JUDGMENT : B.S. Walia, J. 1. Vide this judgment, we are deciding Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment dated 18.09.2001 rendered by the learned Single Judge in OWP No. 459/1999 which was filed by respondent No. 1 i.e. State, against order dated 04.01.1999 passed by respondent No. 2 i.e. J & K Special Tribunal, Jammu (hereinafter referred to as the 'Tribunal') whereby the Tribunal while accepting report No. 207/ATJ dated 25.5.1987 of the Tehsildar Jammu allowed the revision petition and set aside order dated 29.04.1997 passed by the Financial Commissioner, J & K Jammu as also orders dated 19 Fagun 2009 and 11.03.1959 passed on mutation Nos. 67 and 53 respectively and directed necessary entries to be made in the revenue record. Brief facts of the case leading to the filing of this Letters Patent Appeal are that orders were passed by the Tehsildar, Jammu dated 19 Fagun 2009 BK (March 1953) on mutation No. 67 and mutation No. 53 dated 11.03.1959 by virtue of which land comprising Khasra No's. 52, 42, 68, 133, 17, 18 and 19, measuring 37 Kanals 7 Marlas situated in Village Channi Kamala, Tehsil Jammu was escheated to the State under the Jammu and Kashmir Big Landed Estates Abolition Act, 2007 (BK) after extinguishing the rights of ownership of the proprietor of the said land i.e. Nahar Singh (Lambardar of the Village), father of Amar Singh, Kashmiroo S/o. Ganga Singh and Baldev Singh S/o. Khajan Singh. 2. After a lapse of about three decades and after Nahar Singh's death, his son i.e. Amar Singh filed two revision petitions praying for setting aside orders of the Tehsildar, Jammu dated 19 Fagun 2009 BK (March 1953) on mutation No. 67 and mutation No. 53 dated 11.03.1959. The said revisions were transferred to the Director Land Records exercising the powers of Divisional Commissioner for disposal on 12.07.1986 who ordered both the revision petitions to be disposed of by a single judgment. 3. That during the pendency of the revision petitions, the Director Land records directed the Tehsildar, Jammu to ascertain whether the land referred to above was lying fallow since Kharif 2007 and whether the land in dispute was unculturable waste. 3. That during the pendency of the revision petitions, the Director Land records directed the Tehsildar, Jammu to ascertain whether the land referred to above was lying fallow since Kharif 2007 and whether the land in dispute was unculturable waste. The Tehsildar Jammu vide report dated 26.05.1987 submitted that the land Khasra No. 18 and 19 min though recorded in the Khasra Girdawri 2007 BK as Banjar Qadim had bushes and other plantation and Arak Kap etc, besides the Banjar land was used by the appellant for grazing his, cattle and Arak Kap for raising fuel and fodder. This finding of the Tehsildar was based on some ex-parte evidence recorded in the year 1987. On the basis of the aforementioned report, the Director Land Records vide order dated 31.07.1987 made a recommendation to the Financial Commissioner, J & K, that the revision petitions be accepted and orders on mutation Nos. 67 dated 19 Fagun 2009 BK (March 1953) and mutation No. 53 dated 11.03.1959 be set aside and the case remanded to the concerned Tehsildar for passing fresh order after hearing the parties and keeping in view the provisions of the Big Landed Estates Abolition Act, 2007 (BK). 4. That pursuant to order dated 31.07.1987 passed by the Director Land Records, the matter was heard by the Joint Financial Commissioner, Agrarian Reforms exercising the powers of the Financial Commissioner who vide a reasoned and speaking order dated 26.02.1993, rejected the recommendation made by the Director Land Records and upheld the orders dated 19 Fagun 2009 BK (March 1953) and 11.03.1959 on mutation Nos. 67 and 53 respectively by holding that the revisions against the impugned orders had been preferred after a lapse of about three decades without any convincing ground or intelligible explanation, besides, on merits also there was no basis for exemption of the land from the operation of the Jammu and Kashmir Big Landed Estates Abolition Act, 2007 (BK) as the land covered by the impugned orders was Banjar Qadeem i.e. culturable land but not unculturable while Gair Mumkin land being used as village Pond and Village Paths was never used as Arak, Kap or for raising fuel or fodder, as such, the said land was not exempted from the provisions of the Jammu and Kashmir Big Landed Estates Abolition Act, 2007 (BK). Accordingly, while holding that the recommendations of the Director Land Records exercising the powers of the Divisional Commissioner were contrary to the facts and that the orders impugned before the Director Land Records had been rightly passed escheating the land in question to the Government under the Jammu and Kashmir Big Landed Estates Abolition Act, 2007 (BK), the revision petitions were dismissed. While dismissing the revision petitions, the learned Joint Financial Commissioner, Agrarian Reforms exercising the powers of the Financial Commissioner also took into account the observations of the Divisional Commissioner in his recommendations that- "Petitioner along with counsel and Revenue Attorney on behalf of the State are present. Notice was serve to Jammu Development Authority who did not attend the Court inspite of service of notice and even telephonic talk with Chairman, Jammu Development Authority regarding defending the cases and to watch the interest of the Jammu Development Authority. But Jammu Development Authority did not attend the Court nor deputed counsel to defend the cases after receiving the notices, hence ex-parte proceedings were taken against Jammu Development Authority on 23.6.87." 5. That the detailed and well reasoned order dated 26.02.1993 passed by the learned Joint Financial Commissioner, Agrarian Reforms exercising the powers of the Financial Commissioner was challenged by Amar Singh before the Jammu and Kashmir Special Tribunal as being without jurisdiction on account of the Joint Financial Commissioner, Agrarian Reforms exercising the powers of the Financial Commissioner, not having been conferred with the powers of Financial Commissioner, thereby not having the authority to hear the aforesaid revision. The order passed by the learned Joint Financial Commissioner, Agrarian Reform was set aside by the Tribunal and case remanded to the Financial Commissioner for disposal. 6. That pursuant to the orders of the Tribunal, the learned Financial Commissioner heard the reference made by the Divisional Commissioner in the revision petitions filed by Amar Singh against the orders of the Divisional Commissioner and vide order dated 29.04.1997 rejected the recommendation's of the Director Land Records exercising the powers of the Divisional Commissioner thereby upholding orders on the mutations passed by the Tehsildar Jammu by virtue of which the land stood escheated to the State under the provisions of the Jammu and Kashmir Big Landed Estates Abolition Act, 2007 (BK). 7. 7. That against the order of the learned Financial Commissioner dated 29.04.1997, a revision was filed by Amar Singh before the Tribunal which vide its order dated 04.01.1999 accepted the same and set aside order dated 29.04.1997 passed by the Financial Commissioner, J & K Jammu as also orders dated 19 Fagun 2009 and 11.03.1959 passed on mutation Nos. 67 and 53 and directed necessary entries to be made in the revenue record. Consequentially, orders escheating the land to the State in terms of the Jammu and Kashmir Big Landed Estates Abolition Act, 2007 (BK) stood set aside. Resultantly, the land in question was to revert to the erstwhile owner of the land. 8. That vide order dated 04.01.1999, the Tribunal allowed the revision petition, set aside order dated 29.04.1997 passed by the learned Financial Commissioner, J & K, inter alia, on the ground that the finding of the Financial Commissioner that the revision petitions had been filed after 27 years was of no consequence since no specific time period had been stipulated for filing revision petition, moreover, the land was admittedly being used for raising fodder for cattle and fuel, besides was unculturable as evident from the report of the Tehsildar No. 207/ATJ dated 26.05.1987, therefore the right of the owners could not be extinguished. On the aforesaid reasoning the Tribunal set aside the order of the learned Financial Commissioner, J & K, dated 29.04.1997 as also orders dated 19 Fagun 2009 and 11.03.1959 passed on mutation Nos. 67 and 53 and directed necessary entries to be made in the revenue record. 9. That order dated 04.01.1999 passed by the Tribunal as was challenged by the State by way of OWP No. 459/1999 was set aside by the learned Single Judge vide order dated 18.09.2001. It is the aforementioned decision of the learned Single Judge which has been impugned in the Letters Patent Appeal by Amar Singh S/o. Nahar Singh. 9. That order dated 04.01.1999 passed by the Tribunal as was challenged by the State by way of OWP No. 459/1999 was set aside by the learned Single Judge vide order dated 18.09.2001. It is the aforementioned decision of the learned Single Judge which has been impugned in the Letters Patent Appeal by Amar Singh S/o. Nahar Singh. The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition filed by the State while taking note of the position that the description of the land in question i.e. "Gair Mumkin Road, Gair Mumkin Lane, Gair Mumkin Jadid, Banjar Qadim, Gair Mumkin Road" in 2007 BK and Kharief 2007, was not being disputed on behalf of Amar Singh, but the reliance by the Director Land Records on the report dated 26.05.1987 submitted by the Tehsildar Jammu pursuant to a spot visit and recording of statement of a number of witnesses, of the land being arak on which fuel and fodder was grown could not be taken into account as normally revenue record was the basis for determining the rights of the owners and the question as to whether the land would come to vest in the claimant was determinable on the basis of the revenue record at the relevant time i.e. the year 2007 BK and Kharief 2007 which stood prepared almost 37 years ago, therefore, to say that presumption attached to the revenue record could be rebutted on the basis of spot inspection after a lapse of close to three decades was an argument which could not be accepted. On the aforesaid basis, the learned Single Judge held that the finding recorded by the Tribunal that the position in the year 2007 BK and Kharief 2007 could not be taken note of, instead position as existing at time of inspection after close to three decades was to be taken note of was an argument which could not be accepted as record, which was prepared almost three decades ago could not be brushed aside lightly and in any case spot inspection made after three decades could not visualize the situation as existed when the Act of Samvat 2007 was enforced. However, the same only reveals the status as obtaining on 26.05.1987 AD and not as it existed in the year 2007 BK i.e. 1953/1959 and that in order to qualify for exemption what had to be seen was the position as obtaining on the record in the year 2007 BK i.e. year 1953/1959. On the basis of the aforesaid reasoning, the learned Single Judge set aside judgment dated 04.01.1999 passed by the Tribunal. 10. The order of the learned Single Judge has been challenged primarily on the ground that the spot inspection was made by a respectable officer i.e. Tehsildar, Jammu who recorded the evidence of responsible persons of the locality, therefore, the report could not be ignored simply because of time gap of 37 years in between the time of spot inspection and the position as existed in Kharif 2007, that delay in filing the revision petitions had been well explained before the revenue authorities and the Director Land Records had recommended acceptance of the revision petitions to the Financial Commissioner, who however rejected the same vide order dated 29.04.1997 on flimsy grounds. However, order of the Financial Commissioner dated 29.04.1997 was set aside by the Tribunal vide order dated 04.01.1999 while upholding the order of the Director Land Records dated 31.07.1987. It was also contended that entries of revenue record could be rebutted under the Land Revenue Act, therefore, no element of finality could be attached to the Girdawari entries and the said entries stood properly rebutted during the Course of enquiry by the Tehsildar as per report dated 26.05.1987 pursuant to enquiry ordered by the Director Land Records. It was also contended that entries of revenue record could be rebutted under the Land Revenue Act, therefore, no element of finality could be attached to the Girdawari entries and the said entries stood properly rebutted during the Course of enquiry by the Tehsildar as per report dated 26.05.1987 pursuant to enquiry ordered by the Director Land Records. Besides, the mutations were attested behind the back of Nahar Singh, land in dispute had all along remained unculturable and was used for raising fuel and fodder, that for the purposes of exercising revisional jurisdiction, the Jammu and Kashmir Big Landed Estates Abolition Act, 2007, had not described any limitation, consequentially if the Legislature had not laid down any limitation, then there may be lacuna in the Act but the same could not be filled up while exercising powers u/s. 30(6) of the Jammu and Kashmir Big Landed Estates Abolition Act, therefore, the delay could not be a factor for rejection of the claim that the land had wrongly vested in the State, the situation as prevalent in 2007 Bikrami was a question of fact and the Director Land Records had properly appreciated the same and his finding had been upheld by the J & K Special Tribunal, therefore, could not be ignored by the learned Single Judge, that once it was proved that the land was being used for raising fuel and fodder, the provisions of the Jammu and Kashmir Big Landed Estates Abolition Act, 2007 exempted the land from its operation, thus, the owners of the land could not have been expropriated of the same. 'Banjer Qadeem' was unculturable land and could not be treated as culturable and when the Jammu and Kashmir Big Landed Estates Abolition Act, 2007 came into operation, a part of the land in dispute was recorded as 'Banjar Qadeem' and the remaining land was also decidedly unculturable being in the shape of pond and private path and that in terms of Notification No. 20/49 LRC dated 16.08.1950/Para 2), while commuting the aggregate area of 182 Kanals, Kah-Krishim, Arak, Kap' and unculturable waste used for raising fuel and fodder as was assessed to land revenue could not be taken into account and that since the land in dispute was decidedly unculturable, therefore, the same could not be taken into account while commuting 182 Kanals of land. Even otherwise, Section 4(b) of the Big Landed Estates Abolition Act, 2007 provided that unculturable waste land used for raising fuel and fodder was exempt from the operation of the Act. Consequentially, the land in question was exempt from the operation of the Jammu and Kashmir Big Landed Estates Abolition Act, 2007. 11. That on the death of Amar Singh S/o. Nahar Singh on 27.06.2014, application for bringing Shamsher Singh, Kuldeep Singh, Rashpal Singh and Parshotam Singh (sons of Late Amar Singh S/o. Nahar Singh) as legal representatives of the appellant-Amar Singh on record was allowed vide order dated 17.11.2014. 12. On the other hand, on behalf of the State it has been contended that the revision petition was highly belated and the Tribunal erred in rejecting the plea in respect thereto for its dismissal on ground of delay and laches and the sole reason for the revision petition after three decades of the passing of the impugned mutations was on account of a big Posh Housing Colony known as Channi Himat having come up on the land in question and the market value of the said land having risen to Crores. It was contended that the same was the reason for Amar Singh to have challenged the mutations after three decades without giving any explanation as to why the said mutations were not challenged by his father during his lifetime and why they were challenged only by him after three decades and only explanation given was that he was not aware about the same and had filed the revision petition immediately on coming to know about the same from the Patwari concerned. 13. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the record and considered the submissions made but are of the considered view that for the reasons recorded hereunder, no interference whatsoever is called for with order of the learned Single Judge dated 18.09.2001 in OWP No. 459/1999 setting aside order dated 04.01.1999 passed by the J & K Special Tribunal, Jammu, consequentially, the recommendations of the Director Land Records dated 31.07.1987, resulting in upholding of order dated 29.04.1997' passed by the learned Financial Commissioner as also orders dated 19 Fagun 2009 passed on mutation No. 67 and mutation Nos. 53 dated 11.03.1959. 14. 53 dated 11.03.1959. 14. A perusal of the record reveals that revision petitions were filed by Amar Singh on 08.09.1986 against the orders dated 19 Fagun 2009 (BK) (March 1953) on Mutation No. 67 and 11.03.1959 on Mutation No. 53 i.e. after a lapse of close to three decades. Delay was sought to be explained on the ground of not being aware of the orders and of the revisions being filed immediately on coming to know about the impugned orders from the Patwari concerned. The explanation for inordinate delay in filing the revision petition, apart from being vague, is totally unsatisfactory and unconvincing. It is very surprising that although Nahar Singh father of Amar Singh was Lambardar of the village yet he never challenged the mutations. It is only Nahar Singh's son of Amar Singh who filed two revision petitions before the Director Land Records with the powers of Divisional Commissioner (Appeals) Jammu with a prayer for setting aside the orders of the Tehsildar, Jammu dated 19 Fagun 2009 BK (March 1953) on Mutation No. 67 and dated 11.03.1959 on Mutation No. 53, that too, after a lapse of close to three decades of the passing of the order on the impugned mutations and, that too, without giving any satisfactory explanation for the owner and father i.e. Nahar Singh or for that matter he himself i.e. Amar Singh not having challenged the mutations or the orders on the same earlier. 15. Record further reveals that the learned Financial Commissioner vide order dated 29.04.1997 rejected the recommendations of the Director Land Records and upheld the orders of the Tehsildar dated 19 Fagun 2009 BK (March 1953) on Mutation No. 67 and dated 11.03.1959 on Mutation No. 53, inter alia, on the ground of inordinate delay of close to three decades without there being any satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay, besides the land classified as 'Banjer Qadeem' not falling within the definition of unculturable land, therefore, land which had been recorded as 'Banjer Qadeem' not being exempt from the application of provisions of the Jammu and Kashmir Big Landed Estates Abolition Act, 2007(BK) as only Gair Mumkin Land earmarked for production of fuel and fodder and Arakh Kaps could qualify for exemption from the provisions of the Jammu and Kashmir Big Landed Estates Abolition Act, 1927 (BK). 16. 16. We have also perused the stand of the State in the writ petition, namely of the entries in the revenue record about the land in question being recorded as 'Banjer Qadeem' and 'Gair Mumkin' as also of the same clearly showing that the land was capable of cultivation and was not uncultivable therefore, not falling within the exempted area, therefore of having been escheated to the State under the Act and the Tribunal not having distinguished between 'Gair Mumkin' and 'Banjer Qadeem' and that as a matter of fact, the status of land covered under Mutation No. 53 was 'Banjer Qadeem' while in Mutation No. 67, it was 'Gair Mumkin' and that since 'Banjer Qadeem' was cultivable and 'Gair Mumkin' was uncultivable on which fuel and fodder was raised, it was 'Gair Mumkin' land which was exempted under the Act. The mutations in question were attested on the basis of the recorded entries as were prevalent in Kharief-2007 BK. Thus there was sufficient evidence in the shape of revenue records to show that the land had rightly been escheated to the State being culturable and not falling within the ambit of exemption clause. Further, since the entries in the revenue record clearly revealed that the area shown as 'Gair Mumkin" was recorded as 'path' and 'pond', therefore the same belied any inference of the same being used for production of fuel and fodder and it was purely on the said basis that the then Tehsildar had passed an order escheating land measuring 37 kanals 7 marlas in favour of the State because of the said area not falling within the ambit of exempted area. On the other hand, the recommendations of the Director Land Records as also the order of the Tribunal is based primarily on the report of the Tehsildar dated 26.05.1987. However, the same only reveals the status as obtaining on 26.05.1987 AD and not as it existed in the year 2007 BK i.e. 1953/1959 and that in order to qualify for exemption what had to be seen was the position as obtaining on the record in the year 2007 BK i.e. year 1953/1959. Besides no documentary evidence was led by Amar Singh before the Director Land Records to substantiate his claim that the land was used for fuel and fodder production and was unculturable. Besides no documentary evidence was led by Amar Singh before the Director Land Records to substantiate his claim that the land was used for fuel and fodder production and was unculturable. In the circumstances, it is abundantly clear that the land in question did not qualify for exemption from the application of the provisions of the Jammu and Kashmir Big Landed Estates Abolition Act, 2007 (BK). Apparently, the Tribunal has not taken aforesaid aspect of the matter into account and has based its order on the report of the Tehsildar Jammu who on the basis of spot inspection in the year 1987 recorded in the report dated 26.05.1987 that the land was used for raising fuel and fodder. 17. Section (4) of the Jammu and Kashmir Big Landed Estates Abolition Act, 2007 (BK) relates to the extinction of ownership rights and its vesting in the State. Clause (2) sub-clause (a) & (b) are exceptions to the aforementioned section and lay down that the Act would not apply to a unit of land not exceeding 182 kanals including residential sites, Bedzars and Safedzars as also Kahi-Krishm, Araks Kap and such lands including those used for raising fuel and fodder as are unculturable, including orchards. Section 4 of the J & K Big Landed Estates Abolition Act, Svt. 2007 is reproduced hereunder: "4. Extinction of the right of ownership in certain land (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, the right of ownership held by a proprietor in land other than land mentioned in sub-section (2) [as according to the village records] shall, subject to the other provisions of this Act, extinguish and cease to vest in him from the date this Act comes into force: Provided that the right of ownership held by a proprietor in land covered by sub-clause (v) of clause (a) of section 2 shall extinguish and cease to vest in him from the date of Big Landed Estates Abolition (Amendment) Act, 2008 is published in the Government Gazette, and such proprietor shall have the right to exchange such land with the unit of land for which he has exercised his right of selection under clause (a) of sub-section (2). (2) Extinction of the right of ownership under sub-section (1) shall not apply to- (a) unit of land not exceeding 182 Kanals including residential sites, Bedzars and Safedzars; (b) Kah-Karisham areas, Araks, Kaps and such lands including those used for raising fuel or fodder, as are unculturable; and (c) orchards: Provided that the Government may dispose of the land mentioned in clause (b) in such manner as may be recommended by the Committee that shall be set up for this purpose. (3) Every proprietor, and in case of a proprietor who is an evacuee as defined in the Jammu and Kashmir State Evacuees (Administration of Property) Act, 2006, the Custodian shall have the option, subject to the provisions of Section 14, to select the land mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2)". 18. In view of the position as noted above, it is clear that the land owned by Nahar Singh, father of Amar Singh and his other two co-sharers did not fall within the said exceptions and the finding of the Tribunal in favour of Amar Singh holding the case to be covered by the exceptions on the basis of report submitted by the Tehsildar at the behest of Director Land Records and the report of Tehsildar that the land in question was Arak on which fuel and fodder was grown, was based on a finding which was recorded ex-parte on 26.05.1987 AD. It belies comprehension that the status of land in Kharief-2007 BK (corresponding to the year 1951 AD) was sought to be explained on the basis of spot inspection in the year 1987 AD and, that too, ex-parte. What was the position in the year 1951 AD could not be visualised by spot inspection in the year 1987 AD and the only finding which could be given in the year 1987 AD was with regard to the position in the year 1987 AD, therefore, the finding of the Tehsildar dated 26.05.1987 with regard to the status of land in Kharief-2007 BK (corresponding to the year 1951 AD) was wholly perverse. The order of the Director Land Records as also the Tribunal is unsustainable on this short ground alone. 19. Another aspect of the matter is that the right to challenge the mutation accrued in favour of Nahar Singh, father of Amar Singh, who as has been stated earlier was the Lambardar of the village. The order of the Director Land Records as also the Tribunal is unsustainable on this short ground alone. 19. Another aspect of the matter is that the right to challenge the mutation accrued in favour of Nahar Singh, father of Amar Singh, who as has been stated earlier was the Lambardar of the village. Nahar Singh did not challenge the mutations in his lifetime and it is only after his death that the same were challenged by his son Amar Singh after close to three decades of recording of the impugned mutations. We are of the view that the right to sue if any accrued in favour of the erstwhile owner of the land i.e. Nahar Singh, father of Amar Singh. However, in the absence of challenge having been raised by Nahar Singh, it was not open to his successor in interest i.e. Amar Singh to raise a challenge at a belated stage by taking up the plea that he was not aware of the accrual of right if any, to sue, earlier. The successor-in-interest steps into the shoes of the person to whom the right to sue had originally accrued. No fresh period of limitation would accrue in favour of the successor in interest on the blank averment of his having come to know of the impugned orders only recently and of having challenged the same immediately thereafter. 20. Reference in context to the aforesaid can be made to Section 9 of Limitation Act, Svt. 1995. The same is reproduced as under:- "9. Continuous running of time Where once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability to sue stops it: Provided that, where letters of administration to the estate of a creditor have been granted to his debtor, the running of the time prescribed for the suit to recover the debt shall be suspended while the administration continues." 21. Onus lies heavily in a case like the present one, on the successor-in-interest to establish that the impugned orders were not to the knowledge of his predecessor-in-interest as also that despite devolution of property (in the instant case) of Nahar Singh on him, he inspite of due diligence was not aware of nor did he come to know about the impugned orders. Apparently, Nahar Singh who was a Lamberdar did not challenge the impugned orders during his lifetime. Apparently, Nahar Singh who was a Lamberdar did not challenge the impugned orders during his lifetime. After the death of Nahar Singh, his property devolved on his legal heirs. In the circumstances, it does not lie in the mouth of Nahar Singh's legal heir i.e. Amar Singh to contend that he was not aware about the impugned order even on the death of his, father Nahar Singh and devolution of his property on him. 22. Perusal of record further reveals that for accepting the recommendations of the Divisional Commissioner which in turn were based on the spot inspection of the Tehsildar Jammu dated 26.05.1987, the Tribunal in its order dated 04.01.1999 observed that the entries in the revenue record could be rebutted in terms of Section 32 of the Land Revenue Act by leading cogent evidence and the same had been done as evident from the report of the Tehsildar Jammu dated 26.05.1987. However, while so holding the Tribunal failed to take into account the requirement in terms of Section 32 of the Land Revenue Act for filing a suit for declaratory decree by person aggrieved by an entry in a record before the Collector (Deputy Commissioner) for the correction of the record and of said Amar Singh having failed to avail of the said remedy. Relevant extract of the order of the Tribunal as well as Section 32 of the Land Revenue Act is reproduced hereunder: "The finding of learned Financial Commissioner that entries made as Banjar Qadeem in revenue record cannot be ignored, is misconceived. Section 31 and 32 of Land Revenue Act says that entries in revenue record can be rebutted by cogent evidence. In the present case the entries in revenue were rebutted by leading cogent evidence, when Additional Tehsildar had made the report after visiting the spot and after recording the statements of 15 persons that in the land in dispute bushes are grown and the same is in the nature of Arak and Kaps for growing of fuel and fodder and such type of lands are exempted from the operation of the Big Landed Estates Abolition Act, 2007. The entries in revenue record had been categorically rebutted by the report of Additional Tehsildar..." Section 30, 31 and 32 of the Land Revenue Act:- "30. The entries in revenue record had been categorically rebutted by the report of Additional Tehsildar..." Section 30, 31 and 32 of the Land Revenue Act:- "30. Obligation to furnish information necessary for the preparation of record Any person whose rights, interests or liabilities are required to be entered in any record under this Chapter shall be bound to furnish, on the requisition of any Revenue Officer or village officer engage in compiling the record, all information necessary for the correct completion thereof. 31. Presumption in favour of entries in records-of-rights and annual records Any entries made in record of rights in accordance with the law for the time being in force or in an annual record in accordance with provision of this Chapter and the rules there under, shall be presumed to be true until the contrary is proved. 32. Suit for declaratory decree by person aggrieved by an entry in a record (1) If any person considers himself aggrieved by an entry in a record-of-rights [he may institute a suit before the Collector (Deputy Commissioner)] for the correction of the record, and for possession of the right claimed if he is not in possession thereof, with in one year (two years in the case of Frontier Districts of Gilgit and Ladakh) from the date of publication of the record of the distribution of the assessment under Section 49, sub-section (1). (2) If any person consider himself aggrieved by an entry in the annual record, [he may institute suit a before the Collector (Deputy Commissioner)] within the period prescribed by the Limitation Act No. LX of 1995 for correction of the record and for possession of the right claimed if he is not in possession thereof, or for declaration of his right if he is in possession thereof: Provided that, nothing in this sub-section shall entitle any person to bring a suit for the correction of the records-of-rights of a preceding Settlement after the period prescribed for such suit in sub-section (1) has expired. Nothing in this section shall be a bar to a suit by a tenant, to contest his liability to ejectment on the ground that he is an occupancy tenant under Sections [7-A(1) and 50(7)] of the Jammu and Kashmir Act, 1980". 23. Nothing in this section shall be a bar to a suit by a tenant, to contest his liability to ejectment on the ground that he is an occupancy tenant under Sections [7-A(1) and 50(7)] of the Jammu and Kashmir Act, 1980". 23. That no doubt entries in the revenue record can be rebutted by cogent evidence but the report of the Tehsildar dated 26.05.1987 relied upon by the Director Land Records as well as Tribunal cannot by any stretch of imagination be said to be cogent evidence in view of the same having been recorded in the year 1987 AD in respect of the position as said to be existing in the year 1951 AD. However, the spot inspection made after three decades could not in any circumstance visualize the situation as existed when the Act of Samvat 2007 was enforced. The spot inspection could only reveal the status as obtaining on 26.05.1987 AD and not as it existed in the year 2007 BK i.e. 1953/1959 and that in order to qualify for exemption what had to be seen was the position as obtaining on the record in the year 2007 BK i.e. year 1953/1959. Thus, in the circumstances, the application for condonation of delay of three decades in impugning the mutations by way of revision petitions apparently is a cooked up story in order to get over the bar of limitation, delay and laches as also of declaratory suit not having been filed as provided for in terms of Section 32 of the Land Revenue Act. The stratagem of filing revision petitions instead of declaratory suit before the Collector (Deputy Commissioner) for the correction of record in terms of Section 32 of the Land Revenue Act appears to have been done solely to overcome the inordinate delay in agitating the matter by coming up in a jurisdiction not stipulating any limitation, that too without giving a satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay. In the aforementioned background the submission of learned counsel for the State that the revision petitions were filed after decades solely on account of the value of the property in question having shot up phenomenally on account of being situated in prime location of Jammu appears to be a submission which cannot be brushed aside, merits acceptance and indeed appears to be the reason impelling said Amar Singh to have woken up from deep slumber to challenge the impugned orders after close to three decades. 24. Apart from the aforementioned position, a perusal of the order of the learned Joint Financial Commissioner, Agrarian Reforms dated 26.02.1993 reveals reference to report of the Tehsildar, Jammu, dated 27.04.1987 i.e. report of a Tehsildar other than the Tehsildar on whose report (dated 26.05.1987), reliance was placed by the Director Land Records exercising the powers of the Divisional Commissioner as also by the Tribunal. The report dated 27.04.1987 gives a totally different description of the land in use and mentions that the land in question had been transferred to the Jammu Development Authority (JDA) and part of it had been un-authorizedly occupied by a 3rd person. In the circumstances, reliance by the Director Land Records as well as the Tribunal on the report dated 26.05.1987 is clearly contrary to the factual position of the land having vested in the Jammu Development Authority (JDA) and part of it having been un-authorizedly occupied. Thus in the circumstances, the spot inspection report dated 26.05.1987 could not in any circumstance have been relied upon for ascertaining the position as it existed at site close to three decades prior to spot inspection in the year 1987. 25. We have also noticed that the Director Land Records exercising the powers of the Divisional Commissioner in his order dated 31.07.1987 mentioned that notices were served on JDA but in spite of service and telephonic talk with the then Chairman JDA regarding defending the case to watch the interests of JDA, nobody turned up from their side, therefore, ex-parte proceedings were initiated on 23.06.1987. We have also noted that the Joint Financial Commissioner Agrarian Reforms J & K Jammu in his order dated 26.02.1993 recommended that the land involved in the revisions was situated in the midst of Channi Himmat and Trikuta Nagar Housing Colony and was very valuable but part of the land had been encroached upon and was illegally occupied and that it was high time that the JDA to whom this land had since been transferred took steps to secure the land for public benefit. We have also noticed that earlier on a number of dates none appeared to defend the State. The sequence of events as noticed above reveals a very alarming situation where valuable rights of the State are being jeopardized by those responsible for defending the interest of the State by adopting a lackadaisical attitude. 26. That irrespective of the position as noted above one cannot lose sight of the settled position of law that although no period of limitation has been stipulated u/s. 30(6) of the J & K Big Landed Estates Abolition Act, Svt. 2007 for exercising revisional power, yet the same does not imply that the revisional power can be invoked at any point of time. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Collector v. D. Narsing Rao, (2015) 3 SCC 695 while holding that suo motu revision undertaken after a long lapse of time, even in the absence of any period of limitation was arbitrary and opposed to the concept of rule of law referred to earlier decisions on the exercise of revisional power in the absence of stipulation of period of limitation which lay down that absence of stipulation of period of limitation does not imply that revisional jurisdiction can be invoked at any point of time but that the same must be invoked within a reasonable period of time. Relevant extract of the said judgment taking note of earlier judgments is reproduced hereunder: "12.3. In the decision in Santosh kumar Shivgonda Patil v. Balasaheb Tukaram Shevale this Court while dealing with the power of revision under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 held as follows: (SCC pp. 356-57, paras 11-12) "11. Relevant extract of the said judgment taking note of earlier judgments is reproduced hereunder: "12.3. In the decision in Santosh kumar Shivgonda Patil v. Balasaheb Tukaram Shevale this Court while dealing with the power of revision under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 held as follows: (SCC pp. 356-57, paras 11-12) "11. It seems to be fairly settled that if a statute does not prescribe the time-limit for exercise of revisional power, it does not mean that such power can be exercised at any time; rather it should be exercised within a reasonable time. It is so because the law does not expect a settled thing to be unsettled after a long lapse of time. Where the legislature does not provide for any length of time within which the power of revision is to be exercised by the authority, suo motu or otherwise, it is plain that exercise of such power within reasonable time is inherent therein. 12. Ordinarily, the reasonable period within which the power of revision may be exercised would be three years under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code subject, of course, to the exceptional circumstances in a given case, but surely exercise of revisional power after a lapse of 17 years is not a reasonable time. Invocation of revisional power by the Sub-Divisional Officer under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code is plainly an abuse of process in the facts and circumstances of the case assuming that the order of the Tahsildar passed on 30-3-1976 is flawed and legally not correct." 12.4. In the decision in State of Punjab v. Bhatinda District Coop. Milk Producers Union Ltd. this Court while dealing with the revisional power under Section 21 of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948 held thus: (SCC p. 367, paras 17-19) "17. A bare reading of Section 21 of the Act would reveal that although no period of limitation has been prescribed therefore, the same would not mean that the suo motu power can be exercised at any time. 18. It is trite that if no period of limitation has been prescribed, statutory authority must exercise its jurisdiction within a reasonable period. What, however, shall be the reasonable period would depend upon the nature of the statute, rights and liabilities thereunder and other relevant factors. 19. 18. It is trite that if no period of limitation has been prescribed, statutory authority must exercise its jurisdiction within a reasonable period. What, however, shall be the reasonable period would depend upon the nature of the statute, rights and liabilities thereunder and other relevant factors. 19. Revisional jurisdiction, in our opinion, should ordinarily be exercised within a period of three years having regard to the purport in terms of the said Act. In any event, the same should not exceed the period of five years." Likewise relevant extract of the concurring judgment are reproduced hereunder "28. To the same effect is the view taken by this Court in Sulochana Chandrakant Galande v. Pune Municipal Transport wherein this Court reiterated the legal position and held that the power to revise orders and proceedings cannot be exercised arbitrarily and interminably. This Court observed: (SCC p. 476, para 28) "28. The legislature in its wisdom did not fix a time-limit for exercising the revisional power nor inserted the words 'at any time' in Section 34 of the 1976 Act. It does not mean that the legislature intended to leave the orders passed under the Act open to variation for an indefinite period inasmuch as it would have the effect of rendering title of the holders/allottees permanently precarious and in a state of perpetual uncertainty. In case it is assumed that the legislature has conferred an everlasting and interminable power in point of time, the title over the declared surplus land, in the hands of the State/allottee, would forever remain virtually insecure. The Court has to construe the statutory provision in a way which makes the provisions workable, advancing the purpose and object of enactment of the statute." 29. xxx 31. To sum up, delayed exercise of revisional jurisdiction is frowned upon because if actions or transactions were to remain forever open to challenge, it will mean avoidable and endless uncertainty in human affairs, which is not the policy of law. Because, even when there is no period of limitation prescribed for exercise of such powers, the intervening delay, may have led to creation of third-party rights, that cannot be trampled by a belated exercise of a discretionary power especially when no cogent explanation for the delay is in sight. Rule of law it is said must run closely with the rule of life. Rule of law it is said must run closely with the rule of life. Even in cases where the orders sought to be revised are fraudulent, the exercise of power must be within a reasonable period of the discovery of fraud. Simply describing an act or transaction to be fraudulent will not extend the time for its correction to infinity; for otherwise the exercise of revisional power would itself be tantamount to a fraud upon the statute that vests such power in an authority. In the light of the position noted above, we have no hesitation in holding that not only was the entertaining of the revision petition at the behest of Amar Singh in the absence of declaratory suit having been filed under Section 32 of the Land Revenue Act before the Commissioner (Deputy Commissioner) within the stipulated period of time an action coram non judice but also that there was no basis for invoking the revisional jurisdiction or for that matter seeking condonation of delay of close to three decades in invoking the revisional jurisdiction belatedly and the same ought to have been dismissed at the threshold on ground of delay and laches as also on account of the land in question having vested in the Jammu and Kashmir Development Authority thereby creating third party rights besides, there being no merit for exemption of the land from the operation of the Jammu and Kashmir Big Landed Estates Abolition Act, 2007(BK). Resultantly, while upholding the order of the learned Single Judge in OWP No. 459/1999 besides order of the learned Financial Commissioner, Jammu dated 29.04.1997 as also the orders passed on Mutation No. 67 dated 29.11.2002 Bikrami and on Mutation No. 53 dated 11.03.1959 escheating the land to the Government, we dismiss the instant Letters Patent Appeal.