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2015 DIGILAW 697 (BOM)

Vijaykumar Dwarkadas Sharma v. Damodar Ramkrushna Kowale

2015-03-10

A.B.CHAUDHARI, P.N.DESHMUKH

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JUDGMENT : A.B. Chaudhari, J. 1. By the present application, the applicant has put to challenge the FIR No. 3026/2006 for an offence punishable under Section 35-A of the Bombay Money Lenders Act, registered with Police Station Police Station, Hiwarkhed, Tq. Telhara. In support of the application, Mr. Mohta, learned counsel for the applicant, invited our attention to the judgment and order in Writ Petition No. 3796/2006 decided on 13.10.2006 by learned Single Judge of this Court. The said application was filed by applicant Vijay Sharma and in the said judgment, it was held that action under section 13B of the Bombay Money Lenders Act was not warranted and was, therefore, set aside. He submitted that the FIR is in respect of the same cause of action about the alleged money lending without license. He submitted that the said judgment has become final and conclusive between the parties and as such no offence was made out. 2. Per contra, the learned A.P.P. invited our attention to the reply filed by non applicant No. 4 to this application and submitted that offence under Section 35A and B was made out against the applicant and, therefore, offence was registered. She, therefore, submitted that the application deserves to be dismissed. 3. We have heard learned counsel for the rival parties. We have perused the entire record. Upon perusal of the judgment in Writ Petition No. 3796/2006, which has become final between the parties, we are inclined to hold that the said judgment in the case of the applicant and complainant would clearly act as a bar for taking criminal action against the applicant. Here, in this context, it would be necessary to look into the provisions of Section 41, 42 and 43 of the Indian Evidence Act, which read thus: "41. Relevancy of certain judgments in probate, etc. jurisdiction A final judgment, order or decree of a competent Court, in the exercise of probate, matrimonial, admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction, which confers upon or takes away from any person any legal character, or which declares any person to be entitled to any such character, or to be entitled to an specific thing, not as against any specified person but absolutely, is relevant when the existence of any such legal character, or the title of any such person to any such thing, is relevant. Such judgment, order or decree is conclusive proof-- that any legal character which it confers accrued at the time when such judgment, order or decree came into operation; that any legal character, to which it declares any such person to be entitled, accrued, to that person to be entitled, accrued, to that person at the time when such judgment, order or decree declares it to have accrued to that person; that any legal character which it takes away from any person ceased at the time from which judgment, order or decree declared that it had ceased or should cease; and that anything to which it declares any person to be so entitled was the property of that person at the time from which such judgment, order or decree declares that it had been or should be his property. 42. Relevancy and effect of judgments, orders or decrees, other than those mentioned in section 41 Judgments, orders or decrees other than those mentioned in section41, are relevant if they relate to matters of a public nature relevant to the enquiry; but such judgments, orders or decrees are not conclusive proof of that which they state. 43. Judgment, etc., other than those mentioned in sections 40 to 42, when relevant: "Judgments, orders or decrees, other than those mentioned in sections 40, 41 and 42, are irrelevant, unless the existence of such judgment, order or decree, is a fact in issue, or is relevant under some other provision of this Act." 4. We think, applying these provisions, final adjudication having been already made, the issue cannot be reopened. This Court clearly recorded a finding that the order passed by the authority under Section 13B of the Act was not warranted and the FIR was lodged on the same facts. That being so, we are of the firm opinion that in the wake of the adjudication on the civil side in relation to the transaction in question between the same parties, not having been found to be illegal or contrary to the provisions of the Bombay Money Lenders Act, the FIR is liable to be quashed and set aside. In the result, following order is inevitable. "ORDER (i) Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer Clause (i) of the application."