the effect that whether the seized gold was the ornament, the CEGAT at paragraph 8 of the impugned order under Annexure-10 has vividly discussed the contentions raised and came to a conclusion that the seized gold was the ornaments. It is worth mentioning here that the gold seized was produced before the Additional Collector, who on examination has held as follows :- "The gold in question was brought by the Officer of Cuttack Division and the container of the gold containing 34 pieces of gold was opened in the presence of the party. It is seen that all the bangles are of different sizes having design on the outer side of the pieces and inner surface is smooth. There is no noticeable wear and tear on the pieces." Thus, it appears that the gold seized were bangles having design on the outer side of the pieces and inner surface of those bangles were smooth. In the light of the finding given by the Additional Collector, CEGAT proceeded to decide the issue involved relying upon a decision in the case of M/s. Choksi Purshottam Vishrambhai v. Union of India and Others, reported in 1989 (23) ECR 306 = 1984 (17) E.L.T. 46 (Bom.), wherein, the Hon?ble Supreme Court held as under :- "10. Rather than proceed wholly upon the evidence of the panchas, though uncontroverted. I desired to satisfy myself about the appearance of the bangles. They were produced in Court and were inspected by me. There are indeed five sets of designs upon the bangles. The bangles are crude and would not be purchased by the sophisticate but they are not such as cannot be called ornaments within the meaning of that word in Section 2(p) of the Act. They were produced in Court and were inspected by me. There are indeed five sets of designs upon the bangles. The bangles are crude and would not be purchased by the sophisticate but they are not such as cannot be called ornaments within the meaning of that word in Section 2(p) of the Act. There an ornament is defined as a thing, in a finished form, meant for personal adornment or for the adornment of any idol, deity or any other object of religious worship, made of, or manufactured from, gold, whether or not set with stones or gems (real or artificial), or with pearls (real cultured or imitation) or with all or any of them, and includes parts, pendants or broken pieces of ornaments. The explanation to the definition states that, for the purposes of the Act, nothing made of gold, which resembles an ornament, shall be deemed to be an ornament unless the thing (having regard to its purity, size, weight, description or workmanship) is such as is commonly used as ornament in any State or Union territory. The evidence on record is that bangles of purity, size, weight, description and workmanship akin to the seized bangles are in fact used as ornaments by ladies. My observation of the bangles is that there is nothing in the workmanship thereof which can exclude them from being used as ornaments or called such." 14. For effective adjudication of questions Nos. (ii) and (iv) formulated in the present proceeding, this Court, in course of hearing, felt it necessary to examine the seized gold and directed for its production vide order dated 10-9-2015 which was produced before this Court on 8-10-2015. On examination of the bangles produced it appears that there is design in each of the bangles on their outer side and the inner side of each of the bangles was smooth. Moreover, this being a question of fact and a finding has already reached by the fact finding authority, the same cannot be interfered with unless the same is illegal, based on no evidence and perverse. Apparently, no such case could be made out by Mr. Mishra, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner to take a different view in the matter. 15. Arguing on the question No. (iv) framed by this Court, Mr. Apparently, no such case could be made out by Mr. Mishra, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner to take a different view in the matter. 15. Arguing on the question No. (iv) framed by this Court, Mr. Mishra, learned Senior Advocate submitted that learned Tribunal has erred in law in not taking into consideration the result of the purity test specifically when purity was established by test in Government mint is not disputed. Mr. Acharya, learned counsel for the opposite party, on the other hand, submitted that the learned Tribunal was correct in concluding that the purity of the ornaments cannot be taken into consideration as the same was not permissible in view of the fact that no such allegation was made in the show cause notice issued to the opposite party. The Rules of natural justice provides that notice to show cause should contain in clear term the allegations made against the person. Unless the owner of the gold, namely, the opposite party is given an opportunity to show cause with regard to the allegations made and is provided with the materials to that effect, she would not be in a position to give reply to the same. Thus, for compliance of the principles of natural justice, it was incumbent on the Additional Collector to give an opportunity to the opposite party to reply on the question of purity of the gold seized. As such, the opposite party had no occasion to give any reply on the report, if any, of the Government mint with regard to purity of the gold seized. At this stage, Mr. Mishra contended that the gold seized were of highly purity and ordinarily ornaments are not prepared from the gold of high purity. This is again a question of fact. Evidently, neither any question with regard to the same was raised nor evidence to that effect was adduced by the Department at the time of adjudication before the Additional Collector. Hence, the same is not available to be raised by the petitioner at the stage of reference to this Court. Thus, the contention raised by Mr. Mishra to the effect that for non-acceptance of the report from Government mint with regard to purity of the gold seized the impugned order is vitiated, cannot be held to be correct. Hence, the same is not available to be raised by the petitioner at the stage of reference to this Court. Thus, the contention raised by Mr. Mishra to the effect that for non-acceptance of the report from Government mint with regard to purity of the gold seized the impugned order is vitiated, cannot be held to be correct. Thus, the CEGAT was correct in not accepting the report of the Government mint with regard to purity of the gold seized. 16. In that view of the matter, the questions of references are answered accordingly and consequently the S.J.C. is dismissed being devoid of any merit, but in the circumstances there shall be no order as to costs. 17. [Per : I. Mahanty, J.]. - I agree.