JUDGMENT : M. Satyanarayana Murthy, J. The defendants in Original Suit No.108 of 1988 on the file of the Court of Additional Subordinate Judge, Ongole (for short, the 'trial Court') preferred this Appeal challenging the decree and judgment dated 06.03.1996, wherein the suit filed by the plaintiff, for partition of the schedule property into 2 equal shares and allot one such share to the plaintiff, for rendition of true and correct accounts and grant mesne profits, was decreed. 2. For convenience of reference, the ranks given to the parties in O.S. No.108 of 1988, before the trial Court, will be adopted throughout this judgment. 3. During pendency of the Appeal, 2nd defendant-1st appellant and 1st defendant-2nd appellant herein died and, accordingly, A.S.M.P. No.8733 of 1999 filed to bring on record appellants 2, who is already on record, and appellants 3 and 4 as legal heirs of 1st appellant and respondents 4 to 6 as legal heirs of 2nd appellant is ordered on 02.07.2012; plaintiff-sole respondent herein died and, accordingly, A.S.M.P. No.472 of 2012 filed to bring on record respondents 2 and 3 as her legal heirs is ordered on 29.02.2012. 4. The plaintiff filed the suit for the aforesaid reliefs alleging that plaintiff, 1st defendant and one Angalakurthy Ramulu are the natural children of Angalakurthy Subbaiah and Rosamma. 2nd defendant is the daughter of 1st defendant and wife of the Ramulu. After obtaining permission from Angalakurthy Subbaiah, Angalakurthy Papayya and Ammakkamma adopted Ramulu on 10.05.1943, as per Hindu rites and customs, under a registered adoption deed. Angalakurthy Subbaiah is no other than the brother's son of Papayya. Since the date of adoption, Ramulu ceased to be the member of his natural family and has been living with Papayya and Ammakkamma as their natural son. Angalakurthy Subbaiah, who own and possessed a thatched house in the village and as the same became dilapidated and fell down, shifted his residence to the house of Ramulu. Subsequently, Ramulu married the 2nd defendant. As Subbaiah became old, Ramulu used to assist and manage the property of Subbaiah. After death of Subbaiah in the year 1964 the suit schedule property devolved upon his widow Rosamma and his two daughters, plaintiff and 1st defendant, and since then they are jointly enjoying the schedule property with the assistance of Ramulu. Subsequently, Ramulu married the 2nd defendant. As Subbaiah became old, Ramulu used to assist and manage the property of Subbaiah. After death of Subbaiah in the year 1964 the suit schedule property devolved upon his widow Rosamma and his two daughters, plaintiff and 1st defendant, and since then they are jointly enjoying the schedule property with the assistance of Ramulu. Later, after the death of Rosamma, in the year 1977, the plaintiff and 1st defendant together became entitled to entire schedule property and have been enjoying the same jointly but, as the 1st defendant is living in the village where the schedule property situate, the 1st defendant is in management of the routine work relating to cultivation etc., and the plaintiff used to visit the village in connection with the cultivation like raising crops, harvesting etc., occasionally. Thus, the possession of schedule property by the plaintiff and 1st defendant is joint as they are co-sharers; moreover, the 2nd defendant, who is resident of the same village, also used to assist her mother, 1st defendant. While the matter stood thus, the plaintiff requested the 1st defendant to co-operate for partition of the schedule property but she refused; thereupon, the elder by name Tulluri Venkaiah was sent to mediate but no purpose was served; hence, the suit for the aforesaid reliefs. 5. The 2nd defendant filed written statement admitting the relationship between the parties, adoption of Ramulu by Papayya and Ammakkamma, execution of registered adoption deed but resisted the claim of the plaintiff on various grounds mainly contending that: a) Angalakurthy Subbaiah and his son Ramulu used to live together in the ancestral thatched house, as members of the joint family, in spite of his adoption in the year 1943. Hence, the contention of the plaintiff that the Ramulu has nothing to do with the property of Subbaiah is absurd; b) The 1st defendant admitted about the death of Subbaiah in the year 1964 while contending that after the death of Subbaiah, his estate devolved upon his wife, Rosamma and his son Ramulu, who were living with him but the plaintiff and 1st defendant, who got married by then, were living separately. Therefore, the plaintiff and 1st defendant have no right or interest in the schedule property but after death of Subbaiah, his son Ramulu and wife of Subbaiah enjoyed the property jointly; after death of Rosamma, Ramulu alone is in possession and enjoyment as on the date of schedule property with absolute rights; thereby the plaintiff is not entitled to claim any share in the schedule property; c) Ramulu never managed or assisted the plaintiff and 1st defendant in enjoyment of property, after death of Subbaiah, and this theory is set-up to claim that the plaintiff is in joint possession and enjoyment of the property. Neither the plaintiff nor the 1st defendant have got any right, title or interest in the schedule property thereby not entitled to claim the relief of partition; d) Item 4 of the schedule property is not part of the estate of late Subbaiah. Ramulu was entitled to Ac.2.09 cents in Survey No.409 of which a part Ac.1.00 cents is shown as Item 4 of the schedule having got under the adoption deed and also registered sale deed dated 05.05.1943; thus, Item 4 of the schedule property is the absolute and self acquired property of late Ramulu; e) Item 11 of the schedule property is only Ac.3.13 cents but not Ac.4.11 cents as shown in the plaint; Similarly, Item 10 of the plaint schedule is only 60 gadies but not 70 gadies as shown in the schedule annexed to the plaint. The barns and cattle shed shown in Item 8 of the plaint schedule were not in existence by the date of death of Subbaiah; they were constructed by Ramulu. Item 8 of the schedule property is the self acquired property of Ramulu and that he was in exclusive possession and enjoyment of the property in dispute and after his death the 2nd defendant succeeded the estate of late Ramulu; Consequently the plaintiff is not entitled to claim any share in the property and prayed to dismiss the suit. 6. The 1st defendant filed memo dated 08.11.1988 adopting the written statement filed by 2nd defendant. 7. Basing on the above pleadings, the trial Court though initially framed 2 issues, on 20.03.1989, while pronouncing the judgment framed as many as 10 issues, while recasting the earlier issues, which are as follows: 1. Whether the said Angalakurthi Ramulu was adopted by Angalakurthi Ammakkamma in the year 1943? 2. 7. Basing on the above pleadings, the trial Court though initially framed 2 issues, on 20.03.1989, while pronouncing the judgment framed as many as 10 issues, while recasting the earlier issues, which are as follows: 1. Whether the said Angalakurthi Ramulu was adopted by Angalakurthi Ammakkamma in the year 1943? 2. Whether the said adoption was cancelled by the adoptee or the parties to the adoption? 3. Whether the said Ramulu lived with his parents even after adoption and, if so, whether it revives the coparcenary interest in his natural family? 4. Whether the said Ramulu managed the properties of his natural family in his own right or merely assisted his father, mother and sisters? 5. Whether the entries in revenue records make the possession of properties exclusive and absolute in the hands of the said Ramulu or D-2? 6. Whether Item 4 of the suit schedule property is the absolute and exclusive property of Ramulu? 7. Whether the barns and cattle sheds in Item 8 were constructed by Ramulu or his parents? 8. Whether Items 10 and 11 comprised less extent than the plaint and, if so, what is its affect on the suit? 9. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to half share in all items of the suit schedule property and mesne profits? 10. To what relief? 8. During course of trial, on behalf of the plaintiff, PWs.1 to 3 were examined but marked no documents. On behalf of the defendants, DWs.1 to 4 were examined and Exs.B-1 to B-19 were marked. 9. Upon hearing argument of both the counsel, considering oral and documentary evidence on record, the trial Court decided all the issues in favour of the plaintiff and passed a preliminary decree declaring that the plaintiff is entitled to half share in Items 1 to 3 and 5 to 11 of the schedule property with a further direction to file a petition for ascertainment of mesne profits. 10. Aggrieved by the decree and judgment of the trial Court, the defendants preferred the instant Appeal raising several contentions. 10. Aggrieved by the decree and judgment of the trial Court, the defendants preferred the instant Appeal raising several contentions. The main grounds urged before this Court are: a) The finding of the trial Court that the 1st defendant is estopped from contending that the Ramulu is continuing as member of the joint family and that in view of the adoption had taken place prior to commencement of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (for short, 'the Act') the property that vested on Ramulu will not be divided but the trial Court on erroneous approach held that the Ramulu was not entitled to claim any share in the property of his natural parents, Subbaiah and Rosamma; b) The trial Court did not consider the plea of perfection of title by adverse possession by Ramulu, passed a decree declaring that the plaintiff is entitled to half share in Items 1 to 3 and 5 to 11 of the schedule property and it is erroneous approach; c) It is contended that Ramulu and his natural father Subbaiah constituted as composite family and thereby Ramulu is entitled to half share in the suit schedule property but this fact was not considered and committed an error in passing the preliminary decree under challenge; and finally prayed to allow the Appeal setting-aside the decree and judgment of the trial Court. 11. During course of argument, Sri Koneti Raja Reddy, learned counsel for the defendants-appellants, would contend that when adoption had taken place prior to commencement of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, Ramulu is entitled to claim share both in the natural family and adopted family being the son but the effect of partition that took place prior to commencement of the Act was not considered by the trial Court and totally disinherited the 2nd defendant, who is the wife of Ramulu. It is further contended that the trial Court did not consider the composite family of Ramulu and Subbaiah though Ramulu was taken in adoption by Papayya and Ammakkamma; so also, perfection of title by adverse possession by Ramulu to the exclusion of plaintiff for over a period of 20 years paying land revenue to the Revenue authorities and taxes to the concerned authorities. If these contentions are appreciated by the trial Court in proper perspective, the trial Court would have dismissed the suit but on erroneous appreciation of facts and law passed a preliminary decree in favour of the plaintiff and, therefore, requested this Court to reappraise entire evidence, both oral and documentary, and dismiss the suit by allowing this Appeal. 12. Whereas, Sri Gurram Pedda Babu, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondents 1 to 3, argued totally in support of the finding recorded by the trial Court and placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in L.N. Aswathama and another v. P. Prakash, 2009 (13) SCC 229 and decisions of this Court in Cosmopolitan Co-operative Housing Society Limited and another v. State of A.P. and others, AIR 2009 AP 136 , P. Veerabhadrappa Setty v. Polliki Chandrahas, 2014 (2) ALD 724 and Indukuru Ramachandra Reddy and another v. Agnigundala Venkata Ranga Rao and another, 2012 (6) ALD 195 . 13. Considering rival contentions, perusing the material available on record including the decree and judgment under challenge, the points that arise for consideration are: 1) Whether Angalakurthy Ramulu, adopted son of Papayya and Ammakkamma, is entitled to claim share in the property of his natural parents, as the adoption took place prior to commencement of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956? 2) Whether Ramulu and Subbaiah formed into a composite family? If so, is the 2nd defendant wife of deceased Ramulu is entitled to claim half share in the schedule property? 3) Whether Ramulu perfected his title by adverse possession? If so, is the 2nd defendant became absolute owner of the property after death of Ramulu? 4) Whether the plaintiff and 1st defendant being the daughters of Subbaiah and natural sisters of Ramulu are entitled to claim half share each in the schedule property? 14. Point No.1: Undisputedly, the adoption of Ramulu took place prior to commencement of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, adoption deed was executed on 10.05.1943 and the said fact was admitted by the 2nd defendant in the written statement itself. When the adoption took place prior to commencement of the Act, Ramulu ceased to be the member of his natural family and became a coparcener in the adopted family. When the adoption took place prior to commencement of the Act, Ramulu ceased to be the member of his natural family and became a coparcener in the adopted family. Therefore, under Section 11 of the Act, Ramulu was disentitled to claim share in the property of his natural family but provisions of the Act have no application for the adoption which took place prior to commencement of the Act. In such case, the un-codified law of adoption alone is applicable to such adoptions and such adoptions are governed by the smruthis and other treatises to decide the rights of the adopted son in the property of his natural parents. 15. Various High Courts in our country have expressed different opinions about the rights of adopted son in the property of his natural family. Where a member of mitakshara joint family adopts a son, the latter becomes a coparcener from the moment of his adoption, with his adoptive father as well as with other members of the coparcenary. In consequence of his adoption, he acquires a right as though by birth in ancestral or joint family property, can interdict alienation's, demand partition and is also entitled to the benefit of survivorship. Therefore, the status of an adopted son is on par with a natural son and became a coparcener in mitakshara. Among the sudras in Madras, Bengal and other provinces except in Bombay, it is settled that the adopted son shares equally with the after born auras a son. The Madras High Court in Raja v. Subbaraya, (1844) 7 Madras 253, approved in the latter judgment in Perrazu v. Subbarayadu, (1921) 48 IA 280. The Privy Council in Guramma Bhratar Chanbasappa Deshmukh and another v. Malappa, AIR 1964 (SC) 510 overruling the above judgments of Madras High Court accepted the view; however, the Bombay High Court refused to follow the treatises of Dattaka Chandrika and the decision of the Privy Council based on it held that among Sudras, the adopted son gets only 1/5th of the whole estate but these principles have nothing to do with the present facts of the case. 16. By adoption of a boy, he is completely removed from natural family as regards to all civil rights and obligations as held in Muthu Krishnan v. Palani, 1969 (1) MLJ 129 . 16. By adoption of a boy, he is completely removed from natural family as regards to all civil rights and obligations as held in Muthu Krishnan v. Palani, 1969 (1) MLJ 129 . Thus, the adopted son was completely removed and thereby he need not even to observe pollution on the birth or death of any member in the family of his birth. He also ceases to perform funeral ceremonies for those of his family for whom he would otherwise have offered oblations, and he loses all rights of inheritance as completely as if, he had never been born as held by the Allahabad High Court in Chandrakunwar v. Choudri Narpat Singh, (1907) 34 IA 27 and later judgment of the Apex Court in Salig Ram v. Munshi Ram and another, AIR 1961 (SC) 1374 . 17. In view of the principles laid down in the decisions referred supra, the adopted son loses his rights in the coparcenary property of his natural family and does not inherit anything from the natural family and not liable for their debts. Another theory of succession of property of natural parents is that once a property is vested on the adopted son in the natural family property, it cannot be divested on account of his adoption subsequently. From the conflicting views even on this aspect by different High Courts, a similar question came up for consideration before Calcutta High Court, whether the adopted son is divested of the ancestral property in his natural family which vested solely and absolutely in him prior to his adoption as the only surviving member of joint family to which it previously belonged, is a question on which there is difference of opinion. In Venkatanarasimha Appa Rao v. Rangayya Apparao, (1906) 29 Madras 437, the Madras High Court following the decision of Calcutta High Court in Behari Lal v. Kailal Chunder, (1896) 1 CWN 121 held that he is not so divested. The Orissa High Court also took a similar view in Madhab Sahu v. Hat Kishore Sahu, ILR 1974 (9) Cuttack 139. The Bombay High Court did not accept the view and held that on adoption, the adopted son loses all his rights to property he may have acquired in his natural family, including the right to property which had become exclusively vested in him before his adoption. The Bombay High Court did not accept the view and held that on adoption, the adopted son loses all his rights to property he may have acquired in his natural family, including the right to property which had become exclusively vested in him before his adoption. The fundamental idea underlying an adoption is that the boy given in adoption gives up the natural family and everything connected with it and takes his place in the adoptive family as if he had been born in it. The result would be that on adoption the property vested in him would be divested, and devolve upon the next heir in the family of his birth. But in Dattatraya Sakharam v. Gobind Sambhaji, (1916) 40 Bombay 429, a different view was taken and it was distinguished inMahableshwar Narayan v. Subramanya, (1923) 47 Bombay 542 and Palani 8 held that a person does not on adoption lose the share which he has already obtained on partition from his natural father and brothers in the family of his birth, on the ground that the share so obtained cannot be said to be the estate of his natural father within the meaning of the text of Manu. 18. Similar view was expressed by different High Courts and the consistent view of various High Courts is that if a property is vested on son in a natural family by partition or otherwise, it would not divest on account of his adoption by adoptive parents. In such case the said Ramulu, ceases to be the member of his natural family; since, adoption tantamount to renunciation or surrender of paternal heritage of natural family. The words 'heritage' and 'gotra' are sufficiently comprehensive and in the mitakshara school where the son's inheritance is always unobstructed, there is even less scope for the distinction between inheritance already vested in him and property which he may inherit, if there be no adoption. On the whole, the view of the Bombay High Court appears to be the better solution. 19. On the whole, the view of the Bombay High Court appears to be the better solution. 19. Thus, applying the principle laid down by Bombay High Court to the present facts of the case, in the absence of proof of vesting of any property on Ramulu by his natural family, either by partition or in any other mode, he is disentitled to claim share in the property of his natural family on his adoption since he ceases to be a member of his natural family in view of his transplantation to the adoptive family and that too the said adoption amounts to renunciation of paternal heritage in the natural family; thereby, he is not even entitled to perform funerals of his natural parents and observation of pollution on birth and deaths in the natural family; thus, he is totally disconnected with his natural family. 20. In the present case, there is absolutely no evidence that any property was vested on the Ramulu in the property of natural parents and thereby question of claiming any share by Ramulu and, after his death by 2nd defendant, wife of Ramulu does not arise. From various principles laid down by different High Courts, it is obvious that a person who was adopted by another family, the adopted boy ceases to be the member of natural family and unless any property is vested prior to his adoption either in partition or otherwise, he is disentitled to claim share in the natural family property; if any property is vested on him, it cannot be divested on account of his adoption. Therefore, Ramulu, the adopted son of Papayya and Ammakkamma is not entitled to claim share in the property of his natural family, after his adoption, since no property was vested on him prior to his adoption on 10.05.1943. 21. Learned counsel for the defendants-appellants contended that prior to the un-codified law on Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance, the adopted boy is entitled to claim share even in the natural family property, being a coparcener, but this view is against the principles of law laid down by various High Courts. Therefore, the contention of learned counsel is without any substance and does not merit consideration. Hence, I hold that Ramulu, adopted son of Papayya and Ammakkamma, was not entitled to claim share in the property of his natural family. Therefore, the contention of learned counsel is without any substance and does not merit consideration. Hence, I hold that Ramulu, adopted son of Papayya and Ammakkamma, was not entitled to claim share in the property of his natural family. Accordingly, the point is answered in favour of the plaintiff-respondents 1 to 3 and against the defendants-appellants. 22. Point No.2: The concept of composite family is almost foreign to Hindu law, but such concept is developed due to custom prevailing in a particular community or due to express or implied contract between the parties to form a composite family. Composite family means where two or more families agreed to live and work together, pool their resources, throw their gains and labour into the joint stock, shoulder the common risk, utilise the resources of the units indiscriminately for the purpose of the whole family, such a case may be within the ambit of composite family, provided that there is a custom of such merger known to those families. A composite family is indeed constituted with the same purpose. 23. Evidently, it has for its objects the convenient and efficient management at family property by co-operate effort. Spirit of cooperation and mutual help is a dominant factor in constitution of such families. The families usually knit together by strong ties of marriage feel impelled to pool together their joint resources and merge themselves into a single unit under some engagement. There are also cases where rich husbands take into their families the brothers of their poor wives along with their family property and entrust them with the management of their house-hold duties and cultivation. These instances are merely illustrative. As a matter of course, there can be several other considerations which may bring two or more families together blending them into one composite whole reinforcing them further by strong ties of matrimonial relations. The requirements of a composite family indeed are varied. They are not satisfied if there is no custom known to the family. It will be fatal for the institution, if its origin is not traced to any agreement express or implied. The blending should be so far complete as to make it appear, in all its ventures and undertakings, a complete unified whole. They are not satisfied if there is no custom known to the family. It will be fatal for the institution, if its origin is not traced to any agreement express or implied. The blending should be so far complete as to make it appear, in all its ventures and undertakings, a complete unified whole. The resources of the units must be available for the purpose of the whole family without any discrimination and each member thereof must be in a position to act for the other members. And all this, as already said, must be a necessary consequence of the original agreement between the parties. The agreement may be express or implied, but it must be between the families to pool together their labour, skill and resources and work for the common weal. 24. The extent of their share in the family will depend upon the terms of the agreement and unless it is agreed to the contrary, the shares of the families will ordinarily be equal. If such an agreement is to be inferred from the circumstances, the circumstances must be such as to lead to that inevitable conclusion. Being a creature of custom having its origin in agreement, it admits of no doubt that the evidence to be adduced in support thereof must be clear and convincing as held by a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Anchuru Veerapa Naidu v. Gurijala Vetikaiah Chowdari, AIR 1961 AP 534 . 25. In another Division Bench judgment of this Court in Kakarla Subbayya and others v. Makkena Sitaramamma and another, AIR 1959 AP 86 , it is ruled as follows: "In the absence of an express agreement, the formation of a composite family cannot ordinarily be inferred from the mere circumstances of two different families living together and cultivating jointly, unless the conduct and mutual relations of the component units are wholly incompatible with the preservation of their individuality. A long duration, say, the passing of a few generations of common living may, in itself, raise a presumption of merger sometimes." It was further observed therein as follows: "Again, a continuous course of dealing with the properties of the quondam units for the common Benefit of the family, or acquisitions jointly in the names of all the members of a common head and the launching of joint ventures, of the shouldering of common risks and the utilisation of the resources of the units indiscriminately for the purpose of the whole family would be some of the indicia of a merger." 26. Similarly, in another Division Bench judgment of this Court in Vakati Venkatasubba Reddi v. Pelleti Pitchamma and others, AIR 1960 AP 263 , this Court while discussing the similar facts discussed about the burden of proof and held as follows at Para 11: "Thus in this case when the plaintiff succeeded in proving merely that the parties are, be it closely, and the families lived together for sometime in the same house helping each other and had a common mess, but the properties belonging to each branch were kept distinct and dealt with separately and exclusively, the question whether there has been a 'composite family' giving rise to right of partition of the properties held in severally needs to be considered. At the out-set in ascertaining the legal position of the parties placed in similar circumstances as these in the instant case, we may steer clear of the law propounded concerning the 'composite family' coming into existence by a proved custom and the arrangement resulting from the affiliation of an ill-atom son-in-law to a member of a Hindu joint family; nor the learned Advocate-General has adopted this analogy to substantiate the case of the appellant. Creation of a 'composite family' said to have been brought about by living together of the representatives of different families by pooling their labour and property with a view to facilitate convenient and efficient management of that property needs from its very nature to be established by unmistakable and unimpeachable evidence of such merger of the units constituting the composite family, that the blending together should not only be complete but impossible of yielding any scope for assertion of individuality for the use of the composing units either in the matter of owning property or acts in relation thereto or concerning them. Though it might be that the practise of different families living together to gain and having been benefited by the corporate existence may have divided the pooled resources according to the understanding between the parties or in equal shares, Courts have been anxious not to recognise such composite families with legal rights unless it is possible to infer a tenable and enforceable arrangement which may be either express or implied" 27. This Court in R. Sudhakar Reddy v. J. Govinda Reddy, 2015 (2) ALD 531 , held as follows: "It is further held that unless a custom is prevailing in the particular caste or region, the ill-atom adoption of a third party cannot be accepted. Custom if recognised by a group of persons or area etc., is a source of law. Jurisprudentially custom is a known source of law and an integral part of the Lex non-script or unwritten law having law creating efficacy. It commends itself to the national and social conscience as principles of justice and public utility." 28. In the earliest Division Bench judgment of Madras High Court in Allareddi Subbamma v. Nallapareddi Audilakshmamma, 22 MLJ 260, it was ruled as follows: "Isolated cases are of little value unless it be proved that these two families have been united together on equal terms. There is nothing to show that any member of the Allareddi family has ever managed any of the lands which stand in the name of the Nallapareddi family." The learned Judges went on to say, "The arrangement, if regarded as a union, was therefore unequal." 29. In a judgment of this Court in Garimella Annapurnayya v. Kota Appalanarasimhamurthy and others, 1994 (3) ALT 491, this Court in Para 16 held as follows: "As the legal texture, a composite family is neither related to coparcenary nor to a Hindu Joint Family. The institution has no basis in the original text of Hindu Law and is purely a creature of custom obtaining in some parts of the families. It is mostly prevalent in certain parts of South India especially in Andhra Pradesh. The institution has no basis in the original text of Hindu Law and is purely a creature of custom obtaining in some parts of the families. It is mostly prevalent in certain parts of South India especially in Andhra Pradesh. A 'composite family' may be described as follows: "......Where two or more families agree to live and work together, pool their resources, throw their gains into the joint stock, shoulder the common risks and utilise the resources of the units indiscriminately for the purpose of the whole family, such a case may well be within the ambit of composite family, provided there is a custom of such merger known to those families. A composite family is indeed constituted with some purpose and has evidently for its object the convenience and efficient management of the properties of the larger unit by the corporate effort of all the members of the smaller units composing the same. The spirit of co-operation and mutual help and the policy of all-for-each, and each-for-all are the dominant factors permeating the constitution of such a family. The family is usually knit together by strong ties of matrimony and affection among its members, who though not descended from a common ancestor feel impelled to pool together their several resources and merge the same into a single unit under the same management. There are instances of such composite families in existence under the custom in which the husbands affiliate into the matrimonial home, the brothers of their wives and entrust them with the management of their household duties and cultivation. The requisites of a composite family are not satisfied if there is not a custom in the family and it will be fatal for such an institution if its origin is not traced to some engagement, expressed or implied. The blending should be so far complete as to make it appear in all its ventures and undertakings a complete unified whole. The resources of the unit must be available for the whole family without any discrimination and each member thereof must be in a position to act for the other members. And all this must be a necessary consequence of the original agreement between the parties. The extent of their shares will depend upon the terms of the agreement and unless it is agreed to the contrary the shares of the families will ordinarily be equal. And all this must be a necessary consequence of the original agreement between the parties. The extent of their shares will depend upon the terms of the agreement and unless it is agreed to the contrary the shares of the families will ordinarily be equal. If such an agreement is to be inferred from the circumstances, those circumstances must be such as to lead inevitably to that conclusion. The mere fact that one of the members of one family had been helping in the cultivation by the members of another family is not by itself sufficient to raise such a presumption when all the other circumstances brought to light go against the plea of composite family." 30. One of the contentions in the grounds of Appeal, more particularly at Ground 5 is that Subbaiah and Ramulu constituted as members of composite family and thereby Ramulu is entitled to claim half share in the suit schedule property. There is an admission in the evidence of PW.1 about living together by Ramulu and his natural father Subbaiah, even after adoption but that by itself is not sufficient to infer that they are living as members of composite family. The concept of composite family is only by custom prevailing in the community or area or by an agreement but here neither any custom nor any agreement was pleaded to constitute Ramulu and his natural father Subbaiah as composite family. Strangely, no such plea was raised in the written statement filed by 2nd defendant but strangely the plea of composite family has sprung up for the first time in the Appeal without any factual foundation in the pleading. Therefore, in the absence of any pleading that Subbaiah and Ramulu constituted as composite family either by virtue of custom prevailing in the community or by virtue of an agreement, this plea is not open to the defendants for the first time in this Appeal. 31. In Veerappa Naidu 16, our own High Court has imported the true and correct meaning of a composite family as above. From the legal stipulations stated above, composite family, as a creature of custom, has nothing to do with the ill-atom affiliation although it may be an incident or an event in such a situation. 31. In Veerappa Naidu 16, our own High Court has imported the true and correct meaning of a composite family as above. From the legal stipulations stated above, composite family, as a creature of custom, has nothing to do with the ill-atom affiliation although it may be an incident or an event in such a situation. However, in Kakarla Subbaiah 17, it was observed that a long duration, say, the passing of few generations by common living may itself leave a presumption of merger some times - to call it, composite family. None of the expressions in any precedents or the author-ships (Mayne's Hindu Law & Usage, Mulla's Hindu Law and Raghavachariar's Hindu Law) can be taken to mean that ill-atom affiliation is an integral part of a composite family. There may be composite family with or without ill-atom affiliation and the vice versa. In a proper legal estimation a composite family may in some form bear similarity to joint tenancy and not tenancy in common. The distinction between tenancy in common and joint tenancy is well marked. Coparcenary or the Hindu Joint Family is akin to tenancy in common. In the case of tenants in common, they own the property in ascertained or definite shares, but the property has not been divided into shares. In the case of joint tenancy, joint owners own the property and their shares have not been ascertained and cannot be ascertained except perhaps at the time of partition. (Page 2401 of Venkataramaiya's Law Lexicon II Edn. Vol.4). 32. Custom is one of the sources of law. A stage has ripened to examine the scope and the extent of proof required to establish such a custom of either composite family or ill-atom affiliation. The concept of relevancy and proof of custom is codified in Section 13 of the Indian Evidence Act (Act I of 1872). Nothing more than a repetition of the same would unfurl the implication: Section 13: Where the question is as to the existence of any right or custom, the following facts are relevant:- (a) any transaction by which the right or custom in question was created, claimed, modified, recognized, asserted or denied, or which was inconsistent with its existence; (b) particular instances in which the right or custom was claimed, recognised or exercised, or in which its exercise was disputed, asserted or departed from. 33. 33. Therefore, the relevancy of the proof of custom clearly is subject to sub-clauses (a) and (b) of the above provision. The Supreme Court has settled the law, that the burden of proving custom in derogation of general law, lies heavily on the party who sets it up, vide Kunjuraman v. Mathevan, AIR 1971 SC 1398 , and Md. Baqar v. Naimunnisa Bibi, AIR 1965 SC 548. The mode and degree of proof of any type of custom can be stipulated in law in substratum: "In order that an alleged custom may be given the force of law, first, the evidence should be such as to prove the uniformity and continuity of the usage, and the conviction of those following it that they were acting in accordance with law and this conviction must be inferred from the evidence. Secondly, evidence of acts of the kind, acquiescence in those acts, their publicity, decision of Courts, or even of panchayats upholding such acts, the statements of experienced and competent persons of their belief that such acts were legal and valid, will be admissible. But evidence of this latter kind will be of little weight, if unsupported by actual examples of the usage asserted..... Custom cannot be extended by analogy. It must be established inductively not deductively and it cannot be established by a priori methods", (page 145 of Sarkar on Evidence - Section 13). 34. Family custom being a category of special custom, should have the attributes of antiquity, certainty and uniformity and it must be consciously accepted as having the force of law and these conditions must be proved by clear and unambiguous evidence, Harihar v. Balmiki, AIR 1975 SC 733 , and Pushpavathi v. Viswesumra, AIR 1964 SC 118 . As a first measure, such a custom should be pleaded in specific terms what the custom is, upon which a party is relying on, for the purpose of proof. The law in this regard within the scope of Order 6, Rule 3 of CPC appears to be settled by the Supreme Court in more than one precedent, Kunjuraman 22 and Salig Ram 10. 35. In view of the principles laid down in the decisions referred supra, unless there is a custom or an agreement between two families to constitute a composite family, such plea is not acceptable. 35. In view of the principles laid down in the decisions referred supra, unless there is a custom or an agreement between two families to constitute a composite family, such plea is not acceptable. Hence, by applying the principles laid down in the decision referred supra, and for lack of sufficient pleading and evidence to establish that Ramulu and his natural family constituted as composite family, this plea is only an after thought or an invention made for the first time during Appeal without any plea and evidence before the trial Court. Hence, it is not open to the defendants to claim half share in the property of his natural family, as a member of composite family. Therefore, it does not merit consideration and the 2nd defendant being the wife of Ramulu is not entitled to claim any share in the natural family of Ramulu as a member of composite family. Accordingly, the point is held in favour of the plaintiff-respondents 1 to 3 and against the defendants-appellants. 36. Point No.3: One of the contentions raised in the grounds of Appeal is that Ramulu has been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the property for over a period of 24 years exclusively and thereby perfected his title by adverse possession. In fact, before the trial Court, no such contention was raised, no issue was framed and decided by the trial Court but for the first time this contention was raised in the grounds of Appeal and during course of argument. 37. In fact, there is no pleading in the written statement as to when Ramulu claimed hostile title and continuing in possession for more than the statutory period. In the absence of any specific plea as to the date of claiming hostile title, it is difficult to accept that Ramulu is continuing in possession and enjoyment of the property claiming hostile title to the knowledge of plaintiff and 1st defendant for more than 24 years. Moreover, plaintiff and 1st defendant are co-sharers and possession of one co-sharer is possession of both, unless there is evidence of exclusion of one of the co-sharers from enjoying the property. Mere separate living of plaintiff and 1st defendant from their father Subbaiah is not sufficient to conclude that they were excluded from enjoying the property under Article 110 of Limitation Act. Mere separate living of plaintiff and 1st defendant from their father Subbaiah is not sufficient to conclude that they were excluded from enjoying the property under Article 110 of Limitation Act. The limitation of 12 years starts from the date of exclusion of co-sharers from enjoying the property to their knowledge. There is nothing on record to establish that plaintiff and 1st defendant were excluded from enjoying the property to the knowledge of other. However, the specific contention of the defendants-appellants in the grounds of Appeal is that Ramulu perfected his title by adverse possession. It is settled proposition of law that pleading is the foundation for claiming adverse possession or any right in the property. The importance of pleadings was discussed in Maria Margarida Sequeria Fernandes v. Erasmo Jack De Sequeria, AIR 2012 SC 1727 , wherein the Apex Court highlighted the importance of purity of pleadings in civil cases and held as follows: "61. In civil cases, pleadings are extremely important for ascertaining the title and possession of the property in question. 68. In order to do justice, it is necessary to direct the parties to give all details of pleadings with particulars. Once the title is prima facie established, it is for the person who is resisting the title-holder's claim to possession to plead with sufficient particularity on the basis of his claim to remain in possession and place before the court all such documents as in the ordinary course of human affairs are expected to be there. Only if the pleadings are sufficient, would an issue be struck and the matter sent to trial, where the onus will be on him to prove the averred facts and documents. 71. Apart from these pleadings, the court must insist on documentary proof in support of the pleadings. All those documents would be relevant which come into existence after the transfer of title or possession or the encumbrance as is claimed. While dealing with the civil suits, at the threshold, the court must carefully and critically examine the pleadings and documents. 72. The court will examine the pleadings for specificity as also the supporting material for sufficiency and then pass appropriate orders. 74. If the pleadings do not give sufficient details, they will not raise an issue, and the court can reject the claim or pass a decree on admission. On vague pleadings, no issue arises. 72. The court will examine the pleadings for specificity as also the supporting material for sufficiency and then pass appropriate orders. 74. If the pleadings do not give sufficient details, they will not raise an issue, and the court can reject the claim or pass a decree on admission. On vague pleadings, no issue arises. Only when he so establishes, does the question of framing an issue arise. Framing of issues is an extremely important stage in a civil trial. Judges are expected to carefully examine the pleadings and documents before framing of issues in a given case. 75. In pleadings, whenever a person claims right to continue in possession of another property, it becomes necessary for him to plead with specificity about who was the owner, on what date did he enter into possession, in what capacity and in what manner did he conduct his relationship with the owner over the years till the date of suit. He must also give details on what basis he is claiming a right to continue in possession. Until the pleadings raise a sufficient case, they will not constitute sufficient claim of defence. 76. * * * 77. The court must ensure that pleadings of a case must contain sufficient particulars. Insistence on details reduces the ability to put forward a non-existent or false claim or defence. In dealing with a civil case, pleadings, title documents and relevant records play a vital role and that would ordinarily decide the fate of the case." 38. In view of the principles referred above, it is the duty of the defendants to plead and prove the requirements which are essential for claiming adverse possession; otherwise, the defendants are not entitled to defend the claim of the plaintiff. In one of the oldest judgments of Privy Council in Secretary of State for India v. Debendra Lal Khan, AIR 1934 PC 23 , the Privy Council observed that the ordinary classical requirement of adverse possession is that it should be "nec vi, nec clam, nec precario" and the possession required must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that possession is adverse to the competitor. 39. 39. Thus, the three requirements mentioned in the above judgment are sine-qua-non to defend the claim of the plaintiff basing on the adverse possession, but here there is absolutely no pleading and evidence to establish those 3 requirements without making any allegation in the written statement, that Ramulu is in possession and enjoyment of the property for over a period of 24 years. The pleadings and evidence did not disclose the exact date of claiming hostile title or exact date of continuing. In the absence of such pleadings and evidence, it is difficult to accept the plea of adverse possession. 40. In S.M. Karim v. Bibi Sakina, AIR 1964 SC 1254 , the Apex Court observed as follows: "Adverse possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and extent and a plea is required at the least to show when possession becomes adverse so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected can be found. There is no evidence here when possession became adverse, if it at all did and a mere suggestion in the relief clause that there was an uninterrupted possession for "several 12 years" or that the plaintiff had acquired "an absolute title was not enough to raise such a plea. Long possession is not necessarily adverse possession and the prayer clause is not a substitute for a plea." 41. If the proposition laid down by the Apex Court in the decision cited supra, is applied to the present facts of the case, it is for the defendants, who are basing their defence on adverse possession, to plead and prove the 3 requirements and mere continuing in long possession is not necessarily adverse possession and that the uninterrupted possession in the property is not a substitute for the plea of adverse possession. 42. In R. Chandevarappa and others v. State of Karnataka and others, (1995) 6 SCC 309 , the Apex Court laid down the principles regarding adverse possession and necessity of pleadings and held as follows: "The question then is whether the appellant has perfected his title by adverse possession. It is seen that a contention was raised before the Assistant Commissioner that the appellant having remained in possession from 1968, he perfected his title by adverse possession. But the crucial facts to constitute adverse possession have not been pleaded. Admittedly the appellant came into possession by a derivative title from the original grantee. It is seen that a contention was raised before the Assistant Commissioner that the appellant having remained in possession from 1968, he perfected his title by adverse possession. But the crucial facts to constitute adverse possession have not been pleaded. Admittedly the appellant came into possession by a derivative title from the original grantee. It is seen that the original grantee has no right to alienate the land. Therefore, having come into possession under colour of title from original grantee, if the appellant intends to plead adverse possession as against the State, he must disclaim his title and plead his hostile claim to the knowledge of the State and that the State had not taken any action thereon within the prescribed period. Thereby, the appellant's possession would become adverse. No such stand was taken nor evidence has been adduced in this behalf. The counsel in fairness, despite his research, is unable to bring to our notice any such plea having been taken by the appellant." 43. In D.N. Venkatarayappa and another v. State of Karnataka and others, (1997) 7 SCC 567 , the Apex Court highlighted the crucial pleadings to constitute adverse possession and held as follows: "Therefore, in the absence of crucial pleadings, which constitute adverse possession and evidence to show that the petitioners have been in continuous and uninterrupted possession of the lands in question claiming right, title and interest in the lands in question hostile to the right, title and interest of the original grantees, the petitioners cannot claim that they have perfected their title by adverse possession." 44. The principle laid down in the above judgment is a binding precedent and in view of the proposition laid down by the Apex Court, it is not only the duty of the defendants to plead and prove those 3 requirements, but mere continuing in possession for a long period of more than 24 years by Ramulu and paying land revenue would not constitute adverse possession. 45. In a recent judgment of the Apex Court in Hemaji Waghaji Jat v. Bhikhabhai Khengarbhai Harijan and others, 2008 (6) ALD 121 (SC), it was held as follows in Para 23: "23. There is another aspect of the matter, which needs to be carefully comprehended. According to Revamma's case, the right of property is now considered to be not only a constitutional or statutory right but also a human right. There is another aspect of the matter, which needs to be carefully comprehended. According to Revamma's case, the right of property is now considered to be not only a constitutional or statutory right but also a human right. In the said case, this Court observed that "Human rights have been historically considered in the realm of individual rights such as, right to health, right to livelihood, right to shelter and employment, etc. but now human rights are gaining a multifaceted dimension. Right to property is also considered very much a part of the new dimension. Therefore, even claim of adverse possession has to be read in that context. The activist approach of the English Courts is quite visible from the judgments of Beaulane Properties Limited v. Palmer, (2005) 3 WLR 554and JA Pye (Oxford) Limited v. United Kingdom, (2005) 49 ERG 90. The Court herein tried to read the human rights position in the context of adverse possession. But what is commendable is that the dimensions of human rights have widened so much that now property dispute issues are also being raised within the contours of human rights." 46. In Mandal Revenue Officer v. Goundal Venkaiah and another, 2010 (2) ALD 115 (SC), the Apex Court, relying on its earlier judgment in Anakili v. A. Vedanayagam, 2007 (14) SCC 308 , held as follows: "Claim by adverse possession has two elements: (1) the possession of the defendant should become adverse to the plaintiff; and (2) the defendant must continue to remain in possession for a period of 12 years thereafter. Animus possidendi as is well known is a requisite ingredient of adverse possession. It is now a well-settled principle of law that mere possession of the land would not ripen into possessory title for the said purpose. Possessor must have animus possidendi and hold the land adverse to the title of the true owner. For the said purpose, not only animus possidendi must be shown to exist, but the same must be shown to exist at the commencement of the possession. He must continue in the said capacity for the period prescribed under the Limitation Act. Mere long possession, it is trite, for a period of more than 12 years without anything more does not ripen into a title." 47. He must continue in the said capacity for the period prescribed under the Limitation Act. Mere long possession, it is trite, for a period of more than 12 years without anything more does not ripen into a title." 47. The Apex Court in P.T. Munichikkana Reddy v. Revamma, 2007 (6) SCC 59 considered various facets of the law of adverse possession and laid down various propositions including the following: "Adverse possession in one sense is based on the theory or presumption that the owner has abandoned the property to the adverse possessor on the acquiescence of the owner to the hostile acts and claims of the person in possession. It follows that sound qualities of a typical adverse possession lie in it being open, continuous and hostile. To assess a claim of adverse possession, two-prolonged enquiry is required: 1. Application of limitation provision thereby jurisprudentially "wilful neglect" element on part of the owner established. Successful application in this regard distances the title of the land from the paper-owner. 2. Specific positive intention to dispossess on the part of the adverse possessor effectively shifts the title already distanced from the paper-owner, to the adverse possessor. Right thereby accrues in favour of adverse possessor as intent to dispossess is an express statement of urgency and intention in the upkeep of the property." 48. The Apex Court in T. Anjappa and others v. Somalingappa and another, 2006 (7) SCC 570 , held as follows: "The concept of adverse possession contemplates a hostile possession i.e. a possession which is expressly or impliedly in denial of the title of the true owner. Possession to be adverse must be possession by a person who does not acknowledge the other's rights but denies them. A person who bases his title on adverse possession must show by clear and unequivocal evidence that his property claimed. For deciding whether the alleged acts of a person constituted adverse possession, the animus of the person doing those acts is the most crucial factor. Adverse possession is commenced in wrong and is aimed against right. A person is said to hold the property adversely to the real owner when that person in denial of the owner's right excluded him from the enjoyment of his property. Adverse possession is commenced in wrong and is aimed against right. A person is said to hold the property adversely to the real owner when that person in denial of the owner's right excluded him from the enjoyment of his property. Adverse possession is that form of possession or occupancy of land which is inconsistent with the title of the rightful owner and tends to extinguish that person's title. Possession is not held to be adverse if it can be referred to a lawful title. An occupation of reality is inconsistent with the right of the true owner. Where a person possesses property in a manner in which he is not entitled to possess it, and without anything to show that he possesses it otherwise than an owner (that is, with the intention of excluding all person from it, including the rightful owner), he is in adverse possession of it. It is the basic principle of law of adverse possession that (a) it is the temporary and abnormal separation of the property from the title of it when an man holds property innocently against all the world but wrongfully against the true owner; (b) it is possession inconsistent with the title of the true owner." 49. In Aswathama 1, the Apex Court reiterated the requirements for establishing the adverse possession or prescription of title by adverse possession and burden of proof; in Para 18 held that long continuing possession by itself would not amount to adverse possession, if it was either permissive or without animus possessindi. To establish the claim of title by prescription, the possession of claimant must be physical/actual, exclusive, open, uninterrupted, notorious and hostile to the true owner for a period exceeding 12 years. It is further held that burden is on the defendants who asserted that Ramulu perfected his title by adverse possession. Therefore, it is for the defendants to establish that Ramulu is in possession and enjoyment of the property claiming hostile title against true owners for a period exceeding 12 years, before filing the present suit. 50. In Md. Mohammad Ali (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sri Jagadish Kalita and others, 2004 (1) SCC 271, the Apex Court ruled that long and continuous possession by itself, it is trite, would not constitute adverse possession. 50. In Md. Mohammad Ali (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sri Jagadish Kalita and others, 2004 (1) SCC 271, the Apex Court ruled that long and continuous possession by itself, it is trite, would not constitute adverse possession. Even non-participation in the rent and profits of the land to a co-sharer does not amount to ouster so as to give title by prescription. A co-sharer, as is well settled, becomes a constructive trustee of other co-sharer and the right of one trustee and/or her predecessors-in-interest would, thus be deemed to be protected by the trustee. 51. It is further contended that mere payment of land revenue to the concerned authorities by Ramulu under Exs.B-6 to B-13 is not sufficient to infer that Ramulu claimed exclusive right in the property for over a statutory period of 12 years from the date of setting up or claiming hostile. Even otherwise, Exs.B-6 to B-13 relates to the period from 1979 to 1989 for a period of 10 years. Mere payment of land revenue is not sufficient to ripen the possession of property into adverse possession and the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondents drawn the attention of this Court to a decision of this Court in Cosmopolitan Co-operative Housing Society 2, wherein it was held that any amendment made in record of rights would be subject to adjudication by civil Court and as such the entries in revenue records are not conclusive proof of title. Similarly, in Veerabhadrappa Setty 3, this Court reiterated the same principle and held that entries in revenue records under Section 6 of A.P. Rights in Land and Pattadar Passbooks Act, 1971, provided that every entry in record of rights should be presumed to be true until contrary was proved but it is settled law that mere long possession would not fructify into title, unless such possession was adverse to the real owner and entries in revenue records would not confer any title to the property. In Nirman Singh and others v. Thakur Lal Rudra Partab Narain Singh and others, AIR 1926 PC 100 , Privy Council and this Court in Yeluri Vijayabharathi and others v. Yeluri Manikyamma and others, 1998 (2) ALT 623 and the Apex Court in Jattu Ram v. Hakam Singh and others, (1993) 4 SCC 403 reiterated the same principle. 52. In Nirman Singh and others v. Thakur Lal Rudra Partab Narain Singh and others, AIR 1926 PC 100 , Privy Council and this Court in Yeluri Vijayabharathi and others v. Yeluri Manikyamma and others, 1998 (2) ALT 623 and the Apex Court in Jattu Ram v. Hakam Singh and others, (1993) 4 SCC 403 reiterated the same principle. 52. In view of the consistent principles laid down by the Apex Court and this Court the entries in revenue records are only for fiscal purpose and such long continuous possession as per the entries in adangals etc., would not create or confer any title in immovable property and therefore the long continuous possession of the property by Ramulu is not sufficient to claim title by adverse possession in the absence of proof of continuous possession of Ramulu for over a statutory period of 12 years after setting up adverse or hostile title. In fact in the pleadings no date of setting up of hostile or adverse title was disclosed and the evidence is also silent on this aspect. In those circumstances, this Court has no option except to conclude that the defendants-appellants miserably failed to establish adverse title claimed by 2nd defendant. Strangely, in the evidence of DW.1, she admitted that she has got share in the property and during the lifetime of Ramulu, natural brother of 1st defendant and husband of 2nd defendant, never requested her to relinquish her share in the schedule property. In a way, she admitted that she is entitled to a share in the property and consequently the plaintiff being the sister of 1st defendant is entitled to claim share in the property of their parents along with 1st defendant. In those circumstances, it is difficult to accept the contention of the defendants that the 2nd defendant is entitled to claim right in the entire property in view of perfecting title by adverse possession by Ramulu, after his death. Hence, I have no slightest hesitation to hold this point in favour of the plaintiff-respondents 1 to 3 and against the defendants-appellants. 53. Point No.4: Undisputedly, the plaintiff and 1st defendant are the natural sisters of Ramulu, who went in adoption in the year 1943, under undisputed registered adoption deed dated 10.05.1943. Hence, I have no slightest hesitation to hold this point in favour of the plaintiff-respondents 1 to 3 and against the defendants-appellants. 53. Point No.4: Undisputedly, the plaintiff and 1st defendant are the natural sisters of Ramulu, who went in adoption in the year 1943, under undisputed registered adoption deed dated 10.05.1943. After adoption of Ramulu by his adopted parents, he ceased to be a member of his natural family and no property was vested on him before his adoption in the property of natural family. Therefore, the plaintiff and 1st defendant alone remained as members of the family and they are entitled to claim entire property in equal shares being the legal heirs of deceased Subbaiah and Rosamma. In view of the undisputed relationship between the plaintiff, 1st defendant and Ramulu, the trial Court rightly concluded that the plaintiff and 1st defendant alone are entitled to equal share being the daughters of Subbaiah and Rosamma and this finding of the trial Court is free from any legal infirmity warranting interference of this Court. Hence, the finding of the trial Court is hereby confirmed holding that the plaintiff and 1st defendant are entitled to equal share in the suit schedule property, except Item 4 of schedule property since it was admittedly separate property of Ramulu, husband of 2nd defendant, as per the admissions made by PW.1 in her evidence and supported by documentary evidence EXs.B-1 to B-3. Hence, the well reasoned judgment of the trial Court is free from irregularities and illegalities and the same is hereby confirmed holding this point in favour of the plaintiff-respondents 1 to 3 and against the defendants-appellants. In view of my foregoing discussion, I find no merit in the Appeal and, accordingly, the Appeal Suit is liable to be dismissed. In the result, the Appeal Suit is dismissed confirming the decree and judgment dated 06.03.1996, passed in Original Suit No. 108 of 1988 by the learned Additional Subordinate Judge, Ongole. In consequence, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this Appeal, shall stand dismissed. No order as to costs.