JUDGMENT : S. Pujahari, J. - The appellant herein calls in question the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed against him in S.T. No.216 of 1990 on the file of the Sessions Judge, Sundergarh. The learned Sessions Judge, Sundergarh vide the impugned judgment and order while acquitting the appellant and other accused persons of the charge under Sections 148, 323/149 and 302/149 of the Indian Penal Code (for short "the I.P.C.", held the appellant guilty of the charge under Section 304, Part-II of I.P.C. and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for five years. 2. Prosecution case placed before the trial court is that on 08.02.1990 at about 1.30 p.m., when the informant - Binod Khes (P.W.1) and the deceased Pradeep Kumar Kindo along with their other friends numbering about 8 to 9 were coming out of the hotel of Rajanikant Patnaik after taking their lunch, the appellant along with other accused persons forming an unlawful assembly appeared there. The appellant then caught hold of the hand of the deceased and challenged him about the previous incident in the College and thereafter he was assaulted by fist and kick blows by 4 to 5 others and so also he was assaulted by a lathi on his shoulder by the appellant. One among the accused persons, namely, Saroj Kumar Naik also assaulted the informant by an iron rod causing injuries on his hand. Then when the injured party members were proceeding to the Police Station to report the matter, they met one of their friends, namely, Gyanaranjan Hota on their way, which was at a distance of 150 meters from the spot where they were assaulted. When they were talking with him, the appellant and other accused persons arrived there and the appellant brick-bated at the deceased from a distance of about 10 feet which struck his head, and thereby the deceased sustained injuries and was shifted to the hospital. The informant also sustained injury and was shifted to the hospital. When they were talking with him, the appellant and other accused persons arrived there and the appellant brick-bated at the deceased from a distance of about 10 feet which struck his head, and thereby the deceased sustained injuries and was shifted to the hospital. The informant also sustained injury and was shifted to the hospital. After discharge from the hospital, the informant reported the matter in Town Police Station, Sundargarh and pursuant to the said report, Sundargarh Town P.S. Case No.11 of 1990 was registered under Sections 148, 323/149 of I.P.C. and during course of investigation, when the deceased died while undergoing treatment, the case turned to one under Section 302/149 of I.P.C. On completion of investigation, police found substance in the investigation and placed charge-sheet against the appellant and other accused persons under Sections 148, 323/149 and 302/149 of I.P.C. Accordingly, cognizance was taken by the S.D.J.M., Sundergarh and the case was committed to the Court of Sessions. The trial court placing reliance on such case of the prosecution, framed charge against the appellant and other accused persons, as stated earlier. As the appellant and other accused persons have pleaded not guilty to the charge, trial was held in course of which the prosecution examined as many as eight witnesses and exhibited certain documents, so also the Material Objects to bring home the charge. In their defence, the appellant and other accused persons, though did not produce any oral evidence, but exhibited the casualty memo sent to the police in support of their case. 3. It appears that on conclusion of the trial, the trial court placing reliance on the version of the witnesses to the occurrence, so also the postmortem examination report though acquitted all the accused persons of the aforesaid charges, but returned the judgment of conviction and order of sentence against the appellant, as stated earlier. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the versions of the witnesses to the occurrence being not in conformity with one another and they having improved the case of the prosecution from time to time, the trial court erred in placing reliance on their evidence to come to a conclusion that the appellant brick-bated the deceased, for which the deceased sustained the injuries and succumbed to the injuries while undergoing treatment in the hospital. Since the prosecution witnesses are unworthy of credence and defence has also made out a case through elicitation from one of the doctors that the injury contributing to the death of the deceased was possible by a fall, the trial court could not have held the death of the deceased to be homicidal in nature or that the same was authored by the appellant. In such premises, he submits that the appellant is entitled to an order of acquittal. Alternatively, he submits that the materials on record do not make out a case under Section 304, Part-II of I.P.C., but at best an act of rashness or negligence punishable under Section 338 of I.P.C. or a case of grievous hurt, and as such the conviction of the appellant under Section 304, Part-II of I.P.C. is liable to be modified, and considering the circumstances in which the occurrence occurred and the tender age of the appellant should be dealt with under the Probation of Offenders Act. 5. In response, learned Addl. Standing counsel submits that there being clear, cogent and convincing evidence to the effect that the deceased was brick-bated by the appellant, for which he sustained injuries on his head which resulted in his death, and as such the death of the deceased was homicidal one. He further submits that since the appellant brick-bated at the deceased from a close proximity striking to his head and causing the injuries, it cannot be treated as a rash or negligent act, rather it can very well be said that the appellant intending the resultant injuries brick-bated at the deceased and injuries received by the deceased were proved to be fatal, and hence, no fault can be found with the conviction recorded against him by the trial court. In such premises, the sentence imposed also being commensurate with the facts and circumstances, the same needs no interference of this Court. 6. In such premises, the sentence imposed also being commensurate with the facts and circumstances, the same needs no interference of this Court. 6. From the materials available on record, it appears that P.Ws.1, 2, 3 and 6 in no uncertain terms deposed that on the date of occurrence, when they were coming out of the hotel of Rajanikant Patnaik after taking their lunch, the appellant along with his associates appeared there, challenged deceased Pradeep Kumar Kindo and there the deceased was assaulted by fist and kick blows, so also assaulted on his shoulder, alike one of them also assaulted the informant and when the informant and his other friends were going to report the matter, near veterinary hospital, the appellant and his associates chased them and the appellant brick-bated from a distance of ten feet to the deceased which struck at his head and he sustained injuries. No doubt, as from the materials on record, it was found that the version of the witnesses with regard to the first occurrence was full of improvement and material contradictions and also they did not attribute any role to any of the accused persons or named any of the accused persons and also did not identify them to have participated in the incident, the trial court discarded the first part of the occurrence to have been proved, but accepted the second part of the prosecution case in so far as it related to the assault on the deceased by the appellant, while disbelieving the others accused persons to have shared any common object with the appellant much less in forming any unlawful assembly. As held by the trial court, it was the lone act of the appellant, and the other accused persons had not contributed in any manner to the death of the deceased. 7. Needless to say that the maxim of "falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus" is not a sound rule for appreciation of the evidence in criminal cases by the Courts in India, inasmuch as it is hard to come across a witness in India whose evidence does not contain a ring of falsehood while deposing about the occurrence. The Hon'ble Apex Court as such have refused to apply the aforesaid maxim to discard the evidence of the witnesses in entirety whose evidence are false in one part. The Hon'ble Apex Court as such have refused to apply the aforesaid maxim to discard the evidence of the witnesses in entirety whose evidence are false in one part. It is true that the Court must make an attempt to separate grain from the chaff, the truth from the falsehood, yet this could only be possible when the truth is separable from the falsehood. Where the grain cannot be separated from the chaff because the grain and the chaff are so inextricably mixed up that in the process of separation the Court would have to reconstruct an absolutely new case for the prosecution by divorcing the essential details presented by the prosecution completely from the context and the background against which they are made, then this principle will not apply. The aforesaid position of law has been settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court in a line of decisions, one of which is reported in the case of Balaka Singh v. State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1975 SC 1962 . 8. In such view of the matter, when in this case, P.Ws.1, 2, 3 and 6 have categorically deposed that the deceased was brick-bated by the appellant, for which he sustained the injuries and was taken to the hospital and immediately the F.I.R., Ext.1 was also lodged by P.W.1 which discloses the same, this Court sees no apparent reasons to reject the finding of the trial court that the injuries on the head of the deceased which contributed to his death, as revealed from the postmortem examination report of P.W.5, was caused by the appellant. The doctor, P.W.4, who had examined the deceased first, has also deposed that the injuries caused to be homicidal one. No doubt, from the version of the doctor, P.W.4, who had first examined the deceased and given first-aid to him, it was elicited that the injuries could be possible by a fall on the pitch road, but he has not ruled out the possibility of the injuries being caused by the brick-bat. No doubt, from the version of the doctor, P.W.4, who had first examined the deceased and given first-aid to him, it was elicited that the injuries could be possible by a fall on the pitch road, but he has not ruled out the possibility of the injuries being caused by the brick-bat. The doctor (P.W.5), who conducted the postmortem examination over the dead body of the deceased, has categorically deposed that the injuries sustained by the deceased are homicidal in nature, and no foundation fact having been laid or other evidence adduced showing or suggesting the deceased to have fallen down and sustained injuries or that the injuries were not caused by the appellant, it cannot be said that the appellant has proved his case by the standard of preponderance of probabilities that the deceased sustained the injury accidentally and as such the version of the eyewitnesses to this part of the occurrence was unreliable. 9. In view of the aforesaid, I see no apparent and plausible reason to discard the finding of the trial court that the appellant brick-bated at the head of the deceased which proved to be fatal and resulted in the death of the deceased. 10. Now, coming to the second contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that even if it is accepted that the appellant is said to have brick bated at the deceased from a close distance, it cannot be said that he intended the same, and it might have been the outcome of the rash and negligent act, such contention of the appellant appears to this Court to be devoid of merit, inasmuch as there is enough material disclosing the fact that the appellant from a close distance brick-bated at the deceased which struck at his head. Therefore, it is not an act of rashness or negligence, rather with an intention to cause the injuries to the deceased, he (appellant) brick-bated him (deceased). The same is more so in view of the proven fact that the appellant caused the injuries intending to do so, the onus was on him to show that the injuries were not intended by him. The same is more so in view of the proven fact that the appellant caused the injuries intending to do so, the onus was on him to show that the injuries were not intended by him. In this regard, reliance can be placed on an oft quoted decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court which has become locus classicus, i.e., the case of Virsa Singh v. The State of Punjab, reported in 1958 AIR 465, wherein it has been held as follows; "xxxxx xxxxxx xxxxx Once the intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be present is proved, the rest of the enquiry is purely objective and the only question is whether, as a matter of purely objective inference, the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. No one has a licence to run around inflicting injuries that are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and claim that they are not guilty of murder. If they inflict injuries of that kind, they must face the consequences; and they can only escape if it can be shown, or reasonably deduced, that the injury was accidental or otherwise unintentional. 11. Therefore, when the evidence on record discloses that the appellant from a close distance brick-bated at the deceased which struck at his head and there is nothing on record to show that the aforesaid was a rash and negligent act, it can very well be said that the appellant intending the injuries caused the injuries on the head of the deceased which in the ordinary course of nature was found to be sufficient to cause the death as found by the doctor conducting postmortem examination. The aforesaid act of the appellant could have been amounted to murder, for which he was charged, but considering the fact that there was no pre-mediation on the part of the appellant and during an altercation between them owing to the previous day's incident in the college the quarrel ensued, and the appellant had been to the spot without being armed with any weapon and the assault was perpetrated by a piece of brick, the same comes within the exception 4 to Section 300 of I.P.C. and, as such, is covered by the exception of "culpable homicide" not amounting to murder. The conviction of the appellant, therefore, should have been made under Section 304, Part-I of I.P.C. instead of Section 304, Part-II of I.P.C. as he intended the injuries. But, no appeal having been preferred against the said conviction, this Court is not in a position to convert the same, and as such confirms the conviction and does not want to interfere with the sentence imposed which appears to be commensurate with the facts and circumstances of the case. 12. Hence, this criminal appeal is devoid of merit and, as such, stands dismissed. The impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence are hereby confirmed. L.C.R. received be sent back forthwith along with a copy of this Judgment. Final Result : Dismissed