JUDGMENT : Vinod Prasad, J. 1. Paramananda Nayak, the writ petitioner, has invoked our extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of The Constitution Of India, seeking relief "to issue a writ order or direction in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or direction to the opposite parties to consider the representation of the petitioner for one time settlement for repayment of loan amount in respect of account No. 15710602300002, Uco Bank, Abdalpur branch, district Jajpur." Before entering into merits of this petition a concise accurate recapitulation of background facts, as can be fathomed out from the averments made in this petition, would reveal that the petitioner Paramananda Nayak is the owner of plot No. 562, Khata No. 144, Mauja Jajati Nagar, Unit-8, district Jajpur having an area of Ac.O.24 Decimals. Petitioner hankered to construct a residential house over the said plot for which he was in financial crunch and hence the petitioner approached respondent UCO Bank for granting him loan of Rs. 20,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty Lacs only) and succeeded in getting that much of amount of loan sanctioned on 11.8.2006 by entering into an agreement for that purpose. By way of secured asset, the borrower petitioner had mortgaged aforementioned plot to the secure creditor, UCO bank. Loan account of the petitioner is No. 15710602300002. The loan was to be liquidated by paying agreed amount as EMIs as per schedule of payment. It is own averments by the petitioner borrower in para 4 of the writ petition, that he could re-pay only Rs. 7,00,000/- (Rupees Seven Lacs only) to the Bank/secured creditor and thereafter he was unable to pay balance of EMIs. Information from the UCO Bank, annexed as Annexure-1 would go to show that till 31.3.2015, the petitioner was required to pay Rs. 54,08,754/- only (Rupees Fifty four lacs Eight thousand Seven hundred and Fifty four only) to discharge his entire loan liability. Admittedly, nonpayment of EMIs inevitably resulted in classifying petitioner's aforesaid account as non performing asset (NPA) by the secured creditor Bank. 54,08,754/- only (Rupees Fifty four lacs Eight thousand Seven hundred and Fifty four only) to discharge his entire loan liability. Admittedly, nonpayment of EMIs inevitably resulted in classifying petitioner's aforesaid account as non performing asset (NPA) by the secured creditor Bank. Wielding statutory rights conferred under The Securitisation and Recovery of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), the financial institution/Bank issued notice under section 13(2) of the Act on 12.6.2015, which was received by the petitioner, calling upon the borrower petitioner to discharge his full liability within sixty days (60 days) from the date of notice and also informing the petitioner that failing to discharge his said liability, the "Bank will exercise all or any of the rights detailed under Sub-Section (4) of Section 13 and under applicable provisions of the said Act." This notice, under section 13(2) of the Act, which is annexure No. 2 to the writ petition, in fact records the liability amount as on 31.3.2015 as Rs. 54,08,754/- only (Rs. Fifty four lacs Eight thousand Seven hundred and Fifty four only). The borrower petitioner filed an objection under section 13(3-A) of the Act on 28.10.2015 addressed to respondent/Opposite party No. 2, a copy of which is annexed as annexure No. 3 and wherein it was requested "to make one time settlement by deducting the interest amount which enables me to clear up the rest balance amount as for instalments basis." It is averred in para-7 of the writ petition that the Branch Manager has informed the petitioner that his proposal for one time settlement (OTS) shall not be considered and the Bank is going to publish notice u/s. 13(4) of the Act. Hence this writ petition assailing action by the Bank on the grounds (i) that the refusal by the Bank to consider OTS proposal by the borrower petitioner is illegal, arbitrary, and contrary to Law (ii) the secured asset, mortgaged land, is very valuable and will fetch more than crores of rupees as the same is located in central place of market of Jajpur town (iii) no action has been taken by the Bank on the representation made by the petitioner nor the opposite parties have passed an order for taking action u/s. 13(4) of the Act and hence their action is illegal, arbitrary and contrary to Law (iv) the petitioner sincerely wants to repay the loan but the Bank has not acceded to his request for one time settlement. 2. In the light of above slated facts we have heard learned counsel for the petitioner in support of the writ petition in extenso. 3. Petitioner contends with vehemence that the Bank could not have rejected petitioner's OTS proposal and without deciding his objection u/s. 13(3-A) could not proceed u/s. 13(4) of the Act. Writ petition because of said reason is maintainable and mandamus should be issued as prayed. 4. Tenure and texture of present writ petition leaves no room for doubt that it relates to an action taken by the secured creditor, UCO Bank under the Act and consequently the primary question with emerges for determination is as to whether the writ petition is maintainable or not when the petitioner has got alternative efficacious and speedy remedy to approach Debt Recovery Tribunal, in short "DRT". Petitioner reiterates the same submissions inked in his petition but we find his contentions untenable, sans the law laid down by the Apex Court having a binding effect under Article 141 of the Constitution. We remind ourselves that question of entertaining writ petitions under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, in disputes covered under the Act, no longer remains res integra and has been subject matter of many a decision by the Hon'ble Apex Court and now it is trite law that no writ petition is maintainable in disputes relating to the Act and the parties must be relegated to seek remedy under the Act before the DRT. Without being bibliographical, we consider it apt to refer to some of those binding precedents. Without being bibliographical, we consider it apt to refer to some of those binding precedents. In United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon and Ors.:, AIR 2010 SC 3413 it has been held by the apex court as under:-- "17. There is another reason why the impugned order should be set aside. If respondent No. 1 had any tangible grievance against the notice issued under Section 13(4) or action taken under Section 14, then she could have availed remedy by filing an application under Section 17(1) . The expression 'any person' used in Section 17(1) is of wide import. It takes within its fold, not only the borrower but also guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action taken under Section 13(4) or Section 14 . Both, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to pass interim orders under Sections 17 and 18 and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available to an aggrieved person under the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc., the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute." In Kanaiyalal Chand Sachdeva And Others versus State of Maharashtra and Others :, (2011) 2SCC 782 it has been held as under:-- "21. Therefore, in all such cases, High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute." In Kanaiyalal Chand Sachdeva And Others versus State of Maharashtra and Others :, (2011) 2SCC 782 it has been held as under:-- "21. In Indian Overseas Bank v. Ashok Saw Mill the main question which fell for determination was whether the DRT would have jurisdiction to consider and adjudicate post Section 13(4) events or whether its scope in terms of Section 17 of the Act will be confined to the stage contemplated under Section 13(4) of the Act? On an examination of the provisions contained in Chapter III of the Act, in particular Sections 13 and 17, this Court held as under: "35. In order to prevent misuse of such wide powers and to prevent prejudice being caused to a borrower on account of an error on the part of the banks or financial institutions, certain checks and balances have been introduced in Section 17 which allow any person, including the borrower, aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of Section 13 taken by the secured creditor, to make an application to the DRT having jurisdiction in the matter within 45 days from the date of such measures having taken for the reliefs indicated in sub-section (3) thereof. 36. The intention of the legislature is, therefore, clear that while the banks and financial institutions have been vested with stringent powers for recovery of their dues, safeguards have also been provided for rectifying any error or wrongful use of such powers by vesting the DRT with authority after conducting an adjudication into the matter to declare any such action invalid and also to restore possession even though possession may have been made over to the transferee. **** 39. We are unable to agree with or accept the submissions made on behalf of the appellants that the DRT had no jurisdiction to interfere with the action taken by the secured creditor after the stage contemplated under Section 13(4) of the Act. On the other hand, the law is otherwise and it contemplates that the action taken by a secured creditor in terms of Section 13(4) is open to scrutiny and cannot only be set aside but even the status quo ante can be restored by the DRT." 22. On the other hand, the law is otherwise and it contemplates that the action taken by a secured creditor in terms of Section 13(4) is open to scrutiny and cannot only be set aside but even the status quo ante can be restored by the DRT." 22. We are in respectful agreement with the above enunciation of law on the point. It is manifest that an action under Section 14 of the Act constitutes an action taken after the stage of Section 13(4), and therefore, the same would fall within the ambit of Section 17(1) of the Act. Thus, the Act itself contemplates an efficacious remedy for the borrower or any person affected by an action under Section 13(4) of the Act, by providing for an appeal before the DRT. 23. In our opinion, therefore, the High Court rightly dismissed the petition on the ground that an efficacious remedy was available to the appellants under Section 17 of the Act. It is well settled that ordinarily relief under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India is not available if an efficacious alternative remedy is available to any aggrieved person." 5. In view of such unambiguous propounded law by the Hon'ble Apex Court, there remains little or no doubt that present writ petition is not maintainable because of existence of statutory efficacious alternative speedy remedy to the borrower petitioner. 6. Now, adverting to the submissions of petitioner's counsel that proposal of OTS submitted by the petitioner could not have been rejected by the Bank, we find the contention to be ludicrous and untenable. It is for the Bank to consider said aspect. It is a matter between two parties who are bound by the terms of agreement in between them. No third party intervention is required unless it is shown that the action by the secured creditor is beyond the purview of the Act itself and for that also the appropriate remedy is Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) as has been held above. It is a matter between two parties who are bound by the terms of agreement in between them. No third party intervention is required unless it is shown that the action by the secured creditor is beyond the purview of the Act itself and for that also the appropriate remedy is Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) as has been held above. In this regard, section 13(1) of the Act may be benefitingly taken note of which provides "Notwithstanding anything contained in section 69 or section 69 A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882(4 of 1882), any security interest created in favour of any secured creditor may be enforced, without the intervention of the Court or tribunal, by such creditor in accordance with the provisions of this Act." Bank as a secured creditor therefore has every right to enforce discharge of loan by the borrower in accordance with the provisions of the Act and no fetters on its power can be clamped by the Court or the tribunal as section 13 starts with a non-obstante clause. In the present petition, we further find that castigating the Bank for not accepting OTS proposal by the petitioner is an oxymoron contention as pleadings in that respect projects altogether a different picture. On his own the petitioner has pleaded that because of economic hardships and financial losses, he could not adhere to the schedule of payments by paying regular EMIs. This he could not do when his liabilities were much less than what he is required to pay now. Once the petitioner could not pay lesser amount, how can he pay a much more amount by entering into OTS is a very queer submission to comprehend. To us it seems that the petitioner wants to use OTS proposal as a ploy to delay the payment further so that Bank could be restrained from proceeding u/s. 13(4) of the Act for some more period. Otherwise also claim of the petitioner that the Bank is "going to take over possession of the land under section 13(4) of the said Act" is based on no concrete material and is purely conjectural and hypothetical. No notice has been issued under said section nor any intimation has been forwarded to the petitioner in that respect. For the above reasons, we don't find any substance in petitioner's submissions and consequently repel the same. 7. No notice has been issued under said section nor any intimation has been forwarded to the petitioner in that respect. For the above reasons, we don't find any substance in petitioner's submissions and consequently repel the same. 7. Second limb of petitioner's contention is that without deciding the objection filed by the petitioner u/s. 13(3-A) of the Act, the Bank could not proceed u/s. 13 (4) of the Act. Firstly, as has already been observed there is no basis to accept that the Bank is taking any action u/s. 13(4) of the Act and secondly what is apparent from the record is that petitioner was served with a notice u/s. 13(2) on 12.6.2015 calling upon him to repay the entire dues, which on that date existed as Rs. 54,08,754/- only (Rupees Fifty four lacs Eight thousand Seven hundred and Fifty four only) within sixty days from the date of issuance of notice i.e. 12.6.2015. The petitioner instead of filing his objection u/s. 13(3-A) within 60 days, the time period or cut off period, allowed by the statute for the Bank to proceed u/s. 13(4) of the Act thereafter, admittedly, let the period of sixty days expire and filed his objection only on 28.10.2015 i.e. after a gap of more than 134 days, on 28.10.2015. The question which emerges for determination is whether the Bank is obliged to consider objection if the same is filed beyond the period of 60 days. 8. SARFAESI Act is a special enactment for specific purpose to "regulate securitisation and reconstruction of financial assets and enforcement of security interest and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto." In transactions/contracts of such a nature each day counts as it either decreases right of the bank to recover a fixed amount or increases liability of the borrower to repay the liability. In our opinion, time is the essence of contract and hence time schedule fixed statutorily has to be adhered to strictly. Time of sixty days fixed by the statute is for the purposes of granting breathing time to the borrower to discharge his liability in full. In fact the borrower is under liability through a legal contract entered into on his own volition to follow repayment schedule. Time of sixty days fixed by the statute is for the purposes of granting breathing time to the borrower to discharge his liability in full. In fact the borrower is under liability through a legal contract entered into on his own volition to follow repayment schedule. Further, section 13 (3-A) inserted by Act 30 of 2004, w.e.f. from 11.11.2004, does not provide any time limit for the borrower to file an objection against notice u/s. 13(2) of the Act and this is for the reason that the legislature intended that the proceedings should be expedited as quickly as possible within a reasonable time frame. The borrower, therefore, is required to file his objection as soon as possible, without any delay and to say forthwith, after receipt of notice from the secured creditor. While not fixing any period for the borrower to file objection, legislature in the same sub section 13 (3-A) of the Act has mandated the secured creditor to dispose of any such objection filed by the borrower within fifteen days (15 Days). This is also for obvious reason that the Bank should not delay in disposing of the objection within a reasonable period of time as that is in the interest of the Bank as well as the borrower. Section 13 (3-A) of the Act has to be interpreted keeping in mind the legislative intent and the purpose for which SARFAESI Act has been enacted. It has to be read in conjunction with other sub-sections and analyzing thus we are of the opinion that section 13 (3-A) of the Act albeit falls in the domain of procedure to be observed by the secured creditor, does not strictly fall in the realm of directory provision but is of a mandatory nature. Passing of each day creates a new liability on the borrower and a nascent right for the secured creditor. In this respect there lies a significant difference between Order VIII Rule 1 CPC and section 13 (3-A) of the Act. In this respect we can profitably refer to the observations made by the Apex court in Kailash versus Nanhku:, AIR 2005 SC 2441 wherein it has been held as under:-- "(iv) The purpose of providing the time schedule for filing the written statement under Order VIII, Rule 1 of CPC is to expedite and not to scuttle the hearing. The provision spells out a disability on the defendant. The provision spells out a disability on the defendant. It does not impose an embargo on the power of the Court to extend the time. Though, the language of the proviso to Rule 1 of Order VIII of the CPC is couched in negative form, it does not specify any penal consequences flowing from the non-compliance. The provision being in the domain of the Procedural Law, it has to be held directory and not mandatory. The power of the Court to extend time for filing the written statement beyond the time schedule provided by Order VIII, Rule 1 of the CPC is not completely taken away. (v) Though Order VIII, Rule 1 of the CPC is a part of Procedural Law and hence directory, keeping in view the need for expeditious trial of civil causes which persuaded the Parliament to enact the provision in its present form, it is held that ordinarily the time schedule contained in the provision is to be followed as a rule and departure there from would be by way of exception. A prayer for extension of time made by the defendant shall not be granted just as a matter of routine and merely for asking, more so when the period of 90 days has expired. Extension of time may be allowed by way of an exception, for reasons to be assigned by the defendant and also be placed on record in writing, howsoever briefly, by the Court on its being satisfied. Extension of time may be allowed if it was needed to be given for the circumstances which are exceptional, occasioned by reasons beyond the control of the defendant and grave injustice would be occasioned if the time was not extended. Costs may be imposed and affidavit or documents in support of the grounds pleaded by the defendant for extension of time may be demanded, depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case." (Underline emphasis ours) The observation underlined above creates a distinction between Order VIII Rule 1 CPC and section 13(3A) of the Act. At the cost of reiteration, we record that each day's delay results in a significant penal consequence upon the borrower and creates a new liability on him and at the same time a further Right on the secured creditor. At the cost of reiteration, we record that each day's delay results in a significant penal consequence upon the borrower and creates a new liability on him and at the same time a further Right on the secured creditor. Time schedule being essence of the contract, thus cannot be held to be only directory and not mandatory in nature. This opinion of ours is also supported by the proviso attached to section 13 (3-A) which ordains that no reason so communicated or the likely action of the secured creditor at the stage of communication of the reasons shall confer any right to challenge the same either before the DRT or before the District Judge under sections 17 or 17-A of the Act respectively. Curtailment of the right of the borrower to challenge in an appropriate forum the reasons communicated or steps taken in communication by the secured creditor is a significant departure from Order VIII Rule 1 CPC. Thus the right injected in the borrower to challenge the action of a secured creditor is infused with life only when action under section 13(4) is resorted to and not prior to it. This becomes apparent if section 17 (3) of the Act is read in conjunction with Section 13 (3-A) & (4) of the Act. Here we would like to add that we do not want to say that the borrower is left remediless after his objection is rejected by the secured creditor as he certainly can challenge it while challenging action under section 13(4) of the Act under section 17 (3) of the Act before the DRT. Once the statute prohibits challenge to an action by the secured creditor in the forum meant for it, then in view of various propounded law by the Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, no writ petition can be entertained to scuttle down the enacted provisions as it will amount to permitting something to be done indirectly or in a surreptitious way which is prohibited in law. Otherwise also if the statute provides for seeking remedy in a particular forum, no other forum should be generated to act dehors the statute. 9. Otherwise also if the statute provides for seeking remedy in a particular forum, no other forum should be generated to act dehors the statute. 9. In our final analysis, we find that since the petitioner had not made any objection within the period permitted under the statute i.e. sixty days (60 Days), the Bank is not under any legal compulsion to decide the same within fifteen days (15 Days) and hence petitioner cannot gain any benefit of his own wrong. Second submission by the petitioner is also without any merit and hence is discarded. In view of what we have said hereinbefore and wrapping up, we don't find any merit in this writ petition which for the said reason stands dismissed. No order as to cost. Final Result : Dismissed