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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2015 DIGILAW 703 (MP)

Union of India v. Damodar Singh

2015-07-08

B.D.RATHI, U.C.MAHESHWARI

body2015
ORDER 1. Heard on IA 470/2015 petitioners’ application under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the alleged delay in filing this review petition to review the order dated 28.6.2008 passed in First Appeal No.172/2008. 2. This review petition has been filed barred by six years and seven months as is appearing from perusal of the order under review vis-a-vis the endorsement seal of the copying section of this Court on the certified copy of the order dated 28.6.2008. 3. The averments of the IA have been disputed on behalf of the respondent by filing an elaborate reply. 4. Assistant Solicitor General after taking us through the averments of the IA argued that aforesaid long delay in filing the review petition has taken place because of departmental process in obtaining permission to file the review petition since such aspect was considered at various levels in various offices of the petitioners authorities. He also said that the entire delay has been explained in the application by proper and cogent reasons and each day’s delay has been properly explained in the application. In continuation, he said that in view of settled position of law, while dealing with the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, stake of litigation should also be taken into consideration and order should be passed with justice oriented approach, and the Court should slow in dismissing the proceedings of the case on the ground of delay, as such, by condoning the delay the case should be decided on merits so the controversy involved in the matter may be resolved finally. In support of such contentions, he has placed reliance on the decisions of the apex Court in the matters State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani [ (1996)3 SCC 132 ], N Balkrishnan v. M.Krishnan [ (1998)7 SCC 123 ], as also the judgment of the apex Court in the matter of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur [ (2013)12 SCC 649 ], and prayed to condone the alleged delay by holding the cause stated in the application as sufficient cause as per requirement of section 5 of the Limitation Act by allowing the IA. 5. On the other hand, aforesaid prayer is opposed by the counsel for the respondent on the basis of the averments stated in the reply. 5. On the other hand, aforesaid prayer is opposed by the counsel for the respondent on the basis of the averments stated in the reply. Besides reply, he has also said that whenever limitation provided under the law for some specific proceedings has expired and such proceedings are filed after expiry of such limitation, then the valuable right accrued in favour of the other party in the meantime, should not be interfered lightly unless sufficient cause is made out and day to day delay is explained. Keeping in view such principle, if the case at hand is examined then it is apparent that the order under review was passed by the Court on 28.6.2008 and certified copy of the order was applied by the office of the petitioners herein only on 12.12.2014, i.e. after years together and, for that, the cause stated in the application could not be treated to be sufficient cause. So in view of such conduct and negligence on the part of authorities of the petitioners, in view of the law laid down by the apex Court in Esha Bhattacharjee (supra), cited by the petitioners’ counsel, the application deserves to be dismissed. In addition, he has also placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd [ AIR 1962 SC 361 ], holding that after expiry of the period of litigation, if any proceeding is filed by a party against the successful party then the valuable right accrued in favour of successful party could not be interfered lightly unless in the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act sufficient cause is made out, and in such premises, prayed for dismissal of the application. 6. Having heard counsel, keeping in view their arguments, we have carefully gone through through the review petition as well as the order under review along with the aforesaid case laws cited by counsel for the respective parties. 7. It is apparent from the certified copy of the order under review that prior to 14.12.2014, no efforts were made on behalf of the petitioners to get certified copy of such order. 7. It is apparent from the certified copy of the order under review that prior to 14.12.2014, no efforts were made on behalf of the petitioners to get certified copy of such order. If there was any intention on the part of authorities of the petitioners to file review petition, then certainly such application for obtaining certified copy of the order should have been filed immediately after passing of the order or within some reasonable period, because such order was passed in presence of the counsel for the petitioners herein. 8. Although presence of the respondents’ counsel (petitioners herein) has been disputed by the counsel for the petitioners, but in view of available record, such submission has not appealed us. 9. The aforesaid circumstances show the conduct and the way of working of the authorities of the petitioners. It is apparent from the averments of the IA that although on behalf of the petitioners dates have been given with some description of the officials of the authorities of the petitioners, according to which such authorities had taken sufficient time to examine the matter for granting permission to file review petition and therefore, long delay of years together has caused, but nowhere in the application it is stated as to on which date application for obtaining certified copy of the order under review was filed and on which date such certified copy was received from the office of this Court and on the basis of such certified copy what steps were taken in the departments of the petitioners. In the lack of such information in the application, conduct of the authorities of the petitioners could not be presumed to be bona fide, and on such terms, the cause stated in the application could not be taken to be sufficient cause as per requirement of section 5 of the Limitation Act. 10. The case laws cited on behalf of the petitioners could be applied to the matter had there been some bona fide circumstances to show sufficient cause to condone the alleged long delay, which is not found in the case ad hand, therefore, such case laws cited on behalf of the petitioners are not helping to the petitioners. 10. The case laws cited on behalf of the petitioners could be applied to the matter had there been some bona fide circumstances to show sufficient cause to condone the alleged long delay, which is not found in the case ad hand, therefore, such case laws cited on behalf of the petitioners are not helping to the petitioners. On the contrary, the principles laid down by the apex Court in Esha Bhattacharjee (supra), holding that a party is not entitled to get relief of section 5 of the Limitation Act on account of his conduct and negligence, is helping the respondent. 11. Apart from the aforesaid, in view of the decision of the apex Court in the matter of Ramlal (supra) if a valuable right has accrued in favour of a party, then after expiry of the period of limitation to file review petition, unless bona fide reasons are shown by the party, such valuable right accrued could not be interfered on the basis of averments of the application filed under section 5 of the Limitation Act. 12. In view of the aforesaid discussions, sufficient cause for condoning the alleged delay as per requirement of section 5 of the Limitation Act is not found by this Court, hence, we are not inclined to allow the IA and condone the alleged delay. Consequently, the same is hereby dismissed. Pursuant to it, this review petition is also dismissed as barred by limitation. 13. There shall be no order as to costs. .