JUDGMENT : Arijit Banerjee, J.: 1. This is an application for recalling the judgment and order dated 4th June, 2015 passed by this court whereby WP No. 829 of 2013 (Derby Sales Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. vs. The State of West Bengal & Ors.) was disposed of on contest after hearing all the concerned parties at length. By the said judgment and order the respondent authorities were directed to hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the premises no. 7/1A, Hazra Road, Calcutta 700019 to the writ petitioner no. 1 within four weeks from that date. The said order also provided for police help to the writ petitioner for the purpose of implementation of the said order. The facts of the case would appear from the judgment and order dated 4th June, 2015 which is under recall in the present application. For the sake of convenience the material facts are briefly recapitulated hereinbelow. 2. The property in question being premises no. 7/1A, Hazra Road, Calcutta 700019 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘said Premises’) was requisitioned under the Defence of India Act, 1939. The provisions of the West Bengal Land Acquisition (Continuance of Powers) Act, 1951, permitted the State Government to keep the said property under requisition and use it for any public purpose. The said 1951 Act ceased to have forced from April 1983. By an order dated 19th November, 1992 the First Land Acquisition Collector, Calcutta directed the Kolkata Municipal Corporation (in short ‘KMC’) to vacate the property which had been handed over to the Corporation by the State Government and which the Corporation was using for accommodating its staff. 3. By an order dated 16th January, 1993, the Joint Secretary of the State Government released the said property in terms of Section 10B of the West Bengal Premises (Requisition and Control) Act, 1947. Possession of the said property, however, was retained by the KMC. The owner of the property sold the said property to one Rajarshi Dey who subsequently sold the property to the writ petitioner no. 1. 4. The petitioners filed WP No. 466 of 2006 in this court for direction on the respondent authorities to hand over possession of the said property to the petitioners. By judgment and order dated rd August, 2006 this Court allowed the said petition. 5. 1. 4. The petitioners filed WP No. 466 of 2006 in this court for direction on the respondent authorities to hand over possession of the said property to the petitioners. By judgment and order dated rd August, 2006 this Court allowed the said petition. 5. The KMC preferred an appeal from the said judgment and order which was dismissed by the Hon’ble Appeal Court by a judgment and Order dated 18th February, 2008. However, three months time was granted to the KMC to handover vacant and peaceful possession of the property to the owner of the property. 6. The KMC filed a special leave petition against the order of the Hon’ble Appeal Court which was disposed of on the basis of submission made on behalf of the KMC that the said property had been notified for acquisition vide notification dated 28th May, 2009 and, thereafore, the special leave petition did not survive for consideration. 7. The notification dated 28th May, 2009 was issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 read with Section 17(4) thereof. The same was followed by a declaration in the Form 5B dated 8th September, 2009 under Section 6 of the said Act of 1894. Thereafter, no further steps were taken and the proceeding under the Land Acquisition Act thus lapsed. 8. In the above factual background WP No. 829 of 2013 was filed by the writ petitioners for enforcement of the Hon’ble Appeal Court’s order dated 18th February, 2008 which has attained finality. This court, after due consideration and submissions made on behalf of the parties, by a judgment and order dated 4th June, 2015 allowed the said writ petition and directed the respondent authorities to hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the said property to the owner thereof within four weeks from that date. The present application has been filed for recalling of the said judgment and order dated 4th June, 2015. 9. The writ petitioners who are the respondents in the present application have chosen not to file any affidavit in opposition. 10. The first submission made by Mr. Ashok Kumar Banerjee, Ld. Senior Counsel appearing for the KMC authorities, is that in view of the writ petitioners choosing not to file any affidavit in opposition to the present application, the averments in the application are deemed to be admitted by the writ petitioners. 11. Mr. 10. The first submission made by Mr. Ashok Kumar Banerjee, Ld. Senior Counsel appearing for the KMC authorities, is that in view of the writ petitioners choosing not to file any affidavit in opposition to the present application, the averments in the application are deemed to be admitted by the writ petitioners. 11. Mr. Banerjee submitted that at the time of hearing of the writ petition, a very important document was not placed before this court. The document is a registered agreement dated 17th August, 1994 executed by and between the KMC and Rajarshi Dey, the predecessor-in-interest of the writ petitioner no. 1. Mr. Banerjee submitted that the said Rajarshi Dey was the owner of the premises no. 7/1A, Hazra Road and 3/1 Nafar Kundu Road. He was desirous of amalgamating the said two premises and constructing a building on such amalgamated premises. He submitted that the said agreement records that the Mayor-in-Council vide item no. 140.2 dated 10th September, 1993 considered and approved in principle the proposal of the owner for amalgamation of both the said premises in order to get sanction of a composite building plan on the amalgamated plot as per CMC Building Rules on condition that an equivalent floor area which has been occupied by the CMC employees at 7/1A, Hazra Road, will be given to CMC at its back side fronting Nafur Kundu Road on such terms and conditions and rent etc as would be fixed in an agreement to be executed between the owner and CMC in this regard. Mr. Banerjee referred to certain clauses of the said agreement which are set out here in below:- “1. In exchange of the entire Premises No. 7/1A, Hazra Road (old) along with the two storied building standing thereon having total existing covered floor areas of 5537 sq. ft. comprising of 2826 sq. ft. in the ground floor having 13’-2” existing height plus 2’-4” high plinth and 2711 sq. ft. in the 1st floor having 13’-2” existing height which are under occupation and possession of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation, the 2nd party agrees to accommodate the Ist party the covered areas of 5500 sq. ft. equally divided into 2750 sq. ft. ft. in the ground floor having 13’-2” existing height plus 2’-4” high plinth and 2711 sq. ft. in the 1st floor having 13’-2” existing height which are under occupation and possession of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation, the 2nd party agrees to accommodate the Ist party the covered areas of 5500 sq. ft. equally divided into 2750 sq. ft. in the 1st floor having height not less than 9’-6” completely built up and fit for habitable use with a separate passage in the ground floor on the western side space which leads from Nafar Kundu Road on the north to the southern end of the accommodation to be exchanged in favour of the 1st party including ingress and egress from Nafar Kundu Road to the built up stair case leading from ground floor to the 2nd floor and the 2nd party is also to build a separate staircase in the covered floor spaces under the CMC for the exclusive use of the CMC being the Ist Party. 2. The Calcutta Municipal Corporation shall continue to pay the same rent as is being paid now to the L. A. Collector @ Rs. 145/- per month till the Calcutta Municipal Corporation gets possession of the newly built up area and the rent would be paid to the L. A. Collector or to the second party as would be decided by the L. A. Collector. 3. Since the Calcutta Municipal Corporation will give the opportunity to the second party for constructing the building at the existing Premises No. 7/1A, Hazra Road and has agreed to vacate the same for the above purpose, the Calcutta Municipal Corporation would continue to pay notional rent to the owner only after getting possession of the equivalent new floor areas measuring 5500 sq. ft. with specific heights etc., as mentioned in details in Clause No. 1 and such rent will be more or less the same as the present rent and the Calcutta Municipal Corporation will continue to use the said built up areas and other amenities on monthly tenancy basis. 7. ft. with specific heights etc., as mentioned in details in Clause No. 1 and such rent will be more or less the same as the present rent and the Calcutta Municipal Corporation will continue to use the said built up areas and other amenities on monthly tenancy basis. 7. From the date of sanction of the plan by the Calcutta Municipal Corporation, the 2nd Party will get two years time for construction of these portions of the proposed building on the amalgamated premises fronting on Nafar Kundu Road, and the conservancy staff will vacate 7/1A, Hazra Road only after getting possession on the constructed portion as aforesaid. Thereafter the existing building presently occupied by the said conservancy staff of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation will be demolished for construction of the remaining portions of the said proposed combined building which will be built at the cost of the second party. The Calcutta Municipal Corporation is not to pay any part of the cost of the proposed construction of the new building. 11. On completion of the construction of the accommodation by the 2nd party for habitable use in all respects to the satisfaction of the 1st Party, the 1st party will shift and occupy the newly constructed accommodation as per clause no. 1 and will vacate the existing old accommodation under occupation of CMC conservancy labours at old premises no. 7/1A, Hazra Road by 3 (three) months from the date of issue of notice by the 2nd party upon the 1st party. 12. On execution and registration of this agreement, both the Calcutta Municipal Corporation and the owner are required to communicate the Land Acquisition Collector about the mutually agreed agreement between the parties requesting the L. A. Collector, Calcutta as well concerned State Government to keep pending the acquisition proposal as initiated by the CMC in order to facilitate for giving effect to this agreement. ” 12. Relying on the said agreement Mr. Banerjee submitted that the acquisition proceedings were kept pending to facilitate implementation of the said agreement. The said agreement gives substantive rights to KMC to continue in occupation of the said premises and the agreement is binding on the writ petitioner no. 1 which is the successor-in-interest/assign of the said Rajarshi Dey. 13. Mr. Relying on the said agreement Mr. Banerjee submitted that the acquisition proceedings were kept pending to facilitate implementation of the said agreement. The said agreement gives substantive rights to KMC to continue in occupation of the said premises and the agreement is binding on the writ petitioner no. 1 which is the successor-in-interest/assign of the said Rajarshi Dey. 13. Mr. Banerjee submitted that even though the challenge to the acquisition proceedings succeeded in all courts right up to the Supreme Court, KMC’s right to possession in respect of the said premises in terms of the said agreement remains. Only through due process of law can KMC be evicted from the said premises. 14. Mr. Banerjee then submitted that although the present application has not been made in the form of a review application, the form should not matter. The court should look at the substance of the application. In this connection he relied on a decision of the Orissa High Court in the case of Kella Appalaswamy vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Orissa reported in (1977) 106 ITR 487. In that case the Orissa High Court reiterated the observation of Lord Buckmaster in the case of Montreal Street Railway Company Vs. Normandin reported in (1917) AC 170 to the effect that all rules are nothing but provisions intended to secure proper administration of justice. It is, therefore, essential that the rules should be made to serve and to be subordinate to the purpose sought to be achieved. The Orissa High Court also referred to the dicta of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Gujarat Vs. Ram Prakash P. Puri reported in (1970) 2 SCR 875 to the effect that procedure is the hand-maid and not a mistress of law, intended to subserve and facilitate the course of justice and not to govern or obstruct it. 15. Mr. Banerjee then submitted that this Court was approached as an executing Court for execution of the Hon’ble Appeal Court’s order dated 18th February, 2008. This court should refuse to execute the said order if it is found that the order was obtained by suppression of material facts. 15. Mr. Banerjee then submitted that this Court was approached as an executing Court for execution of the Hon’ble Appeal Court’s order dated 18th February, 2008. This court should refuse to execute the said order if it is found that the order was obtained by suppression of material facts. He submitted that in paragraph 15 of the present application, the writ petitioners have been clearly accused of knowingly making inaccurate and wrong statements in the writ petition and thereby frustrating the legal possessory right of the KMC in respect of the said premises. He submitted that the writ petitioners should have drawn this court’s attention to the agreement between the KMC and the said Rajarshi Dey. In this connection he relied on a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Naseem Bano Vs. State of UP reported in AIR 1993 SC 2592 in support of his submission that allegations made in the writ petition, if not traversed by way of filing affidavit in opposition, would be deemed to be admitted. 16. Mr. Banerjee submitted that notwithstanding the fact that the KMC failed to vacate the said premises within the three months period granted by the Hon’ble Appeal Court by its order dated 18th February, 2008, still, KMC can only be evicted from the said premises by following due process of law. In this connection, Mr. Banerjee relied on a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Samir Sobhan Sanyal Vs. Tracks Trade Pvt. Ltd. reported in (1996) 4 SCC 144 . He also relied on another decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Lallu Yeshwant Singh Vs. Rao Jagdish Singh reported in AIR 1968 SC 620 in support of his contention that even a trespasser cannot be evicted without due process of law. He relied on a decision of this court in the case of Bonbehari Roy Vs. Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority reported in AIR 2004 Cal 254 in support of his contention that once it is held that the principles of Order 21 of the CPC apply to writ proceedings, Rules 97-101 of Order 21 also come into operation and as such in a proceeding before a Writ Court which is in the nature of an execution proceeding, valid objections can be raised to the execution of an earlier order of the Writ Court. 17. Mr. 17. Mr. Banerjee then relied on a decision of this court in the case of Smt. Santilata Paul Vs. Nanda Kishore Mukherjee reported in AIR 1981 Cal 219 wherein it was held that in an application under Order 21 Rule 97 of the CPC if the opposite party raises a question of title, the court must decide that question before allowing the application. 18. Mr. Banerjee referred to Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure and submitted that the scope of review is very wide. The court may review its earlier order for any sufficient cause. He submitted it has been stated in paragraph 19 of the present application that the facts indicating that the said premises is being occupied by KMC on the strength of a registered deed of agreement by which the erstwhile owner gave the right to KMC to keep the said property and the records relating thereto could not be placed before this court at the time of hearing of the writ petition due to unavailability of the same. Since the document has now come to light, the order under review should be recalled. 19. Finally Mr. Banerjee submitted that the writ petitioners approached this court after an inordinate delay and on that ground alone the writ court should have dismissed the petition. In this connection he relied on a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board Vs. TT Murali Babu reported in (2014) 4 SCC 108 wherein at paragraph 17 of the judgment the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that it is the duty of the court to reject the writ petition if there was no sufficient cause for inordinate delay in approaching the court as such delay may have impact on others’ ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to indolent persons and writ petitions filed after inordinate delay without furnishing sufficient explanation for such delay, should be thrown overboard at the very threshold. 20. Appearing on behalf of the writ petitioners Mr. Abhrajit Mitra, Ld. Senior Counsel submitted that the said agreement between the KMC and the said Rajarshi Dey cannot be looked into at this stage. 20. Appearing on behalf of the writ petitioners Mr. Abhrajit Mitra, Ld. Senior Counsel submitted that the said agreement between the KMC and the said Rajarshi Dey cannot be looked into at this stage. A document that was very much in the possession of KMC but was not produced at the time of hearing of the writ petition, cannot be the basis for maintaining an application for review of the judgment and order passed on the writ petition. No ground within the meaning of Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure for reviewing the said judgment and order has been made out. 21. Mr. Mitra further submitted the said purported agreement was never given effect to and was in fact, given a go bye as would appear from the conduct of the parties to the said agreement. The time periods stipulated in the said agreement for the parties to discharge their respective obligations have long elapsed but the parties have not taken any step for enforcement of the said agreement. If, indeed KMC had any right to occupy the premises in question under the said agreement, then there could have been no necessity for initiating acquisition proceeding for acquiring the said premises. The acquiring authority being the State Government, the KMC cannot have any better right than the State Government in respect of the said premises. He referred to a letter dated 24th June, 2015 written by the office of the First Land Acquisition Collector, Calcutta to the Commissioner, Calcutta Municipal Corporation, whereby the State Government called upon the KMC to hand over vacant possession of the said premises to the representative of the First Land Acquisition Collector for restoration of possession to the writ petitioners as per the Court’s order dated 4th June, 2015 passed in WP No. 829 of 2013. Mr. Mitra submitted that when the State Government is ready and prepared to hand over vacant possession of the said premises to the writ petitioners, the KMC cannot continue to occupy the said premises on the basis of some purported private agreement. 22. Mr. Mitra then submitted that the allegation of the KMC that the said agreement was suppressed by the writ petitioners from this court at the time of hearing of the writ petition, is wholly baseless. The writ petition was not heard ex parte in the absence of the KMC. 22. Mr. Mitra then submitted that the allegation of the KMC that the said agreement was suppressed by the writ petitioners from this court at the time of hearing of the writ petition, is wholly baseless. The writ petition was not heard ex parte in the absence of the KMC. It was a contested hearing and KMC also did not feel that the said agreement was relevant and as such did not disclose the same before this court. 23. Finally Mr. Mitra submitted that if at all, the said agreement may be a basis for review of the Hon’ble Appeal Court’s order dated 18th February, 2008 of which execution was prayed for in the said writ petition. The said agreement cannot be a ground for review of this court’s order dated 4th June, 2015. 24. I have considered the rival contentions of the parties. 25. Order 47 Rule 1 provides as follows:- “R 1. Application for review of judgment. – (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved – (a) By a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred, (b) By a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or (c) By a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes. And who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order. (2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the case on which he applies for the review. (Explanation. (Explanation. – The fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior Court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment.)” 26. In the case of S. Nagaraj Vs. State of Karnataka reported in 1993 suppl. (4) SCC 595 the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that review literally and even judicially means re-examination or reconsideration. The basic philosophy inherent in it is the universal acceptance of human fallibility. Yet in the realm of law the Courts and even the statutes lean strongly in favour of finality of decision legally and properly made. Exceptions both statutorily and judicially have been carved out to correct accidental mistakes or miscarriage of justice. Even when there was no statutory provision and no rules were framed by the highest court indicating the circumstances in which it could rectify its order, the courts culled out such power to avoid abuse of process or miscarriage of justice. Rectification of an order stems from the fundamental principle that justice is above all. It is exercised to remove the error and not for disturbing finality. 27. In the case of Lily Thomas Vs. Union of India reported in (2000) 6 SCC 224 , the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that the power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law. A review petition is not an appeal in disguise. The power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. Such power can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review. 28. In the case of State of West Bengal Vs. Kamal Sen Gupta reported in (2008) 8 SCC 612 the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that where a review is sought on the ground of discovery of new matter or evidence, such matter or evidence must be relevant and must be of such a character that if the same had been produced, it might have altered the judgment. Mere discovery of new or important matter or evidence is not sufficient ground for review ex debito justitiae. Mere discovery of new or important matter or evidence is not sufficient ground for review ex debito justitiae. Not only this, the party seeking review has also to show that such additional matter or evidence was not within his knowledge and even after the exercise of due diligence, the same could not be produced before the Court earlier. 29. It is also settled law that there is a clear distinction between an erroneous decision and an error apparent on the face of the record. The term ‘mistake or error apparent’ signifies an error which is evident on the face of the record and does not require detailed or lengthy examination, scrutiny or elucidation of the facts or the legal position. If an error is not self-evident and identification thereof requires long debate and process of reasoning, it cannot be treated to be an error apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of Order 47 Rule 1 of the CPC. While an erroneous decision can be corrected only by the higher forum, a decision suffering from error apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by exercise of the review jurisdiction. A review petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be an appeal in disguise. 30. It is further settled law that the expression ‘any other sufficient reason’ has to be read ejusdem generis with the other specified grounds for review. In other words, the said expression has to be interpreted in the light of the other grounds. 31. The reviewing court cannot act as an appellate court. The court exercising the power of review cannot re-consider or reappraise the evidence with a view to assessing the correctness of the order under review. 32. From the above discussion it is clear that the power of review can be exercised when an order suffers from some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or when some new and important matter or evidence has been discovered which after exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the reviewing petitioner or could not be produced by him at the time when the order under review was passed or for any other sufficient reason. In the present case, review has been sought on the ground that the said agreement between KMC and Rajarshi Dey was not placed before this Court at the time of hearing and disposal of the writ petition. However, no ground has been made out as to why the said document was not placed before this Court at the time of hearing of the writ petition excepting a bold statement that the document was unavailable at the time of hearing of the matter. Discovery of any and every material or evidence after an order is passed will not be a ground for review. The party seeking review must also establish that even with due diligence he could not have known of such material or evidence and could not have produced the same before the Court passing the order of which review is sought for. In the case of Avinash Hansraj Gajbhiye Vs. Official Liquidator, M/S. V. Pharma (P) Ltd. reported in AIR 2006 SC 1317 , review was sought by the appellant on the basis of certain additional materials which according to him had relevance and the Company Judge had found that no ground based on discovery of new and important matter which after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the appellant or could not be produced by him at the time when the original order was passed, was made out. This finding by the Company Judge was affirmed by the Division Bench. When the appellant sought a review of the Division Bench order, the Division Bench considered the conduct of the appellant right through the proceedings and found that the appellant was indulging in dilatory tactics just to thwart the order passed by the Company Judge on the misfeasance application. The court also found that there was no ground made out for review of its earlier order. The Supreme Court upheld the order of the Division Bench and the Ld. Single Judge. 33. In the present case also I do not find any ground for review of the order dated 4th June, 2015. 34. There is another reason which compels me to dismiss the present application. The order under review was passed in execution of the Hon’ble Division Bench judgment and order dated 18th February, 2008. This court acted as an executing court in passing the order under review. 34. There is another reason which compels me to dismiss the present application. The order under review was passed in execution of the Hon’ble Division Bench judgment and order dated 18th February, 2008. This court acted as an executing court in passing the order under review. An executing court cannot go behind the decree or order of which execution is sought. This is a well established principle of law and if any authority is needed, one may refer to the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Rameshwar Dass Gupta Vs. State of UP reported in (1996) 5 SCC 728 which clearly lays down that an executing court cannot travel beyond the order or decree under execution. So long as the Hon’ble Division Bench judgment and order dated 18th February, 2008 stands, it has to be given effect to. An executing court can only refuse to execute an order or decree if the same suffers from the vice of lack of inherent jurisdiction of the court passing such order or decree. It is nobody’s case that the Hon’ble Division Bench order dated 18th February, 2008 is bad for lack of inherent jurisdiction of the court. 35. For the reasons aforestated, this review application fails and is dismissed. In view of the conduct of KMC I am also of the opinion that KMC has sought to protract litigation and thwart handing over of vacant possession of the premises in question to the writ petitioner no. 1 by filing the present review petition which according to me is wholly meritless and in fact, frivolous. Such conduct is not expected of a statutory public authority which should act fairly and reasonably. This kind of litigation should be deprecated and discouraged. The KMC shall pay costs of this application assessed at Rs. 30,000/- to the writ petitioner. 36. The review application No. GA 2107 of 2015 is accordingly disposed of.