JUDGMENT : 1. The instant revision petition has been preferred by the defendant-petitioner impugning the order dt. 07/10/2011 whereby its application under Order 7 Rule 11 read with Section 151 CPC filed in a suit for cancellation, declaration, possession and injunction has been disallowed. 2. The brief facts germane to resolve the controversy are stated as under: 2.1. For the sake of brevity and expression, the petitioner herein has been referred to as the defendant and the respondent as plaintiff. 3. That on 21/12/2010, the plaintiff instituted a suitagainst the defendant for cancellation of a registered saledeed dt.11/09/2007 alongwith recovery of possession andother reliefs. In the plaint, the plaintiff avers that shealongwith other co-owners of the suit property agreed to salethe same to the defendant upon an oral contract, that aconsideration of Rs.3 Crore would be paid by the defendant.The plaintiff further avers that she only understands Urdulanguage and is not able to read or write either English orHindi language & the defendant on various occasions paid anamount of only Rs. 50 lacs in furtherance of the above agreedsale consideration. The plaintiff further pleads that thedefendant got her signatures on blank papers and stamppapers and contracted that the rest amount of Rs. 2.5 Croreshall be handed over at the time of taking possession fromthe plaintiff. The plaintiff further avers that on 11/09/2007 thedefendant alongwith certain men claiming to be theemployees of the Office of the Registrar Department came tothe plaintiff's house and assured the plaintiff that the balanceof sale consideration of Rs.2.5 Crore shall be given to her atthe time of obtaining possession of the suit property and theplaintiff claims in the suit that relying on such avermentscoupled with the fact that she was an illiterate lady, shesigned and executed the document at her house withoutreading the contents of such document. The plaintiff thenclaims that in October 2009, the defendant came alongwithsome policemen and other persons and tried to forciblydisposses the plaintiff and when the plaintiff reminded thedefendant to pay the balance of Rs.2.5 Crore, the defendantrefused. The plaintiff further pleads that forced by suchcircumstances, she was obliged to institute a suit forinjunction alongwith an application for temporary injunction.In the suit itself, the plaintiff clarifies that such temporaryinjunction application was dismissed by both the court of firstinstance as well as the appellate court & a writ was pendingimpugning such orders. The plaintiff further pleads that forced by suchcircumstances, she was obliged to institute a suit forinjunction alongwith an application for temporary injunction.In the suit itself, the plaintiff clarifies that such temporaryinjunction application was dismissed by both the court of firstinstance as well as the appellate court & a writ was pendingimpugning such orders. The plaintiff further asserts that on10/05/2010 in the garb of above orders, the defendantdispossessed her from the suit property and thus claiming tobe aggrieved by such act of the defendant, the plaintiffinstituted the suit claiming to annul the registered sale deeddt. 11/09/2007 and has sought recovery of possession andother ancillary reliefs. The plaintiff in the suit also asserts thatcause of action to file the present suit accrued to her on10/05/2010 when she claims to be dispossessed from the suitproperty by the defendant. The plaintiff further asserts hersuit to be in limitation in accordance with article 58, 59 and 67of the Limitation Act. 4. The defendant entered appearance in the suit and moved an application in the trial court under Order 7 Rule 11 read with Section 151 CPC urging to reject the suit on the following grounds:- (a) the sale deed was executed on 11/09/2007 and registered on 18/09/2007 and thus the suit was barred by law of limitation being instituted after the prescribed period of limitation of 3 years. (b) no suit for cancellation of a registered sale deed can be filed on the basis of unpaid sale consideration and at the most only a suit for recovery of balance sale consideration is maintainable and hence the suit ought to be rejected as on a meaningful reading of the plaint no “cause of action” was disclosed. (c) the suit was not on proper court fees. (d) whole of the agreed sale consideration was paid to the defendant as emerging from the endorsement to this effect in the registered sale deed. 5. The trial court, after hearing both the parties, rejected the application of the defendant under Order 7 Rule 11 read with Section 151 CPC observing that the suit was in limitation and the suit was not liable to be rejected on being barred by Section 11 CPC and the court fee paid was sufficient. 5. The trial court, after hearing both the parties, rejected the application of the defendant under Order 7 Rule 11 read with Section 151 CPC observing that the suit was in limitation and the suit was not liable to be rejected on being barred by Section 11 CPC and the court fee paid was sufficient. The court further though referred to some judicial decisions, but without discussing them and without considering the question of their applicability on the facts of the case, dismissed the application moved by the defendant. 6. Ld. Counsel for the plaintiff-petitioner vehementlycontends that the impugned order is bad in law and the suitof the plaintiff is ex-facie barred by the law of limitation.Besides, he also contends that from a meaningful reading ofthe plaint, it is apparent that no cause of action is disclosed.He further contends that the “cause of action” conveys awider meaning which not only includes infringement of a legalright but the right itself and scrutinizing the averments of theplaint in this light, it is apparent that the plaintiff has no legalright to file a suit for cancellation/ declaration of a registeredsale deed, admitted to be executed by her on the basis thatthe sale price actually agreed was not paid to her. He alsodrew attention of this Court towards various provisions ofTransfer of Property Act. In support of his submission, herelied upon the judgments rendered in the case of Saleem Bhai and others Vs. State of Maharashtra and others: (2003) 1SCC 557; Sopal Sukhdeo Sable and others Vs. AssistantCharity Commissioner and others; (2004) 3 SCC 137 ; AbdulRahim & ors. Vs. Sk. Abdul Zabar & ors.: AIR 2010 SC 211 ;Hardesh ores (P) Ltd. Vs. Hede and Company: (2007) 5 SCC614; Dilboo (Smt) (Dead) By Lrs. & ors. Vs. Dhanraji (Smt.)(Dead) & ors.: (2000) 7 SCC 702 ; MD. Noorul Hoda Vs. BibiRaifunnisa & ors.: (1996) 7 SCC 767 ; Ramti Devi (Smt.) Vs.Union of India: (1995) 1 SCC 198 ; KutcherlakotaVijayalakshmi Vs. Radimeti Rajaratnamba & ors.: AIR 1991Andhra Pradesh 50; Vidhyadhar Vs. Manikrao & anr.: (1999)3 SCC 573 . 7. Per-contra, ld. Counsel for the plaintiff supportedthe impugned order and contended that the suit was wellwithin limitation and disclosed “cause of action” and the application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC was misconceived. Insupport of his submission, he relied upon the judgmentsrendered in the case of Kaliaperumal Vs. Manikrao & anr.: (1999)3 SCC 573 . 7. Per-contra, ld. Counsel for the plaintiff supportedthe impugned order and contended that the suit was wellwithin limitation and disclosed “cause of action” and the application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC was misconceived. Insupport of his submission, he relied upon the judgmentsrendered in the case of Kaliaperumal Vs. Rajagopal & Anr.:2009 DNJ (SC) 555; Mohkam Chand Dasot & Anr. Vs. Addl.Distt. & Sessions Judge; 2006(1) DNJ (Raj.) 469; RamPrakash Gupta Vs. Rajiv Kumar Gupta & ors.: 2008 DNJ (SC)9; Popat and Kotecha Property Vs. State Bank of India StaffAssociation: 2005(2) WLC (SC) Civil; Mohan Lal SukhadiaUniversity, Udaipur Vs. Miss Priya Soloman: 1999 DNJ (Raj.)97; State of Maharashtra Vs. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar (Dead)By Lrs.: (2000) 3 SCC 460 ; Dharam Chand & ors. Vs.Jogeshwar & 2 Ors.: 2009(1) DNJ (Raj.) 332; Kamala & ors.Vs. K.T. Eshwara Sa & Ors.: 2007-08 DNJ (SC) (Suppl.) 251;Williams Vs. Lourdusamy & Anr.: 2008(2) WLC (SC) Civil 179;Deva Ram & Anr. Vs. Ishwar Chand & Anr.: 1995 DNJ (SC)454; Binjraj Vs. Gheesulal & Anr.: 1998 DNJ (Raj.) 197. 8. Heard the rival contentions raised by the counsel and carefully scrutinized the plaint, in the light of the settled legal proposition laid down with respect to Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. 9. Before proceeding further, some of the judicial precedents are mentioned here as under:- 9.1 Saleem Bhai and others Vs. State of Maharashtra and others (Supra): Order 7 Rule 11 CPC- Courts powers under the provisions can be exercised at any stage of the suit before conclusion of the trial. 9.2 Sopal Sukhdeo Sable and others Vs. AssistantCharity Commissioner and others (supra): For the purposes ofdeciding an application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, theaverments in the plaint are germane. Pleas taken in thewritten statement would be wholly irrelevant at that stage. Aduty is casted on Court to perform its obligation in rejectingthe plaint hit by any of the infirmities under Clause (a) toClause (d) even without intervention of the defendant. 9.3 Hardesh ores (P) Ltd. Vs. Hede and Company Supra): Order 7 Rule 11 (d) Rejection of plaint on ground of limitation- “Law” within the meaning of Order 7 Rule 11 (d) must include the law of limitation. 9.4 ITC Limited Vs. 9.3 Hardesh ores (P) Ltd. Vs. Hede and Company Supra): Order 7 Rule 11 (d) Rejection of plaint on ground of limitation- “Law” within the meaning of Order 7 Rule 11 (d) must include the law of limitation. 9.4 ITC Limited Vs. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal and others: 1998 (2) SCC 70 : Clever drafting creating illusion of cause of action is not permitted in law and a clear right to sue should be shown in the plaint. 9.5 T. Arivandandam Vs. TV Satyapal and another: 1977(4) SCC 467 : If on a meaningful- not formal reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC should be exercised and if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, it ought to be nipped in the bud at the first hearing. 9.6. The term “cause of action” has also been defined and interpreted by a series of settled judicial precedents and some of them are mentioned here under:- 9.7. In Om Prakash Srivastava v. Union of India and Anr. (2006) 6 SCC 207 it was held as follows: “9. By "cause of action" it is meant every fact, which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the Court. In other words, a bundle of facts, which it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to succeed in the suit. (See Bloom Dekor Ltd. v. Subhash Himatlal Desai and Ors. ( 1994 (6) SCC 322 ). 10. In a generic and wide sense (as in Section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908)”cause of action” means every fact, which it is necessary to establish to support a right to obtain a judgment (See Sadanandan Bhadran V. Madhavan Sunil Kumar ( 1998 (6) SCC 514 ). 11. It is settled law that “cause ofaction” consists of bundle of facts, whichgive cause to enforce the legal inquiry forredress in a court of law. In other words, itis a bundle of facts, which taken with thelaw applicable to them, gives the plaintiff aright to claim relief against the defendant. Itmust include some act done by thedefendant since in the absence of such anact no cause of action would possiblyaccrue or would arise.(See South East Asia Shipping Co. In other words, itis a bundle of facts, which taken with thelaw applicable to them, gives the plaintiff aright to claim relief against the defendant. Itmust include some act done by thedefendant since in the absence of such anact no cause of action would possiblyaccrue or would arise.(See South East Asia Shipping Co. Ltd. V. Nav Bharat Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. and others.( 1996 (3) scc 443 ). 12. The expression “cause of action”has acquired a judicially settled meaning. Inthe restricted sense “cause of action” meansthe circumstances forming the infraction ofthe right or the immediate occasion for thereaction. In the wider sense, it means thenecessary conditions for the maintenance ofthe suit, including not only the infraction ofthe right, but also the infraction coupledwith the right itself. Compendiously, asnoted above the expression means everyfact, which it would be necessary for theplaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order tosupport his right to the judgment of theCourt. Every fact, which is necessary to beproved, as distinguished from every piece ofevidence, which is necessary to prove eachfact, comprises in “cause of action”. (See Rajasthan High Court Advocates' AssociationVs. Union of India and Ors.(2001 (2) scc294). 13. The expression“cause of action” has sometimes been employed to convey the restricted idea of facts or circumstances which constitute either the infringement or the basis of a right and no more. In a wider and more comprehensive sense, it has been used to denote the whole bundle of material facts, which a plaintiff must prove in order to succeed. These are all those essential facts without the proof of which the plaintiff must fail in his suit. (See Gurdit Singh V. Munsha Singh ( 1977 (1) SCC 791 ). 14. The expression “cause of action”is generally understood to mean a situationor state of facts that entitles a party tomaintain an action in a court or a tribunal; agroup of operative facts giving rise to oneor more bases of suing; a factual situationthat entitles one person to obtain a remedyin court from another person.(See Black'sLaw Dictionary). In Stroud's JudicialDictionary a “cause of action” is stated to bethe entire set of facts that gives rise to anenforceable claim; the phrase comprisesevery fact, which if traversed, the plaintiffmust prove in order to obtain judgment. In Stroud's JudicialDictionary a “cause of action” is stated to bethe entire set of facts that gives rise to anenforceable claim; the phrase comprisesevery fact, which if traversed, the plaintiffmust prove in order to obtain judgment. Inwords and Phrases4th Edn.) the meaningattributed to the phrase “cause of action” incommon legal parlance is existence of thosefacts, which give a party a right to judicialinterference on his behalf. (SeeNavinchandra N. Majitia Vs. State ofMaharashtra and Ors.( 2000 (7) SCC 640 ). 15. In Halsbury's Laws of England (Fourth Edition) it has been stated as follows: “cause of action” has beendefined as meaning simply a factualsituation, the existence of which entitlesone person to obtain from the Court aremedy against another person. The phrasehas been held from earliest time to includeevery fact which is material to be proved toentitle the plaintiff to succeed, and everyfact which a defendant would have a rightto traverse. 'Cause of action' has also beentaken to mean that particular act on thepart of the defendant which gives theplaintiff his cause of complaint, or thesubject matter of grievance founding theaction, not merely the technical cause ofaction". 10. On a meaningful reading of the plaint, it ismanifestly clear that the plaintiff has instituted the instant suitfor cancellation, declaration and other ancillary relief assertingthat the actual sale price settled was different than the priceindicated in the registered sale instrument and as the samewas not paid, the sale deed was liable to be annulled. Theexecution of registration of the sale deed is not denied by theplaintiff. The suit is instituted on 21/12/2010 whereas the saledeed is executed on 11/09/2007 and registered on18/09/2007. Article 59 of the Limitation Act is as under:- 59 To cancel or set aside an instrument or decree or for the rescission of the contract. Three years When the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument or decree cancelled or set aside or the contract rescinded first become known to him 11. A bare glance of the above provisions, makes itclear that the prescribed period of limitation is 3 years, fromthe facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument ordecree cancelled or set aside or the contract rescinded “first”became known to him/her. The word “first” is of utmostsignificance. The plaintiff herself is none other than one of theexecutory of the registered instrument. A bare glance of the above provisions, makes itclear that the prescribed period of limitation is 3 years, fromthe facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument ordecree cancelled or set aside or the contract rescinded “first”became known to him/her. The word “first” is of utmostsignificance. The plaintiff herself is none other than one of theexecutory of the registered instrument. Had she been astranger to the sale deed, the position would have beendifferent but a party to a registered instrument cannot claimthat he/she “first” became known to the instrument at a laterpoint of time. 12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Dilboo(Smt) (Dead) By Lrs. & ors. Vs. Dhanraji (Smt.) (Dead) & ors(supra) has opined: “Registered document- Date ofregistration will be the date of deemed knowledge -Whenever a document is registered the date of registrationbecomes the date of deemed knowledge. Where a fact couldbe discovered by due diligence then deemed knowledgewould be attributed to the plaintiff because a party cannot beallowed to extend the period of limitation by merely claimingthat he/she had no knowledge. 13. Thus, the instant suit being filed on 21/12/2010 after the statutory prescribed period of 3 years from 18/09/2007, the date of registration of the sale deed, was exfacie barred by the law of limitation. 14. Looked from another angle, this Court is of thefurther view that the plaint also does not disclose cause ofaction and is liable to be rejected on this count also. It issettled law that where a document is sued upon and its termsare not set out in the plaint but referred to in the plaint, thesaid document gets incorporated by reference in the plaint(Church of Christ Charitable Trust and Educational CharitableSociety Vs. Ponniamman Educational Trust: 2012(8) SCC706). The sale deed executed by the plaintiff does notincorporate any recital that title shall not vest in the buyeruntil and unless sale price is paid. In view of Section 54 of theTransfer of Property Act, coupled with the fact of absence ofany such recital, as mentioned hereinabove, the title passedon to the buyer on the execution and registration of the saledeed. In such fact and situation, the plaintiff has no legal rightto get the sale deed annuled, even if it is presumed that thecontracted sale price was not paid to her. In such fact and situation, the plaintiff has no legal rightto get the sale deed annuled, even if it is presumed that thecontracted sale price was not paid to her. The suit, asinstituted is not for recovery of any unpaid sale price but forannulment of a registered sale deed on the averment that theagreed sale price was not paid. Even if the plaint avermentsare taken on its face value and presumed to be true andcorrect, the plaintiff is not vested with any legal right to claimcancellation of the sale deed. The term “cause of action” notonly incorporates infringement of legal right but the legal rightitself. Thus, the plaintiff being devoid of any legal right toclaim annulment of sale deed and on the basis of such plaintaverments, it can safely be held that the plaint does notdisclose any cause of action. 15. Consequently, the revision petition stands allowed & the order of the trial court is quashed, set aside and the plaint being barred by law of limitation as also being not found to disclose cause of action is rejected being hit by the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. No order as to costs.