Judgment Mansoor Ahmad Mir, J. A vehicular traffic accident, which was caused by the driver, namely Pheru Ram @ Vijay Kumar, while driving vehicle, i.e. Tata Sumo, bearing registration No. HP-16-0037, rashly and negligently on 21.01.2005, at about 3.45 P.M. at place Bharoli near Pulwahal, P.S. Rajgarh, in which two persons, namely Beeru Bahadur and Reeta Verma, sustained injuries and succumbed to the injuries and one Balwinder Singh and a minor child, Aman Verma, sustained injuries, has given birth to the appeals in hand, thus, I deem it proper to determine all these appeals by this judgment. 2. The legal representatives/dependents of the deceased have filed two claim petitions, being M.A.C. Petition No. 22 FTC/2 of 2005/06, titled as Smt. Ramkali and another versus Sh. Partap Singh Bhagnal and others (subject matter of FAO No. 450 of 2007), before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Fast Track Court, Solan, H.P. (for short "the Tribunal-I") and MAC Petition No. 07-MAC/2 of 2006, titled as Ramesh Verma and others versus Sh. Partap Singh and others (subject matter of FAO No. 107 of 2010), before Motor Accident Claims Tribunal-I, Sirmaur District at Nahan, H.P. (for short "the Tribunal-II"), for grant of compensation, as per the breakups given in the respective claim petitions. 3. Claimants-injured have also filed claim petitions, being MAC Petition No. 04-MAC/2 of 2006, titled as Aman Verma versus Sh. Partap Singh and others (subject matter of FAO No. 106 of 2010), before Tribunal-II and M.A.C. Petition No. 8-S/2 of 2008, titled as Sh. Balwinder Singh versus Sh. Kuldeep Chauhan and others (subject matter of FAO No. 128 of 2011), before MACT-II, Solan, District Solan, H.P. (for short "the Tribunal-III") for grant of compensation, as per the break-ups given in the respective claim petitions. 4. The owner-insured, the driver and the insurer have resisted the claim petitions on the grounds taken in the respective memo of objections. 5. Issues were framed in all the four claim petitions. The parties led evidence in support of their respective cases in all the four claim petitions. 6. The Tribunals in three claim petitions, subject matter of FAOs No. 450 of 2007, 106 and 107 of 2010, after scanning the evidence, vide separate awards of different dates, held that the insurance contract was not in force on the date of the accident and saddled the insured-owner with liability. 7. 6. The Tribunals in three claim petitions, subject matter of FAOs No. 450 of 2007, 106 and 107 of 2010, after scanning the evidence, vide separate awards of different dates, held that the insurance contract was not in force on the date of the accident and saddled the insured-owner with liability. 7. The claimants, the driver and the insurer have not questioned the said impugned awards, thus, have attained finality so far it relate to them. 8. Only the insured-owner has questioned these impugned awards by the medium of FAOs No. 450 of 2007, 106 & 107 of 2010 on the ground that the insurance policy was in force, rather effective, on the date of the accident and the Tribunals have fallen in an error in saddling him with liability. 9. Tribunal-III in M.A.C. Petition No. 8-S/2 of 2008, subject matter of FAO No. 128 of 2011, held that the insurance policy was effective at the relevant point of time and directed the insurer to satisfy the award. 10. The owner-insured, the driver and the claimants have not questioned the said impugned award on any count, thus, has attained finality so far it relates to them. 11. The insurer has questioned the said impugned award on the ground that the Tribunal-III has fallen in an error in saddling it with liability for the simple reason that the insurance policy was not in force at the relevant point of time, i.e. the date of accident. 12. Neither the claimants nor the respondents in the claim petitions, i.e. the driver, the owner-insured and the insurer have questioned the adequacy of compensation or the factum of rashness or negligence. Thus, the findings returned by the Tribunals on the said issues have attained finality. 13. The only question to be answered in these appeals is - whether the insurance contract was effective on the date of the accident, i.e. 21.01.2005? 14. Learned counsel for the owner-insured argued that the cover note, Exhibit RD-1 in M.A.C. Petition No. 22 FTC/2 of 2005/06,, has been issued before the date of the accident, as in the bottom of the cover note, the date of issue has been recorded as 21-1-2005', however the effective date of commencement of the insurance has been wrongly recorded as 22-1-2005'. 15. The argument, though attractive, is devoid of any force, for the following reasons: 16. 15. The argument, though attractive, is devoid of any force, for the following reasons: 16. The cover note, Exhibit RD-1, contains the date of commencement and expiry of insurance. It is apt to reproduce relevant portion of the cover note herein: "............................ 3. Effective date of commencement of Insurance for the purpose of the Act Time 00-01 AM Date 22-1-2005 4. Date of Expiry of Insurance Date 21-1-2006 ............................." 17. While going through the cover note, one comes to an inescapable conclusion that the cover note contains the date from which the insurance contract was effective. The owner-insured has not questioned the same till the accident occurred or till today. The same effective date of the insurance is recorded in the cover note as well as the insurance policy. 18. The parties are covered by promises, terms and conditions contained in the insurance agreement that includes the cover note and the insurance policy. 19. The Apex Court in a case titled as National Insurance Company Limited versus Abhaysing Pratapsing Waghela and others, titled as (2008) 9 Supreme Court Cases 133, held that if cover note is issued, the cover note contains the date of commencement, is the date from which the insurer is liable. It is apt to reproduce paras 12, 17 and 22 of the judgment herein: "12. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, "the Act") was enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to motor vehicles. Chapter XI of the Act provides for insurance of motor vehicles against third party risks. Section 145 of the Act is the definition section; clause (b) whereof defines 'certificate of insurance' to mean: "145. (b) ........ a certificate issued by an authorized insurer in pursuance of subsection (3) of Section 147 and includes a cover note complying with such requirements as may be prescribed, and where more than one certificate has been issued in connection with a policy, or where a copy of a certificate has been issued, all those certificates or that copy, as the case may be; * * *" Clause (d) of Section 145 defines 'policy of insurance' to include 'certificate of insurance'. 13. to 16. .................. 17. Indisputably, the first respondent is a third party in relation to the contract of insurance which had been entered into by and between the appellant and the owner of the vehicle in question. 13. to 16. .................. 17. Indisputably, the first respondent is a third party in relation to the contract of insurance which had been entered into by and between the appellant and the owner of the vehicle in question. We have noticed hereinbefore that a document was produced before the Tribunal. Even according to the appellant, although it was only a Motor Input Advice cum Receipt, it contained the Cover Note No. 279106. We, therefore, have to suppose that a Cover Note had, in fact, been issued. If a cover note had been issued which in terms of clause (b) of sub- Section 1 of Section 145 of the Act would come within the purview of definition of certificate of insurance; it also would come within the purview of the definition of a insurance policy. If a cover note is issued, it remains valid till it is cancelled. Indisputably, the insurance policy was cancelled only after the accident took place. A finding of fact, therefore, has been arrived at that prior to the deposit of the premium of insurance in cash by the owner of the vehicle, the cover note was not cancelled. 18. to 21. ................ 22. Yet again in Deddappa v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (2008) 2 SCC 595 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 517, having regard to the provisions contained in Section 54(v) of the Insurance Act, 1938, in the fact situation obtaining therein, it was opined : (SCC p. 600, para 20) "20. A contract is based on reciprocal promise. Reciprocal promises by the parties are condition precedents for a valid contract. A contract furthermore must be for consideration. (Emphasis added)" 20. The Apex Court has discussed the same issue in the case titled as Balbir Kaur and others versus New India Assurance Company Limited and others, reported in (2009) 13 Supreme Court Cases 370. It is apt to reproduce para 11 of the judgment herein: "11. For the purpose of this case, we would assume that an insurance policy, in law, could be issued from a future date. A policy, however, which is issued from a future date must be with the consent of the holder of the policy. The insurance company cannot issue a policy unilaterally from a future date without the consent of the holder of a policy. A policy, however, which is issued from a future date must be with the consent of the holder of the policy. The insurance company cannot issue a policy unilaterally from a future date without the consent of the holder of a policy. Even the said circular letter had not been produced and/or no material was placed as to why the policy was issued from a later date. It is, however, not necessary for us to delve deep into the matter in view of the limited notice issued by this Court. Respondent No. 3, however, owner of the vehicle has not questioned that part of the order passed by the High Court. He, therefore, accepted the judgment of the High Court. Accordingly, liability to pay the awarded amount by him is not in question." 21. The Apex Court in a case titled as New India Assurance Company, Bangalore versus Kareemunnisa, reported in (2009) 16 Supreme Court Cases 241, wherein the insurance policy was effective w.e.f. 22.09.1986 at 1.10 P.M., but the accident occurred at 11.30 A.M. on the same day, held that the insurer was not liable. It is apt to reproduce para 3 of the judgment herein: "3. The policy of insurance gives the effective date of commencement as "22-9-1986 .... 1.10 p.m.". Thereafter is printed, "(BOTH DAYS INCLUSIVE)". Relying upon what is in brackets, the Tribunal and the court below came to the conclusion that the Insurance Company was liable even though the accident in question had occurred at 11.30 a.m. on the same day i.e. before the issuance of the policy. The point in question would appear to be covered by the judgment of this Court in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sunita Rathi, (1998) 1 SCC 365 , where it has been held that the insurer cannot be held liable when the time of insurance of the policy is mentioned thereon and the accident has occurred before that time." 22. The Apex Court in another case titled as Oriental Insurance Company Limited versus Porselvi and another, reported in (2009) 15 Supreme Court Cases 116, wherein the cover note clearly indicated that the insurance policy was valid from 29.5.1996 to 28.5.1997, though it was issued on 28.5.1996, effect of which was not taken into consideration by the High Court, remanded the case for fresh consideration. It is apt to reproduce paras 4 and 5 of the judgment herein: "4. Learned Counsel for the appellant brought to our notice the cover note which clearly indicates that the policy was valid from 29-5- 1996 to 28-5-1997 though it was issued on 28-5- 1996. A copy of the policy was brought on record. Relevant portion thereof reads as follows: "Effective date of commencement of insurance for the purpose of the Act, from (sic) o'clock on (date) 29-5-1996 to midnight of 28-5-1997." 5. A three Judge Bench of this Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Sita Bai, (1999) 7 SCC 575 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1322, inter alia observed as follows: "6. The correctness and applicability of the judgment in Ram Dayal case {New India Assuirance Co. Ltd. v. Ram Dayal, (1990) 2 SCC 680 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 432} came up for consideration before this Court subsequently in a number of cases. In New India Assurance Co. v. Bhagwati Devi, (1998) 6 SCC 534 , a three-Judge Bench of this Court relied upon the view taken in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jikubhai Nathuji Dabhi, (1997) 1 SCC 66 , wherein it had been held that if there is a special contract, mentioning in the policy the time when it was bought, the insurance policy would be operative from that time and not from the previous midnight as was the case in Ram Dayal case where no time from which the insurance policy was to become effective had been mentioned. It was held that should there be no contract to the contrary, an insurance policy becomes operative from the previous midnight, when bought during the day following, but in cases where there is a mention of the specific time for the purchase of the policy, then a special contract comes into being and the policy becomes effective from the time mentioned in the cover note/the policy itself. The judgment in Jikubhai case has been subsequently followed in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sunita Rathi, (1998) 1 SCC 365 , by a three-Judge Bench of this Court also." 23. Applying the test to the instant case, the cover note is on the file, which provides that the insurance policy is valid w.e.f. 22.01.2005 at 00.01 A.M. to 21.01.2006. Thus, the insurance contract was not effective at the time of the accident. 24. Applying the test to the instant case, the cover note is on the file, which provides that the insurance policy is valid w.e.f. 22.01.2005 at 00.01 A.M. to 21.01.2006. Thus, the insurance contract was not effective at the time of the accident. 24. The Apex Court in the cases titled as National Insurance Co. Ltd. versus Sobina Iakai (Smt) and others, with National Insurance Co. Ltd. versus Kerolin P. Marak (Smt) and others, reported in (2007) 7 Supreme Court Cases 786, and J. Kalaivani and others versus K. Sivashankar and another, reported in (2007) 7 Supreme Court Cases 792, laid down the same principle of law. It is apt to reproduce paras 15 to 19 of the judgment in Sobina Iakai's case (supra) herein: "14. This Court had an occasion to examine the similar controversy in the case of New India Insurance Company v. Ram Dayal, (1990) 2 SCC 680 . In this case, this Court held that in absence of any specific time mentioned in the policy, the contract would be operative from the midnight of the day by operations of the provisions of the General Clauses Act but in view of the special contract mentioned in the insurance policy, the effectiveness of the policy would start from the time and date indicated in the policy. 15. A three-judge Bench of this Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jikhubhai Nathuji Dabhi, (1997) 1 SCC 66 , has held that in the absence of any specific time mentioned in that behalf, the contract would be operative from the mid-night of the day by operation of provisions of the General Clauses Act. But in view of the special contract mentioned in the insurance policy, it would be operative from the time and date the insurance policy was taken. In that case, the insurance policy was taken at 4.00 p.m. on 25-10-1983 and the accident had occurred earlier thereto. This Court held (at SCC p. 67, para 3) that "the insurance coverage would not enable the claimant to seek recovery of the amount from the appellant Company." 16. Another three-Judge Bench of this Court in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sunita Rathi, (1998) 1 SCC 365 , dealt with similar facts. This Court held (at SCC p. 67, para 3) that "the insurance coverage would not enable the claimant to seek recovery of the amount from the appellant Company." 16. Another three-Judge Bench of this Court in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sunita Rathi, (1998) 1 SCC 365 , dealt with similar facts. In this case, the accident occurred at 2.20 p.m. and the cover note was obtained only thereafter at 2.55 p.m. The Court observed that the policy would be effective from the time and date mentioned in the policy. 17. In New India Assurance Co. vs. Bhagwati Devi, [( 1998 (6) SCC 534 ], this Court observed that, in absence of any specific time and date, the insurance policy becomes operative from the previous midnight. But when the specific time and date is mentioned, then the insurance policy becomes effective from that point of time. This Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Sita Bai, (1999) 7 SCC 575 , and National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Chinto Devi, (2000) 7 SCC 50 , has taken the same view. 18. In J. Kalaivani v. K. Sivashankar, (2007) 7 SCC 792 : JT 2001 (10) SC 396, this Court has reiterated clear enunciation of law. The Court observed that it is the obligation of the Court to look into the contract of insurance to discern whether any particular time has been specified for commencement or expiry of the policy. A very large number of cases have come to our notice where insurance policies are taken immediately after the accidents to get compensation in a clandestine manner. 19. In order to curb this widespread mischief of getting insurance policies after the accidents, it is absolutely imperative to clearly hold that the effectiveness of the insurance policy would start from the time and date specifically incorporated in the policy and not from an earlier point of time." 25. It would also be profitable to reproduce paras 3 to 6 of the judgment in K. Kalaivani's case (supra) herein: "3. The vehicle involved in the accident was in fact covered by a policy of insurance issued by the same insurance company on 8-2-1995 which was to expire by the midnight of 7-2- 1996. It would also be profitable to reproduce paras 3 to 6 of the judgment in K. Kalaivani's case (supra) herein: "3. The vehicle involved in the accident was in fact covered by a policy of insurance issued by the same insurance company on 8-2-1995 which was to expire by the midnight of 7-2- 1996. It was the ill luck of the claimants that the accident took place at 4.30 a.m. on 8-2-1996 which is only four and a half hours after the expiry of the erstwhile policy. On the succeeding day the owner of the vehicle went to the insurance company and got another policy issued in respect of the same vehicle, but which the company specifically indicated the time of commencement of the policy as 10 a.m. on 8-2-1995. 4. The question posed before us is whether the policy issued by the insurance company on 8.2.1998 can be regarded as renewal of the earlier policy. 5. Three decisions have been placed before us. In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Ram Dayal, (1990) S SCC 680 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 432, it was held that in the absence of any specific time mentioned in that behalf, the contract of insurance would be operative from the midnight of the day by operation of the provisions of the General clauses Act, 1897. In National Insurance co. Ltd. v. Jijubhai Nathuji Dabhi, 1997 (1) SCC 66 , a three judge bench of this Court approved the legal position adopted in the said decision. However, learned judges observed thus: (SCC p. 67, para 3) "But in view of the special contract mentioned in the insurance policy, namely it would be operative from 4.00 p. m. on 25-10-1983 and the accident had occurred earlier thereto, the insurance coverage would not enable the claimant to seek recovery of the amount from the appellant company". This question was again considered by another three-Judge Bench of this Court in New India Assurance v. Bhagwati Devi, (1998) 8 SCC 534 , and after following the dictum in the earlier decision that bench has stated thus:(SCC p. 535, para 2) "The principle deduced is thus clear that should there be no contract go contrary, an insurance policy becomes operative from the previous midnight, when bought during the day following. However, in case there is mention of a specific time for its purchase then a special contract to the contrary comes into being and the policy would be effective from the mentioned time. The law on this aspect has been put to rest by this Court. There is, this, nothing further for us to deliberate upon". 6. Therefore, the position has become now well neigh settled. The court has to look into the contract of insurance to discern whether any particular time has been specified for commencement or expiry, as the case may be, of the policy of insurance. The copies of the erstwhile policy as well as the present policy have been produced for our perusal, the authenticity of which has not been questioned before us. The erstwhile policy shows that it expired by midnight of 7-2-1996 by specific terms incorporated in the policy. The next policy has clearly indicated that it had commenced only at 10.00 a. m. on 8-2-1996. The interregnum created the void in respect of the vehicle vis-a-vis the insurance company. The unavoidable consequence of it is that the insurance company cannot now be mulcted with the liability in respect of the award granted by the tribunal." 26. Keeping in view the mandate of Chapter XI of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short "the MV Act"), the owner-insured is required to get his vehicle insured. The insurance agreement is a contract between the owner-insured and the insurer. In view of the terms and conditions contained in the insurance policy read with the mandate of the said Chapter, the insurer has to indemnify the owner-insured, provided the owner-insured is not in breach, if pleaded and proved by the insurer. Thus, the policy document is an important document, which governs the parties, is to be construed strictly. 27. The Apex Court in a case titled as Vikram Greentech India Limited and another versus New India Assurance Company Limited, reported in (2009) 5 Supreme Court Cases 599, laid down the same principle. It is apt to reproduce paras 16 to 18 of the judgment herein: "16. An insurance contract, is a species of commercial transactions and must be construed like any other contract to its own terms and by itself. In a contract of insurance, there is requirement of uberimma fides i.e. good faith on the part of the insured. It is apt to reproduce paras 16 to 18 of the judgment herein: "16. An insurance contract, is a species of commercial transactions and must be construed like any other contract to its own terms and by itself. In a contract of insurance, there is requirement of uberimma fides i.e. good faith on the part of the insured. Except that, in other respects, there is no difference between a contract of insurance and any other contract. 17. The four essentials of a contract of insurance are, (i) the definition of the risk, (ii) the duration of the risk, (iii) the premium and (iv) the amount of insurance. Since upon issuance of insurance policy, the insurer undertakes to indemnify the loss suffered by the insured on account of risks covered by the insurance policy, its terms have to be strictly construed to determine the extent of liability of the insurer. 18. The endeavour of the court must always be to interpret the words in which the contract is expressed by the parties. The court while construing the terms of policy is not expected to venture into extra liberalism that may result in re-writing the contract or substituting the terms which were not intended by the parties. The insured cannot claim anything more than what is covered by the insurance policy. (General Assurance Society Ltd. v. Chandmull Jain, AIR 1966 SC 1644 ; Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sony Cheriyan, (1999) 6 SCC 451 , and United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Harchand Rai Chandan Lal, (2004) 8 SCC 644 )" 28. Having said so, the insurance policy was not in existence at the time of the accident and the insurer is not liable to satisfy the award and came to be rightly exonerated by the Tribunals-I and II in the claim petitions, subject matters of FAOs No. 450 of 2007, 106 & 107 of 2010, Tribunal-III has fallen in an error in saddling it with liability. 29. Viewed thus, the appeals filed by the owner-insured, i.e. FAOs No. 450 of 2007, 106 & 107 of 2010 merits to be dismissed and the appeal filed by the insurer, i.e. FAO No. 128 of 2011 is to be allowed and the owner-insured has to satisfy all the impugned awards. 30. 29. Viewed thus, the appeals filed by the owner-insured, i.e. FAOs No. 450 of 2007, 106 & 107 of 2010 merits to be dismissed and the appeal filed by the insurer, i.e. FAO No. 128 of 2011 is to be allowed and the owner-insured has to satisfy all the impugned awards. 30. Having glance of the above discussion, FAOs No. 450 of 2007, 106 & 107 of 2010 are dismissed, the impugned awards in FAOs No. 450 of 2007, 106 & 107 of 2010 are upheld, FAO No. 128 of 2011 is allowed and the impugned award in FAO No. 128 of 2011 is modified, as indicated hereinabove. 31. The owner-insured is directed to deposit the awarded amount in FAO No. 128 of 2011 before the Registry within eight weeks. Thereafter, the awarded amount in all the claim petitions be released in favour of the claimants strictly as per the terms and conditions contained in the impugned awards. 32. Send down the record after placing copy of the judgment on each of the Tribunal's files.