JUDGMENT : Heard Mr. M.L. Verma, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Ajit Kumar, learned senior counsel for Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 and Mr. Sudarshan Srivastava, learned counsel for respondent no. 5. 2. The present writ application has been filed by the petitioner with the following prayers:- a). For issuance of an appropriate writ or a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the Bill dated 10.06.2013 which is for a sum of Rs.2,72,03,25,445.72, which is allegedly a Bill which has been communicated vide letter no. 1583 dated 10.06.2013 by the Electrical Superintending Engineer ( Respondent no. 3), being a rectified bill as a result of the order passed by the Hon'ble High Court dated 02.05.2013 in CWJC No. 852 of 2000 ( R) and which also includes an amount of fuel surcharge for the period July, 1993 to August 1999 for a sum of Rs.5,92,84,086.72, though the said issue of fuel surcharge was not a subject matter of dispute in CWJC No. 852 of 2000 (R). b) For issuance of an appropriate writ (s), order(s) or Direction (s) or writ for a declaration that 1999 Induction Furnace Tariff is applicable from 06.04.2000 from the date on which it was published in the Gazette and continued till 6th May, 2001 in as much as in terms of letter dated 07.05.2001, the said tariff was extended by the Bihar State Electricity Board only to areas falling within the territorial jurisdiction of the State of Bihar and not the areas falling within the State of Jharkhand since the said extension of the tariff was never adopted by the Jharkhand State Electricity Board nor it was published in the official gazette of the State of Jharkhand and consequently from 07.05.2001 up till 31.12.2003 the erstwhile 1993 tariff of the Bihar State Electricity Board would be applicable. c) For issuance of an appropriate writ (s), order(s) or direction (s) for a direction upon the respondents to revise the impugned Bills in the manner as stated herein below and which is supported by the various Circulars, Tariffs as well as the judgments of this Hon'ble Court: i) The Bill on the basis of 1999 tariff schedule should be raised w.e.f. 06.04.2000 till 31.03.2002; ii) The bill for the month of April, 2000 has to be levied proportionately i.e. from 01.04.2000 till 05.04.2000, which should be levied on the 1993 tariff and subsequently on the basis of Induction Furnace Tariff. iii) Since the respondents have increased the contract demand from 10500 KVA to 19233 KVA w.e.f.16.04.2000 and consequently on account of increase in tariff, a new agreement has to be signed and, therefore, in terms of Clause 4(c) of the Agreement for the first 12 months, the demand charge has to be levied on the basis of what is recorded in the maximum demand indicated. iv) From January, 2004, the contract demand has to be treated as 10,500 KVA and 12,500 KVA from March, 2005 whereas, the respondents have treated contract demand of the petitioner to be 19,233 KVA on the basis of 1999 Induction Furnace Tariff, which was notified on 06.04.2000 in the Official Gazette. v) That from January, 2004 till April, 2010, whatever KVA, which has been recorded, has to be charged in terms of the Tariff order of 2004 and this issue is also fortified by a judgment of the Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court. vi) That from May, 2010, a contract demand has been treated to be 14,524 KVA , which is without any basis and the bills should have been on the basis of 12,500 KVA. vii) No delayed payment surcharge should have been levied because when the Bills itself are wrong and needs to be rectified/revised, there is no question of levying of delayed payment surcharge. The amount paid earlier by way of interim order passed in CWJC No. 852 of 2000 (R) has to be adjusted from the total demand. d) For issuance of an appropriate writ or a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the letter dated 22.06.2013, received by the petitioner on 24.06.2013, by which the Electrical Superintending Engineer has summarily dismissed the objections of the petitioner without any cogent reasons and false and frivolous assumptions. 3. d) For issuance of an appropriate writ or a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the letter dated 22.06.2013, received by the petitioner on 24.06.2013, by which the Electrical Superintending Engineer has summarily dismissed the objections of the petitioner without any cogent reasons and false and frivolous assumptions. 3. The fact, which emanates from the averments made in the writ application is that the petitioner (Tata Yodogawa Limited) is having a Roll Manufacturing Unit at Gamharia in the district of Saraikella, Kharsawan. The petitioner is involved in manufacturing of Rolls, for which Induction Furnaces are used merely in conjunction with other types of Furnaces for manufacturing the said Rolls and is also used as an intermediate process in the manufacturing of Rolls. The foundry of melting set up consists of Heat Treatment Furnaces, Mould Drying Ovens, Roll Casting Facilities. The Machine Shop comprises of several heavy duty machine tools like Lathes, Grinding Machines and Milling Machines. The petitioner company had acquired the technology for manufacturing of Rolls from Yodogawa Steel Works Ltd., Japan and the detailed equipments selections and facilities were done under the Foreign Technical Collaboration. The manufacturing of Rolls started in 1970 and the petitioner company claims to be a leading supplier of quality Rolls to all integrated steel plants and defence establishments in India and a sizeable production is also exported outside. Initially, the petitioner had entered into an agreement in the year 1968 with the Bihar State Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as BSEB for the sake of brevity) with the contract demand of 12500 KVA. A fresh agreement was entered into by the petitioner and BSEB on 1.4.1979 , wherein the Contract Demand was reduced from 12500 KVA to 10500 KVA. The BSEB with the approval of the State Government came out with a tariff as contained in Tariff Notification No. COM/TAR/1010/1993-430 dated 21.06.1993, which covered within its ambit all categories of consumers and also laid down the terms and conditions for supply of electricity to its consumers and which is commonly referred to as 1993 Tariff. Dispute arose between certain members of the Bihar Steel Manufacturers Association, who were basically manufacturers of ingots in their Induction Furnace and since allegations were levelled with respect to large scale theft of electricity, First Information Reports were instituted against those consumers and the electricity lines were also disconnected by the Board. Dispute arose between certain members of the Bihar Steel Manufacturers Association, who were basically manufacturers of ingots in their Induction Furnace and since allegations were levelled with respect to large scale theft of electricity, First Information Reports were instituted against those consumers and the electricity lines were also disconnected by the Board. To resolve the dispute, the members of the Bihar Steel Manufacturers Association held a meeting with the authorities of the Electricity Board, at which a consensus was arrived at for framing of tariff of such category of consumers, who were basically members of the said Association and consequent thereupon, the Secretary of BSEB issued a letter dated 24.09.1999, introducing a New Tariff Schedule for HT Consumers having Induction Furnace and the consumers of Induction Furnaces came within the purview of New Tariff Schedule with effect from 1.9.1999. The New Tariff Schedule of 1999 with respect to Induction Furnaces came to be known as High Tension Specified Services (HTSS) and it was made applicable to all consumers who were having a contract demand of 300 KVA and more for Induction Furnaces and the casting units having Induction Furnace of melting capacity of 500 K.G. or below were excluded. The New Tariff Schedule of 1999 was published in the gazette on 6.4.2000. The BSEB had raised bills upon the petitioner on the basis of 1999 Induction Tariff for the period January & February-2000 and the bills as well as the applicability of Induction Tariff was the subject matter of a writ application being CWJC No. 852 of 2000 R. The writ application was finally decided by this Court on 2.5.2013, in which it was held as follows: "36. In these circumstances therefore and the reasons discussed herein-above, the sole question raised for determination in the instant writ application is answered against the petitioner. It is accordingly held that the tariff schedule notified by the Bihar State Electricity Board vide annexure-5 dated 24thth September 1999 and the Gazette Notification dated 15thth March 2000 is applicable to the petitioner Unit as well. Accordingly, the petitioner is liable to pay the electricity Bills raised on the basis of the said tariff. 37. It is accordingly held that the tariff schedule notified by the Bihar State Electricity Board vide annexure-5 dated 24thth September 1999 and the Gazette Notification dated 15thth March 2000 is applicable to the petitioner Unit as well. Accordingly, the petitioner is liable to pay the electricity Bills raised on the basis of the said tariff. 37. For the reasons indicated herein-above, respondents would rectify the impugned Bills in question after carrying out necessary correction in the computation of the capacity of the induction furnaces of the petitioner based upon the measurement undertaken by it during physical inspection of the petitioner Unit within a period of six weeks. The petitioner would be liable to pay the outstanding Bills raised after rectification. It will also be liable to pay the delayed payment surcharge on the rectified Bill reckoned from 16thth March 2000 (Annexure-13) after adjustment of any amount deposited by it pursuant to the interim orders passed earlier till the same are paid. The petitioner cannot be absolved of the liability to pay delayed payment surcharge on the rectified Bill which is due to the respondents after the challenge to the applicability of the tariff to their Unit has failed. In view of what has been held herein above, the respondent Board would be entitled to raise electricity Bills against the petitioner for the remaining period thereafter on the basis of the instant tariff in question, till they are replaced by any subsequent tariff as notified by the Jharkhand State Electricity Regulatory Commission. 38.Therefore, the challenge to the applicability of the tariff to the petitioner Unit raised in the present writ application fails. However, the writ petition is disposed of with the aforesaid observations and directions." 4. Pursuant to the judgment dated 2.5.2013, passed in CWJC No. 852 of 2000R, the Electrical Superintending Engineer issued a letter no. 1583 dated 10.06.2013, enclosing the rectified bills amounting to Rs.2720325445.72, which also included an amount of Rs.59284086.72 kept in abeyance raised against fuel surcharge for the periods 7/1993 to 08/1999. Pursuant to the judgment dated 2.5.2013, passed in CWJC No. 852 of 2000R, the Electrical Superintending Engineer issued a letter no. 1583 dated 10.06.2013, enclosing the rectified bills amounting to Rs.2720325445.72, which also included an amount of Rs.59284086.72 kept in abeyance raised against fuel surcharge for the periods 7/1993 to 08/1999. The petitioner had filed an application for review of the judgment dated 2.5.2013, passed in CWJC No. 852 of 2000 R, which was, however, dismissed on 17.07.2013 with an observation that in case the petitioner is aggrieved by any such bill raised thereafter pursuant to the judgment in question that may be a fresh cause of action for the petitioner but cannot be a ground for seeking review. Having been unsuccessful in the matter of review of the order dated 2.5.2013, passed in CWJC No. 852 of 2000 R, the petitioner has sought to challenge the bills raised vide letter dated 10.06.2013 in the present writ application. 5. Mr. M.L. Verma, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, at the outset, has submitted that the issues with respect to the petitioner being a HTSS consumer as well as the issue of delayed payment surcharge , which have been decided in C.W.J.C. No. 852 of 2000 R are already the subject matter of an appeal and the said issues are being kept alive as and when the same is decided by this Court in LPA No. 217 of 2013. Learned senior counsel contends that the question on which amount the delayed payment surcharge has to be levied has to be decided as the respondents have whimsically calculated the electricity dues without considering the applicability of various tariffs for the various periods. The fountain head of raising the bills is the tariff but the Board has to first consider as to which tariff would apply to the petitioners and on what basis and for what period the said tariff would be made applicable. 6. It has been submitted that all along the petitioner's actual KVA recorded was much less than its contract demand and the fixation of contract demand based on clause 2 of 1999 Induction Furnace Schedule to 1993 tariff was notional, deemed and unrelated to the actual drawn. 6. It has been submitted that all along the petitioner's actual KVA recorded was much less than its contract demand and the fixation of contract demand based on clause 2 of 1999 Induction Furnace Schedule to 1993 tariff was notional, deemed and unrelated to the actual drawn. It has further been submitted by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has not challenged the amount of the bill as such but the manner in which the bills have been raised by applying inapplicable tariff. Learned senior counsel further adds that the 1999 Induction Furnace Tariff had a deeming provision that for every ton of furnace, the load would be determined to be 600 KVA. It has been submitted that the respondents have billed the petitioner on the basis of 1999 schedule to 1993 tariff from January, 2004 up to March, 2013 and the respondents have raised the bills on the basis of 19233 KVA but as would be evident the actual KVA drawn is much less than the deemed contract demand of 19233 KVA. Submission has also been advanced by relying on the judgment passed in WPC No. 3647 of 2005 by submitting that the tariff was applicable till the month of March 2001 and even after January 2004 when the tariff issued by the Board came into existence, the Board continued to raise the bills on the basis of the deemed contract demand in terms of the 1999 Tariff Schedule to the 1993 tariff. It has been submitted that a fresh contract demand was entered into by the petitioner with the Board from February, 2005 for enhancement of load from 10500 KVA to 12000 KVA but while rectifying the bills from February, 2005, the same were raised on the basis of deemed and fixtional contract demand of 19,233 KVA in terms of 1999 Tariff Schedule to the 1993 tariff. Learned senior counsel, therefore, submits that after 1.1.2004, there is no way that any bill can be raised on the petitioner based on either the 1993 tariff of BSEB or 1999 Induction Tariff Schedule. The learned senior counsel has submitted that the respondent-Board has raised the bills by taking assistance of a tariff which is not in existence and which has become defunct after coming into existence of Jharkhand State Electricity Regulatory Commission. The learned senior counsel has submitted that the respondent-Board has raised the bills by taking assistance of a tariff which is not in existence and which has become defunct after coming into existence of Jharkhand State Electricity Regulatory Commission. It has been submitted that the schedule of 1999 to 1993 tariff, as extended on 7.5.2001 was applicable to only the areas in the State of Bihar and since the same was never adopted by the State of Jharkhand or the respondent-Board, the same could never be made applicable to the consumers of electricity in the State of Jharkhand. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner has further stated that in view of clause 11.10.3 of Electricity Supply Code Regulation, 2005, it was incumbent upon the State-Board to give an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner in response to the representation submitted by the petitioner against the revised bills. 7. Mr. M.L. Verma, in this context has referred to the Judgement 1993(2) PLJR 527-Dumraon Textiles Limited Vs. The Bihar State Electricity Board & Ors., wherein it was held as follows:- “19. The Board being a public authority discharges Governmental function. A consumer depends upon the authorities of the Board for its day to day amenities which are essential for human existence, It is the State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. It is thus required to act fairly, judiciously and in accordance with the principles of natural justice. Its action thus must be fair and conform to the standards of public morality. Its officers cannot act arbitrarily or raise demand for substantial amount of money without affording opportunity of hearing to the consumer.”. 8. Learned senior counsel while assailing the certificate proceeding has submitted that the certificate proceeding which has been initiated is only with an object to frustrate the present writ application. He has also questioned the power of the certificate officer to decide the applicability of respective tariffs for the relevant periods while raising the bills. The certificate officer as has been submitted by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner, is acting in a haste and which has created apprehensions for the petitioner that proper adjudication will not be made by the certificate officer. Once the petitioner has invoked the writ jurisdiction, the certificate officer cannot decide an issue, which is within the domain of the writ Court. Once the petitioner has invoked the writ jurisdiction, the certificate officer cannot decide an issue, which is within the domain of the writ Court. The certificate officer seems to have a bias and is not acting as would be expected from a quasi judicial authority. 9. Mr. Ajit Kumar, learned senior counsel for respondent nos. 1 to 4 has at the out set submitted that the letters patent appeal, which was preferred against the order dated 26.03.2015 by this Court in I.A. No. 1353 of 2015 was withdrawn, which in effect means that the order passed in I.A. No. 1353 of 2015 seeking amendment in the main writ application by including prayer for quashing of letter no. 07 dated 19.02.2015 being a notice under section 7 of the Bihar & Orissa Public Demand Recovery Act, 1914 has been affirmed. He has further submitted that since the Certificate Officer is in seisin of the matter, it is best left open for the Certificate Officer to decide the issue in hand, moresoever in view of the fact that the petitioner has submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the Certificate Officer by filing a detailed objection in terms of Section 9 of the Bihar & Orissa Public Demand Recovery Act, 1914. Mr. Ajit Kumar,learned senior counsel , has also referred to the various provisions of Bihar & Orissa Public Demand Recovery Act, 1914, more notably the provisions related to the filing of certificate on requisition as dealt in Section 6 of the Act, service of notice and copy of certificate on certificate debtor in terms of section 7 of the Act, effect of service of notice of certificate as per Section 8 of the Act, filing of petition denying liability enumerated in section 9 of the Act and hearing and determining of such petition in terms of Section 10 of the Act. In referring to the aforesaid provisions of Bihar & Orissa Public Demand Recovery Act, 1914, the learned senior counsel has tried to highlight the fact that the Certificate Officer is fully empowered under the Act to hear the certificate debtor as also to consider the objection, if any, made by the certificate debtor and it has further been delegated with the power to determine as to whether the certificate debtor is liable for the whole or any part of the amount, for which the certificate was signed and has the jurisdiction to set aside, modify or vary the certificate accordingly. In such circumstances, as has been argued by the learned senior counsel for respondent nos. 1 to 4, this Court while deciding an issue sitting in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot divest the powers of the Certificate Officer, who has been empowered thus under the Act and by usurping the jurisdiction of the certificate officer decide the issue itself. It has further been submitted that the statute itself has been enacted to decide certificate proceedings and there being a specialized forum for deciding the question as to whether the certificate, which has been filed raising the demand is within the precincts of various tariff prevalent for the period, in which the bills were raised, there appears no occasion for interfering in the said proceedings. It has also been urged that whatever arguments have been advanced on behalf of the petitioner have been taken by the petitioner in its objection filed before the Certificate Officer and there cannot be any parallel proceeding to decide the veracity, correctness or otherwise for the bills raised, which is under challenge in the present writ application and in view of the wide amplitude of powers vested upon the Certificate Officer under the statute, the entire dispute relating to raising of the bills can be properly appreciated by the Certificate Officer. The learned Senior Counsel further adds that umpteenth times, the petitioner had moved various forums and revised/rectified bills, which were raised and which is the subject matter of the present writ application was pursuant to the order dated 2.5.2013, passed in CWJC No. 852 of 2000R. The learned Senior Counsel further adds that umpteenth times, the petitioner had moved various forums and revised/rectified bills, which were raised and which is the subject matter of the present writ application was pursuant to the order dated 2.5.2013, passed in CWJC No. 852 of 2000R. It has been submitted that in fact after the order was passed in CWJC No. 852 of 2000R, the petitioner had preferred a review application being Civil Review No. 40 of 2013, in which after consideration of the entire aspects of the case and the review sought for by the petitioner, the same was dismissed. In fact, learned senior counsel for respondent nos. 1 to 4 adds that the issues, which have been raised by the petitioner in the present writ application, had mostly been considered in CWJC No. 852 of 2000 R as well as in Civil Review No. 40 of 2013 and since the issues in earlier proceedings and the present proceeding seems to overlap each other and the same having been decided by the Hon'ble Single Judge in the earlier round of litigation, the same cannot be re agitated and reopened as it would virtually result in sitting in appeal over the judgment of the Hon'ble Single Judge. It has also been submitted that the issue of fuel surcharge has also been decided against the petitioner in C.W.J.C. No. 2758 of 2000 R. The learned senior counsel also adds that without paying the electricity dues, the petitioner has surrendered the electrical connection taken from the Board which further goes to show the conduct of the petitioner. 10. Replying to the contentions advanced by Mr. Ajit Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing for respondent nos. 1 to 4, it has been submitted that challenge to the bill has been raised for the first time in the present writ application and never before the rectified bills were an issue in any forum. It has further been submitted that the submission made by the respondents with respect to resjudicata and constructive resjudicata, the same has been repelled by this Court vide order dated 26.03.2015 while allowing I.A. No. 651 of 2015. It has further been submitted that the submission made by the respondents with respect to resjudicata and constructive resjudicata, the same has been repelled by this Court vide order dated 26.03.2015 while allowing I.A. No. 651 of 2015. Responding to the stand taken by the respondents that when the petitioner has submitted to the jurisdiction of the Certificate Officer, the writ application could not be entertained, it has been submitted that the certificate officer is proceeding speedily with an objection to pass an order before the issue in the present writ application is finally decided. Mr. M.L. Verma, learned senior counsel, further adds that the actual KVA recorded was much less than the contracted demand and therefore it is wholly fallacious and misleading on the part of the Board to suggest that the petitioner was trying to avail and utilize more load merely because the fixtional KVA had been fixed at a higher figure. So far as the issue of fuel surcharge, which has been raised by learned senior counsel for respondent nos. 1 to 4, it has been submitted that various consumers had raised the issue earlier and several interim orders were passed in their favour and the petitioner was not the sole consumer to have approached this Court challenging the fuel surcharge. It cannot be by any stretch of imagination concluded that the revised/rectified bills cannot be challenged merely on the ground that a certificate proceeding has been initiated. Moreover, as per learned senior counsel for the petitioner, the writ application was filed in 2013 and after expiry of a considerable long period of time, counter affidavit had been filed by the respondent nos. 1 to 4 and if in the meantime a certificate proceeding has been initiated , the same cannot cause any hindrance to this Court to decide the issue as to whether the rectified bills raised by the Board pursuant to the order passed in CWJC No. 852 of 2000 R was in terms of the tariff applicable from time to time. Learned senior counsel further adds that misleading arguments have been advanced by learned senior counsel for respondents nos. Learned senior counsel further adds that misleading arguments have been advanced by learned senior counsel for respondents nos. 1 to 4 that the petitioner had deliberately surrendered its electrical connection given by the Board while consuming electricity from another licencee-JUSCO inasmuch as the connection from JUSCO was taken in the year 2008, which was during the pendency of CWJC No. 852 of 2000 R and since the petitioner was not in need of the electricity being supplied by the Board, it had surrendered its connection. 11. Mr. Sudarshan Srivastava, learned counsel appearing for respondent no. 5, has submitted that the certificate officer is competent to decide as to whether the bills were raised in terms of the tariff applicable from time to time. It has further been submitted that once the amendment application preferred by the petitioner has been rejected by this Court and which has been affirmed in appeal, the said order having attained finality and the petitioner having submitted to the jurisdiction of the certificate officer, the issue raised by the petitioner can best be decided by the certificate officer. It has also been submitted that in terms of the provision of Bihar & Orissa Public Demand Recovery Act, the Certificate Officer is competent enough to decide the issues, which have been raised by the petitioner in the present writ application with respect to the applicability of the tariff on the revised/rectified bills. So far as the various legal issues, which have been raised by the petitioner, learned counsel for respondent no. 5 adds that whatever judgements have been relied upon the petitioner are binding on the certificate officer and he has to consider each and every aspect of the matter before coming to a final conclusion. 12 Before embarking on a threadbare discussion of the rival submissions advanced by the respective counsel, It would be necessary to consider at the very inception the judgements rendered by the Hon’ble Single Judge in WPC No. 852 of 2000 R and the subsequent order passed in Civil Review No. 40 of 213. The sole purpose of doing so is to arrive at such finding which would obliterate issues, which are overlapping and which have already been decided in CWJC No. 852 of 2000 and in Civil Reivew No. 40 of 2013. The sole purpose of doing so is to arrive at such finding which would obliterate issues, which are overlapping and which have already been decided in CWJC No. 852 of 2000 and in Civil Reivew No. 40 of 2013. The first issue would be whether the delayed payment surcharge (DPS) has been considered by the learned Single Judge or not. In CWJC No. 852 of 2000R, the question of DPS has been answered against the petitioner, which for the sake of reference, is quoted hereunder:- “Petitioner cannot be absolved of the liability to pay delayed payment surcharge on the rectified bill, which is due to the respondents after the challenge to the applicability of the tariff to their Unit has failed”. 13. In the review application by the petitioner, one of the grounds which were taken for review of the order dated 2.5.2013, in CWJC No. 852 of 2000 R is that the petitioner would be liable to pay delayed payment surcharge on the rectified bills raised after rectification reckoned from 16.03.2000. The basis for raising such plea was clause 16.2 of the 1993 tariff. However, this contention was negated and it was held thus: "15. This Court, after answering the sole question raised by the writ petitioner in the negative, held that the instant tariff schedule is applicable to the petitioner's unit and in such circumstances the petitioner is liable to pay the bills raised under the said tariff schedule dated 24.9.1999. The petitioner was under an obligation to pay the impugned bills and then protest. If the petitioner would have succeeded in its challenge to the impugned bills, whether whole or part of it, it would have been entitled to refund of the same with interest. Since, the petitioner had been enjoying the stay granted earlier for the last 13 years in respect of the impugned bills in question, this Court in order to ensure that no parties suffer because of operation of the stay during the pendency of the writ application, in the facts and circumstances, considered it proper and equitable to direct that the petitioner would be liable to pay delayed payment surcharge on the rectified bills raised after correction of the computation error to be reckoned from the date of impugned bill dated 16.3.2000 after the challenge to the applicability of the tariff to their Unit has failed. 14. 14. In such circumstances, the contention of the petitioner is a re agitation of the same issue, which has already been decided and which is the subject matter of the appeal filed by the petitioner against the order dated 2.5.2013, passed in CWJC No. 852 of 2000 R and this Court is not empowered to reopen the said issue. 15. Much stress has been laid by learned senior counsel for the petitioner that various judgments on the issue point to the fact that the rectified bills which have been raised by the Respondent Board is not in accordance with the tariff applicable from time to time. The learned senior counsel has also relied upon the various judgments which are noted here in below:- 16. In the case of M/s Vimal Deep Steel Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Jharkhand State Electricity Board through its Chairman (WPC No. 3517 of 2010) and Bharat Ingots & Steel Pvt. Ltd., Jamshedpur Vs. Jharkhand State Electricity Board ( WPC No. 3647 of 2005, it has been held that with effect from 1.1.2004 , the tariff of 1999 and 2001 has no application in the territory of State of Jharkhand because by that time, the Jharkhand State Electricity Regulatory Commission had already issued tariff which is applicable in the State of Jharkhand and thereby the bills raised by the JSEB had been quashed. In WPC No. 3647 of 2005, it was held that the tariff issued by the BSEB on 7.5.2001 is not applicable in the State of Jharkhand and the JSEB has no power to raise bill on the basis of aforesaid tariff. 17. Similar was the judgment rendered by this Court in WPC No. 3304 of 2008 (Jharkhand State Electricity Board & Another Vs. M/s Lord Balaji Manufacturing Steel Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.). 18. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon the judgements rendered in the case of M/s Vikromatic Steel Pvt. Ltd. Vs. JSEB & Ors., reported in (2003) 4 JCR 247 , Kanoria Chemicals & Industries Vs. U.P. State Electricity Board & Ors., reported in (1997) 5 SCC 772 , Kusumam Hotels Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Kerala State Electricity Board & Ors., reported in (2008) 13 SCC 213 , Uptron India Ltd. Vs. Shammi Bhan & Anr., reported in (1988) 6 SCC 538 and LPA No. 466/2010 with LPA No. 465/2010 ( JSEB & Ors. Vs. U.P. State Electricity Board & Ors., reported in (1997) 5 SCC 772 , Kusumam Hotels Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Kerala State Electricity Board & Ors., reported in (2008) 13 SCC 213 , Uptron India Ltd. Vs. Shammi Bhan & Anr., reported in (1988) 6 SCC 538 and LPA No. 466/2010 with LPA No. 465/2010 ( JSEB & Ors. Vs. M/s Laxmi Business and Cement Company Pvt. Ltd. The judgments, which have been relied upon by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner, are an effort to show that the rectified bills, which have been raised by the respondent Board was not in accordance with the tariffs applicable from time to time. The petitioners have already filed their objection in the certificate proceedings. Since the certificate officer is in seisin of the matter, it can make a meticulous examination and the bills which the petitioner contends should have been raised in terms of the tariff applicable from time to time which the certificate officer is not precluded from doing so as in terms of Section 10 of the Bihar & Orissa Public Demand Recovery Act, which envisages that the certificate officer after hearing and after taking evidence, if necessary, determines whether the certificate debtor is liable for the whole or any part of the amount, for which the certificate was signed and may set aside, modify or vary the certificate accordingly. 19. It is a settled principle of law that a quasi judicial authority discharging quasi judicial function in exercise of the statutory power is entitled to discharge his function in light of his own independent perspective. When a statutory authority is vested with the power to determine such questions as in the present writ application, the final determination by the said authority is a necessity at the first instance. The obligation to act fairly on the part of the administrative authorities was evolved to ensure the rule of law and to prevent failure of justice. This doctrine is complimentary to the principles of natural justice which the quasi judicial authorities are bound to observe. While considering any issue before it which is affecting rights of the parties, the quasi judicial authorities are required to consider each and every aspect of the issue at hand and on consideration is required to pass a reasoned order. This doctrine is complimentary to the principles of natural justice which the quasi judicial authorities are bound to observe. While considering any issue before it which is affecting rights of the parties, the quasi judicial authorities are required to consider each and every aspect of the issue at hand and on consideration is required to pass a reasoned order. Such order as has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kranti Associates Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Masood Ahmed Khan & Ors., reported in (2010) 9 SCC 496, which I quote "must not be like the inscrutable face of sphinx". Moreover, the Bihar & Orissa Public Demand Recovery Act, 1914 is a complete code in itself vesting the Certificate Officer with a wide amplitude of power to determine whether the certificate debtor is liable for the whole or any part of the amount, for which the certificate was signed and may set side, modify or vary the certificate accordingly. The Bihar & Orissa Public Demand Recovery Act in its inbuilt provision has protected the certificate debtor to the extent of filing objections and the Certificate Officer is duty bound to consider the objections and may take evidence if necessary and thereafter decide on the issue finally. The statute provides for determination of the certificate claim and when different hierarchies providing Forums in relation to passing of an order as also appellate or original order by no stretch of imagination can a higher authority interfere with the independence, which is the basic feature of any statutory scheme involving adjudicatory process. The petitioner having subjected itself to the certificate proceedings by filing objections and taking various steps before the said authority, it is open for the petitioner to raise all its points before the Certificate Officer, who shall consider the same and thereafter pass necessary orders. 21. In view of the alternative Forum, to which the petitioner has subjected itself for adjudication, this Court in writ jurisdiction would be reluctant to consider the issue with respect to the rectified bills, as has been raised by the petitioner in this application. 22. Accordingly, I do not find any merit in this application, which is, hereby, dismissed.