Order Petitioners have assailed Final Notification dated 9/5/1979 (Annexure-B) issued in respect of land bearing Sy.No.35, measuring 1 acre 10 guntas at Konasandra Village, Jigani Hobli, Anekal Taluk, Bengaluru District. 2. It is the case of petitioners that, petitioner No.1 Smt. Nanjamma is the owner in respect of Sy.No.35, measuring 4 acres 16 guntas, which was gifted to her by her father Sri. Muninanjappa @ Annaiappa, on 14/11/1959. Petitioner Nos.2 and 6 are the daughters of petitioner No.1 and petitioner Nos. 3 to 5 are her sons. It is stated that they are in joint possession and enjoyment and enjoyment of the aforesaid land. That out of 4 acres 16 guntas in Sy.No.35, 1 acre 10 guntas of land was proposed to be acquired for the purpose of formation of house sites under Preliminary Notification dated 19/4/1977 (Annexure-A) issued by respondent No.1. It was followed by a declaration and Final Notification dated 9/5/1979 (Annexure-B), which is assailed in this writ petition. Petitioners have stated that the first petitioner’s husband Sri. Thimmarayappa had preferred W.P.No.15029/1979 assailing the final notification. That writ petition was dismissed on 29/11/1984, against which Writ Appeal No.1140/1985 was filed, which was also dismissed on 8/7/1985. Petitioner No.1 had preferred W.P.No.5729/1985, assailing the notifications and the same came to be dismissed on 28/5/1985. Against which writ appeal was filed, which also met the same fate. Thereafter, petitioners preferred Writ Petition No.51564/2014, seeking a direction to the Assistant Commissioner, Bengaluru South Sub-Division, Bengaluru, to furnish the details of taking possession and passing of the award in respect of the land measuring 1 acre 10 guntas, which was acquired. This Court, by order dated 1/12/2014, directed the said authority to furnish the details to the petitioners. When the matter stood thus, this writ petition has been filed on 12/12/2014 assailing the Final Notification dated 9/5/1979. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for petitioners and learned Addl. Government Advocate, who appears for respondent Nos.1 to 4 and 6 on advance notice as well as perused the material on record. 4. Petitioners’ counsel, candidly submitted that the husband of petitioner No.1 and thereafter petitioner No.1 had approached this Court by filing the aforesaid writ petitions and also writ appeals and they were unsuccessful in those matters. Government Advocate, who appears for respondent Nos.1 to 4 and 6 on advance notice as well as perused the material on record. 4. Petitioners’ counsel, candidly submitted that the husband of petitioner No.1 and thereafter petitioner No.1 had approached this Court by filing the aforesaid writ petitions and also writ appeals and they were unsuccessful in those matters. But he contended that, as possession of the land has not been taken by the respondent-Authorities, petitioners must be given relief in this writ petition by quashing the Final Notification dated 9/5/1979. He contended that there is no delay in approaching this Court, as the petitioners had earlier approached this Court although there were unsuccessful. He, therefore, contended that, as possession of the land in question i.e., 1 acre 10 guntas in Sy.No.35 continue to remain with the petitioners, Final Notification may be quashed and relief be granted to the petitioners and that there is no delay in approaching this Court. 5. Per contra, learned Addl. Government Advocate appearing for respondents contended that, apart from filing the writ petitions, petitioners had also filed O.S. No. 162/1987, which was dismissed by judgment and decree dated 28/10/1998 and they have once again filed O.S. No. 24/2014 seeking a relief of declaration and injunction and that steps would be taken in that suit by the State Government. He contended that petitioners are in the habit of approaching the Court several times. In view of the petitioners approaching this court repeatedly, although being unsuccessful in the earlier attempts, the writ petitions must be dismissed as an abuse of the process of this Court and also on account of delay and laches in assailing the Final Notification. 6. Learned Addl. Government Advocate also stated that on 19/9/1979 itself, possession had been taken, which is evident from the correspondence between the Block Development Officer and the Special Land Acquisition Officer dated 12/10/1990. Therefore, at this length of time, this writ petition cannot be entertained. 7. Having heard the learned counsel for parties and perused the material on record, it is noted that the petitioners have not assailed Preliminary Notification dated 19/4/1977, but they have assailed only Final Notification dated 9/5/1979. Therefore, at this length of time, this writ petition cannot be entertained. 7. Having heard the learned counsel for parties and perused the material on record, it is noted that the petitioners have not assailed Preliminary Notification dated 19/4/1977, but they have assailed only Final Notification dated 9/5/1979. That apart, petitioners have candidly disclosed in the writ petition that husband of petitioner No.1 has filed Writ Petition No. 15029/79, which was dismissed by this Court and Writ Appeal No. 1140/1985 filed against that order was also dismissed. Thereafter, petitioner No.1 had filed Writ Petition No.5729/1985, which was dismissed by this Court and subsequently, writ appeal filed against the said order also stood dismissed. O.S. No. 162/87, filed by petitioner was dismissed on 28/10/1998. Thereafter, O.S.No.24/2014 has been filed for the very same reason by the petitioners. On considering the aforesaid facts, it becomes clear that the petitioners are in the habit of repeatedly approaching this Court on the very same cause of action. Therefore, this writ petition has to be dismissed on the principles of res judicata, constructive res judicata and abuse of process of this Court. 8. Apart from that, the writ petition which assails only the Final Notification dated 9/5/1979 is filed on 12/12/2014 after a period of thirty five years. There are no averments explaining the reason for delay. The delay of thirty five years in the instant case is glaring and ought not to be condoned, particularly, when the petitioners have earlier approached this Court assailing the very same notification. In this regard, reliance could be placed on the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. A plethora of decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court on the issue regarding delay and as to how a Court of equity exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot extend its hands to such persons who approach the Court after several years can be relied upon. In fact, the Apex Court has held in several decisions that stale claims ought not to be entertained by High Courts exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The recent decisions in that regard are as follows: a) In a recent decision of the Apex Court reported in 2011 AIR SCW 1332 (STATE OF ORISSA & ANR. The recent decisions in that regard are as follows: a) In a recent decision of the Apex Court reported in 2011 AIR SCW 1332 (STATE OF ORISSA & ANR. V/S. MAMATA MOHANTY) the consideration of an application where delay and laches could be attributed against a person who approaches in a writ petition is discussed by stating that though the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply to writ jurisdiction, however, the Doctrine of Limitation being based on public policy, the principles enshrined therein are applicable and writ petitions could be dismissed at the initial stage on the ground of delay and laches. b) In the case of SHANKAR COOP HOUSING SOCIETY LTD. V/S. M.PRABHAKAR & ORS (2011 AIR SCW 3033), the Apex Court at para 53 has given the relevant considerations, in determining whether delay or laches in approaching the writ court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The same reads as follows; “53. The relevant considerations, in determining whether delay or laches should be put against a person who approaches the writ court under Article 226 of the Constitution is now well settled. They are: (1) there is no inviolable rule of law that whenever there is a delay, the court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition; it is a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and each case must be dealt with on its owns facts. (2) The principle on which the court refuses relief on the ground of laches or delay is that the rights accrued to others by the delay in filing the petition should not be disturbed, unless there is a reasonable explanation for the delay, because court should not harm innocent parties if their rights had emerged by the delay on the part of the petitioners. (3) The satisfactory way of explaining delay in making an application under Article 226 is for the petitioner to show that he had been seeking relief elsewhere in a manner provided by law. If he runs after a remedy not provided in the Statute or the statutory rules, it is not desirable for the High Court to condone the delay. It is immaterial what the petitioner chooses to believe in regard to the remedy. (4) No hard and fast rule, can be laid down in this regard. Every case shall have to be decided on its own facts. It is immaterial what the petitioner chooses to believe in regard to the remedy. (4) No hard and fast rule, can be laid down in this regard. Every case shall have to be decided on its own facts. (5) That representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of the delay.” c) Similarly, the Apex Court in the case of SAWARAN LATHA AND OTHERS V/s. STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS ( 2010(4) SCC 532 ) has held that when the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued in the year 2001 and the award was passed in the year 2004, writ petitions filed for quashing of the notification in the year 2009 have to be dismissed on the ground of delay as the litigants who dare to abuse the process of the Court in disregard of the law of limitation, delay and laches should not be encouraged. d) In TAMIL NADU HOUSING BOARD, CHENNAI Vs. M.MEIYAPPAN & OTHERS (2010 AIR SCW 7130), when the acquisition proceedings were challenged 10 years after notifications were issued, the Apex Court held that the High Courts should not have entertained the writ petition particularly after passing of the award and that the High Court should have dismissed the writ petition at the threshold on the ground of delay and laches. e) In SWAIKA PROPERTIES (P) LIMITED AND ANOTHER Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN & OTHERS ( 2008 (4) SCC 695 ), the Apex Court has followed its earlier decisions in the case of MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF GREATER BOMBAY Vs. THE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENT CO. PVT. LTD. & OTHERS ( (1996) 11 SCC 501 ) by observing as follows: “After the award under Section 11 of the Act was made by the Collector he is empowered under Section 16 to take possession of the land, if the possession was not already taken, exercising power under Section 17(4). Thereupon, the land shall vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. It is well settled law that taking possession of the land is by means of a memorandum (Panchnama) prepared by the Land Acquisition Officer and signed by Panch witnesses called for the purpose. Subsequently, the collector hands over the same to the beneficiary by means of another memorandum or panchnama, as the case may be. It is well settled law that taking possession of the land is by means of a memorandum (Panchnama) prepared by the Land Acquisition Officer and signed by Panch witnesses called for the purpose. Subsequently, the collector hands over the same to the beneficiary by means of another memorandum or panchnama, as the case may be. But in this case Section 91 of the BMC Act statutorily comes into play which would indicate that the Land Acquisition Officer while making award should intimate to the Commissioner, Municipal Corporation of the amount of compensation determined and all other expenses. The Corporation shall pay over the same to the Land Acquisition Officer.” It was held that the writ petition had been filed after possession was taken over and the award had become final and therefore, the writ petition had to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. f) The order of the High Court dismissing the writ petition was confirmed by the Apex Court in BANDA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORTIY, BANDA Vs. MOTILAL AGARWAL AND OTHERS ( (2011) 5 SCC 394 ) as the filing of the writ petition was 9 years after the declaration was issued under Section 6(1) of the Act and the delay of 6 years after passing of the award and the delayed filing of the writ petition was a reason for refusing to entertain the prayer made in the writ petition. It was held that in a challenge made to the acquisition of land for the purpose of public purpose Courts have consistently held that the delay in filing the writ petition should be viewed seriously, if the petitioner fails to offer plausible explanation for the delay. g) Reference can also be made to another decision of the Apex Court reported in (1996) 6 SCC 445 in the case of STATE OF RAJASTHAN & OTHERS V/s. D.R.LAKSHMI & OTHERS, wherein it has cautioned the High Court not to entertain the writ petitions where there is inordinate delay while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. h) Similarly, in the case of THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, AHMEDNAGAR & ANR. V/S. SHAH HYDER BEIG & ORS. h) Similarly, in the case of THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, AHMEDNAGAR & ANR. V/S. SHAH HYDER BEIG & ORS. [(2002) 2 SCC 48], it has been opined thus: “The real test for sound exercise of discretion by the High Court in this regard is not the physical running of time such but the test is whether by reason of delay, there is such negligence on the part of the petitioner so as to infer that he has given up his claim or where the petitioner has moved the Writ Court, the rights of the third parties have come into being which should not be allowed to disturb unless there is reasonable explanation for the delay.” i) In fact in S.S. BALU AND OTHERS V/S. STATE OF KARNATAKA [ (2009) 2 SCC 479 ], it has been held that delay defeats equity and that relief can be denied on the ground of delay alone even though relief is granted to other similarly situated persons who approach the courts in time. j) To a similar effect is the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ANDHRA PRADESH INDUSTRIAL INFRASTRUCTURE CORPORATION LTD. V. CHINTHAMANENI NARASIMHA RAO & OTHERS [ (2012) 12 SCC 797 ]. The said decisions are squarely applicable to the facts of the present case. 9. In the circumstances, writ petition is dismissed as being hit by principles of res judicata and constructive res judicata and also on the ground of delay and laches and being an abuse of process of this Court. However, I refrain from imposing costs as the petitioners have disclosed filing of earlier writ petitions and writ appeals in the memorandum of writ petition.