JUDGMENT Hon’ble P.K.S. Baghel, J.—This civil revision under Section 25 of Provincial Small Causes Court, 1887 (Act No. 9 of 1887) has been preferred by a tenant/revisionist against the judgment and decree dated 25.11.2009 passed by the Additional District Judge, Varanasi for the arrears of rent and his ejectment in SCC suit. 2. Briefly stated the facts are that Ms Taksal Theaters Private Limited is a Company registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1956. The Taksal Theater building situate at Nadesar in Varanasi. The tenant-revisionist is a tenant of 3rd floor in the said building. The accommodation in question is 25' x9'’ x 9' x 2'’ x 18' 6'’ total area is 380.80 square feet. The said portion was let out to the tenant-revisionist in February, 1988. According to the landlord the present rent of the building is Rs. 2687/- per month including the service charges. The landlord claims that the provisions of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 are not applicable to the said building as the rent is above Rs. 2000/- per month. 3. The landlord on 28.4.2007 issued a composite notice of demand terminating the tenancy and called upon the tenant to vacate the premises after the thirty days time from the date of receipt of the notice. The said notice was served on 30.4.2007, but the tenant did not vacate the premises within stipulated period and submitted a reply on 10.5.2007. The landlord instituted a suit in small cause Court, Varanasi being Suit No. 16 of 2007 for the eviction of the tenant-revisionist and for the recovery of arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 9516/- and the damages. 4. It was averred that on 1.2.1988 the demised premises was let out to the tenant for eleven months. At present the rent is Rs. 2,687/- per month including the service charges. The provisions of Rent Control Act are not applicable. It is further stated that as the tenancy was only for eleven months and after the expiry of the said period the landlord does not want to let out the premises in question to the tenant, therefore vide notice dated 28.4.2007 the tenancy has been terminated after giving notice of thirty days. 5. It is further stated that as the tenancy was only for eleven months and after the expiry of the said period the landlord does not want to let out the premises in question to the tenant, therefore vide notice dated 28.4.2007 the tenancy has been terminated after giving notice of thirty days. 5. In the plaint it was stated that the landlord is a Private Limited Company registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1956 and Sri Gopi Dargan is its Director who was authorized to institute the suit No. 16 of 2007 (M/s. Taksal Theatres Private Limited v. Ram Lakhan Gupta). The tenant-revisionist filed a written statement and contested the suit. It was admitted by the tenant that a portion of Taksal Theater building was let out to him. Further it was claimed that the said tenancy was created under a memorandum dated 16.2.1988 which was executed between landlord and tenant. The original agreement was taken and retained by the landlord. 6. In the additional plea the tenant took the stand that initially monthly rent was only Rs. 500/- for total covered area of 3rd floor. Beside the rent it was agreed between the parties that the tenant shall pay service charge of Rs. 300/- per month. According to tenant-revisionist the deed of memorandum contains a renewal clause subject to enhancement of the rent @ 20% after expiry of every three years. The landlord has been pressurizing the tenant-revisionist to increase the rent and service charges every time and the tenant had no option but to yield to the illegal demand of the landlord. It is further stated that tenant-revisionist in order to avoid litigation and harassment agreed to the condition of increasing the rent and service charges @ 20% on expiry of every three years. 7. The landlord examined Gopi Dargan as PW 1 and Ram Lakhan Gupta the tenant-revisionist was examined as DW-1. While deciding the issue No. 1 the trial Court held that Gopi Dargan was authorized to file the suit. The issue No. 2 was decided by the trial Court also in favour of the landlord that the provisions of Act No. 13 of 1972 are not applicable on the premises on the ground that the rent was above Rs. 2000/- per months. The trial Court rejected the plea of the tenant-revisionist that the rent was only Rs. 1640/- and the service charge Rs. 2000/- per months. The trial Court rejected the plea of the tenant-revisionist that the rent was only Rs. 1640/- and the service charge Rs. 1045/- cannot be included in the rent. The Court found that the service charge was included in rent therefore, the provisions of Act, No. 13 of 1972 was not applicable. The third issue regarding the notice the trial Court found that the notice was valid and the illegality pointed out by the tenant-revisionist was not sustainable. On the above finding the suit of the landlord was decreed. 8. I have learned counsel for the tenant-revisionist Mr.C.K.Parikh and Sri U.N.Sharma, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Chandan Sharma, learned counsel for the landlord respondent. 9. Learned counsel for the tenant-revisionist submitted that on 16.2.2008 two separate memorandum were executed between the parties. The first one was in respect of rent which was Rs. 500/- per month and on the same day a separate and independent agreement was also entered into between the parties in respect of service charge as service agreement for separate amount of Rs. 300/- as service charge and it cannot be treated as rent. Under Section 2(1)(g) of the U.P.Act No. 13 of 1972 a building is exempted from its operation, if the rent is above Rs. 2,000/- per month. He submitted that service charge cannot be treated as a part of rent therefore, the finding recorded by the Court below on issue No. 2 that the service charge was included in the rent and for the said reason the total amount of rent was Rs. 2687/- therefore the provisions of Act No. 13 of 1972 would not be applicable. 10. Learned counsel for the tenant-revisionist failed to cite any authority that service charge cannot be included in the rent. 11. Learned counsel for the landlord submitted that Section 3 (1) of the Act No. 13 of 1972 defines the building. Section 7 of the Act provides that the tenant shall be liable to pay the landlord in addition to and as part of the rent, the certain taxes or proportionate part thereof, if any, payable in respect of the building or part under this tenancy. Section 7 of the Act provides that the tenant shall be liable to pay the landlord in addition to and as part of the rent, the certain taxes or proportionate part thereof, if any, payable in respect of the building or part under this tenancy. It was further submitted that the term building means a residential or non residential building roofed structure and includes any land including any garden, garages and out houses, appurtenant to such building; any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building ; any fittings and fixtures affixed to such building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof. 12. Learned counsel for the landlord has placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Pushpa Sen Gupta v. Susma Ghose, (1990) 2 SCC 651 , Sewa International Fashions v. Smt. Suman Kathpalia and others, AIR 2000 Delhi 69 and Manager, Punjab National Bank, Shamshabad Agra and others v. District Judge, Agra and others, 1997 (1) AWC 378, in support of his submission he submitted that the word ‘rent ‘includes not only which is strictly under the rent but also demand in respect of amenities or services provided by landlord under the terms of tenancy. 13. He lastly urged that Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 defines ‘leases’ which states that a lease of immovable property is a transfer or a right to enjoy such property made available for certain time, express or implied, or of money. 14. I have considered the rival submissions and perused the record. It is a common ground that at present the rent of the premises is Rs. 2,687/- per month. The principal question that arises for consideration is whether the service charge can be included in the rent or not. If the service charge is not a part of the rent then the provisions of the Rent Control Act, 1972 would be attracted because the rent would fall below Rs. 2000/- per month. The issue whether the service charge or other amenities can be part of th rent has been decided in a series of decisions by the Supreme Court and this Court also. It is noteworthy that word ‘rent’ has not been defined under the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. 15. 2000/- per month. The issue whether the service charge or other amenities can be part of th rent has been decided in a series of decisions by the Supreme Court and this Court also. It is noteworthy that word ‘rent’ has not been defined under the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. 15. The Supreme Court in the case of Karnani Properties Ltd. v. Miss Augustine, AIR 1957 SC 309 , considered the term ‘rent’. The Court was considering a case arising out from the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act (17 of 1950). In the said case the word ‘rent’ was not defined. The Supreme Court relying on a judgment of Property Holding Company Ltd. v. Clark, 1948-1 KB 630, held that the term ‘rent’ is comprehensive and it includes all payment by the tenant to be paid to his landlord for the use and occupation of the building. It also includes the furnishing, electric installations and other amenities agreed between the parties. The relevant part of the judgment reads as under : “The term ‘rent’ has not been defined in the Act. Hence it must be taken to have been used in its ordinary dictionary meaning. The term ‘rent’ is comprehensive enough, to include all payments agreed by the tenant to be paid to his landlord for the use and occupation not only of the building and its appurtenances but also of furnishings, electric installations and other amenities agreed between the parties to be provided by and at the cost of the landlord. Therefore all that is included in the term ‘rent’ is within the purview of the Act.” (emphasis supplied by me) 16. The judgment of Karnani Properties Ltd. (supra) was relied by the Supreme Court in Pushpa Sen Gupta v. Susma Ghose, (1990) 2 SCC 651 . This Court also in the case of P.L.Kureel Talib Mankab, Bidhan Parishad v. Beni Prasad and another, AIR 1976 All 362 , considered the service charges which the landlord had been realizing from the tenant every month. In the said case the services included maintenance and operation of lift, electricity, furnishing and cleaning water pump, salary of the watchman etc. The Court was of the view that the service charges were part of the ‘rent’. The Court has relied the judgment of the Supreme Court in Karnani Properties Ltd. (supra). In the said case the services included maintenance and operation of lift, electricity, furnishing and cleaning water pump, salary of the watchman etc. The Court was of the view that the service charges were part of the ‘rent’. The Court has relied the judgment of the Supreme Court in Karnani Properties Ltd. (supra). Same view has been taken by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Gokaran Singh v. Ist Additional District and Sessions Judge, Hardoi and others, 2000 (2) JCLR 375 (All) (FB). The full Bench held that word ‘rent’ in absence of any definition must be held to have been used in its ordinary dictionary meaning and the term ‘rent’ is comprehensive and it includes all payments agreed by the tenant to be paid to his landlord. Paragraph 13 of the judgment held thus : “Before proceeding further, we will have to see as to what is meant by term ‘arrears of rent’ as used in clause (a) of Sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act. Under the Act or the Rules framed thereunder, term ‘rent’ has not been defined. Therefore, it must be held to have been used in its ordinary dictionary meaning. Term’ rent’ is comprehensive enough, to include all payments agreed by the tenant to be paid to his landlord for the used and occupation not only of the building and its appurtenances but also of furnishes, electricity installation and other amenities agreed between the parties to be provided by and at the cost of the landlord, as held by the Apex Court while dealing with a case under West Bengal Premises (Rent Control) Temporary Provision Act, 1950, the provisions of which are analogous to the provisions of the Act, In Karanani Properties Ltd., AIR 1957 SC 309 . The rent may be agreed rent or standard rent in view of provisions of Section 4 (2) of the Act.” 17. A similar view has been taken by this Court in the case of Manager, Punjab National Bank, Shamshabad, Agra and others v. District Judge, Agra and others, 1997 (1) AWC 378. 18. The rent may be agreed rent or standard rent in view of provisions of Section 4 (2) of the Act.” 17. A similar view has been taken by this Court in the case of Manager, Punjab National Bank, Shamshabad, Agra and others v. District Judge, Agra and others, 1997 (1) AWC 378. 18. In the Sewa International Fashions v. Smt. Suman Kathpalia and others, AIR 2000 Del 69 , the Delhi High Court took the view that apart from the money which is paid as rent if any service is rendered and if any payment is made in respect of the same it shall also be included within the definition of rent. In the said case also the issue was whether the maintenance charges paid by the tenant shall be included in the rent. It was urged before the Delhi High Court that the maintenance charges cannot be computed as rent and therefore the payment made towards maintenance charges cannot be said to be payment towards rent. The Delhi High Court relying on the judgment in the case of Karnani Properties Ltd. (supra) and following the judgment of the High Court, Allahabad in the case of P.L.Kureel Talib Mankab, Bidhan Parishad v. Beni Prasad and another (supra) held that maintenance charges could be included within the ambit of expression rent. The relevant part of the judgment reads as under: “It is an established proposition of law that rent includes not only what is originally described as rent in agreement between a landlord and tenant but also those payment which is made for the amenities provided by the landlord under the agreement between him and the tenant. The payment made towards the maintenance charges of the premises rented out and also for providing amenities to the tenant would also come within the expression ‘rent’ as rent includes all payments agreed to be paid by the tenant to his landlord for the use and occupation not only of the building but also of furnishing, electric installations and other amenities.” 19. From the aforesaid judgments it emerges that the word ‘rent is a comprehensive and it includes the maintenance charges/service charges. 20. From the aforesaid judgments it emerges that the word ‘rent is a comprehensive and it includes the maintenance charges/service charges. 20. Now coming to the facts of this case, the Landlord has filed the memo of rent agreement dated 16.2.1988 regarding service charges and rent agreement for the tenancy for 11 months as paper No. 19 GA/32 to 35 and paper No. 19 Ga/36 to 38. Those documents are on record of the case also as Annexure-1, 2 and 3 to the Stay Application of Civil Revision. 21. The relevant part of the agreement dated 16.2.1988 regarding service charge reads as under : “That the company shall be responsible for the maintenance of common roads, common passage, common lights and other services provided in the tenancy agreement and the tenant shall pay Rs. 300/- (Rupees three hundred only) per month to the Company against the said services.” 22. From perusal of the agreement it is clear that tenant had agreed to pay the service charges to the landlord. The agreement also provides for enhancement of service charge. Indisputably the agreement has been acted upon as the tenant has been paying agreed amount. 23. It is noteworthy that tenant in his deposition has stated that he has the original receipt of the landlord but he has not filed it. The landlord has established from the documentary evidence as well as from the oral statement that service charges were part of rent. Learned counsel for the revisionist could not satisfy the Court that the finding of facts recorded by the Court below suffers from any perversity. 24. This Court has taken consistent view that the revisional Court while exercising its power under Section 25 of the Act, ordinarily will not set aside the finding of facts and substitute its own finding after re appreciation of evidence. The Court interfere only in those cases where it finds the finding is based on no evidence or suffers from vice of perversity. The Court interfere only in those cases where it finds the finding is based on no evidence or suffers from vice of perversity. Reference may be made to the judgment in Laxmi Kishore v. Har Prasad Kishore v. Har Prasad Shukla, 1979 All CJ 473; Om Prakash Gupta v. Additional District Judge, Aligarh, 1996 All RC (2) 532; Man Mohan Dixit v. Additional District Judge, 1996 All RC (2) 561: (1997 AIHC 740); Anwaruddin v. Additional District Judge, Aligarh, 1999 All CJ 54: AIR 1999 All 218 , Rajendra Nath Tripathi v. Jagdish Nath Gupta, 1999 All CJ 431: (1999 All LJ 1429) and Har Swarup Nigam v. District Judge, 1999 All CJ 990. 25. The Supreme Court has recently in the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78, has held that ordinarily appellate jurisdiction involves a rehearing but in the revisional jurisdiction Court cannot act as Second Court of first appeal. Paragraph 31 of the judgment reads as under : “31. We are in full agreement with the view expressed in Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works v. Rangaswamy Chettiar, (1980) 4 SCC 259, that where both expressions “appeal” and “revision” are employed in a statute, obviously, the expression “revision” is meant to convey the idea of a much narrower jurisdiction than that conveyed by the expression “appeal”. The use of two expressions “appeal” and “revision” when used in one statute conferring appellate power and revisional power, we think, is not without purpose and significance. Ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction involves a rehearing while it is not so in the case of revisional jurisdiction when the same statute provides the remedy by way of an “appeal” and so also of a “revision”. If that were so, the revisional power would become coextensive with that of the trial Court or the subordinate tribunal which is never the case. The classic statement in Dattonpant Gopalvarao Devakate v. Vithalrao Maruthirao Janagaval, (1975) 2 SCC 246 , that revisional power under the Rent Control Act may not be as narrow as the revisional power under Section 115 of the Code but, at the same time, it is not wide enough to make the High Court a second Court of first appeal, commends to us and we approve the same. We are of the view that in the garb of revisional jurisdiction under the above three Rent Control Statutes, the High Court is not conferred a status of second Court of first appeal and the High Court should not enlarge the scope of revisional jurisdiction to that extent.” 26. After careful consideration of the matter I am of the view that Court below has correctly appreciated the evidence on record and its findings on the issue of default do not warrant any interference by the Court in its revisional jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Act. 27. For the reasons recorded herein above, revision lacks merit and it accordingly dismissed. 28. The tenant-revisionist is granted three months time to vacate the premises subject to the following conditions : (I) the tenant shall submit an undertaking in the Court below that he will handover the vacant and peaceful possession to the landlord on or before 15th July,2015. (II) he will continue to pay the rent on each succeeding month till vacation of the accommodation on 7th day of each month. (III) He will not create any third party interest in the disputed premises. 29. There shall be no order as to costs. ——————