JUDGMENT Hon’ble P.K.S. Baghel, J.—The tenant/defendant has preferred this Civil Revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 (Act 9 of 1887) against the order dated 16 August 2011 passed by Judge Small Causes Court, whereby the suit for the eviction of tenant has been decreed. 2. The essential facts are; the plaintiff/respondent is the owner and landlord of the premises Chaudhary Bhawan situated at Niwari Road, Modi Nagar, District Ghaziabad. The landlord instituted a suit No. 72 of 2006 in the Court of Judge, Small Causes Court, Ghaziabad for the eviction of the tenant/revisionist and for the recovery of Rs. 3,18,600/- as arrears of rent together with pendente lite and further interest. The landlord has further claimed damages at the rate of Rs. 25,000/- per month for the use and occupation of the premises from 16 July 2005 till the premises is actually vacated by the defendant and the possession is handed over to the landlord. He further claimed a sum of Rs. 2 lacs as damages for the expenses incurred by him in making modification of the premises. The landlord’s case was that he let out a portion of the house, Chaudhary Bhawan consisting three halls, three rooms, two verandas and two galleries at the rate of Rs. 18,000/- per month w.e.f. 27.1.2004. The landlord and the tenant entered into an agreement dated 27.1.2004 in the said premises for a period of three years. The tenant had taken the premises on rent for running a Coaching Institute/Educational Institution. On the request of the tenant the landlord had made suitable alterations in his premises as per the need of the tenant. Accordingly, he has incurred a sum of approximately Rs. 2 lacs for the modifications. As the tenant wanted to run the educational institution, the existing kitchens were altered to make the room for the said purposes. 3. It is stated that after the alteration of the building the tenant took the possession of the premises on 27.1.2004. But the tenant did not make the payment of rent in terms of the agreement. It is averred in the plaint that for the reasons best known to the tenant he has not used the building. The furniture is lying in the building and his associates/employees come to the premises and sit there for the whole day and leave it after locking the same. It is averred in the plaint that for the reasons best known to the tenant he has not used the building. The furniture is lying in the building and his associates/employees come to the premises and sit there for the whole day and leave it after locking the same. The landlord repeatedly made requests for the payment of arrears of the rent but the tenant was not serious about the payment of the rent. When the tenant did not pay any heed to the repeated requests of the landlord for the payment of his arrears of rent and the current rent the land lord had no option but to send a notice dated 17 June 2005 under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (Act No. 4 of 1882) for terminating his tenancy and demanding arrears of rent and for vacation of the premises. It is stated that the said notice was duly served upon the defendant/tenant but neither he made the payment of rent nor vacated the premises. 4. The tenant contested the suit. In its written statement the tenant admitted the fact that the tenancy commenced on 27.1.2004 in terms of the agreement at the rate of Rs. 18,000/- per month but the landlord had given possession of only one hall, one room and in the rest of the premises the landlord has been keeping his goods and living in the same premises. The landlord had assured the tenant that within 8-10 days he would vacate the remaining part of the tenanted premises and will handover the possession of the rest of the building in terms of the agreement. The tenant also admitted that an agreement was entered into between the landlord and the tenant on 27.1.2004 but the landlord did not handover the possession of entire premises as per the agreement, for the said reason there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. It has also been stated that the landlord has refused to accept the rent. 5. It was further averred that after sometime the tenant wanted to vacate the premises by removing his effects from the premises but the landlord did not permit him. It has also been stated that the landlord has refused to accept the rent. 5. It was further averred that after sometime the tenant wanted to vacate the premises by removing his effects from the premises but the landlord did not permit him. It is also stated that in February 2004 the landlord has taken back the possession of one room and has let out to some other persons and his goods lying in the premises, has also been given to the new tenant for their use. 6. The landlord has examined himself as P.W.-1 and Naupal Singh as P.W.-2 and also filed some documentary evidence; copy of the notice dated 17.6.2005, agreement which was exhibited, reply submitted by the tenant to the notice, the report of the amin in another suit No. 1449 of 1996 “Yogendra Singh v. Nagar Palika and others” etc. The tenant has examined himself and has filed the affidavit of one Karamveer, who was also examined as DW-2. The tenant did not file any documentary evidence. The Trial Court has framed two issues; (i) whether on 27.1.2004 the part of the Chaudhary Bhwan consisting of three halls, three rooms, two varandas and two galleries have been let out to the defendant or entire building Chaudhary Bhawan was let out, and (ii) Whether the defendant is entitled for any other relief. 7. In respect of the issue No. 1, the Trial Court found that the landlord let out three halls, three rooms, two verandas and two galleries to the tenant. The Trial Court has recorded a finding that it was an admitted case of the tenant that an agreement was entered into on 27.1.2004 in respect of three halls, three rooms, two verandas and two galleries at the rate of Rs. 18,000/- per month. The Court has also relied upon the report of the amin dated 20.4.2006 against which no objection was filed by the tenant. The Court has also referred the report of the amin in another Suit No. 1449/1996 “Yogenera Singh v. Nagar Palika and others”. The Court has referred some other admissions like a paper No. 32Ga dated 2 December 2004, a communication sent by the tenant to the landlord regarding furniture etc.. The Court has also referred the report of the amin in another Suit No. 1449/1996 “Yogenera Singh v. Nagar Palika and others”. The Court has referred some other admissions like a paper No. 32Ga dated 2 December 2004, a communication sent by the tenant to the landlord regarding furniture etc.. The Court has disbelieved the case of the tenant that since the possession of the entire accommodation was not handed over to him, therefore, he could not use the premises for the purpose to run the coaching classes. In this regard the Court has referred the statement of the tenant that when he could not get the possession of the entire accommodation then he sent a notice to the landlord to give the possession of the premises as per the agreement, however the tenant did not file the said notice as evidence on the record. There is no explanation of the tenant on record that why he has not filed said evidence. 8. In view of the aforesaid findings the Trial Court has decreed the suit for the eviction and arrears of rent. 9. I have heard Sri Ravi Kant, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Tarun Agrawal, learned counsel for the revisionist, and Sri Vijay Prakash, learned Counsel for the respondent-landlord. 10. The learned Senior Advocate submitted that from the perusal of the agreement dated 27.1.2004 it is evident that the entire premises was given on rent for three years to the tenant. Since the rent agreement does not contain any further detail of the tenanted property then it is explicit under the agreement that entire Chaudhary Bhawan premises was given on the rent. It was further submitted that the premises was let out for a period of three years, therefore, it was required to be compulsorily registered as per Section 107 of the Act No. 4 of 1882. He further urged that the rent agreement was executed on a stamp-paper of Rs. 100/-, thus having regard to Section 49 of the Registration Act, the rent deed was clearly inadmissible in the evidence, therefore, Trial Court grievously erred in placing reliance on the said document. For the above reasons, none of the clauses of the rent agreement including the clause relating to fixation of rent of Rs. 18,000/- per month could have been received in evidence. For the above reasons, none of the clauses of the rent agreement including the clause relating to fixation of rent of Rs. 18,000/- per month could have been received in evidence. The reliance has been placed on a judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of K.B. Saha and Sons Private Limited v. Development Consultant Limited, (2008) 8 SCC 564 . 11. It was also submitted that since the attesting witnesses were not examined, hence it could not have been relied upon by the Trial Court. Lastly it was urged that the Trial Court has wrongly placed the burden of proof on the defendant. 12. The learned counsel for the revisionist Sri Vijay Prakash submitted that the defendant/revisionist was a tenant of a portion of the above premises, Chaudhary Bhawan, consisting of three halls, three rooms, two verandas and two galleries on monthly rent of Rs. 18,000/- w.e.f. 27.1.2004. The defendant/revisionist did not pay rent from 27.1.2004 to 16.7.2005 in spite of repeated demand, thus a notice was sent on 17 June 2005 terminating the tenancy of the defendant and in spite of the said notice he did not make the payment. It is further submitted that the amin made a spot inspection of the tenanted accommodation on 20.4.2006 in the presence of both the parties and defendant/revisionist did not file any objection to the report submitted by the amin. The Trial Court has rightly relied on the said report, other evidence and has recorded a finding of fact which should not be disturbed under the revisional jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Act No. 9 of 1887. 13. Lastly, it was urged that the Trial Court has decreed the suit on the basis of the admission of the defendant/revisionist on the point of rate of rent and the existence of the tenant and landlord relationship between him and the plaintiff. The revisionist has failed to point out any jurisdictional error in the judgement passed by the learned Court below. Lastly, it was urged that the findings recorded by the Trial Court on the issue of existence of tenancy and rate of rent are the findings of facts which do not require any interference by this Court under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. 14. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their submissions and perused the record. 15. 14. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their submissions and perused the record. 15. The parties are not in conflict on the fact that they entered into an agreement dated 27.1.2004 for creating a tenancy of the premises and according to the tenant he got the possession of one hall, one room. From the evidence on the record it is evident that the Chaudhary Bhawan is a huge building, in which some tenants like Pragyan Classes, IIT, Medical Entrance etc. were running their coaching classes/institutions at the time of institution of the suit. 16. In the written statement the tenant has admitted about the agreement dated 27.1.2004 and the rate of rent also at the rate of Rs. 18,000 per month. It is apposite to extract paragraph-2 of the written statement, thus: **2- ;g fd okni= dh /kkjk 2 ftl izdkj of.kZr gS] xyr gS] Lohdkj ugha gS A lgh rF; ;g gS fd izfroknh us oknh ls iz’uxr lEifRr dks fdjk, ij fy;k Fkk vkSj fdjk,nkjh 27-1-2004 ls 'kq: gksuh Fkh rFkk iwjs Hkou dk fdjk;k 18000@&:i;s izfrekg r; gqvk Fkk A oknh }kjk izfroknh dks lEiw.kZ Hkou e; leLr fuekZ.k ds fdjk, ij nsuk r; gqvk Fkk ijUrq ftl le; fdjk,nkjh 'kq: gqbZ Fkh] ml le; Hkou dk ,d gky ,oa ,d dejk [kkyh Fkk vkSj 'ks"k Hkou esa oknh dk lkeku j[kk Fkk] ftlesa oknh jg jgk Fkk A oknh }kjk izfroknh ls ;g dgk x;k Fkk fd og vkB&nl fnu esa vius lkeku dks dgha vkSj f'kQ~V dj nsxk vkSj iwjs Hkou dk dCtk oknh dks ns nsxk A dFku blds foijhr oknh xyr gS] Lohdkj ugha gS A** 17. The only dispute raised by the tenant was that the landlord had agreed to let out the entire premises and not only a part of the premises. In the written statement the tenant has averred that in the said premises three other educational institutions were running. Thus the case of the tenant that the entire premises was let out to him, has been rightly disbelieved by the Trial Court. The Trial Court has recorded a finding of fact with regard to a part of the tenancy on the basis of two Amin reports. 18. It is noteworthy that the tenant has not filed any objection against the amin’s report of this case. The Trial Court has recorded a finding of fact with regard to a part of the tenancy on the basis of two Amin reports. 18. It is noteworthy that the tenant has not filed any objection against the amin’s report of this case. It is also not disputed that the tenant has not filed any documentary evidence in support of his case. The tenant has examined one Karamveer as DW-2, who has admitted that he had not seen the house, and is also not aware of the fact that the entire house is consisting of 100 rooms, which has been let out to the tenant. 19. The oral statement of the tenant also failed to inspire the confidence of the Court. He has also admitted that he had sent a notice to the landlord when he could not get the possession of the entire premises but the Trial Court has rightly recorded that he has not filed the notice as an evidence. 20. Now I may deal with the submissions of the learned Senior advocate. 21. It was contended on behalf of the revisionist that the premises was let out for a period of three years, therefore, the rent agreement dated 27.1.2004 was required to be compulsorily registered as per Section 107 of the Act No. 4 of 1882. It is further urged that the Court below has erred by placing reliance on such an unregistered document. He has placed reliance on a judgement of the Supreme Court in K.B. Saha and Sons Private Limited (supra). In the said case a residential flat was let out to M/s Development Consultant Limited by the landlord by a memorandum dated 30 March 1976. The flat was let out for a particular officer, Keshab Das and members of his family, and for not other purposes. One of the terms of the memorandum was that if the tenant intended to use the flat in question for any purpose other than providing residential accommodation to its employee Keshab Das, the tenant would seek written consent from the landlord. 22. The Company informed the landlord that its employee Mr. Keshab Das had vacated the flat and the Company wanted to repair it and to allot it to some other employee. 22. The Company informed the landlord that its employee Mr. Keshab Das had vacated the flat and the Company wanted to repair it and to allot it to some other employee. The landlord refused to give his consent for the same and he protested that the Company has no right to allot the premises to another employee, therefore, it must surrender the same once vacated by Mr. Keshab Das. The landlord instituted Title Suit No. 19 of 1992 for declaration and permanent injunction that as per terms of memorandum dated 30.3.1976 the Company had no right to allot the said premises to any other employee after its employee Mr. Keshab Das had vacated the premises. The Trial Court granted an interim injunction. Later on, the landlord issued a notice under Section 13(6) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 calling upon the Company to vacate the suit premises. In response to the said notice when the Company refused to vacate the premises, he filed another suit being Title Suit No. 39 of 1995 praying for ejectment of the respondents from the suit premises. The Company filed a written statement and one of the plea taken on it was that they have paid the rent to the appellant and as such the tenancy was protected by the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. A further plea was taken by it was that the tenancy agreement entered into by the parties, was illegal and invalid and as such the agreement was against the Statute. Therefore, no injunction could be granted against them. 23. The Trial Court recorded a finding inter alia that the respondent had deposited the rent in the office of the Rent Controller, Calcutta, therefore, he was not a defaulter and was not liable to be evicted on the ground of default. The tenant could be directed to vacate the suit premises only on proof of grounds mentioned in Section 13(1) of the Act. The agreement was not registered which was required to be registered under Section 49 of the Registration Act, therefore, the agreement was not admissible in evidence. The trial Court dismissed both the suits. Against the order of the trial Court two first appeals were filed. The High Court affirmed the judgement and decree passed by the Assistant District Judge whereby both the suits were dismissed. 24. The trial Court dismissed both the suits. Against the order of the trial Court two first appeals were filed. The High Court affirmed the judgement and decree passed by the Assistant District Judge whereby both the suits were dismissed. 24. The matter was carried to the Supreme Court by the landlord. The Supreme Court, after considering large number of the judgements on the point of requirement of registration, held as under: “34. From the principles laid down in the various decisions of this Court and the High Courts, as referred to hereinabove, it is evident that: 1. A document required to be registered, if unregistered is not admissible into evidence under Section 49 of the Registration Act. 2. Such unregistered document can however be used as an evidence of collateral purpose as provided in the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act. 3. A collateral transaction must be independent of, or divisible from, the transaction to effect which the law required registration. 4. A collateral transaction must be a transaction not itself required to be effected by a registered document, that is, a transaction creating, etc. any right, title or interest in immovable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards. 5. If a document is inadmissible in evidence for want of registration, none of its terms can be admitted in evidence and that to use a document for the purpose of proving an important clause would not be using it as a collateral purpose.” 25. From a perusal of the law laid down by the Supreme Court it is evident that an unregistered document can be used as the evidence of collateral purpose as provided under the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act. In the said case, the landlord had relied on clause-9 of the lease agreement for the purpose that the tenant was liable to be evicted because of violation of clause-9 of the lease agreement. The Court found that since the suit was filed only on the ground of clause-9 of the unregistered document, therefore, it was not for a collateral purpose. 26. In the present case the tenant has admitted the terms of the agreement with regard to the rate of rent and the possession, therefore, the case relied by the learned Senior Advocate stands on completely different footing. 27. In the case of Ahmedsaheb (Dead) By Lrs. 26. In the present case the tenant has admitted the terms of the agreement with regard to the rate of rent and the possession, therefore, the case relied by the learned Senior Advocate stands on completely different footing. 27. In the case of Ahmedsaheb (Dead) By Lrs. and others v. Sayed Imail, (2012) 8 SCC 516 , the landlord filed a civil suit for the recovery of arrears of rent. The tenant admitted the fact that the premises was let out to him at the rate of Rs. 800/- per year. It was also admitted that the rent was due from him. The High Court observed that it is needless to emphasize that an admission of a party in the proceedings, either in the pleading or oral, is the best evidence and the same does not need any further corroboration. The Court observed as under: “12.... In our considered opinion, that vital aspect in the case viz. the admission of the respondent in the written statement about the rate of rent and the further admission about its non-payment for the entire period for which the claim was made in the three suits was sufficient to support the suit claim. The High Court failed to note the said factor while deciding the second appeal which led to the dismissal of the appeals. Even while eschewing Exhibit 69 from consideration, the High Court should have noted that the relationship of landlord and tenant as between the plaintiffs and defendants was an established factor and the rate of rent was admitted as Rs. 800 per year.” 28. In the same judgement the Supreme Court has referred and relied its earlier judgement in the case of Anthony v. K.C. Ittoop & Sons, (2000) 6 SCC 394 . Following discussion and conclusion are apt and relevant for the purpose of the case: “14. When it is admitted by both sides that the appellant was inducted into the possession of the building by the owner thereof and that the appellant was paying monthly rent or had agreed to pay rent in respect of the building, the legal character of the appellant’s possession has to be attributed to a jural relationship between the parties. When it is admitted by both sides that the appellant was inducted into the possession of the building by the owner thereof and that the appellant was paying monthly rent or had agreed to pay rent in respect of the building, the legal character of the appellant’s possession has to be attributed to a jural relationship between the parties. Such a jural relationship, on the fact situation of this case, cannot be placed anything different from that of lessor and lessee falling within the purview of the second paragraph of Section 107 of the TP Act extracted above. From the pleadings of the parties there is no possibility for holding that the nature of possession of the appellant in respect of the building is anything other than as a lessee.” 29. In view of the above the next question arises that whether this Court should exercise its jurisdiction under Section 25 to set aside finding of facts recorded by the Court below. For the reasons recorded above, I find that the Court below has recorded finding of facts against the tenant which are based on relevant evidence on record. The learned counsel for the revisionist failed to point out that the findings are not based on evidence of record. The scope of interference under revisional jurisdiction under Section 25 came to be considered in long line of decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court. 30. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Laxmi Kishore and another v. Har Prasad Shukla, 1981 ARC 545, has elaborately considered the scope of interference under Section 25 of the Small Cause Courts Act and held as under: “3. This provision confers a supervisory and not a appellate power. The record can be called for seeing that the decree is according to law. If it is not, the revisional Court can pass such order with respect thereto as it may think fit. This power is conditional on the revisional Court finding that the decree or order sought to be revised was not according to law. The phrase ‘pass such orders with respect thereto as it thinks fit’ has come up for consideration before the Supreme Court in several decisions...” 31. Similar view has been consistently taken by this Court in a long line of decisions. The phrase ‘pass such orders with respect thereto as it thinks fit’ has come up for consideration before the Supreme Court in several decisions...” 31. Similar view has been consistently taken by this Court in a long line of decisions. Reference may be made to the judgements in the cases of Om Prakash Gupta v. Vth Additional District & Sessions Judge, Aligarh and others, 1996(2) ARC 532; Man Mohan Dixit v. Additional District Judge/Special Judge (E.C. Act), Jalaun at Orai and others, 1996(2) ARC 561; Anwar Uddin v. Ist Additional District Judge, Aligarh and others, 1999(1) ACJ 54; Rajendra Nath Tripathi and another v. Jagdish Dutt Gupta and another, 1999(1) ACJ 431; and Har Swarup Nigam v. District Judge, Allahabad and others, 1999(2) ACJ 990. 32. The Supreme Court in the case of Malini Ayyappa Naicker v. Seth Manghraj Udhavdas Firm and others, AIR 1969 SC 1344 , held as under: “9. It may be remembered that Shah, J. was also a party to the decision in Hari Shankar’s case, 1962 Supp 1 SCR 933 : AIR 1963 SC 698 (supra). We see no conflict between the two decisions. The former decision enumerates some of the circumstances under which the High Court can interfere while considering whether the decision under review was made according to law. All that it laid down in Abdul Shakur’s case is that the High Court is not competent to disturb a finding of fact reached by the District Court even if in reaching that finding it was required to take into consideration a statutory presumption.” 33. The Supreme Court in the case of Girdharbhai v. Saiyed Mohmad Mirasaheb Kadri, AIR 1987 SC 1782 , held thus: “16...We must, however, guard ourselves against permitting in the guise of revision substitution of one view where two views are possible and the Court of Small Causes has taken a particular view. If a possible view has been taken, the High Court would be exceeding its jurisdiction to substitute its own view with that of the Courts below because it considers it to be a better view. The fact that the High Court would have taken a different view is wholly irrelevant. Judged by the standard, we are of the opinion that the High Court in this case had exceeded its jurisdiction.” 34. The fact that the High Court would have taken a different view is wholly irrelevant. Judged by the standard, we are of the opinion that the High Court in this case had exceeded its jurisdiction.” 34. The Supreme Court in the case of Harsavardhan Chokkani v. Bhupendra N. Patel and others, (2002) 3 SCC 626 , held as under: “7... Nonetheless, the High Court is exercising the revisional power which in its very nature is a truncated power. The width of the powers of the revisional Court cannot be equated with the powers of the appellate Court. In examining the legality and the propriety of the order under challenge, what is required to be seen by the High Court is whether it is in violation of any statutory provision or a binding precedent or suffers from misreading of the evidence or omission to consider relevant clinching evidence or where the inference drawn from the facts proved is such that no reasonable person could arrive at or the like. It is only in such situations that interference by the High Court in revision in a finding of fact will be justified. Mere possibility of a different view is no ground to interfere in exercise of revisional power...” 35. The Supreme Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78, has elaborately considered the scope of the revision in the following words: “31. We are in full agreement with the view expressed in Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works v. Rangaswamy Chettiar, (1980) 4 SCC 259, that where both expressions “appeal” and “revision” are employed in a statute, obviously, the expression “revision” is meant to convey the idea of a much narrower jurisdiction than that conveyed by the expression “appeal”. The use of two expressions “appeal” and “revision” when used in one statute conferring appellate power and revisional power, we think, is not without purpose and significance. Ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction involves a rehearing while it is not so in the case of revisional jurisdiction when the same statute provides the remedy by way of an “appeal” and so also of a “revision”. If that were so, the revisional power would become coextensive with that of the trial Court or the subordinate tribunal which is never the case. Ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction involves a rehearing while it is not so in the case of revisional jurisdiction when the same statute provides the remedy by way of an “appeal” and so also of a “revision”. If that were so, the revisional power would become coextensive with that of the trial Court or the subordinate tribunal which is never the case. The classic statement in Dattonpant Gopal Varao Devakate v. Vithalrao Maruthirao Janagaval, (1975) 2 SCC 246 , that revisional power under the Rent Control Act may not be as narrow as the revisional power under Section 115 of the Code but, at the same time, it is not wide enough to make the High Court a second Court of first appeal, commends to us and we approve the same. We are of the view that in the garb of revisional jurisdiction under the above three Rent Control Statutes, the High Court is not conferred a status of second Court of first appeal and the High Court should not enlarge the scope of revisional jurisdiction to that extent.” 36. In the present case the tenant has admitted that he got the possession on 27.1.2004. He has also not disputed the rate of the rent at the rate of Rs. 18000/- per month, thus in my view a jural relationship between the parties came into existence. The parties are on conflict with regard to the fact whether the landlord had given the possession of entire premises or not. As noted above, the said disputed question of fact cannot be adjudicated in revisional jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Small Cause Courts Act. The Court below has recorded a finding of fact on the basis of the unrebutted report of the Amin and the other evidence on the record. 37. In view of the above, the revision lacks merit and it is accordingly dismissed. 38. The tenant-revisionist is granted three months’ time to vacate the premises subject to the following conditions; (i) the tenant shall submit an undertaking in the Court below that he will handover the vacant and peaceful possession to the landlord on or before 3 July 2015; (ii) he will continue to pay the rent on each succeeding month till vacation of the accommodation on 07th day of each month. (iii) he will not create any third party interest in the disputed premises. 39. No order as to costs. ——————