ORDER : Ashok B. Hinchigeri, J. - The petitioner has called into question the order dated 3-3-2014 (Annexure-K) issued by the first respondent-Additional Labour Commissioner (Administration) and Appellate Authority. The facts of the case in brief are that as per Clause 23 of the Standing Orders of the petitioner-Company, the retirement age of its employees is 58 years. The second respondent-Union filed an application before the Certifying Officer under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 ('the said Act' for short), seeking the amendment of the Standing Orders for raising the age of retirement from 58 to 60 years. The Certifying Officer passed the order dated 7-8-2013 (Annexure-E) rejecting the second respondent's application. The second respondent challenged the same before the first respondent by way of appeal. The first respondent allowed the appeal by the impugned order dated 3-3-2014. 2. Sri C.K. Subramanya, learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the first respondent-Appellate Authority has failed to consider the various contentions raised by the petitioner. He submits that the first respondent has taken the decision to raise the age of retirement from 58 to 60 years without inspecting the work place and without ascertaining the nature of the work of the petitioner's employees. He submits that the concerned officer of the petitioner has filed the affidavit stating that the activities in the petitioner's undertaking are of hazardous nature. Its employees require quick reaction, sharp eyesight, accurate audibility and alertness throughout the working hours. The nature of the job is such that it causes both physical and mental strain. 3. He submits that the respondent 2 has not chosen to cross-examine the deponent of the said affidavit. The affidavit is not even referred to by the first respondent in his order. 4. He submits that the age of retirement cannot be determined mechanically. Section 4 of the said Act requires the Certifying Officer and the Appellate Authority to adjudicate upon the fairness and reasonableness of the provisions of the Standing Orders. He submits that under Section 11 of the said Act the authorities have all the powers of a Civil Court. 5. He relies on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Guest, Keen, Williams (Private) Limited v. P.J. Sterling and Others, AIR 1959 SC 1279 : 1959-II-LLJ-405 (SC). He read out the following portions of the said judgment: "..... 5. He relies on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Guest, Keen, Williams (Private) Limited v. P.J. Sterling and Others, AIR 1959 SC 1279 : 1959-II-LLJ-405 (SC). He read out the following portions of the said judgment: "..... In fixing the age of superannuation Industrial Tribunals have to take into account several relevant factors. What is the nature of the work assigned to the employees in the course of their employment? What is the nature of the wage structure paid to them? What are the retirement benefits and other amenities available to them? What is the character of the climate where the employees work and what is the age of superannuation fixed in comparable industries in the same region? What is generally the practise prevailing in the industry in the past in the matter of retiring its employees? These and other relevant facts have to be weighed by the Tribunal in every case when it is called upon to fix an age of superannuation in an industrial dispute. In the present case, as we have already observed, the age of 55 years has been fixed by both the Tribunals for future entrants; and this is substantially based on the standing order which we have already considered. In regard to the prior employees it is not seriously disputed that the retirement age can and may be fixed at 60. It is under these circumstances that we have come to the conclusion that the age of superannuation for prior employees should be fixed at 60." 6. He also relies on the Division Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of I.T.I. Limited, Naini Officers Association v. Union of India, 2003-I-LLJ-1130 (All.) (DB) and the Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of I.T.I. Limited and Others v. Venugopalan N. and Others, 2010-III-LLJ-77 (Kar.) (DB) (sic). He submits that in Peenya Industrial Area there are 27 Engineering Industries; only in 7 out of 27 such industrial establishments, the age of retirement is 60; in the remaining 20 industrial establishments the age of retirement is 58 years only. 7. He submits that in Peenya Industrial Area there are 27 Engineering Industries; only in 7 out of 27 such industrial establishments, the age of retirement is 60; in the remaining 20 industrial establishments the age of retirement is 58 years only. 7. Sri K. Subba Rao, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Sri K.S. Subramanya for the respondent 2 submits that in reply to the application filed under Right to Information Act, 2005, it is clearly stated that the petitioner does not carry on any hazardous process under Section 2(cb) of the Factories Act, 1948. He submits that no request was made before the Certifying Officer for inspecting the premises of the petitioner. 8. The learned Senior Counsel submits that the age of retirement may be 58 years as per the Model Standing Orders. But under Section 4 of the said Act, it shall be the function of the Certifying Officer or the Appellate Authority to adjudicate upon the fairness and reasonableness of the provisions of any Standing Orders. He relies on the Apex Court's judgment in the case of Rohtakand Hissar Districts Electric Supply Company Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, AIR 1966 SC 1471 : (1966)2 SCR 863 (SC) to advance the submission that the standing orders cannot be certified only on the basis of the consent accorded by the employer and the employee; if there is no agreement, the Certifying Officer and/or the Appellate Authority has to exercise his/their jurisdiction to deal with the matter according to its/their own judgment. Drawing support from this judgment, he contends that the certifying officer has erred by refusing to consider the amendment on the ground that unless both the parties agree on the age of retirement, it cannot be raised. 9. He submits that with the automation and the computerisation, there are no hazardous activities in the petitioner's establishment. 10. Nextly, he relies on the Apex Court's judgment in the case of M/s. British Paints (India) Limited v. Its Workmen, AIR 1966 SC 732 : (1966)2 SCR 523 (SC) : 1966-I-LLJ-407 (SC) wherein it is held that generally speaking, in the present circumstances, fixing the age of retirement at 60 years would be fair and proper, unless there are special circumstances justifying the fixation of the lower age of retirement. He submits that this judgment itself was rendered about 50 years ago. He submits that this judgment itself was rendered about 50 years ago. After 50 years of the passing of the said judgment, it cannot be contended with any rate of success that the age of retirement has to be 58 years. 11. He has also relied on the Apex Court's judgment in the case of Burtnah-Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Company of India Limited v. Their Workmen, 1970-I-LLJ-363 (SC). Para 6 of the said decision read out by him is as follows: "6. In fixing the age of superannuation the most important factor that has to be taken into consideration is the trend in a particular area. That position is made clear by this Court in Talang (G.M.) and Others v. Shaw Wallace and Company Limited and Another, 1964-II-LLJ-644 (SC). There is no denying the fact that life expectation has greatly increased in recent years due to healthier living conditions, better food and improved medical facilities though we have still a long way to go in that regard. Under modern conditions, speaking generally, the efficiency of workmen is not impaired till about 60 years. The needs of a workman are likely to be greater between the age of 50 to 60 years as during that period he has to educate his children, marry his daughters, in addition to maintaining his family. If one looks at the word trend it is obvious that the age of superannuation is gradually pushed up. In some countries it is as high as 70 years. The same trend is there in this country and Delhi area is no exception from the material placed before the Tribunal, it is clear that trend is pronounced in Delhi 12. He submits that the trend of judicial opinion is that the retirement age of the employees of a company should be raised to at least 60 years. 13. He has also relied on the Apex Court's judgment in the case of Tej Bahadur Ram v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (2006)7 SCC 660 : 2006 SCC (L and S) 1723. 14. He seriously disputes the filing of the affidavit dated 26-2-2013. Sri Subramanya, the learned Counsel for the petitioner quickly joins issue with him and submits that the reference is made to the said affidavit in the synopsis with which it is filed. 15. 14. He seriously disputes the filing of the affidavit dated 26-2-2013. Sri Subramanya, the learned Counsel for the petitioner quickly joins issue with him and submits that the reference is made to the said affidavit in the synopsis with which it is filed. 15. Sri T.L. Kiran Kumar, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for the respondent 1 confirms with reference to the affidavit dated 26-2-2013 from the records, which he has secured, that the petitioner has indeed filed the affidavit dated 26-2-2013 along with its synopsis. He also submits that the petitioner has indeed made an application on 30-2-2013 before the Certifying Officer for adducing the evidence. The Certifying Officer has rejected the said application on the ground that it would lead to unnecessary delays and that based on the evidence of one or two witnesses it is not possible to arrive at the decision regarding the age of retirement. The learned Additional Government Advocate would support the impugned order and pray for the dismissal of this petition. 16. The submissions of the learned Counsel have received my thoughtful consideration. The first question that falls for my consideration is whether the first respondent-Appellate Authority's order is liable to be quashed on the ground that no opportunities are afforded to the parties to adduce their evidence in support of their respective stands? 17. It is worthwhile to notice that no request for adducing the evidence is made before the Appellate Authority. Even assuming that the said request or application was made, the Appellate Authority cannot be held to be at fault for not allowing the parties to adduce the evidence. Under Rule 6-A of the Karnataka Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules, 1961 what is contemplated is only forwarding of the copies of the application to the employer requesting him to file objections. No adducing of oral evidence is provided by the statute or the rules framed thereunder. I answer the first question in the negative. 18. The next question that falls for my consideration is: Whether the Appellate Authority is justified in certifying the Standing Order for raising the retirement age from 58 to 60 years? As held by the Apex Court in the case of Guest, Keen, Williams (Private) Limited relied upon by the petitioner's side, the age of superannuation cannot be fixed in isolation. The next question that falls for my consideration is: Whether the Appellate Authority is justified in certifying the Standing Order for raising the retirement age from 58 to 60 years? As held by the Apex Court in the case of Guest, Keen, Williams (Private) Limited relied upon by the petitioner's side, the age of superannuation cannot be fixed in isolation. It has to be done taking into account the nature of work, nature of the wage structure, retiral benefits and other benefits, age of superannuation fixed in the comparable industries in the same region, etc. The decisions in the case of I.T.I. Limited rendered by the Division Benches of the Allahabad High Court and of this Court are in the context of rolling back the age of retirement from 60 to 58 years. 19. In the ease of Jeewanlal (1929) Limited v. The Workmen and Another, (1973) 3 SCC 528 : 1973 SCC (L and S) 166 : 1972-I-LLJ-472 (SC) the need to hold personal inspection of the industrial establishments is emphasised to find out whether the activities are so arduous and hazardous as not to raise the age of superannuation age beyond 58 years. 20. The perusal of the impugned order shows that there is no denial of the second respondent's assertion based on the Voltas Limited, McDowell and Company, Fouress Engineering (India) Limited, Volvo (India) Private Limited, ITC, Bosh, Kennametal (India) Limited, Kunigal Stud Form and the public sector undertakings like H.A.L., B.E.L., B.H.E.L., etc., where the age of retirement is raised to 60 years. 21. In the statement of objections filed by the petitioner there is no comparative picture of the prevailing wages, wage structure, pensionary benefits, etc. The petitioner has not shown that the financial benefits given to the employees in the petitioner's undertaking are higher than those of the undertakings which have raised the age of retirement of their employees to 60 years. 22. It is also to be noted that the endorsement issued under the Right to Information Act is not produced before the Appellate Authority; nor is that produced with any application in these writ proceedings for the production of additional documents. No finding can be categorically delivered on the nature of the activities in the petitioner's establishment. 22. It is also to be noted that the endorsement issued under the Right to Information Act is not produced before the Appellate Authority; nor is that produced with any application in these writ proceedings for the production of additional documents. No finding can be categorically delivered on the nature of the activities in the petitioner's establishment. I do not find any material placed on the record of the Certifying Officer or the Appellate Authority as to whether the petitioner-factory carries on the hazardous process. The Certifying Officer and the Appellate Authority have also not inspected the petitioner's factory. There has been no fact finding exercise undertaken by the concerned authorities. 23. Considering all these aspects of the matter, I find that the impugned order is required to be quashed and the matter is required to be sent back to the first respondent-Appellate Authority for fresh adjudication in accordance with law. It is made clear that the petitioner s request for adducing the evidence is unequivocally turned down. The petitioner and the respondent 2 and/or their learned Advocates shall be present before the respondent 1 on 14-8-2015 without waiting for any notice from him. The first respondent-Appellate Authority shall dispose of the remanded matter as expeditiously as possible and in any case within one month from 14-8-2015. It is open to the petitioner and the respondent 2 to place fresh material on the record of the Appellate Authority. 24. Any benefits disbursed to the members of the second respondent pursuant to the impugned order shall not be recovered until the fresh adjudication takes place at the hands of the first respondent-Appellate Authority. The disbursement of the benefits hinge upon the outcome of the remanded proceedings. It is made clear that if the first respondent-Appellate Authority allows the appeal by certifying the amendment sought by raising the age of retirement from 58 years to 60 years, the same shall come into force with effect from the date on which the impugned order is passed on 3-3-2014. Such a conditional retrospectivity is required in a case of this nature, as the first respondent-Appellate Authority did not take the decision after holding the spot inspection of the factory in question and for no fault on the part of the workmen (members of the second respondent-Union). 25. This petition is accordingly allowed. No order as to costs.