Bharat Chandra Sarma v. Life Insurance Corporation of India
2015-01-06
T.VAIPHEI
body2015
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : 1. The petitioner was initially aggrieved by the failure on the part of the respondent authorities to dispose of the departmental appeal filed by him on 21.6.2012 against the order dated 29.2.2012 removing him from service by way of a punishment. While this writ petition was pending, the respondent authorities/appellate authorities disposed of the appeal by the order dated 5.12.2012 upholding the said removal order dated 29.2.2012. Aggrieved by this, he is initiating this second round of writ petition questioning the validity of the order imposing said penalty. 2. The facts in both the cases are inter connected, were heard together and are now being disposed of by this common judgment. However, it is now obvious that in view of the dismissal of his appeal by the appellate authority, W.P. (C) No. 3853/2012 has become infructuous and is, therefore, dismissed as not pressed. 3. The case of the petitioner is that he was serving as an Assistant in the Tinsukia Branch Office of the Life Insurance Corporation ("Corporation") and was confirmed to this post on 15.5.1990. The petitioner has submitted his letter of resignation on 18.11.1993 to the respondent No. 3 as he could not continue his duty due to the mental illness of his mother. Vide his letter of resignation, he was said to have already retired on 18.11.1993. However, he later on came to know that his resignation was not accepted by the respondent authorities but a departmental enquiry as well as criminal proceeding were in the meantime initiated against him for alleged misappropriation of SSS premium amounting to Rs. 2,66,697.22. Yet another departmental proceeding was initiated against him for unauthorized absence from duty since 1993. The petitioner was later on acquitted in the criminal case, but through the intervention of this Court, he was allowed to resume his duty and joined the duty at Tinsukia Branch on 6.8.2001. In the meantime, the charge-sheet-cum-show cause notice dated 12.1.2008 was issued against him by the respondent No. 3 by alleging that he had absented himself from duty since 6.9.2004 without obtaining leave and without giving information to the Office, which was proposing to impose a penalty of removal from service under regulation 36 (1)(f) of the Life Insurance Corporation (Staff) Regulations, 1960 ("the Regulation" for short). He was also asked to show cause within 10 days from the date of service of the said charge-sheet upon him.
He was also asked to show cause within 10 days from the date of service of the said charge-sheet upon him. 4. The case of the petitioner is that he had never received the said charge-sheet-cum-show cause notice and as such he was not in a position to reply the show cause notice. The proceedings were, however, initiated and the hearings conducted and concluded against him ex-parte. It was only after the conclusion of three ex-parte preliminary hearing that he received the letter dated 28.01.2011 from the Manager (P&IR) enclosing therein copies of minutes of the said preliminary hearing, the list of which was dated 15.12.2010, and of asking him to submit his comments within 10 days. The minute was described by the Manager (P&IR) as "Enquiry Report". On coming to know that the next date fixed for hearing on 18.2.2011, he submitted the letter to the Enquiry Officer dated 18.02.2011 citing reasons for his inability to be personally present on that date and informing about the non-receipt of the charge-sheet-cum-show cause notice. The petitioner also states that most of the documents mentioned in the minutes of the preliminary hearing held on 15.12.2010 were not furnished to him and, therefore, requested him (the petitioner) to supply the said documents so as to enable him to make effective reply. He also prayed for adjournment of the hearing. The petitioner was served with a copy of the charge-sheet-cum-show cause notice dated 12.01.2008 enclosed with a letter dated 06.05.2011 from the Manager (P & IR), Jorhat Divisional Office. But copies of the other documents sought for were not provided to him. The petitioner was thereafter informed about the next date of hearing, which was fixed for 29.08.2011. He duly appeared before the Enquiry Officer on that day and submitted his reply to the charge-sheet-cum-show cause notice wherein he denied that he was absent from duties since 06.09.2004 for more than 90 days at a stretch without information to the office. He also stated that the documents relied on for making such a charge were not supplied to him and, as such, he had been seriously prejudiced and requested that the same be supplied to him. 5. The petitioner stated that he was still desirous of continuing in service and that he had not at any time abandoned his service.
He also stated that the documents relied on for making such a charge were not supplied to him and, as such, he had been seriously prejudiced and requested that the same be supplied to him. 5. The petitioner stated that he was still desirous of continuing in service and that he had not at any time abandoned his service. Subsequently, he was served with a copy of the minutes of the preliminary hearing held on 29.08.2011, which was said to be "enquiry report" and directed him to submit his comments within 7 days. He submitted his reply on 16.09.2011 wherein he, inter alia, stated that the documents mentioned in the minutes at para-3 were not supplied to him earlier but supplied on that date. He denied the charge of unauthorized absence. In the second weeks of June, 2012, when he visited his ancestral home at Sivasagar, he was handed over an envelop by his relative by some unknown person and on opening the said envelop, he found the order dated 29.02.2012 passed by the respondent No. 4 holding him guilty of the charges levelled against him and of imposing the penalty of removal from service upon him. It was further ordered therein that the period of unauthorized absence from duty since 06.09.2004 should be treated as dies-non, i.e. period not spent on duty. The petitioner thereafter preferred an appeal against the order dated 29.02.2012 after some delay as he received the impugned order quite late. During the pendency of the writ petition, the appeal was disposed of by upholding the order of disciplinary authority whereupon the second writ petition i.e. W.P. (C) No. 641/2013 came to be filed by the petitioner. 6. The contentions of Mr. B.D. Konwar, the learned counsel for the petitioner are many-fold. He submits that the so called enquiry report does not contain any discussion or appreciation of evidence. Even his written reply to the charges submitted by him was overlooked by the Enquiry Officer. He did not even find a passing reference to it in the office report/minutes. He seriously questioned the status of the Enquiry Report, which was merely minutes of the preliminary hearing held on 29.08.2011. Under the circumstances, the disciplinary authority could not have relied upon such minutes/report for holding the petitioner guilty of the charges or for awarding a penalty of removal.
He seriously questioned the status of the Enquiry Report, which was merely minutes of the preliminary hearing held on 29.08.2011. Under the circumstances, the disciplinary authority could not have relied upon such minutes/report for holding the petitioner guilty of the charges or for awarding a penalty of removal. According to the petitioner, he has been affected by the non-supply of documents and even his written reply was ignored by the Enquiry Officer. He had in fact submitted the representation seeking permission to report for duty on 6.9.2004 to the Branch Manager of Tinsukia Branch. Moreover, he had sent a copy of the same by FAX and speed post on 06.09.2011 to the Enquiry Officer. The petitioner flatly denies that he had abandoned his service. The leave application submitted by him for the period of absence was never rejected by the concerned authorities and, as such, there was no question of unauthorized absence from duty. The impugned order suffers from the vice of non-application of mind and had he applied his mind properly, he would not have accepted the minutes of the preliminary hearing dated 29.08.2011 to be the Enquiry Report and acted upon it. It is submitted that the so-called Enquiry Report dated 29.8.2011 was merely the minutes of the hearing held on 29.08.2011 in course of the enquiry proceedings and that no final hearing was conducted or no final enquiry report submitted. Nor was any recommendation made by the enquiry officer for imposing a punishment on the petitioner and, as such, the impugned order is totally arbitrary, unreasonable and injustice and is liable to be declared as such. 7. The writ petition is opposed by the respondent Corporation by filing their affidavit-in-reply. The case of the respondent Corporation is that the petitioner committed embezzlement of S.S.S. premium and the same arose out of the complaint dated 29.09.1993 and that during investigation, he refrained from attending his duties in the respondent office and ultimately his resignation letter dated 18.11.1993 was not accepted by them. On 4.2.1994, an F.I.R. was lodged at Tinsukia P.S. where after a case was registered on 30.08.1994 being G.R. No. 185/94 under Section 408 I.P.C. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tinsukia by the order dated 25.01.1999 acquitted him on the benefit of doubt. During the pendency of the aforesaid case, the first charge-sheet dated 19.4.1995 was issued against him for misappropriation of S.S.S. premium amounting to Rs.
During the pendency of the aforesaid case, the first charge-sheet dated 19.4.1995 was issued against him for misappropriation of S.S.S. premium amounting to Rs. 2,66,697.22. The petitioner made a prayer on 25.9.95 for keeping the departmental proceeding in abeyance till the disposal of the G.R. Case. The prayer was rejected and the departmental enquiry was proceeded with where after he filed a writ petition before this Court and obtained a stay order from this Court against the further proceeding of the departmental enquiry. According to the answering respondent, the petitioner had remained absent from duty from 18.11.1993 but his status was "not suspended", "not terminated", "not allowed to resign" during the period. A second disciplinary action was initiated against him by issuing the charge-sheet dated 22.2.1997 proposing therein the penalty of removal from service for his unauthorized absence, but the same was not pursued. The petitioner rejoined his duty on 6.8.2001 as per the order of this High Court. The learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Jorhat, in compliance with the order of the High Court, passed a speaking order denying the petitioner any wages for the period from 18.11.1993 to 5.8.2001 on the principle of "no work, no pay". The contempt case filed by him being Contempt Case No. 803/2005 was dismissed on 8.1.2008. 8. Since 6.9.2004, the petitioner had stopped attending the office without prior information and had never resumed his duties thereafter. The disciplinary proceedings remain unconcluded. The third disciplinary proceeding was initiated against him by issuing charge-sheet-cum-show cause notice dated 12.1.2008 for the charges of abandonment of post since 6.9.2004 and for not responding to the official communication asking for his explanation about his unauthorized absence from duty. The charge-sheet-cum-show cause notice sent to him by registered post at his recorded residential address was returned undelivered. The resignation letter dated 18.11.1993 of the petitioner was not accepted by the respondents. As per Regulation 18 of the Regulation, he was required to serve one month prior notice for his resignation to the respondent authority, but the same was not served by him. The investigation of misappropriation of fund was pending against him before respondent Corporation where after he retired voluntarily on 18.11.1999. When the petitioner did not submit his reply within one and half year, the enquiry was proceeded against him ex-parte under the provisions of the Regulations.
The investigation of misappropriation of fund was pending against him before respondent Corporation where after he retired voluntarily on 18.11.1999. When the petitioner did not submit his reply within one and half year, the enquiry was proceeded against him ex-parte under the provisions of the Regulations. On receipt of the petition for adjournment from the petitioner on the ground that he had not received the copy of Charge-sheet-cum-show cause notice dated 12.1.2008 the respondent Corporation sent to a copy of the charge-sheet-cum-show cause notice to him at his residential address on 22.5.2011, which was delivered to him by registered post on 11.5.2011 as confirmed by the Post Office vide letter No. 10000-10735 dated 15.6.2011, and the next date of hearing fixed on 29.8.2011. 9. As the petitioner had remained continuously absent from duty for a period of 3 years since 2004, the inference of abandonment of service by him was correctly drawn by the disciplinary authority in terms of Explanation 1 to Clause 39(4)(iii) of Regulation, which says that an employee shall be deemed to have abandoned his posts if he absents himself from duty without leave or overstays his leave for a continuous period of 90 days without any intimation thereof in writing. It is asserted by the answering respondents that the petitioner never denied that he received the enquiry report but he denied the charges of unauthorized absence from duties. He could neither produce any evidence in support of his defence nor could he produce any evidence to the effect that he had approached any of the respondent authorities with an intention to join duties or that he was prevented by any authority from joining his duties during the period of his prolonged absence since 2004. It was after the said enquiry that the impugned penalty of removal of service was imposed upon him. The appeal filed by him was time-barred under Regulation 41 of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulation 1960 and as such his appeal was not entertained. It is submitted by the respondent Corporation that the enquiry was conducted strictly with the procedure laid down by the Regulation. The enquiry report was submitted after analysing all the evidences before the answering respondent and after considering the statements of the parties.
It is submitted by the respondent Corporation that the enquiry was conducted strictly with the procedure laid down by the Regulation. The enquiry report was submitted after analysing all the evidences before the answering respondent and after considering the statements of the parties. The petitioner remained absent unauthorisedly from duty for more than 7 years from 6.9.2004 to 29.2.2012 i.e. the date of passing final order without being prevented from resuming his duties at any point of time. He did not even respond to the official communication. He was rightly removed from his service. These are the substantive contentions of the respondent authorities. 10. From the materials on record, this much is established beyond reasonable doubt. The petitioner had remained absent from duty since 6-9-2004 till his removal from service on 29-2-2012. On 12-1-2008, another charge-sheet-cum-show case notice was issued upon him on that day charging him that he had unauthorisedly absent from duty since 6-9-2004 without leave and without giving prior information to the respondent authorities. However, no whisper of statement was ever made by him to show that he did attend the office or that he had attempted to resume his duty, but was not allowed to do so by them. His challenge to the impugned order of removal is basically based on procedural improprieties. On the other hand, the case of the respondent-Corporation is that they issued two letters dated 12-8-2011 and dated 2-9-2012 to the petitioner intimating him of his unauthorized absence from duty, but he did not pay any heed to such advise/requests. In my judgment, the conduct of the petitioner does not deserve any sympathy from this Court. As he is the petitioner, the burden of proof is upon him to show that he did not unauthorisedly absent himself from duty. What had he been doing from 6-9-2004 to 12-1-2008 when the show cause notice was issued upon him on 12-1-2008, has been conveniently avoided/suppressed by him. Instead, he chose to indulge himself in procedural battles about non-serving of documents or of the use of "the minutes of preliminary hearing" as the enquiry report to prove misconduct against him. Such contentions, I am afraid, will not lead him anywhere. This Court is not concerned with procedural lapses unless it can be shown by the petitioner that such procedural lapses have resulted in substantial prejudice to his case.
Such contentions, I am afraid, will not lead him anywhere. This Court is not concerned with procedural lapses unless it can be shown by the petitioner that such procedural lapses have resulted in substantial prejudice to his case. For example, had he been really prevented by the respondent authorities from resuming his duty without reasonable cause, he could have approached this Court immediately for directing the respondents to allow him to resume his duty and should not have waited for them to issue show cause for his alleged unauthorized absence from duty, which was issued only on 12-1-2008. Under the circumstances, the inference is irresistible and the conclusion inescapable that the petitioner abandoned his post as envisaged in Regulation 39(4)(iii) of the Regulations. 11. The instant case reminds of the recent case decided by the Apex Court reported in Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board vs. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 . That was a case in which the respondent No. 1 (Junior Engineer) therein had remained continuously absent from duty from 28-8-1995 without any intimation to his employer and never responded to the repeated memorandum/reminders requiring him to explain his unauthorized absence and to rejoin duty. Disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him and the disciplinary authority imposed the punishment of dismissal on 16-4-1998 observing that belated submission of medical certificate on 1-4-1997 irresistibly led to the conclusion that he was unauthorisedly absent from 28-8-1995. The Board rejected the appeal filed there against. A writ petition was filed by him against the said order in 1998 and the Single Judge of the High Court of Madras by the order dated 12-3-2003 directed reconsideration solely on the ground that the Managing Director who was the disciplinary authority had taken part in the proceedings of the Board which decided the appeal. Pursuant thereto, the matter was again placed before the Board and the appellate authority affirmed the order the disciplinary authority and consequently dismissed the appeal on 1-7-2003. The respondent preferred a writ petition on 7-7-2007 against the reaffirmation of the order of dismissal. The Single Judge, by the impugned judgment, held that even if the employee had absented from duty, there was no past misconduct of desertion/absence and, therefore, the punishment of dismissal from service for the first desertion/absenteeism was too harsh and disproportionate and deserved to be interfered with.
The Single Judge, by the impugned judgment, held that even if the employee had absented from duty, there was no past misconduct of desertion/absence and, therefore, the punishment of dismissal from service for the first desertion/absenteeism was too harsh and disproportionate and deserved to be interfered with. The Division Bench affirmed the order of the Single Judge of the High Court. The appeal filed by the Board was, however, allowed by the Apex Court. The most relevant paragraphs are found at para 31 and 32 of the judgment, which read thus: "31. It is apt to note here that in the said Mukul Kumar Choudhuri case, (2009) 15 SCC 620 the respondent had remained unauthorisedly absent from duty for six months and admitted his guilt and explained the reasons for his absence by stating that he neither had any intention nor desire to disobey the order of superior authority or violate any of the rules or regulations but the reason was purely personal and beyond his control. Regard being had to the obtaining factual matrix, the Court interfered with the punishment on the ground of proportionality. The facts in the present case are quite different. As has been seen from the analysis made by the High Court, it has given emphasis on past misconduct of absence and first time desertion and thereafter proceeded to apply the doctrine of proportionality. The aforesaid approach is obviously incorrect. It is tell-tale that the respondent had remained absent for a considerable length of time. He had exhibited adamantine attitude in not responding to the communications from the employer while he was unauthorisedly absent. As it appears, he has chosen his way, possibly nurturing the idea that he can remain absent for any length of time, apply for grant of leave at any time and also knock at the doors of the Court at his own will. 32. The learned counsel for the respondent has endeavoured hard to impress upon us that the respondent had not been a habitual absentee. We really fail to fathom the said submission when the respondent had remained absent for almost one year and seven months. The plea of absence of "habitual absenteeism" is absolutely unacceptable and, under the obtaining circumstances, does not commend acceptation.
We really fail to fathom the said submission when the respondent had remained absent for almost one year and seven months. The plea of absence of "habitual absenteeism" is absolutely unacceptable and, under the obtaining circumstances, does not commend acceptation. We are disposed to think that the respondent by remaining unauthorisedly absent for such a long period with inadequate reason had not only shown indiscipline but also made an attempt to get away with it. Such a conduct is not permissible and we are inclined to think that the High Court has erroneously placed reliance on the authorities where this Court had interfered with the punishment. We have no shadow of doubt that the doctrine of proportionality does not get remotely attracted to such a case. The punishment is definitely not shockingly disproportionate. 33. Another aspect needs to be noted. The respondent was a Junior Engineer. Regard being had to his official position, it was expected of him to maintain discipline, act with responsibility, perform his duty with sincerity and serve the institution with honesty. This kind of conduct cannot be countenanced as it creates a concavity in the work culture and ushers in indiscipline in an organisation. In this context, we may fruitfully quote a passage from Government of India vs. George Philip (SCC p. 14, para 18) "18. In a case involving overstay of leave and absence from duty, granting six months' time to join duty amounts to not only giving premium to indiscipline but is wholly subversive of the work culture in the organisation. Article 51-A(j) of the Constitution lays down that it shall be the duty of every citizen to strive towards excellence in all spheres of individual and collective activity so that the nation constantly rises to higher levels of endeavour and achievement. This cannot be achieved unless the employees maintain discipline and devotion to duty. Courts should not pass such orders which instead of achieving the underlying spirit and objects of Part IV-A of the Constitution have the tendency to negate or destroy the same." We respectfully reiterate the said feeling and restate with the hope that the employees in any organisation should adhere to discipline for not only achieving personal excellence but for collective good of an organisation. When we say this, we may not be understood to have stated that the employers should be harsh to impose grave punishment on any misconduct.
When we say this, we may not be understood to have stated that the employers should be harsh to impose grave punishment on any misconduct. An amiable atmosphere in an organisation develops the work culture and the employer and the employees are expected to remember the same as a precious value for systemic development." 12. For what has been stated in the foregoing, there is no merit in this writ petition, which is accordingly dismissed, but by directing the parties to bear their respective costs.