ORDER Indrajit Mahanty, J. - Heard Mr. C. Panigrahi, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. P.K. Ray, learned Sr. Standing Counsel for the Central Excise, Customs and Service Tax Department. 2. In this writ application, the petitioner has sought to challenge the order dated 05.06.2015 under Annexure-4, whereby, the Assistant Commissioner Bhubaneswar Service Tax Division, Bhubaneswar has been pleased to reject an application filed in Form-R by the petitioner-company claiming refund of Service Tax amounting to Rs. 2,00,954/- (received on 01.06.2015) purportedly on the ground that "the claim is barred by limitation of time, as required under Section 11B of Central Excise Act, 1944 read with Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994. 3. Mr. Panigrahi, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the bar of limitation under Section 11-B of Central Excise Act, 1944 cannot be applied to the circumstance of the present case since the said bar only applies to "any person claiming refund of any duty of excise and interest". He further submits that since the petitioner is a 100% export oriented unit and, consequently, it is not at all liable to deposit any service tax. 4. It is fairly admitted on behalf of the Department that there is no dispute about the fact that no service tax was payable by the petitioner and as a corollary thereof the amount deposited by the petitioner cannot tantamount to be held to be deposit of Service Tax. In this respect, reliance was placed on a judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. ITC Ltd. (1993) Supp. 4 SCC 326 in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court upheld the view taken by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court with regard to the question of limitation. On the question of limitation, the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court had observed that "the duty of excise is that which is levied in accordance with law" and that "any money which is realised in excess of what is permissible in law would be a realisation made outside the provisions of the Act". 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the deposit of Service Tax by the petitioner was made under a mistake of law and, therefore, can be also recovered beyond the period stipulated. In the case of D. Cawasji & Co. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the deposit of Service Tax by the petitioner was made under a mistake of law and, therefore, can be also recovered beyond the period stipulated. In the case of D. Cawasji & Co. v. State of Mysore, (1975) 1 SCC 636 although the Supreme Court ultimately rejected the claim for refund on the ground of delay and latches, the Court made certain observation in para-7 & 8 of the said judgment which reads as follows: "7. Section 17(1) (c) of the Limitation Act, 1963, provides that in the case of a suit for relief on the ground of mistake, the period of limitation does not being to run until the plaintiff has discovered the mistake or could, with reasonable diligence, have discovered it. In a case where payment is made under a mistake of law as contrasted with a mistake of fact, generally the mistake becomes known to the party only when a court makes a declaration as to the invalidity of the law. Though a party could, with reasonable diligence, discover a mistake of fact even before a court makes a pronouncement, it is seldom that a person can, even with reasonable diligence, discover a mistake of law before a judgment adjudging the validity of the law. 8. Therefore, where a suit will lie to recover moneys paid under a mistake of law, a writ petition for refund of tax within the period of limitation prescribed, i.e. within three years of the knowledge of the mistake, would also lie. For filing a writ petition to recover the money paid under a mistake of law, this Court has said that the starting point of limitation is from the date on which the judgment declaring as void the particular law under which the tax was paid was rendered, as that would normally be the date on which the mistake becomes known to the party. If any writ petition is filed beyond three years after that date, it will almost always be proper for the court to consider that it is unreasonable to entertain that petition, though, even in cases where it is filed within three years, the court has a discretion, having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case, not to entertain the application." 6. It would be important to take note herein that the views of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as quoted herein above were expressed in the context of claim for refund arising out of levy being declared unconstitutional and the views were based upon the theory of Unjust Enrichment and the principles incorporated in Section 72 of the Contract Act. 7. Reliance was also placed upon a judgment of the Hon'ble Madras High Court in the case of Natraj and Venkat Associates v. Assistant Commissioner, Service Tax, Chennai II division, (2010) 28 VST 525 (Mad). The self same issue arising in the present case vis-a-vis the rejection of an application for refund of Service Tax and the Scope of Section 11-B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 was taken into consideration and in the said judgment, the Hon'ble Madras High Court was of the considered view that the bar of limitation prescribed under Section 11-B (1) applied only to "any person claiming refund of any duty of excise and interest. Since there is no dispute in the present fact situation that no service tax was payable by the petitioner as a corollary thereof, what was paid by the petitioner cannot be held to be service Tax and consequently, the claim for petitioner for refund could be entertained by a writ court." The petitioner is also averred in the present writ application that no service tax has been collected by it from its customer and, therefore, even on merits, the petitioner is entitled to seek refund in view of the findings arrived at herein. 8. Accordingly, the writ application is allowed and the impugned order dated 05.06.2015 passed by the Assistant Commissioner, Bhubaneswar Service Tax Division, Bhubaneswar under Annexure-4 is quashed. The opposite parties are directed to take necessary steps forthwith on the refund application of the petitioner preferably within a period of two months from today. Final Result : Allowed