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2015 DIGILAW 688 (MP)

Shanti Devi v. Ku. Sanjdhya Sarathe

2015-07-03

ALOK ARADHE

body2015
ORDER 1. Heard on the question of admission. 2. This appeal is by the defendants. 3. Facts giving rise to filing of the appeal briefly stated are that the plaintiffs filed the suit seeking the relief of permanent injunction inter alia on the ground that the plaintiff is running Baithani Convent School since 1998. It was further pleaded that the accommodation in which the school is being run was obtained under an agreement from one Tarun Sarathe. It was further pleaded that the plaintiff has regularly being making the payment of rent to aforesaid Tarun Sarathe. The President of the society which runs the school authorised the plaintiff to run the school as Head Mistress. However, on 4.6.2004, the defendants asked the plaintiff to vacate the school and threatened the plaintiff with dispossession. Thereupon, the plaintiff filed the suit seeking the relief of permanent injunction. 4. The defendants filed the written statement in which inter alia it was pleaded that the execution of the agreement was denied. It was pleaded that the place where the school is being run belongs to Babulal Sarathe and his legal representatives namely Smt. Shanti Devi and Manoj Kumar, who are defendants are in possession of the same. It was further pleaded that the plaintiff was never found in possession of the accommodation in question. 5. The trial Court held that the plaintiff is in occupation of the premises as an encroacher, therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to injunction. The lower appellate Court on the basis of meticulous appreciation of evidence on record has held that the plaintiff has been authorised to run the school in question. It has further been held that the plaintiff is running the school in question and is in settled possession of the same. The defendants accordingly were restrained from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff over the suit land, except in accordance with law. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the lower appellate Court grossly erred in decreeing the suit filed by the plaintiff. It ought to have been appreciated that the plaintiff is an encroacher and is not entitled to injunction. 7. I have considered the submission made by learned counsel for the appellants and have perused the record. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the lower appellate Court grossly erred in decreeing the suit filed by the plaintiff. It ought to have been appreciated that the plaintiff is an encroacher and is not entitled to injunction. 7. I have considered the submission made by learned counsel for the appellants and have perused the record. The lower appellate Court on the basis of meticulous appreciation of evidence on record has held that the plaintiff is in possession of the accommodation in dispute. It has further been held that the plaintiff has paid rent to the defendants in respect of the accommodation in question and the plaintiff is in settled possession of the same. It is well settled in law that a person who is in settled possession of the land, is entitled to injunction “ See: Rame Gowda v. M. Varadappa Naidu and another [ (2004)1 SCC 769 ]. However, in the case of Lallu Yeshwant Singh (dead) by LRs v. Rao Jagdish Singh and others [ AIR 1968 SC 620 ], it has been held that even assuming that the plaintiff is an encroacher, he can be dispossessed, except in accordance with law. The lower appellate Court therefore has rightly granted the injunction in favour of the plaintiff. The finding of fact recorded by the lower appellate Court is based on meticulous appreciation of evidence on record, which by no stretch of imagination can either be said to be perverse or based on no evidence. Learned counsel for the appellants was unable to dislodge the finding of fact recorded by the lower appellate Court. It is well settled in law that this Court in exercise of power under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot re-appreciate the evidence even if another view is possible. 8. Even otherwise, the jurisdiction of this Court to interfere with the findings of fact is well defined by catena of decisions of Supreme Court. This Court in exercise of power under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure can interfere with the finding of fact only if the same is shown to be perverse or based on no evidence. Even otherwise, the jurisdiction of this Court to interfere with the findings of fact is well defined by catena of decisions of Supreme Court. This Court in exercise of power under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure can interfere with the finding of fact only if the same is shown to be perverse or based on no evidence. See: Narayanan Rajendran and another v. Lekshmy Sarojini and others [ (2009)5 SCC 264 ], Hafazat Hussain v. Abdul Majeed and others (2011)7 SCC 189, Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin and another, [ (2012)8 SCC 148 ], D.R. Rathna Murthy v. Ramappa [ (2011)1 SCC 158 ], Vishwanath Agrawal v. Sarla Vishnath Agrawal [ (2012)7 SCC 288 ], Vanchala Bai Raghunath Ithape (dead) by LR v. Shankar Rao Babu Rao Bhilare (dead) by LRs and others [ (2013)7 SCC 173 ] and Laxmidevamma and others v. Ranganath and others [ (2015) 4 SCC 264 ]. 9. For the aforementioned reasons, no substantial question of law arises for consideration in this appeal. The appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.