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2015 DIGILAW 727 (GUJ)

Rameshbhai Ramajibhai Desai v. State of Gujarat

2015-07-27

N.V.ANJARIA

body2015
JUDGMENT : N.V. Anjaria, J. 1. The petitioner has invoked writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution against the judgment and order of Court of Session in Criminal Appeal, which was preferred under Section 29 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. The said appeal was against the order passed by learned Metropolitan Magistrate. What is prayed for is a writ of certiorari to get the said judgment and order in Criminal Appeal set aside. The following questions arise for consideration:- (i) Whether against the judgment and order deciding an appeal by Court of Session under Section 29 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, a remedy of revision application under Section 397(1) read with Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is available? (ii) Whether, because of what is held by this Court in Narendrakumar @ Nitinkumar Manilal Shah vs. State of Gujarat, 2014 (2) GLR 1353 , a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, is the remedy to challenge judgment and order in appeal decided under Section 29 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005? (iii) Whether the Judicial Magistrate and Court of Session exercising their powers under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 are the Courts as per the hierarchy of class of Criminal Courts under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and can be subjected to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under the provisions of the Cr. P.C? (iv) Whether on the premise and reasoning that the relief available under the provisions of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 are civil in nature, the provisions of the Act exclude the machinery of hierarchy of Courts under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, thereby ruling out amenability of judgment of Court of Session under Section 29 of the Act to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973? (v) If the remedy of tiling revision application under Section 397(1) read with Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is available, whether against the impugned judgment and order, writ jurisdiction for issuance of writ of certiorari should be allowed to be maintained? 2. The basic facts, leaving aside unnecessary details, may be set out. (v) If the remedy of tiling revision application under Section 397(1) read with Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is available, whether against the impugned judgment and order, writ jurisdiction for issuance of writ of certiorari should be allowed to be maintained? 2. The basic facts, leaving aside unnecessary details, may be set out. Respondent No. 2-wife initiated proceedings against the petitioner-husband and others under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, by filing Misc. Criminal Application No. 18 of 2002 under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. In her case before learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Court No. 2, Ahmedabad, respondent No. 2 stated that her marriage was solemnized with the petitioner and after the marriage, her matrimonial life went on smoothly in the beginning, but thereafter, the husband and the in-laws started harassing her. Out of the wedlock four children were born. In the application, the wife made various allegations regarding mental and physical harassment, detailing of which is not necessary herein. The wife filed criminal complaint against the husband and other family members for the offences under Sections 498-A, 323, 506(2), 114 and for the offence under the Dowry Prohibition Act. The relief prayed by the applicant-wife in her application included protection orders, claim for maintenance, amount of rent for residential accommodation, claim for monetary relief and payment of compensation, being the relief under Sections 18, 20 and 22 of the Act. The petitioner-husband filed reply and contested. 2.1. Learned Magistrate passed order below Exh. 1A granting interim maintenance of Rs. 6,000/- per month. By order dated 15th December, 2012, learned Metropolitan Magistrate decided the application of respondent-wife finally, and passed orders granting protection against acts of domestic violence under Section 18, issued residence orders and alternative direction for rent if the accommodation for the wife is not secured, directed payment of Rs. 6,000/- towards maintenance etc. from the date of application and awarded Rs. 4,00,000/- towards compensation. 2.2. Against the aforesaid order passed by learned Metropolitan Magistrate, the petitioner herein preferred Criminal Appeal before the Court of Session, Ahmedabad, taking resort to Section 29 of the Act. The said Criminal Appeal No. 157 of 2014 came to be partly allowed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, City Civil Court No. 3, Ahmedabad. 4,00,000/- towards compensation. 2.2. Against the aforesaid order passed by learned Metropolitan Magistrate, the petitioner herein preferred Criminal Appeal before the Court of Session, Ahmedabad, taking resort to Section 29 of the Act. The said Criminal Appeal No. 157 of 2014 came to be partly allowed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, City Civil Court No. 3, Ahmedabad. Learned Additional Sessions Judge interfered with the order to the extent of reducing the amount of compensation to Rs. 2,00,000/- confirming the rest of the order of learned Metropolitan Magistrate. It is this judgment and order passed by the Sessions Court, brought under the writ jurisdiction of this Court to get it quashed and set aside. 3. As to why writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is being invoked, learned Advocate for petitioner Mr. Vijay Nagesh pressed into service decision of this Court in Narendrakumar, 2014 (2) GLR 1353 . Relying heavily on the same, it was submitted that since it is held therein that the Domestic Violence Act is a law of civil nature and since it provides for relief of civil nature, petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is required to be filed so as to challenge the judgment and order passed in Appeal under Section 29 of me Act. Learned Advocate for the petitioner relied on, in particular, observations in Paragraphs 15.3 to 15.8 of the judgment. 3.1. On the other hand, learned Advocate Mr. A.R. Lakhia for respondent No. 2 submitted that the appeal from which the impugned judgment and order arises was registered as Criminal Case and the same is decided by learned Additional Sessions Judge. He submitted that the appellate jurisdiction was exercised by the Court of Session against the order of learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. It was submitted that this Court may not entertain this petition in its writ jurisdiction. He pressed into service a decision of Kerala High Court in Baiju S/o Chandran Nair vs. Latha D/o. Balan Nair, being Cr. M.C. No. 969 of 2011 decided on 9th June, 2011. 3.2. In view of the above drawn lines of legal contentions, issues as set-out in Paragraph 2 above surfaced. 4. For examining the submission that on the basis of Narendrakumar, 2014 (2) GLR 1353 this petition could be filed and is entertainable, the said decision may be adverted to beforehand. M.C. No. 969 of 2011 decided on 9th June, 2011. 3.2. In view of the above drawn lines of legal contentions, issues as set-out in Paragraph 2 above surfaced. 4. For examining the submission that on the basis of Narendrakumar, 2014 (2) GLR 1353 this petition could be filed and is entertainable, the said decision may be adverted to beforehand. In that case the Court addressed these two questions - (i) Whether Domestic Violence Act provides for civil remedies? (ii) If yes, whether Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure can be applied for quashing of such civil proceedings? 4.1. The petitioners in Narendrakumar, 2014 (2) GLR 1353 had prayed for the quashment of the proceedings instituted under the provisions of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter mentioned as the Domestic Violence Act for sake of brevity). While the facts are not available from the judgment, the proceedings under the Domestic Violence Act were prayed to be quashed and set aside at their threshold, that is at the stage of initiation itself, by seeking an exercise of powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The question dealt with in the present case is remarkably different and differentiable. 5. It may be true that various reliefs contemplated to be provided for, to the aggrieved person-the woman creates civil rights. Section 17 of the Act confers right on women to reside in a shared household, which is defined under the Act; Section 18 is with regard to granting of various protection orders against the facts of domestic violence; Section 19empower the Magistrate to pass residence orders while disposing of application under Section 12(1) of the Act; Section 20 is for granting of monetary reliefs to the aggrieved persons whereunder the Court may award amount under different heads; Section 21 deals with the orders of custody of any child or children to the aggrieved person. Under Section 22, in addition to the above relief, Magistrate can pass compensation orders. All these reliefs can be prayed for by an aggrieved person by filing an application to the Magistrate. At the same time, examination of the Scheme of the Domestic Violence Act, it would be seen, as discussed hereinafter, the remedial avenue and the machinery to secure the relief is made available under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 5.1. All these reliefs can be prayed for by an aggrieved person by filing an application to the Magistrate. At the same time, examination of the Scheme of the Domestic Violence Act, it would be seen, as discussed hereinafter, the remedial avenue and the machinery to secure the relief is made available under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 5.1. Section 12 which falls under Chapter IV in the Act Procedure for Obtaining Order and Reliefs, provides that an aggrieved person or a Protection Officer or any other person on behalf of the aggrieved person can present an application to the Magistrate seeking one or more relief under the Act. Section 27 of the Domestic Violence Act deals with the jurisdiction which reads as under:- "Section 27. Jurisdiction:- (1) The Court of Judicial Magistrate of the first class or the Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, within the local limits of which:- (a) The person aggrieved permanently or temporarily resides or carries on business or is employed. (b) The respondent resides or carries on business or is employed. (c) The cause of action has arisen, shall be the competent Court to grant a protection order and other orders under this Act and to try offences under this Act. (2) Any order made under this Act shall be enforceable throughout India." 5.2. Section 28 is about the procedure which being also relevant, is reproduced herein-below:- "Section 28. Procedure:- (1) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, all proceedings under Sections 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 and offences under Section 31 shall be governed by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974). (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall prevent the Court from laying down its own procedure for disposal of an application under Section 12 or under sub-section (2) of Section 23." 5.3. Under Section 27 above, the jurisdiction is vested with the Court of Judicial Magistrate of First Class or the Metropolitan Magistrate as the case may be. The "Magistrate" here is to be understood as a Magistrate defined under Section 2(i) of the Act. Section 28 expressly says about governing procedure to be under the Cr. Under Section 27 above, the jurisdiction is vested with the Court of Judicial Magistrate of First Class or the Metropolitan Magistrate as the case may be. The "Magistrate" here is to be understood as a Magistrate defined under Section 2(i) of the Act. Section 28 expressly says about governing procedure to be under the Cr. P.C. though leeway is permitted to the Magistrate to adopt its own procedure for disposal of application under Section 12 or under Section 23(2) of the Act, this is to permit due elasticity in the procedure to meet with the object and purpose of the Act, nature of disputes to be dealt with under the Act and the relief to be granted. 5.4. 'Magistrate' is defined under Section 2(i) and means the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class or as the case may be, the Metropolitan Magistrate, exercising jurisdiction under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in the area where the aggrieved person resides temporarily or otherwise or the respondent resides or the domestic violence is alleged to have taken place. 5.5. Section 31(1) of the Act provides for penalty for breach of protection order by respondent. Sub-section (2) again says that the offence under sub-section (1) as far as practicable be tried by the Magistrate who has passed the order, the breach of which is alleged to have been caused by the accused. Sub-section (3) says that while framing charges under sub-Section (1) the Magistrate may also frame charge under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 or any other provision of I.P.C. or Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, if the facts of the case disclose commission of any such offence. The offence under sub-section (1) of Section 31 is treated to be cognizable offence under Section 32 of the Act as regards the proof of this offence, according to sub-section (2) of Section 32, upon the sole testimony of the aggrieved person the Court may conclude that the offence under Section 31(1) has been committed. 5.6. The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Rules, 2006 framed under Section 37 of the Act, stand in tune with the aforesaid statutory provisions. Referring to some of the relevant Rules in this regard, Rule 15, Rule 6 provides for applications which are made under Section 12 of the Act, to be made to the Magistrate in the prescribed form. The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Rules, 2006 framed under Section 37 of the Act, stand in tune with the aforesaid statutory provisions. Referring to some of the relevant Rules in this regard, Rule 15, Rule 6 provides for applications which are made under Section 12 of the Act, to be made to the Magistrate in the prescribed form. Rule 15 dealing with breach of the protection orders stands in consonance with the parent provision under Sections 31 and 32 of the Act. They taken together firmly suggest that the machinery to secure the enforcement of relief under the Act is under the Criminal Procedure Code. 5.7. Except that the relief which may be availed to the aggrieved person under the Act is civil in nature, in the entire scheme of the Act for seeking and securing these relief, the remedies are provided for before the Criminal Courts. An Application for various relief under Section 12 is to be filed before the 'Magistrate' who is defined. Section 27 of the Act deals with jurisdiction to provide that the Court of the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class or the Metropolitan Magistrate having the jurisdiction within the local limits as provided under the Section, shall be the competent Court to grant the protection order. The protection orders are the orders under Section 18. Section 18 says that the Magistrate after giving the aggrieved person opportunity of hearing, passed order under sub-clauses (a) to (g). 5.8. Vis-à-vis the above provisions under the Act, reverting to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 may be referred to which mentions the class of Criminal Courts. According to this Section, besides the High Courts and Courts constituted under any law, there shall be Criminal Codes of following classes in every stake, (i) Court of Session, (ii) Judicial Magistrate of the First Class and in any Metropolitan Magistrate, (iii) Judicial Magistrate of the Second Class and (iv) Executive Magistrate. Section 4(1) of the Code provides that trial of the Indian Penal Code and other laws shall be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions of the Code. Section 4(1) of the Code provides that trial of the Indian Penal Code and other laws shall be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions of the Code. Section 5 the savings clause, provides as nothing contained in this Court shall, in absence of a specific provision to the contrary affect any special law for the time being in force or any special jurisdiction of power conferred or prescribed by any law for the time being in force. 5.9. The Domestic Violence Act, 2005 is a statute of its own kind designed to provide an umbrella of protection to the women who are victims of domestic violence. This law is enacted with a blend of provisions where the relief available under the provisions of the Act are of civil nature but the machinery provided for in the Act to secure the relief is envisaged under the Criminal Procedure Code. The very object of providing a speedy remedy and effective protection of rights can be said to have guided the Legislature to engraft the penal and procedural provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure for enforcement of relief under the Act and for enjoyment of rights availed to the aggrieved person. 6. The Kerala High Court in Baiju Son of Chandran Nair vs. Latha, Misc. Criminal Application No. 969 of 2011 decided on 9th June, 2011 considered the question whether the Court of Magistrate while discharging functions under the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, is a Criminal Court inferior to Court of Session and the High Court. The Court also addressed whether the judgment of Court of Session in an appeal filed under Section 29 of the Act is amenable to the revisional powers of the High Court under Sections 397(1) and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The application in which the above questions were considered, was filed under Section 482, Cr. P.C. The contention on behalf of the petitioners before the Kerala High Court was inter alia that as the Magistrate empowered under the Act, exercises duties, functions and powers which are of a civil nature, and hence, it cannot be said that Magistrate while acting under the provisions of the Act, becomes an inferior Criminal Court for the purpose of Sections 397 and 401 of the Code. It was also the case canvassed that the judgment and order in appeal under Section 29 of the Act cannot be subjected to challenge under Section 397(1) of the Code because the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 does not expressly provide so. 6.1. The Kerala High Court after considering its own other decisions and decisions of other High Courts, concluded that even though the relief if the Magistrate is required and authorised to grant under certain provisions of the Act are of a civil nature, it cannot be said that the Magistrate while exercising those functions is not acting as a Criminal Court. It observed that under Section 29 appeal is provided to lie before the "Court of Sessions" and not to the "Sessions Judge." It ruled that "An appeal is provided to the Court of Session under Section 29 since the Court of the Magistrate whose order is under challenge is Criminal Court inferior to the Court of Sessions." 6.2. As regards amenability of judgment of the Court of Session in appeal under Section 29of the Act it was observed, and held by the Kerala High Court that the appeal is governed by the provisions of the Code though right of appeal is provided by Section 29 of the Act. The Act does not say that judgment of the Court of Session is subject to challenge before any other Court. Under Section 397(1) of the Code, High Court may call for and examine the records of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court. It was stated that a Court of Session is a Criminal Court inferior to the High Court for the purpose of exercise of revisional power under Section 397(1) and 401 of the Code. Section 397(1) of the Code empowers the Courts specified therein to call for records of the inferior Criminal Court and examine them for the purpose of satisfying themselves as to whether a sentence, finding or order of such inferior Court is legal, correct or revisional power is to give the superior Criminal Courts supervisory jurisdiction in order to correct miscarriage of justice arising from misconception of law, irregularity of procedure, neglect of proper precautions or apparent harshness of treatment which has resulted on the one hand in hardship to individuals. The power of revision is supervisory in character enabling the superior Courts to call for records of the inferior Criminal Courts and examine them for the purpose of satisfying themselves that the sentence, finding, order of proceeding of such inferior Court is legal, correct or proper. The decision of the Kerala High Court lays down a correct proposition and deserves to be followed. 6.3. It is not incongruous that the statute is of civil nature, and/or the relief available under the provisions may also relate to civil rights, but the machinery to procure the relief and the rights is provided to be before Criminal Court. The instances are Section 155of the Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963 or Section 16(1) of the Telegraph Act, 1885. The remedial avenues under such laws is before the Magistrate. The further question to be probed is whether Court of Magistrate before whom the remedy is provided, is an inferior or subordinate Criminal Court to be amenable to the appellate or revisional jurisdiction in the hierarchy of higher Courts under the Code of Criminal Procedure. Here a distinction may again arise-whether a Court of Magistrate which is otherwise one of the hierarchical Courts under Section 6 of Cr. P.C. is a persona designata under the statute concerned or he functions as part of a Criminal Court in the hierarchy of such Courts provided under Cr. P.C. in case of later, such Court would be an inferior Criminal Court and would be amenable to normal appellate and revisional jurisdiction envisaged under the Criminal Procedure Code. 7. In Dargah Committee, Ajmer vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1962 SC 574 , the Supreme Court dealt with a question whether Magistrate acting under Section 234 of Ajmer-Mewara Municipalities Regulations, acts as a inferior Criminal Court to the High Court. Under the said provision, the proceedings for recovery of tax were provided before the Additional Tehsildar & Magistrate of Second Class. Against order passed by the Magistrate, appellant preferred criminal revision application before the sessions Court, Ajmer, the revision was dismissed upon which the revisionist moved the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan in its revisional jurisdiction, before which preliminary objection was that the criminal revision application was incompetent since the magistrate who entertained respondent No. 2's application made under Section 234, was not an inferior Criminal Court under Section 439 of Criminal Procedure Code. The Supreme Court held that looking to Section 234, it was clear that proceedings initiated thereunder before a Magistrate were not more than recovery proceedings. The Supreme Court took note that all the questions which may legitimately be raised against the validity of the notice served under Section 153 for carrying out the respects or against the validity of the claim made by the Committee under Section 222 to recover the sum as a tax, could be and ought to be raised in an appeal provided under Section 93(1) of the said Act, and if appeal is not preferred or is dismissed, then all those points are treated concluded and can no more be raised in the proceedings under Section 234. It was observed that is why the nature of inquiry contemplated by Section 234 was very limited and it prima facie partook the character of ministerial inquiry rather than judicial inquiry. 7.1. The Supreme Court held that the Magistrate who entertained the application under Section 234 was not an inferior Criminal Court. The Court stated:- "If at all, this would at best be a proceeding of a civil nature and not criminal. That is why, we think, whatever may be the character of the proceeding, whether it is purely ministerial or judicial or quasi-judicial, the Magistrate who entertains the application and holds the enquiry does so because he is designated in that behalf and so he must be treated as a persona designata and not as a Magistrate functioning and exercising his authority under the Code of Criminal Procedure. He cannot therefore be regarded as an inferior Criminal Court. That is the view taken by the High Court and we see no reason to differ from it." 7.2. An Allahabad High Court decision in Saman Ismaeel vs. Rafiq Ahmad, 2002 Cri. LJ 3648 may also be referred in which case, with reference to the provisions of Muslim Women (Protection of Right on Divorce) Act, the High Court of Allahabad having regard to the preamble of the Act and the statement of objects and reasons held that they clearly show that the Act had been passed with the purpose to provide maintenance to a divorce muslim woman. The scheme of the Act, it was observed, which extends to only seven Sections showed that the complete procedure for conducting the proceedings for challenging the correctness of the order of the Magistrate have not been provided. On the basis of the provisions of the said Act, the High Court stated that the Act makes reference to a "Magistrate" and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 at several places. In that Act also, Section 2(c) defines that a "Magistrate" would mean a Magistrate of First Class exercising jurisdiction under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The provisions of Domestic Violence Act, its scheme and the connotation "Magistrate" to be one under the Cr. P.C. are quite comparable. 8. Coming to Narendrakumar, 2014 (2) GLR 1353 again at this stage of discussion, attentively seen, it rather leans towards the reasoning adopted hereinabove, when it observed in Paragraph 15.3 that "True that the object of Section 31 is to punish the offender for violation of protection orders issued under Section 18 of D.V. Act. Breach of protection orders is classified as cognizable and non-bailable offence under Section 32, and upon testimony of the aggrieved person, the Court may conclude that offence under Sub-Section (1) of Section 31 has been committed by the accused. Protection order can be issued under Section 16 and its breach is cognizable under Section 32. The purpose of Sections 31 and 32 appears to be to ensure compliance of protection orders, if necessary, by enforcing a criminal machinery against the offender." 8.1. Narendrakumar, 2014 (2) GLR 1353 does not lay down even impliedly much less expressly, that in a case where order of the Judicial Magistrate is subjected to Appeal under Section 29 of the Act, judgment and order passed by the Sessions Court in Appeal could be challenged in a writ proceedings. Narendrakumar, 2014 (2) GLR 1353 does not efface the remedy of Appeal or Revision under the hierarchy of Criminal Courts as per the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure which is made applicable to the proceedings of the Domestic Violence Act. It is not possible to stretch the ratio of Narendrakumar, 2014 (2) GLR 1353 so as to comprehend the same to be anything else than what it comprehend in Paragraph 15.7. It is not possible to stretch the ratio of Narendrakumar, 2014 (2) GLR 1353 so as to comprehend the same to be anything else than what it comprehend in Paragraph 15.7. It has to be stated that ratio of the said decision was in the context of and confined to its own facts and the questions framed by the Court to be addressed. 8.2. For Narendrakumar, 2014 (2) GLR 1353 suffice it is to say that the nature of relief available under a particular law and the machinery to secure the relief may be different and for both, the legislature may make provisions under different nature of laws-civil and criminal. Their coexistence need not be read to create a conflict of any kind in their operation or application. 9. The scheme of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, as surveyed hereinabove, suggests that right from the initiation of the proceedings, the remedial machinery is provided before the Court of Magistrate of First Class before whom application under Section 12 of the Act would lie, and against the order made by the Magistrate, appeal is provided to the Court of Session under Section 29 of the Act. This is in the background of an express provision under Section 27 providing for jurisdiction investing the same with the Court of Judicial Magistrate of First Class or the Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, as well as Section 27 providing that all proceedings under Sections 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 and offences under Section 31 shall be governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 9.1. The legislature has implanted the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 not only for procedural purpose under the Sections which deal with relief orders, but also for the purpose of remedy of appeal, etc. Considering the relevant provisions under the Domestic Violence Act dealing with the application to the Magistrate, jurisdiction, procedure, appeal as well as provisions under Sections 31 and 32 of the Act dealing with the penal aspects and the cognizance and proof, it becomes manifest that though the statute in question in general is one of civil kind and the relief available thereunder is of civil nature, the jurisdiction of the Magistrate and the Court of Session, are under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. They are explicitly made so to operate. 9.2. They are explicitly made so to operate. 9.2. The Court of Judicial Magistrate or the Metropolitan Magistrate on whom jurisdiction is vested under this Act, are the Courts mentioned under Section 6 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Court of Session mentioned in Section 29 of the Act is the Court of Session under Section 6(1) read with Section 9 of Cr. P.C. A Magistrate dealing with the matters under the Domestic Violence Act and a Sessions Judge entertaining and deciding appeal under Section 29 of the Act are clothed with all the powers of the Criminal Courts under the Code they have all attributes, power and functional sphere of Criminal Courts under the Code. They are the classes of Courts to be treated as inferior Criminal Courts, amenable to the revisional jurisdiction under Section 397(1) and Section 401, Cr. P.C. 9.3. In other words, Court of Magistrate or Court of Session under the Domestic Violence Act are Courts which exist and function under the Cr. P.C. They are vested with full-fledge adjudicatory as well as procedural powers under the Cr. P.C. Their functioning is not in a limited role. Neither the Magistrate of the First Class, nor the Court of Session under the Domestic Violence Act are persona designata. The ratio of the Dargah Committee, Ajmer, AIR 1962 SC 574 applies with reverse logic. 9.4. The jurisdiction of the Magistrate or the jurisdiction of Court of Sessions under the Act, therefore, are referable to and derived from the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Act in its provisions specifically mentions to be so. Against the orders of the Magistrate, appeal is provided under Section 29 of the Act to the Court of Session. Against the judgment and order in appeal under Section 29, no further appeal or revision is provided in the Act. The provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure, for the revisional powers under Section 397(1) and Section 401, Cr. P.C. would then attract and apply. The remedy of revision under the Cr. P.C. before the High Court has to be held to be available. 10. The impugned judgment and order, for the discussion and the reasons recorded above, is revisable by the High Court in exercise of its power under Section 397(1) read with Section 401 of the Code. The petitioner has the said remedy available. P.C. before the High Court has to be held to be available. 10. The impugned judgment and order, for the discussion and the reasons recorded above, is revisable by the High Court in exercise of its power under Section 397(1) read with Section 401 of the Code. The petitioner has the said remedy available. The impugned judgment and order in Criminal Appeal is pursuant to an adjudicatory exercise involving fact finding inquiry and fact-based conclusions, deriving jurisdiction under Section 29 of the Act as above. It is not the case of erroneous or illegal assumption of jurisdiction, nor any jurisdictional error or irregularity could be demonstrated or existed in respect of the impugned judgment and order delivered in the Criminal Appeal, making out no case whatsoever for issuing the writ of certiorari. 11. In view of above, the proper remedy against the impugned judgment and order being of filing of Criminal Revision Application under Section 397(1) read with Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, writ jurisdiction of this Court by filing petition under Article 226 of the Constitution to set aside the impugned judgment and order could not have been invoked. The petitioner has to approach the revisional Court availing the remedy of Revision Application. 12. It is observed and clarified that the dismissal of the petition being for the reasons and on the grounds as above, this Court has not gone into the merits of the case of either side and any observation in this order shall not be construed as expressions on merits. The present petition is accordingly dismissed. Notice is discharged. Interim relief, if any, stands vacated.