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2015 DIGILAW 692 (GUJ)

Perigon Infratech Pvt. Ltd. v. Petroleum & Natural Gas Regulatory Board

2015-07-13

JAYANT M.PATEL, RAJESH H.SHUKLA

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Judgment Jayant M. Patel, J. 1. The petitioners by this petition are seeking appropriate writ to set aside the communication dated 03-07-2015, whereby the respondent has communicated to the petitioners that as single tender is received, it has been decided by the Board to re-tender the process as per clause 4.4 of the application-cum-bidding document and the petitioners have been advised to collect the papers of the bid. We have heard Mr. Parikh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners. 2. The contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is that the condition No. 4.4 of the tender providing for the power with the respondent to cancel or to annul the bid is unreasonable because there are unbridled power given to the respondent to invoke condition No. 4.4 without assigning any reasons. He further submitted that in past, it has happened that a single tenderer was there. In spite of the same, the decision for re-tendering was not taken but the offer of the single tenderer has been accepted and therefore, if past conventions are taken into consideration, it can be said that the decision is arbitrary. He also submitted that there are statutory rules provided for the mode and manner for consideration of the tender. Nowhere there is express power with the respondent to re-tender in a given case and therefore, in absence of any express statutory power, the decision could be said as bad in law. He lastly contended that the contractor of the adjacent area is Avantika and if tender of the petitioner is cancelled in future, Avantika may get the benefit and therefore, in his submission, the said aspect has prevailed over the respondent and in his submission, such can be said to be mala fide and therefore, this Court may interfere. 3. On the first aspects of challenging the condition as unreasonable, we find that the contention deserves to be rejected on the face of it inasmuch as the petitioner by its own volition accepted the tender condition No. 4.4 and once the condition was voluntarily accepted, it would not lie in the mouth of the petitioners to contend that the condition is unreasonable and it gives unbridled power. It is hardly required to be stated that in tendering process, submission of tender is only an offer by the tenderer. It is hardly required to be stated that in tendering process, submission of tender is only an offer by the tenderer. It is open to the authority inviting the tender to take its decision taking into consideration various factors. In a given case, if the respondent has found that there is only single tender and there may not be any competitive price or inter se competition, it is open to the respondent to take decision for retendering unless it is satisfactorily demonstrated before the Court that with a view to favour or with any ulterior purpose, the decision has been taken. 4. The attempt to contend that Avantika is a contractor of adjacent area and is likely to be benefited if the tender of the petitioner is not accepted, in our view, is purely on hypothesis and surmises. The respondent has taken the decision for entering into re-tendering process and not to keep the area completely blank for the purpose of work in question. On the contrary, the decision is to re-tender at which the petitioner, if eligible, can also participate. But thereby, it cannot be said that the decision is taken to confer benefit upon Avantika on the ground as sought to be canvassed. In our view, the contention is on hypothesis and surmises and without their being any material whatsoever. Hence, the same cannot be accepted. 5. The contention raised by the petitioners of the past practice in our view would hardly assume any relevance inasmuch as it is a commercial wisdom of the respondent to be exercised as to whether they should accept even a single tender or not or that it should go for re-tendering process. The petitioner who is only one of the tenderer has no right under law to insist the acceptance of the tender on the ground as sought to be canvassed. In a commercial venture, unless it is satisfactorily demonstrated before the Court that the decision is with some mala fide or some extraneous purpose, past practice would hardly create any right in favour of the petitioners for acceptance of his tender when the decision is taken to re-tender the process. 6. In a commercial venture, unless it is satisfactorily demonstrated before the Court that the decision is with some mala fide or some extraneous purpose, past practice would hardly create any right in favour of the petitioners for acceptance of his tender when the decision is taken to re-tender the process. 6. The attempt made to contend that statutory rule did not expressly provide for re-tendering in our view is on a non-existent premise inasmuch as there is always inbuilt power with the authority to re-tender if in a given case out of their commercial wisdom they find that there is no fair competition amongst the tenderer. The petitioner who has only submitted cannot assert right as sought to be canvassed. The statutory rule upon which the reliance has been placed are pertaining to the mode and manner of regulating the inter se bidding if it is to be undertaken after the tenders are opened. Such stage has not come and therefore, the ground as sought to be canvassed is on a non-existent premise. As observed earlier, there are inbuilt powers to take appropriate decision for re-tendering in a given case if the respondent board finds that there was only single tender and no fair competition. In view of the above, we find that no case is made out for interference. Hence, the petition is dismissed. Petition Dismissed.