JUDGMENT : Dr. B.R.Sarangi, J. The petitioner, who was working as a Lecturer in P.G. Department of Earth Science of Sambalpur University, has filed this petition to quash the order dated 31.8.2000 (Annexure-21) passed by the disciplinary authority imposing punishment of dismissal from service and confirmation thereof by the appellate authority vide order dated 19.12.2000, Annexure-23. 2. The factual matrix of the case in hand is that the petitioner entered into service as a Lecturer in Earth Science, P.G. Department of Sambalpur University with effect from April, 1987. Pursuant to a news item published in Oriya dailies dated 10.6.1998 and 11.6.1998 relating to an ugly incident that took place on 19.5.1998 at University Guest House, the Registrar of the University directed the Officer-in-Charge of the Guest House to conduct an inquiry and submit his report. As a consequence thereof, the Officer-in-charge of the Guest House called for a report from the Manager of the Guest House and submitted the same to the Registrar of the University. Thereafter, the Revenue Divisional Commissioner (Northern Division), Sambalpur and the Vice- Chancellor of the University directed for a detailed inquiry relating to the incident by one Mr. P.Patra, A.D.M-cum-Administrative Officer, VSS Medical College, Burla. During inquiry, statements of 13 persons were recorded on solemn affirmation and 32 documents were exhibited. Pursuant to the inquiry report, proceedings were initiated against the petitioner and also three others, namely, Udit Kumar Panigrahi, Technician of Sambalpur University, Chittaranjan Tripathy, Manager of the Guest House and S.C.Paramguru, Khansama of University Guest House, Sambalpur and the following charges were framed against the petitioner vide Annexure-12 dated 23.7.1998. “(a) Moral turpitude; (b) Conduct improper on the part of an employee of the University; (c) Misuse of premises of the University; (d) Occupying University Guest House without authority; (e) Collusion with your staff for financial impropriety; (f) Misbehaviour with employees of the University; (g) Conducting business with the University by benami transaction, and thus graining financial advantage.” 3. The petitioner was called upon to explain as to why he should not be suitably punished under Chapter XIV, Part VI of the Orissa University First Statutes, 1990 read with Orissa Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1962, in short, “1962 Rules” within 30 days, failing which action as deemed proper would be taken against him presuming that he had nothing to explain. A memorandum of charge along with statement of allegations was served on the petitioner to which he submitted his explanation, vide Annexure-13 dated 13.07.1998. In his explanation, the petitioner had taken categorical stand that he was not supplied copies of the statements of 13 persons examined as witnesses or the documents referred to in the so-called inquiry report of Sri Patra, A.D.M-cum-Administrative Officer, VSS Medical College, Burla and, therefore, due to non-compliance with the principles of natural justice, the proceeding itself was vitiated. Even though the petitioner made a demand for supply of copies of documents including statements of 13 persons examined by Sri P.Patra, the same went unheeded. In the inquiry four persons were examined as witnesses, namely, Tribikram Mishra, Officer-in-charge of the Guest House as P.W.1, Sunanda Mohanty, Lecturer of B.Ed. College, Sambalpur, as P.W.2, Chakradhar Biswal, Lecturer of B.Ed. College, Sambalpur as P.W.3, and one Purusottam Patra as P.W.4, who were no way connected with the alleged incident. However, P.W.1, Tribikram Mishra being the Officer in-charge of the Guest House examined as a witness, who was neither present in the Guest House at the relevant point of time nor was he in any way connected with the occurrence alleged. On the basis of such perfunctory inquiry, the disciplinary authority finding the petitioner guilty of the charges, imposed a major penalty of dismissal from service on the petitioner vide order dated 31.8.2000 in Annexure-21. The appellate authority confirmed such order passed by the disciplinary authority vide Annexure-23. Hence, the present writ petition. 4. Mr. A.K.Mishra, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner strenuously urged that the entire inquiry proceeding was vitiated due to non-compliance with the principles of natural justice, more particularly due to non-supply of the documents asked for by the petitioner as well as non-examination of material witnesses and above all non-supply of the inquiry report. He further submitted that the harshest punishment, i.e., dismissal from service, imposed by the disciplinary authority and confirmed by the appellate authority being contrary to the provisions contained in Rule 15 of the 1962 Rules, the same is liable to be quashed. 5. To substantiate the arguments advanced by him, Mr.Mishra, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decisions in Kasinath Dikshita v. Union of India and others, AIR 1986 Sc 2118 , State of U.P. and others v. Saroj Kumar Sinha, AIR 2010 SC 3131 , Dr. 5. To substantiate the arguments advanced by him, Mr.Mishra, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decisions in Kasinath Dikshita v. Union of India and others, AIR 1986 Sc 2118 , State of U.P. and others v. Saroj Kumar Sinha, AIR 2010 SC 3131 , Dr. (Smt.) Sushila Mishra v. Union of India and others, 1985 (ii) OLR 494, Gyan Chand Chhatar v. Union of India, (2009) 12 SCC 78 , State of U.P. v. Shatrughan Lal, AIR 1998 SC 3038 , Hardwari Lal v. State of U.P., 1999(8) SCC 582 , Ganesh Rout v. Union of India, 1993(I) OLR 380, Tripura Charan Chatterjee v. W.B State, 1979(I) SLR 878, Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank, 2009(2) SCC 570 , Mathura Prasad v. Union of India, AIR 2007 SC 381 , Jagabandhu Tripathy v. District & Sessions Judge, Khurdha, 2004 (I) OLR 641 , M/s. Mahavir Prasad Sontosh Kumar v. State of U.P., AIR 1970 SC 1302 , Indian Railway Construction Co. Ltd. v. Ajay Kumar, AIR 2003 SC 1843 and Sarat Chandra Panda v. Chief Executive, CESCO, 2004 (I) OLR 415 . 6. Mr. B.K.Behura, learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the University refuting the allegations made by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, argued that there was compliance of the principles of natural justice by supplying the documents, examining the material witnesses and as such no prejudice was caused to the delinquent and therefore, this Court may not interfere with the impugned orders and this being a case of moral turpitude, the Court may be very cautious to pass orders on the basis of the materials available on record. It is stated that this Court has already decided O.J.C. No.2040 of 2001 (Udit Kumar Panigrahi v. Sambalpur University & others) and O.J.C. No.70 of 2001(Chitta Ranjan Tripathy v. Sambalpur University & Others) on identical charges and disposed of those cases wherein the stand taken is completely on a different footing than that of the present case. Considering the gravity of charges, this Court may not interfere with the imposition of penalty against the petitioner. 7. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and going through the records, this Court proposes to deal with the case on the basis of the allegations made, materials available on record and the law governing the field. 8. Considering the gravity of charges, this Court may not interfere with the imposition of penalty against the petitioner. 7. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and going through the records, this Court proposes to deal with the case on the basis of the allegations made, materials available on record and the law governing the field. 8. Non-compliance of the principles of Natural justice (a) The petitioner on receipt of the charges, immediately made a representation to the Registrar of the University on 30.7.1998 (Annexure-13) requesting him to supply the copies of the statements of allegations recorded during the course of preliminary inquiry as provided under Rule 15(3) of 1962 Rules so as to enable him to submit an effective reply to the charges. Again the petitioner requested the Registrar, Sambalpur University on 03.08.1998 stating that some vital points of statements of allegation are not supported by documents, so the source is speculative. Therefore, he requested as per letter dated 23.07.1998 to permit him to peruse the statements of the witnesses recorded in any working day within 2/3 days. In spite of the above, the petitioner was neither supplied with the statements recorded during the preliminary inquiry nor was he supplied with the preliminary inquiry report, basing on which the charges were framed and the reasons for denial have not been assigned. Due to non-supply of documents and non-perusal of statements of the witnesses, the petitioner was constrained to submit his written explanation on 08.08.1998. To give an effective reply to the charges that itself prejudiced the petitioner and violates the principles of the natural justice. (b) As per the provisions contained in University First Statute read with 1962 Rules, the delinquent officer is to be provided/supplied all the documents basing on which the charges are framed and to allow him to peruse/ take extracts of the documents, which in the opinion of the delinquent are necessary for his defence. In view of the specific provision, he is entitled to get the copies of the statements recorded during the preliminary inquiry, basing on which admittedly the statement of allegations have been prepared and as such, the petitioner again requested to supply him the statements of the witnesses recorded during the preliminary inquiry. In view of the specific provision, he is entitled to get the copies of the statements recorded during the preliminary inquiry, basing on which admittedly the statement of allegations have been prepared and as such, the petitioner again requested to supply him the statements of the witnesses recorded during the preliminary inquiry. In spite of the above, the petitioner was neither supplied with the statements recorded during the preliminary inquiry nor was he supplied with the preliminary inquiry report, basing on which the charges were framed. Due to this, the petitioner finding no other alternative, had to submit his preliminary explanation on 08.08.1998 without the required documents on the charges framed against him. (c) In the reply submitted by the petitioner, it was categorically pointed out that though the statement of allegations is supposed to be details of the charges, but the statement of allegations appended to the charge-sheet would go to show that the same are nothing more than a report of the so-called inquiry. Moreover, it was pointed out by the petitioner that the charge-sheet is not supported by the list of witnesses and documents and copies thereof. So far as the statements of witnesses extracted in the “statement of allegations” is concerned, the petitioner pointed out that the same are inconsistent with each other. To substantiate the same, the petitioner had pointed out that while some of the witnesses say that the lady was brought by a Car, some other say that the lady was brought by a scooter. Similarly, from the report of the Manager dated 10.6.2008, it is clear that the names of Sri Mahanandia and Dr.Pradhan was mentioned, but in the subsequent reports, his name along with his brother’s name was dragged into. (d) The petitioner was issued with the notice by the Inquiring Officer to appear before him. After receiving the above notice, the petitioner made a representation to the Inquiring Officer to supply him the statements of 13 witnesses examined by Sri P.Patra, A.D.M. & Administrative Officer, VSS Medical College, Burla, but some of the documents asked for have not been supplied to him. After receiving the above notice, the petitioner made a representation to the Inquiring Officer to supply him the statements of 13 witnesses examined by Sri P.Patra, A.D.M. & Administrative Officer, VSS Medical College, Burla, but some of the documents asked for have not been supplied to him. Though the Marshalling Officer submitted written argument wherein suggestion was given to the Inquiring Officer about his duties and responsibilities even if he is aware of his lacuna in prosecuting his case has relied upon in his arguments, some of the evidences which were not originally there in his list and relied upon the evidence recorded during the inquiry conducted by Mr. P. Patra, A.D.M. & Administrative Officer, VSS Medical College, Burla which was done behind the back of the petitioner. (e) From the above, it appears that charges had been framed on the basis of the statements of allegations in which reference had been made to the inquiry conducted by two separate authorities, namely, Officer-in-Charge of the Guest House and Sri P. Patra, A.D.M-cum-Administrative Officer, VSS Medical College, Burla, who had recorded the statements of 13 persons on solemn affirmation and relied upon 32 nos. of documents, but the said documents were not supplied to the petitioner even though the petitioner had asked for the same. Therefore, there is non-supply of documents to the petitioner in a disciplinary proceeding which amounts to violation of the principles of natural justice. (f) In paragraph-37 of the counter affidavit the opposite parties have candidly admitted about non-supply of list of witnesses and also stated that the charges are not vague and there is no violation of 1962 Rules. Definite charge with detail particulars is a minimum requirement of reasonable opportunity of being heard, apart from the provisions contained in 1962 Rules. The memo of charges needed to accompany the list of witnesses and list of documents to be used for proving the charges. Definite charge with detail particulars is a minimum requirement of reasonable opportunity of being heard, apart from the provisions contained in 1962 Rules. The memo of charges needed to accompany the list of witnesses and list of documents to be used for proving the charges. (g) In Gyan Chand Chhatar (supra), the apex Court referring to State of Andhra Pradesh v. S.Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723 has held that where the charge-sheet is accompanied with the statement of facts and the allegation may not be specific in charge-sheet but may be crystal clear from the statement of charges, in such a situation as both constitute the same document, it may not be held that as the charge was not specific, definite and clear, the inquiry stood vitiated. Thus, where a delinquent is served a charge-sheet without giving specific and definite charge and no statement of allegation is served along with the charge-sheet, the inquiry stands vitiated as having been conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice. Similarly, this Court has already held in Dr. (Smt.) Sushila Mishra (supra) that the complaint is not a secret document. Therefore, nothing can prevent the opposite party to provide the documents utilized against the petitioner and also supply the statement of witnesses recorded in the preliminary inquiry along with preliminary inquiry report submitted by Sri P. Patra, ADM & Administrative Officer, VSS Medical College, Burla. (h) In paragraph 12 of the judgment in Kashinath Dikshita (supra), the apex court held as follows : “The meaning of a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken is that the Government servant is afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself against the charges on which inquiry is held. The Government servant should be given an opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence. He can do so when he is told what the charges against him are. He can do so by cross-examining the witnesses produced against him. The Government servant should be given an opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence. He can do so when he is told what the charges against him are. He can do so by cross-examining the witnesses produced against him. X x x“ (i) The decision in Kashinath Dikshita case (supra) has been followed in State of U.P. v. Saroj Kumar Sinha case (supra), wherein the apex Court in para 36 has held as follows : “36.The proposition of law that a government employee facing a departmental inquiry is entitled to all the relevant statement, documents and other materials to enable him to have a reasonable opportunity to defend himself in the departmental inquiry against the charges is too well established to need any further reiteration. X x x x x (j) In the decision in State Bank of Patiala and others v. S.K.Sharma AIR 1996 SC 1669 referred to by Mr.B.K.Behuria, learned Sr.Counsel for the opposite parties, principles have been evolved by the apex Court with regard to the applicability of the principles of natural justice in the context of disciplinary proceeding and orders of punishment imposed by the employer upon the employee. The said principles have been enumerated in para 32 of the said judgment, which are as follows: “32. We may summarize the principles emerging from the above discussion. (These are by no means intended to be exhaustive and are evolved keeping in view the context of disciplinary enquiries and orders of punishment imposed by an employer upon the employee): (1)An order passed imposing a punishment on an employee consequent upon a disciplinary/ departmental inquiry in violation of the rules/ regulations/ statutory provisions governing such enquiries should not be set aside automatically. The Court or the Tribunal should enquire whether (a) the provision violated is of a substantive nature or (b) whether it is procedural in character. (2)A substantive provision has normally to be complied with as explained hereinbefore and the theory of substantial compliance or the test of prejudice would not be applicable in such a case. (3)In the case of violation of a procedural provision, the position is this: procedural provisions are generally meant for affording a reasonable and adequate opportunity to the delinquent officer/employee. They are, generally speaking, conceived in his interest. Violation of any and every procedural provision cannot be said to automatically vitiate the inquiry held or order passed. (3)In the case of violation of a procedural provision, the position is this: procedural provisions are generally meant for affording a reasonable and adequate opportunity to the delinquent officer/employee. They are, generally speaking, conceived in his interest. Violation of any and every procedural provision cannot be said to automatically vitiate the inquiry held or order passed. Except cases falling under 'no notice', 'no opportunity' and 'no hearing' categories, the complaint of violation of procedural provision should be examined from the point of view of prejudice, viz., whether such violation has prejudiced the delinquent officer/employee in defending himself properly and effectively. If it is found that he has been so prejudiced, appropriate orders have to be made to repair and remedy the prejudice including setting aside the inquiry and/or the order of punishment. If no prejudice is established to have resulted therefrom, it is obvious, no interference is called for. In this connection, it may be remembered that there may be certain procedural provisions which are of a fundamental character, whose violation is by itself proof of prejudice. The Court may not insist on proof of prejudice in such cases. As explained in the body of the judgment, take a case where there is a provision expressly providing that after the evidence of the employer/government is over, the employee shall be given an opportunity to lead defence in his evidence, and in a given case, the inquiring officer does not give that opportunity in spite of the delinquent officer/employee asking for it. The prejudice is self-evident. No proof of prejudice as such need be called for in such a case. To repeat, the test is one of prejudice, i.e., whether the person has received a fair hearing considering all things. Now, this very aspect can also be looked at from the point of view of directory and mandatory provisions, if one is so inclined. The principle stated under (4) hereinbelow is only another way of looking at the same aspect as is dealt with herein and not a different or distinct principle. (4) (a)In the case of a procedural provision which is not of a mandatory character, the complaint of violation has to be examined from the standpoint of substantial compliance. Be that as it may, the order passed in violation of such a provision can be set aside only where such violation has occasioned prejudice to the delinquent employee. (4) (a)In the case of a procedural provision which is not of a mandatory character, the complaint of violation has to be examined from the standpoint of substantial compliance. Be that as it may, the order passed in violation of such a provision can be set aside only where such violation has occasioned prejudice to the delinquent employee. (b) In the case of violation of a procedural provision, which is of a mandatory character, it has to be ascertained whether the provision is conceived in the interest of the person proceeded against or in public interest. If it is found to be the former, then it must be seen whether the delinquent officer has waived the said requirement, either expressly or by his conduct. If he is found to have waived if, then the order of punishment cannot be set aside on the ground of said violation. If, on the other hand, it is found that the delinquent officer/employee has not waived it or that the provision could not be waived by him, then the Court or Tribunal should make appropriate directions (include the setting aside of the order of punishment), keeping in mind the approach adopted by the Constitution Bench in B. Karunakar, (1994 AIR SCW 1050). The ultimate test is always the same, viz., test of prejudice or the test of fair hearing, as it may be called. (5) Where the inquiry is not governed by any rules/regulations/statutory provisions and the only obligation is to observe the principles of natural justice - or, for that matter, wherever such principles are held to be implied by the very nature and impact of the order/action - the Court or the Tribunal should make a distinction between a total violation of natural justice (rule of audi alteram partem) and violation of a facet of the said rule, as explained in the body of the judgment. In other words, a distinction must be made between "no opportunity" and not adequate opportunity, i.e., between "no notice"/"no hearing" and "no fair hearing." (a) In the case of former, the order passed would undoubtedly be invalid (one may call it "void" or a nullity if one chooses to). In such cases, normally, liberty will be reserved for the Authority to take proceedings afresh according to law, i.e., in accordance with the said rule (audi alteram partem). In such cases, normally, liberty will be reserved for the Authority to take proceedings afresh according to law, i.e., in accordance with the said rule (audi alteram partem). (b) But in the latter case, the effect of violation (of a facet of the rule of audi alteram partem) has to be examined from the stand-point of prejudice; in other words, what the Court or Tribunal has to see is whether in the totality of the circumstances, the delinquent officer/employee did or did not have a fair hearing and the orders to be made shall depend upon the answer to the said query. (It is made clear that this principle (No. 5) does not apply in the case of rule against bias, the test in which behalf are laid down elsewhere.) (6)While applying the rule of audi alteram partem (the primary principle of natural justice) the Court/ Tribunal/ Authority must always bear in mind the ultimate and overriding objective underlying the said rule, viz., to ensure a fair hearing and to ensure that there is no failure of justice. It is this objective which should guide them in applying the rule to varying situations that arise before them. (7)There may be situations where the interests of state or public interest may call for a curtailing or the rule of audi alteram partem. In such situations, the Court may have to balance public/State interest with the requirement of natural justice and arrive at an appropriate decision.” (k) Therefore, taking the above facts and circumstances into consideration, this Court has no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the opposite parties had denied reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to defend himself in the inquiry. 9. (ii) Non- supply of inquiry report (a) On perusal of the writ application, it reveals that a letter was communicated to the petitioner on 24.6.2000 (Annexure-9) directing him to show cause as to why he shall not be dismissed from service, which shall be a future disqualification. In the said letter, it has also been stated that he has been found guilty of moral turpitude and misconduct and his further retention in the University service is undesirable. After concluding about the guilt of the petitioner, he was supplied with the copy of the inquiry report as well as the report of the Vice-Chancellor/ Syndicate just to meet the formalities. After concluding about the guilt of the petitioner, he was supplied with the copy of the inquiry report as well as the report of the Vice-Chancellor/ Syndicate just to meet the formalities. This action of the opposite parties runs contrary to the settled principles of law as well as Rules 1962. (b) As per Rule 15(10)(a) of the Rules, 1962, if the Inquiring Officer is not the disciplinary authority, the disciplinary authority shall furnish to the delinquent Government servant a copy of the report of the Inquiring Officer and give him a notice by registered post or otherwise calling upon him to submit within a period of fifteen days such representation as he may wish to make against the findings of the Inquiring Officer. Clause (b) of the said Rules, 1962 provides that on receipt of the representation referred to in sub-clause (a), if the disciplinary authority having regard to the findings on the charges, is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in clauses (vi) to (ix) of Rule 13 should be imposed, he shall furnish to the delinquent Government servant a statement of its findings along with brief reasons for disagreement, if any, with the findings of the Inquiring Officer and give him a notice by registered post or otherwise stating the penalty proposed to be imposed on him and calling upon him to submit within a specified time such representation as he may wish to make against the proposed penalty. (c) On receipt of the report from the Inquiring Officer, the disciplinary authority should furnish a copy of the said report asking the delinquent to submit representation to the findings of the Inquiring Officer, whereafter, the disciplinary authority on consideration of both, i.e., the inquiry report and the representation made by the delinquent, if concludes that any of the penalties specified in Rule 13 of 1962 Rules is to be imposed, then he will issue a notice to the delinquent to show cause with regard to the proposed penalty. But in the present case, the same has been given a complete go bye. But in the present case, the same has been given a complete go bye. (d) So far as non-supply of the inquiry report is concerned, reliance has been placed on Mohd.Ramzan Khan case (supra), which has also been taken into consideration in the subsequent judgment, wherein the apex Court has held that the right to represent against the findings in the inquiry report one’s innocence is distinct from the right to represent against the proposed penalty and the right to represent against the findings in the report is not disturbed in any way. In fact any denial thereof will make the final order vulnerable. Such finding has been arrived at in view of the fact that right to represent against the findings in the inquiry report to prove once innocence is distinct from the right to represent against the proposed penalty. Therefore, by virtue of the amendment in Rule 15 (10)(a)&(b) on 25.2.2000, it was obligatory to follow the procedure by supplying the inquiry report and obtaining representation of the delinquent and then to take a decision finally on the same. 10. (iii) Bias of the authorities (a) On perusal of the pleadings available on record, it reveals that the Vice-Chancellor had prepared the notes in guise of a so-called proposed action to be taken by the Syndicate much earlier to the meeting of the Syndicate and the Syndicate without any application of mind had accepted the same. This fact gets corroborated from the fact that on 30.8.2000 at 4.30 P.M., the Syndicate met and accepted the same. If at all they prepared the report on the very same day, then it was almost impossible to prepare a 23 page report after considering the show cause reply submitted by all the delinquents. The report of the Syndicate was nothing but the opinion of the then Legal Advisor thereby the Syndicate had surrendered its discretion to the Legal Advisor, who had acted as the disciplinary authority. (b) It is well settled in Mathura Prasad (supra) that the statutory authority is bound to act within four corners of law. As it appears, the authorities have not acted in consonance with the provisions of law. As such, the action of the authorities is not well in conformity with the provisions of statutory requirements rather the authorities have acted contrary to the provisions of law. (c) Referring to Mahavir Prasad Sontosh Kumar (supra), Mr. As it appears, the authorities have not acted in consonance with the provisions of law. As such, the action of the authorities is not well in conformity with the provisions of statutory requirements rather the authorities have acted contrary to the provisions of law. (c) Referring to Mahavir Prasad Sontosh Kumar (supra), Mr. A.K. Mishra, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner urged that the quasi-judicial order must be a speaking one as the inquiry has been conducted without assigning any reason on the question of charge of moral turpitude. In absence of material particulars, the proceeding itself is vitiated. It is further urged that the disciplinary authority cannot act on the dictate of any other person as has been held by the apex Court in Indian Railway Construction Co. Ltd (supra). (d) The inquiry having been conducted by Mr. B.N. Mishra, the retired District and Sessions Judge consulting with Mr. G.R. Dubey and obtaining his opinion on the inquiry report and acting in pursuance to said advice itself also vitiates the entire proceeding. It is held in Indian Railway Construction Co. Ltd (supra) that the disciplinary authority cannot act under the dictate of anybody and it has to apply his mind independently and pass necessary order assigning the reasons thereof. (e) The apex Court in State of Punjab v. V.K.Khanna (supra) relying on the decision in Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. (supra), in paragraph 8 has observed thus: “8. The test, therefore, is as to whether there is a mere apprehension of bias or there is a real danger of bias and it is in this score that the surrounding circumstances must and ought to be collated and necessary conclusion drawn therefrom. In the event, however, the conclusion is otherwise that there is existing a real danger of bias administrative action cannot be sustained. If on the other hand, allegations pertain to rather fanciful apprehension in administrative action, question of declaring them to be unsustainable on the basis therefor would not arise.” Similarly in paragraph 34, the apex Court has also observed thus: “x x x It is well settled in Service Jurisprudence that the concerned authority has to apply its mind upon receipt of reply to the charge-sheet or show-cause as the case may be, as to whether a further inquiry is called for. In the event upon deliberations and due considerations it is in the affirmative- the inquiry follows, but not otherwise and it is this part of Service Jurisprudence on which reliance was placed by Mr. Subramaniam and on that score, strongly criticized the conduct of respondents here and accused them of being biased. We do not find some justification in such criticism upon consideration of the materials on record.” Therefore, the orders impugned suffer from vice of bias of authorities. 11. So far as applicability of the case of Udit Kumar Panigrahi v. Sambalpur University and others is concerned the petitioner’s case stands on the same footing and therefore, due to non-compliance of the principles of natural justice, the orders impugned are vitiated and accordingly, the same are to be quashed. 12. For the foregoing reasons and keeping in view the law laid down by the apex Court, this Court holds that the order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority vide order dated 31.08.2000 (Annexure-21) and confirmation thereof made by the appellate authority vide order dated 19.12.2000 (Annexure-23) are vitiated. Accordingly, the same are quashed. The opposite parties are directed to reinstate the petitioner in service forthwith and all the consequential financial and service benefits as due and admissible to him be granted within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. 13. The writ application is thus allowed. No cost.