JUDGMENT : Dr. A.K. Rath, J. - In this application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged, inter alia, the order dated 20.7.2005 passed by the learned A.D.J., F.T.C. No.3, Bhubaneswar in M.S. No.87 of 2004/149 of 2001. By the said order, the learned trial court recalled the order dated 20.11.2002 exempting the plaintiff-petitioner from payment of court fees. 2. Shorn of unnecessary details, the short facts of the case are that the petitioner is a Cooperative Society, registered under the Orissa Cooperative Societies Act, 1962. The Society established a sugar industry at Panipoila in the district of Nayagarh for manufacturing of sugar. The industry became sick and was given on lease to the opposite party by an agreement dated 12.1.1991. As per the agreement, the opposite party was liable to pay the minimum charge @ Rs. 50 lakh per annum except the first year i.e., 1990-91 and also pay the royalty on the quantity of sugar cane crushed. Since the opposite party made default in payment, the agreement was terminated in the year 1998. Thereafter the petitioner as plaintiff instituted M.S. No.149 of 2001 in the court of the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Bhubaneswar impleading the opposite party as defendant for recovery of Rs. 23,76,37,000/- towards outstanding liability. Court fee of Rs. 71,30,305/- was payable on the plaint. Relying on the notification of the Government of Orissa dated 7.6.1994 issued under Section 35 of the Court Fees Act, 1870, an application was filed to exempt it from paying the court fees. It is stated that the plaintiff-industry was running on heavy loss and could not make payments to its workers as well as employees. As the financial condition of the industry was in doldrums, it could not pay even interest on the loans incurred from different financial institutions. The industry had been closed since 2000-2001. It sustained heavy loss and there was no surplus income to pay the court fees. The annual income of the industry was much less than Rs. 12,000/- per annum. By order dated 20.11.2002, vide Annexure-4, the learned trial court allowed the petition and exempted the plaintiff from payment of court fees. 3. Pursuant to issuance of summons, the defendant entered appearance and filed the written statement along with counter claim. The annual income of the industry was much less than Rs. 12,000/- per annum. By order dated 20.11.2002, vide Annexure-4, the learned trial court allowed the petition and exempted the plaintiff from payment of court fees. 3. Pursuant to issuance of summons, the defendant entered appearance and filed the written statement along with counter claim. The defendant filed an application purported to be under Order 7, Rule 11 of C.P.C. read with Section 151 of C.P.C. praying, inter alia, to recall the order dated 20.11.2002 and direct the plaintiff to pay court fees as per valuation of the suit. An ancillary prayer was also made that if the plaintiff fails to pay the required court fees within the time stipulated by the court, the plaint be rejected. The plaintiff filed an objection to the same. It is stated that the petition does not come under any provision of Order 7, Rule 11 C.P.C. Further, payment of court fees is a matter between the plaintiff and the State and the defendant cannot challenge the same. By order dated 20.7.2005, the learned trial court allowed the application filed by the defendant and directed the plaintiff to pay court fees on the valuation of the suit within a month. 4. Heard Mr. S.K. Pattnaik, learned Sr. Advocate for the petitioner and Mr. D.P. Nanda, learned Advocate for the opposite party as well as Mr. S.P. Mishra, learned Advocate General for the State of Orissa. 5. Mr. S.K. Pattnaik, learned Sr. Advocate for the petitioner submitted that the defendant has no locus standi to challenge sufficiency of Court-fees paid. Court fee is primarily a matter between the State and the plaintiff. The application filed by the plaintiff to exempt from payment of court fees has been allowed. The same cannot be recalled in an application under Order 7, Rule 11 of C.P.C. He further submitted that the plaint can be rejected under Order 7, Rule 11 of C.P.C. provided the conditions enumerated in the said order are satisfied. But in the instant case, none of the condition stipulated in the said order is satisfied and as such the learned trial court travelled beyond its jurisdiction in recalling the earlier order. According to Mr. Pattnaik, learned Sr. Advocate, once the court fees has been exempted by the Court, it is only the State who is aggrieved by that order. But in the instant case, none of the condition stipulated in the said order is satisfied and as such the learned trial court travelled beyond its jurisdiction in recalling the earlier order. According to Mr. Pattnaik, learned Sr. Advocate, once the court fees has been exempted by the Court, it is only the State who is aggrieved by that order. The State of Orissa has not filed any application before this Court challenging the order dated 20.11.2002 passed by the learned court below. The application at the behest of the defendant is a ruse. He further submitted that on a bare perusal of the balance sheet, vide Annexure-3, it would show that the industry had sustained a loss of Rs. 55,014,402.75. The industry being a juristic person and the annual income of the industry was much less than Rs. 12,000/- for the financial year 2000-2001, the plaintiff is exempted from payment of court fees in view of the notification dated 7.6.1994 issued by the Government of Orissa. 6. Per contra, Mr. Nanda, learned counsel for the opposite party submitted that Clause (vi) of the notification dated 7.6.1994 issued by the Government of Orissa exempts the persons whose annual income does not exceed twelve thousand rupees from payment of court fees. If the said clause is read with clause (i) to (vii), then a natural person is exempted from payment of court fees, not artificial person. Further, the definition of income mentioned in Clause-(vi) of the notification has to be read and understood as per its dictionary meaning. He further submitted that income means money received over a period of time as a payment for work etc. and as an 'arrival' or "a coming in" i.e., income is what "comes in" or 'received' in the hands of a person in exchange of his services or as an interest on profit on his investment and not as claimed by the petitioner. If the definition of 'income' and 'total income' is taken into account, then the total income irrespective of its sources has to be treated and taken as income for the purpose of calculation of income as per notification of the Government. 7. Mr. Mishra, learned Advocate General on the other hand submitted that the word 'person' appearing in Clause (vi) of the notification dated 7.6.1994 includes an artificial person. But then if the income of such person is less than Rs. 7. Mr. Mishra, learned Advocate General on the other hand submitted that the word 'person' appearing in Clause (vi) of the notification dated 7.6.1994 includes an artificial person. But then if the income of such person is less than Rs. 12,000/- per annum, then he is exempted from payment of court fees. Referring to the balance sheet, vide Annexure-3, he submitted that the industry sustained a loss of Rs. 55,014,402.75 during the financial year 2000-2001 and as such exempted from payment of court fees. He relied on the judgment of this Court in the case of Bijoy Kumar Sahoo v. Gokula Bihari Mohanty and others, AIR 2011 Orissa 183. 8. The following points emerge for consideration of this Court : (1) Whether the defendant has any locus standi to challenge the order of the learned Additional District Judge (FTC No.-III), Bhubaneswar exempting the plaintiff from payment of court fees ? (2) Whether the word 'person' appearing in Clause (vi) of the notification dated 7.6.1994 issued by the Government of Orissa under Section 35 of the Court Fees Act, 1970 includes juridical person ? (3) Whether the annual income of the plaintiff exceeds Rs. 12,000/- enabling it from exemption of court fees under the aforesaid notification ? 9. In Mahasay Ganesh Prasad Ray and another v. Narendra Nath Sen and others, AIR 1953 SC 431 , the apex Court held that the payment of court fees is a matter primarily between the plaintiff and Government. The said dicta was reiterated in Sri Rathnavarmaraja v. Smt. Vimla, AIR 1961 Supreme Court 1299. In paragraph-2 of the said report, the apex Court held as follows:- "(2) The Court-fees Act was enacted to collect revenue for the benefit of the State and not to arm a contesting party with a weapon of defence to obstruct the trial of an action. By recognising that the defendant was entitled to contest the valuation of the properties in dispute as if it were a matter in issue between him and the plaintiff and by entertaining petitions preferred by the defendant to the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction against the order adjudging court-fee payable on the plaint, all progress in the suit for the trial of the dispute on the merits has been effectively frustrated for nearly five years. We fail to appreciate what grievance the defendant can make by seeking to invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court on the question whether the plaintiff has paid adequate court fee on his plaint. Whether proper court-fee is paid on a plaint is primarily a question between the plaintiff and the State. How by an order relating to the adequacy of the court-fee paid by the plaintiff, the defendant may feel aggrieved, it is difficult to appreciate. Again, the jurisdiction in revision exercised by the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is strictly conditioned by cls. (a) to (c) thereof and may be invoked on the ground of refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in the Subordinate Court or assumption of jurisdiction which the court does not possess or on the ground that the court has acted illegally or with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The defendant who may believe and even honestly that proper court-fee has not been paid by the plaintiff has still no right to move the superior courts by appeal or in revision against the order adjudging payment of court-fee payable on the plaint. But counsel for the defendant says that by Act 14 of 1955 enacted by the Madras Legislature which applied to the suit in question, the defendant has been invested with a right not only to contest in the trial court the issue whether adequate court-fee has been paid by the plaintiff, but also to move the High Court in revision if an order contrary to his submission is passed by the court. Reliance in support of that contention is placed upon sub-section (2) of Section 12. That subsection, in so far as it is material, provides : "Any defendant may, by his written statement filed before the first hearing of the suit or before evidence is recorded on the merits of the claim plead that the subject-matter of the suit has not been properly valued or that the fee paid is not sufficient. All questions arising on such pleas shall be heard and decided before evidence is recorded affecting such defendant, on the merits of the claim. All questions arising on such pleas shall be heard and decided before evidence is recorded affecting such defendant, on the merits of the claim. If the court decides that the subject-matter of the suit has not been properly valued or that the fee paid is not sufficient, the court shall fix a date before which the plaint shall be amended in accordance with the court's decision and the deficit fee shall be paid... ." 10. On a survey of the decisions, this Court in the case of Bijay Kumar Sahoo v. Gokula Bihari Mohanty and others, AIR 2011 ORISSA 183, has succinctly stated the principles in paragraph-15 of the said report, which are quoted below:- "15. The principles decided in all the aforesaid decisions and the discussion supra must have, by now, answered the questions posed at the outset. The discussion may be summed up as follows :- (1) The "finality" declared by Section 12 of the Act is limited to the extent that the order on the question of valuation for the purpose of jurisdiction and court-fees is like any other non-appealable interlocutory order and no appeal lies from such an order. (2) Any mistake or vulnerability in the decision/order in view of the interdict in Rathnavarmaraja's case ( AIR 1961 SC 1299 ) cannot be questioned by the defendant on the ground of any mistake or vulnerability in the decision itself or in the decision making process unless the question also involves jurisdiction of the Court to try the suit or entertain the appeal. (3) In Courts of limited pecuniary jurisdiction, valuation assumes great importance and since undervaluation goes to the root of maintainability of the suit, a defendant is entitled to raise the objection irrespective of the nature of the suit when the valuation touches the question of jurisdiction. The distinction between error regarding category and an error regarding valuation pure and simple (as discussed supra in Nemi Chand's case) is of no relevance in a revision by the defendant. (4) So long as the error is not one affecting the jurisdiction of the Court to try the suit or entertain the appeal, the defendant is not affected thereby and in suits filed in Court of unlimited pecuniary jurisdiction, the defendant may not be entitled to question the decision on the valuation. (The question of over-valuation may however be different)." Point No.1 11. (The question of over-valuation may however be different)." Point No.1 11. As held by this Court in the case of Bijay Kumar Sahoo (supra) that so long as the error is not one affecting the jurisdiction of the Court to try the suit or entertain the appeal, the defendant is not affected thereby and in suits filed in Court of unlimited pecuniary jurisdiction, the defendant may not be entitled to question the decision on the valuation. But then the question of overvaluation may, however, be different. Admittedly, the pecuniary jurisdiction of the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division) is unlimited. The instant case is not a question of over valuation. Thus, the defendant has no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the learned trial court, whereby and where under, the plaintiff has been exempted from payment of court fees. Point No.2 12. In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 35 of the Court Fees Act, 1870, the State Government remitted in the whole of the State of Orissa all fees mentioned in Schedule I & II to the said Act payable for filing of cases or proceedings in any Court in Orissa. Accordingly, notification was published on 7.6.1994. On a conspectus of the said notification, vide Annexure-1, it is evident that seven categories of persons are exempted from payment of court fees. Clause (vi) of the notification applies to 'persons' whose annual income does not exceed twelve thousand rupees. 13. In the case of Oriental Pigment Iron (P) Ltd. v. O.S.F.C. and others, W.P.(C) No.14687 of 2008 disposed of on 20.11.2015, the question arose before this Court as to whether the Corporation is an indigent person. Interpreting the provision of Order 33, Rule 1 C.P.C., this Court in paragraph-7 of the judgment held as follows:- "7. What is the meaning of 'person' appearing in the Order 33, Rule 1 C.P.C. After survey of decisions of various High Courts, the apex Court in the case of Union Bank of India v. Khader International Construction and others, AIR 2001 Supreme Court 2277 held that the word 'person' has to be given its meaning in the context in which it is used. It refers to a person who is capable of filing a suit and this being a benevolent provision, it is to be given an extended meaning. It refers to a person who is capable of filing a suit and this being a benevolent provision, it is to be given an extended meaning. It is further held that a public limited company, which is otherwise entitled to maintain a suit as a legal person, can very well maintain an application under Order 33, Rule 1 C.P.C. The word 'person' mentioned in Order 33 includes not only a natural person, but other juridical persons also." Thus, the word 'person' appearing in Clause (vi) takes within its sweep "Juridical Person" as well. Point No.3 14. On a cursory perusal of the balance sheet, vide Annexure-3, dated 31.3.2000, it is evident that the plaintiff-industry sustained a loss of Rs. 19,73,796,93/-. Thus, the annual income of the industry does not exceed Rs. 12,000/-. 15. The decisions cited by Mr. Nanda, learned counsel for the opposite party in the cases of Dulichand Laxminarayan v. Commissioner of Income of Income Tax, Nagpur, AIR 1956 SC 354 , State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer and others, AIR 1963 SC 1811 , Commissioner of Income Tax, Madars v. G.R. Karthikeyan, Coimbatora, 1993 Suppl.(III) SCC 222, T.N. Alloy Foundry Co. Ltd. v. T.N. Electricity Board and others, 2004 (III) SCC 392 , State of M.P. v. Awadh Kishore Gupta and others, 2004 (I) SCC 691 , Mahila Vikash Mandal Colaba and others v. State of Maharashtra and another, 2005 (VI) SCC 184 and Karanataka Bank Ltd. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and others, 2008 (II) SCC 254 are distinguishable in the facts and circumstances of the case. 16. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Islamic Academy of Education and another v. State of Karnataka and others, AIR 2003 SC 3724 has restated the well settled principle of precedent. The apex Court held that a judgment, it is trite, is not be read as a statute. The ratio decidendi of a judgment is its reasoning which can be deciphered only upon reading the same in its entirety. The ratio decidendi of a case or the principles and reasons on which it is based is distinct from the relief finally granted or the manner adopted for its disposal. It is further held that a decision is an authority for what it decides and not what can be logically deduced therefrom. The ratio decidendi of a case or the principles and reasons on which it is based is distinct from the relief finally granted or the manner adopted for its disposal. It is further held that a decision is an authority for what it decides and not what can be logically deduced therefrom. In Padmasundara Rao (Dead) and others v. State of Tamil Nadu and others, AIR 2002 SC 1334 , in paragraph-8 of the said report, the apex Court held that there is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Thus, the aforesaid cases are distinguishable. 17. Resultantly, the petition is allowed. The order dated order dated 20.7.2005 passed by the learned A.D.J., F.T.C. No.3, Bhubaneswar in M.S. No.87 of 2004/149 of 2001 is quashed and the petitioner is exempted from payment of court fees. Final Result : Allowed