JUDGMENT : Soumitra Pal, J. This appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 12th December, 2014, passed in W.P. 6802(W) of 2014 (Satish Kumar Sharma v. Union of India and Ors.), whereby the writ petition was dismissed by the learned Single Judge, holding, inter alia, as under : "In W.P. 6802(W) of 2014, the petitioner has challenged both the orders i.e. the original order and the appellate order in the writ petition. The petitioner tried to impress this Court that the order in original is palpably illegal and contrary to the judicial pronouncement and, therefore, the writ petition is otherwise maintainable. Much argument is advanced to convince the Court that it is an exceptional case and the justice demands the interference and invocation of power of judicial review. In view of the ratio laid down in Shyam Sundar Sarma (supra), the order of the sub-ordinate authority must be the order of the higher authority upon rejection of an application seeking condonation of delay. It is, therefore, the order of the Appellate Authority which is an existence as two orders cannot operate in the field. The Appellate Authority have rejected the application for condonation of delay which resulted into the dismissal of an appeal itself. There is no ambiguity in the order of the Appellate Authority in dismissing the appeal having time barred, as the statute does not provide the power to condone delay beyond certain limits. This Court, therefore, does not find any fault in the order of the Appellate Authority as the order-in-original has merged into it. The writ petition, therefore, fails." 2. It appears that a writ petition was filed challenging the order dated 30th November, 2012 passed by the Additional Commissioner, Central Excise and Service Tax Commissionerate, Bolpur, whereby the demand of service tax of Rs. 12,65,335/- was confirmed, interest was charged and penalty was imposed and the noticee, the appellant herein, was directed to have service tax registration for cargo handing service. Also under challenge was the order dated 7th November, 2013 passed by the Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals-III) dismissing the appeal, preferred against the order dated 30th November, 2012, being time barred. 3. It is submitted by Mr. Also under challenge was the order dated 7th November, 2013 passed by the Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals-III) dismissing the appeal, preferred against the order dated 30th November, 2012, being time barred. 3. It is submitted by Mr. Chakraborty, learned advocate for the appellant, since the appeal was dismissed by order dated 7th November, 2013 by the Commissioner of Central Excise as time barred, in view of the law laid down in the judgment in Raja Mechanical Co. (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner of C.EX. Delhi- I,: 2012(279) E.L.T. 481(S.C.)particularly in paragraph 12 thereof, as the order dated 30th November, 2012 passed by the Additional Commissioner does not merge with the order passed by the Commissioner, the order of the Additional Commissioner stands. Since the order of the Additional Commissioner is ex facie bad, in view of the exceptional circumstances as made out in the writ petition, the learned Single Judge should have issued appropriate writ for undoing the wrong done. In support of his submission, Mr. Chakraborty has relied on the following judgments, which are as under : State of U.P. v. Mohammad Nooh: AIR 1958 SC 86 (1), Patel Stationers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India : 2015 (320) E.L.T. 798 (Guj.), Amitara Industries Ltd. v. Union of India : 2014 (305) E.L.T. 322 (Guj.), Ravi Pharmaceuticals P. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2014 (306) E.L.T. 474 (Guj.), Lathia Industrial Supplies Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner (Appeals-I) : 2014 (307) E.L.T. 460 (Guj.), JCB India Limited v. Union of India : 2014 (301) E.L.T. 209 (P & H), Himgiri Ispat Pvt. Ltd. v. Customs, Excise & Service Tax : 2014 (305) E.L.T. 36 (Uttarakhand), Texcellence Overeseas v. Union of India : 2013 (293) E.L.T. 496 (Guj.), Hans Metal Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India : 2010 (254) E.L.T. 546 (All.) and D.R. Industries Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., 2008 (229) E.L.T. 24 (Guj.). Reliance has also been placed on an unreported judgment delivered on 27th July, 2015 in W.P. 1545 of 2008 (Andrew Yule Co. v. Union of India and Ors., 2008 (229) E.L.T. 24 (Guj.). Reliance has also been placed on an unreported judgment delivered on 27th July, 2015 in W.P. 1545 of 2008 (Andrew Yule Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Kol-V Commissionerate and Ors.) and also on an unreported judgment delivered on 2nd August, 2013 in W.P. 1524 of 2008 (Brishti Vinimay Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise and Ors.) and the order passed in appeal therefrom on 21st January, 2014 in GA No. 3236 of 2013/APOT No. 538 of 2013 (Brishti Vinimay Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise and Ors.). Mr. Chakraborty submits that his client is ready and willing to deposit the entire demand of service tax as a condition precedent for a fresh hearing before the Additional Commissioner. 4. Mr. Pradip Kumar Roy, learned advocate appearing for the respondents submits that since section 35(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 prescribes the time limit for preferring statutory appeal and also the time limit for condoning the delay in preferring such statutory appeal, in view of the judgment of the Full Bench in Union of India v. Jagadish Prasad Jalan Nandalal : 2012(4) CHN (Cal) 1, the judgment in Raj Chemicals v. Union of India : 2013 (287) E.L.T. 145 (Bom.) and in Khanapur Taluka Co-op. Shipping Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Pune-II : 2013 (292) E.L.T. 16 (Bom.), the submission of the appellant is not tenable. 5. In order to appreciate the issue it is necessary to refer to the relevant portion of section 35 of the Central Excise Act, 1944, which is as under: Section 35(1): "Any person aggrieved by any decision or order passed under this Act by a Central Excise Officer lower in rank than a Commissioner of Central Excise may appeal to the Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals).within sixty days from the date of the communication to him of such decision or order. Provided that the Commissioner (Appeals) may, if he is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of sixty days, allow it to be presented within a further period of thirty days." 6. As seen under the Act, a fiscal statute, an appeal has to be presented within sixty days. Provided that the Commissioner (Appeals) may, if he is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of sixty days, allow it to be presented within a further period of thirty days." 6. As seen under the Act, a fiscal statute, an appeal has to be presented within sixty days. However, an appeal can be presented beyond sixty days but within a further period of thirty days if it can be shown that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within sixty days. So, an appeal can be presented at the most within ninety days. 7. In the instant case, the statutory appeal before the Commissioner was preferred even beyond the statutory period of limitation prescribed in section 35. Hence, the Commissioner was justified in passing the order dismissing the appeal on the point of limitation. Since the Commissioner had dismissed the appeal on the point of limitation, as Supreme Court in Raja Mechanical Company Pvt. Ltd (supra) had held that "if for any reason an appeal is dismissed on the ground of limitation and not on merits, that order would not merge with the orders passed by the first appellate authority" (paragraph 12), the order of the Additional Commissioner does not get merged with the order passed in appeal. The question is whether the appellant can challenge the order passed by the Additional Commissioner, as there is patent illegality as contended by the appellant, and calls for intervention in the writ jurisdiction. 8. In our view, if we accept the submission of the appellant that the writ petition challenging the order passed by the Additional Commissioner has to be heard on merits though dismissed on the ground of limitation, in an appeal under section 35, it would render the said section as otiose and would open a flood gate of litigations. The very object of section 35 would be defeated. It would encourage the litigants to approach the High Court under the writ jurisdiction at any point of time in breach of the provisions contained in section 35. It has to be borne in mind that the law of limitation does not render the right of a litigant bad in law but it merely prohibits him from pursuing his remedy beyond a point of time. It has to be borne in mind that the law of limitation does not render the right of a litigant bad in law but it merely prohibits him from pursuing his remedy beyond a point of time. Hence, the judgments relied on behalf of the appellant are not applicable. We are in respectful agreement with the judgment rendered in Raj Chemicals (supra) wherein it was held "Once the Legislature has laid down a period within which an appeal has to be filed and has prescribed the extent to which a delay beyond that period can be condoned, recourse to the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would stand "expressly excluded" within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. Accepting the submission of the Petitioner would completely defeat the scheme of the Central Excise Act, 1944. In any event, the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot issue a direction which could command the authorities constituted under the Act to bypass or breach the provisions made in the statute (paragraph 8). 9. Therefore, for the reason as aforesaid, the appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. I agree. - Mir Dara Sheko, J. Appeal dismissed.