JUDGMENT Ram Surat Ram (Maurya), J. 1. Heard Sri R.P. Mishra for the petitioners and Sri S.D. Pandey for the contesting respondents. The writ petition has been filed against the orders of Consolidation Officer dated 14.6.2013, Settlement Officer, Consolidation dated 20.8.2014 and Deputy Director of Consolidation dated 23.2.2015 passed in the proceeding under section 12 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). 2. On the basis of registered sale deed dated 20.1.1988 Heerawati, Krishnawati and Ramlawati, respondents-4 to 6 filed an objection (registered as Case No. 1 of 2001) under section 12 of the Act for mutation of their names over the land sold to them in the sale deed dated 20.1.1988. The case was contested by the petitioners. It is alleged that Dhanpatti has filed an objection in the case on 20.8.1988. Thereafter issues have been framed, evidence of the parties were recorded. The contesting respondents filed sale deed dated 20.1.1988 and also copy of the permission dated 8.1.1988 granted by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation in Case No. 103 under section 5(1)(c) of the Act. In order to prove the due execution of the sale deed the contesting respondents examined Mata Sharan, Ram Lotan Pandey, who were marginal witnesses of the sale deed and Madan Srivastava scribe of sale deed and also witnesses Keshav Ram Shukla and Raj Ram Mishra. The petitioners adduced documentary evidence for establishing that the permission dated 8.1.1988 granting permission to sell has been recalled by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation on 10.10.1988 and Smt. Dhanpatti executed a registered agreement to sell of the land in their favour. However, the petitioners did not examine any oral evidence. It may be mentioned here that it is alleged that Smt. Dhanpatti filed an objection in the case on 20.8.1988 but Smt. Dhanpatti did not appear in the witness box. The Consolidation Officer after hearing the parties by order dated 14.6.2013 found that due execution of the sale deed dated 20.1.1988 by Smt. Dhanpatti in favour of the respondents was proved by the marginal witnesses of the sale deed. Although it is alleged that permission order dated 8.1.1988 has been recalled by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation but the order dated 10.10.1988 recalling the permission is an ex-parte order has been obtained by committing fraud. Although it is alleged that permission order dated 8.1.1988 has been recalled by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation but the order dated 10.10.1988 recalling the permission is an ex-parte order has been obtained by committing fraud. Since the registered sale deed has been executed as such the names of the transferees were liable to be mutated, accordingly, by order dated 14.6.2013 objections of the respondents were allowed and their names were directed to be mutated in the record. 3. The petitioners filed an appeal registered (registered as Appeal No. 207/2013-14). One Ram Achhaibar also filed another appeal (registered as Appeal No. 205 of 2013-14). Both the appeals were consolidated and decided by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation by order dated 20.8.2014 dismissing both the appeals. The petitioners filed Revision No. 194/133 of 2014-15, Vidya Devi filed Revision No. 195/134 of 2014-15 and Ram Achhaibar and others filed Revision No. 199/138 of 2014-15. The revisions were heard by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, who by order dated 23.2.2015 found that the order of the Consolidation Officer is based upon the registered sale deed of which due execution has been proved. The order does not suffer from any illegality as the petitioners could not adduce any evidence to disprove that the sale deed was not executed by Smt. Dhanpatti and on this finding the revisions, were dismissed. Hence this writ petition has been filed. 4. The Counsel for the petitioners submits that the Consolidation Officer has not given proper opportunity of evidence to the petitioner. Accordingly, the petitioners could not adduce their oral evidence. The execution of the sale deed was denied by Smt. Dhanpatti herself. In such circumstances, sale deed was not liable to be relied upon. The permission granted by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation dated 8.1.1988 has already been recalled by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation by order dated 10.10.1988 as such in view of section 45-A of the Act the sale deed was void. All these grounds were raised in the appeal. The appeal was dismissed in default on 26.3.2014. The petitioners filed an application for recall of the order on the same day on which 30.4.2014 was the date fixed and on that day the case was adjourned to 9.7.2014 and thereafter 27.8.2014 was the date fixed. The appeal was dismissed on 20.8.2014. All these grounds were raised in the appeal. The appeal was dismissed in default on 26.3.2014. The petitioners filed an application for recall of the order on the same day on which 30.4.2014 was the date fixed and on that day the case was adjourned to 9.7.2014 and thereafter 27.8.2014 was the date fixed. The appeal was dismissed on 20.8.2014. The petitioners have raised all these grounds before the Deputy Director of Consolidation but he has not adverted to the grounds raised by the petitioners and dismissed the revision. 5. I have considered the arguments of the Counsel for the parties and examined the record. 6. So far as the order of Consolidation Officer is concerned issues were framed by the Consolidation Officer on the objection of the petitioners. The petitioners have although filed documentary evidence, but did not adduce any oral evidence. The mutation application was filed on the basis of the registered sale deed dated 20.1.1988 of which due execution was proved by the attesting witnesses. In the circumstances, onus probandi was shifted to the petitioners to disapprove its execution but the petitioners could not adduce any evidence in this respect. Supreme Court in Paras Nath Thakur v. Mohani Dasi AIR 1959 SC 1204 , has held that "the well-established rule applicable to suits of the kind it was dealing with, that the burden of proof is heavy on a plaintiff who sues for a declaration of a document solemnly executed and registered, as a fictitious transaction". Again in R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami and V.P. Temple AIR 2003 SC 4548 , has held that "there is an essential distinction between burden of proof and onus of proof: burden of proof lies upon a person who has to prove the fact and which never shifts. Onus of proof shifts. Such a shifting of onus is a continuous process in the evaluation of evidence. In our opinion, in a suit for possession based on title once the plaintiff has been able to create a high degree of probability so as to shift the onus on the defendant it is for the defendant to discharge his onus and in the absence thereof the burden of proof lying on the plaintiff shall be held to have been discharged so as to amount to proof of the plaintiff's title. In the present case, the Trial Court and the first Appellate Court have noted that the plaintiff has not been able to produce any deed of title directly lending support to his claim for title and at the same time the defendant too has no proof of his title much less even an insignia of title. Being a civil case, the plaintiff cannot be expected to prove his title beyond any reasonable doubt; a high degree of probability lending assurance of the availability of title with him would be enough to shift the onus on the defendant and if the defendant does not succeed in shifting back the onus, the plaintiff's burden of proof can safely be deemed to have been discharged. In the opinion of the two Courts below, the plaintiff had succeeded in shifting the onus on the defendant and, therefore, the burden of proof which lay on the plaintiff had stood discharged". Again in Anil Rishi v. Gurbaksh Singh 2006 (101) RD 265 (SC), has held that "a distinction exists between burden of proof and onus of proof. The right to begin follows onus probandi. It assumes importance in the early stage of a case. The question of onus of proof has greater force, where the question is, which party is to begin. Burden of proof is used in three ways: (1) to indicate the duty of bringing forward evidence in support of a proposition at the beginning or later; (ii) to make that of establishing a proposition as against all counter-evidence; and (iii) an indiscriminate use in which it may mean either or both of the others. The elementary rule in section 101 is inflexible. In terms of section 102 the initial onus is always on the plaintiff and if he discharges that onus and makes out a case which entitles him to a relief, the onus shifts to the defendant to prove those circumstances, if any, which would disentitle the plaintiff to the same." Thus, the Consolidation Officer has not committed any error in allowing the mutation application of the contesting respondents. 7. So far as the appeal of the petitioners is concerned, the appeal was dismissed in default by order dated 26.3.2014. The petitioners filed recall application for recalling the aforesaid order which was pending. In the meantime, the Settlement Officer, Consolidation decided the appeal of Ram Achhaibar by order dated 29.8.2014. 7. So far as the appeal of the petitioners is concerned, the appeal was dismissed in default by order dated 26.3.2014. The petitioners filed recall application for recalling the aforesaid order which was pending. In the meantime, the Settlement Officer, Consolidation decided the appeal of Ram Achhaibar by order dated 29.8.2014. The petitioners challenged the order of Settlement Officer, Consolidation dated 20.8.2014 as well as the order of the Consolidation Officer dated 14.6.2013 in revision. The revision was thereafter heard on merit by Deputy Director of Consolidation. In the circumstances, the petitioners instead of pressing their recall application themselves went in revision and got the decision of the Revisional Court on merit. In such circumstances, it is not proper that restoration application will again be decided as such the case of the petitioner has already been decided by the Deputy Director of Consolidation on merit who had otherwise the jurisdiction to hear the revision against the order of the Consolidation Officer itself as held by the Division Bench of this Court in Faujdar Rai v. D.D.C. and others 2006 (100) RD 462 (DB), that a revision can directly be filed from the order of Consolidation Officer. In view of the aforesaid observations the petitioners have no case. The writ petition has no merit and it is dismissed.