JUDGMENT : Dara Sheko, J. This appeal has been preferred against the judgment and decree delivered by the learned Civil Judge, (Senior Division), 3rd Court, Alipore on 14th August, 2008 in Title Suit no. 10 of 2003 (decree being sealed and signed on 22nd August, 2008), by which the learned Trial Court while dismissing the prayer for specific performance of contract, decreed the alternative prayer of the appellant/plaintiff directing the respondent/defendant to return Rs.1,85,000/- to the appellant/plaintiff by 31st December, 2008 with interest @ 6% per annum. 2. The case of the appellant/plaintiff in short is as follows: (a) The suit plot no. 484 appertained to khatian no. 177 of Mouza Kamdahari under Police Station Jadavpur within District 24-Parganas (South), measuring 14 cottahs 13 chittaks and 23 sq. ft. and an area measuring 14 cottahs 13 chittaks and 23 sq. ft. was obtained by the mother of the parties, Nanda Rani Chaudhuri, by two registered deeds of purchase dated 10.2.1956 and 11.1.1968. (b) Nanda Rani Chaudhuri thereafter transferred 5 cottahs 5 chittaks and 31 sq. ft. of the said property in favour of the appellant/plaintiff and 5 cottahs and 3 chittaks and 23 sq. ft. of land in favour of the respondent/defendant by two separate registered deeds both dated 27.4.1992. The remaining part of the said plot was settled amongst the parties by virtue of a family settlement dated 18.5.1992 by which they have been possessing the respective portions. (c) The appellant averred that the respondent on 11.8.2001 orally agreed to sell the suit property measuring 354.8 sq. ft. of land out of his 5 cottahs 3 chittaks 23 sq. ft. to the appellant at a consideration of Rs.2,80,000/- and the appellant accordingly paid Rs.1,85,000/- in five instalments to the respondent, but the respondent started delaying in executing the purported sale deed on different grounds. However at the intervention of the relatives, the respondent gave a written undertaking on 12.9.2001 to execute and register the purported sale deed in favour of the appellant, but with no result. (d) The appellant thereafter issued registered notice on 2.9.2002 accompanied by a draft deed of the purported conveyance but the respondent by letter dated 3.10.2002 refused to execute the sale deed. Last such approach of the appellant was on 10.2.2003 which too was refused. 3. Hence, is the suit. 4. (d) The appellant thereafter issued registered notice on 2.9.2002 accompanied by a draft deed of the purported conveyance but the respondent by letter dated 3.10.2002 refused to execute the sale deed. Last such approach of the appellant was on 10.2.2003 which too was refused. 3. Hence, is the suit. 4. The sole respondent/defendant submitted written statement denying, inter alia, the material allegations made in the plaint. Apart from challenging the cause of action and questioning the maintainability of the suit, specific defence in the written statement is as follows : (i) There was never any contract for sale of land or house or to give possession of any part thereof and the terms of the so-called agreement being unconscionable, vague and indefinite. The suit is barred by the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and the Registration Act. The so-called agreement being not properly stamped and registered is not enforceable in the law. (ii) The appellant had illegally and wrongfully raised construction within the Khas land of the respondent in violation of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act 1980 for which notice was served upon him. (iii) Further there being no oral agreement on 11.8.2001 between the respondent and the appellant for selling the suit property at an agreed sum and the payment of Rs. 1,85,000/- having not been made by the appellant for the so called purchase of the land from the respondent, the question of specific performance of contract, if any, to be performed by the respondent does not arise. (iv) It is specifically contended that the respondent was not so solvent to maintain his family well. He used to live in the house constructed upon the land given by their mother and for its extension and repair, the respondent approached the appellant for some loan, which the appellant time to time had lent. In all Rs.1,85,000/- remained unpaid. (v) The respondent further contended that as a proof of the said loan, the appellant obtained signature of the respondent on a blank paper which subsequently was converted by the appellant as the impugned document in the nature and style of "CHUKTIPATRA" dated 12.9.2001. In all Rs.1,85,000/- remained unpaid. (v) The respondent further contended that as a proof of the said loan, the appellant obtained signature of the respondent on a blank paper which subsequently was converted by the appellant as the impugned document in the nature and style of "CHUKTIPATRA" dated 12.9.2001. The respondent, therefore, having not signed that document knowingly of giving undertaking as alleged by the appellant in the plaint and the respondent also having his residential house upon the suit plot and the price of the suit property being not less than Rs.9 to 10 Lacs, question of sale, as alleged by the appellant at Rs.2,80,000/- only is an unconscionable bargain. Accordingly the suit for specific performance of contract is liable to be dismissed. 5. Upon such pleadings, learned Court below had framed the following six issues, including issue no. 6 as an additional one:- (1) Is the suit maintainable in its present form and in law? (2) Is there any cause of action for the plaintiff to file this suit ? (3) Is the plaintiff entitled to get a sale deed executed and registered in his name in respect of the suit property? (4) Is the plaintiff entitled to get any decree of specific performance of contract as prayed for? (5) What other relief or reliefs, if any the plaintiff is entitled to? (6) Whether the impugned transaction is a loan transaction or not? 6. Learned Trial Court after examining the evidence on record dismissed the prayer for specific performance of contract as sought for in paragraph 19(a) of the plaint and also denied the consequential reliefs sought for in paragraph 19(b) and (d) to (g) of the plaint, but decreed the alternative prayer made in paragraph 19(c) directing the respondent to return Rs.1,85,000/- to the appellant by 31st December, 2008 together with interest @ 6% per annum. 7. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree, the plaintiff, being the appellant, has preferred the appeal on several grounds as set out in the memorandum of appeal. 8. The respondent, however, has not preferred cross appeal. Rather refunded Rs.1,85,000/- with interest in terms of the decree under challenge. 9. 7. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree, the plaintiff, being the appellant, has preferred the appeal on several grounds as set out in the memorandum of appeal. 8. The respondent, however, has not preferred cross appeal. Rather refunded Rs.1,85,000/- with interest in terms of the decree under challenge. 9. This being the first appeal against the impugned judgment, the points for determination are as under: (a) Whether the dismissal of the suit in passing the decree of specific performance of contract, sought for by the appellant, suffers from any illegality? (b) Whether the alternative money decree passed by the Trial Court requires any interference? (c) Whether the judgment and decree under challenge should he upheld or set aside or to be modified? 10. Mr. Samiran Giri, learned advocate for the appellant argued that the Trial Court did not discuss at all the evidence of Nanda Rani Chaudhuri, P.W. 2, the mother of the parties, examined on commission, a witness to the oral agreement entered into between the parties. Regarding sale of the suit property by the respondent in favour of the appellant at a consideration of Rs.2,80,000/- in continuation of which the document, Exhibit-4 and the CHUKTIPATRA, Exhibit-5 were brought into existence where Nanda Rani Chaudhuri by putting her signature became witness, Mr. Giri tried to impress upon the Court the intention of the parties. Though the Trial Court framed issue no. 6 as to whether the impugned transaction was a loan transaction or not, there was neither any discussion nor any finding which was in contravention of Order 14, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, Mr. Giri, submitted to send the suit back on remand for fresh decision. 11. Mr. Giri, relying on the judgment in P.C. Varghese v. Devaki Amma Balambika Devi and Ors.: (2005) 8 SCC 486 submitted that the though plaintiff filed the suit for specific performance of contract in respect of the suit property but the suit also having been filed with the alternative prayer for returning the money paid by the appellant to the respondent, it is maintainable. In support of the case of specific performance of contract on the basis of oral agreement, Mr. Giri relied on the judgment in Shankarlal Narayandas Mundade v. The New Mofussil Co. Ltd. and Ors.: AIR(33) 1946 Privy Council 97 and also referred to judgment in S.C. Basavraja and Anr. In support of the case of specific performance of contract on the basis of oral agreement, Mr. Giri relied on the judgment in Shankarlal Narayandas Mundade v. The New Mofussil Co. Ltd. and Ors.: AIR(33) 1946 Privy Council 97 and also referred to judgment in S.C. Basavraja and Anr. v. Boraiah: 1987(Supp) Supreme Court Cases 123, Madhukar and Ors. v. Sangram and Ors.: (2001) 4 SCC 756 , and Vinod Kumar v. Gangadhar: 2015(1) CHN (SC) 112; to lend support to his submission that the Bench dealing with the First Appeal should adjudicate all the issues, both on the question of law and on fact so that the valuable rights of the parties do not remain undecided. 12. Mr. R.N. Dutta, learned advocate for the respondent referring to Exhibits-4 and 5, replied, since the appellant is now relying upon the subsequent agreement then under section 62 of the Contract Act, 1882, the previous oral agreement has lost its force. Alternatively it is argued that marking of the documents as Exhibits-4 and 5 do not prove that there was an oral agreement. Apart from pointing out about some surreptitious characteristics with regard to Exhibits-4 and 5, Mr. Dutta further argued that within the four corners of the plaint there being no averment with regard to the readiness and willingness of the appellant in performing his part pursuant to the so-called agreement. The relief, as sought for in the suit, is barred under section 16(c) Explanation (ii) of the Specific Relief Act. Relying on the judgment in L.I.C. of India and Anr. v. Ram Pal Singh Bisen: 2010(3) ICC 32 and H.P. Pyarejan v. Dasappa (dead) by L.R.s and Ors.: 2006(2) ICC 366, Mr. Dutta supported the findings and observations of the Trial Court to conclude his argument that the appeal is liable to be dismissed with costs. 13. Mr. Giri replied, since before the Trial Court the documents were marked as exhibits in presence of the other side without objection, those documents had achieved its admissible value and therefore, are not liable to be rejected. Rather it requires favourable consideration, as according to him, these documents Exhibit- 4 and 5 were the documents brought into existence in continuation of the oral agreement in presence of their mother. 14. The suit property admittedly is vacant land situated in between the residential portion of the appellant and the respondent. Rather it requires favourable consideration, as according to him, these documents Exhibit- 4 and 5 were the documents brought into existence in continuation of the oral agreement in presence of their mother. 14. The suit property admittedly is vacant land situated in between the residential portion of the appellant and the respondent. As we find the main relief of the suit is for specific performance of contract, existence of agreement with its specific terms and conditions is a pre-condition, so that it is not hit by section 29 of the Indian Contract Act, 1870. The basis of the case of the appellant was the oral agreement between the parties entered on 11.8.2001. Though according to the appellant the respondent agreed to sell the suit property measuring 354.8 sq. ft. of land at a consideration of Rs.2,80,000/- but in the averments of the plaint or in the evidence of either P.W. 1 or the mother, P.W. 2, we could not find any stipulated date or dates by which the appellant was supposed to make payment of the alleged consideration money or the alleged stipulated date or dates by which the respondent would have exercised the obligation to execute the purported deed of sale in favour of the appellant. 15. The case of the respondent is that there was never any agreement to sell the suit property at a consideration of Rs.2,80,000/-. On the contrary it is the definite case that the respondent had taken loan of Rs.1,85,000/- from his brother, the appellant, in five instalments. The appellant, as P.W. 1, during cross examination stated "save and except my mother there are no independent witnesses in respect of the alleged oral agreement........... The alleged agreement was entered into for construction of a building on the suit property. No building has yet been constructed over the suit property." So, this evidence of the appellant demolished the case of any agreement for sale in lieu of consideration money. According to the plaint case "354.8 sq. ft" of land was supposed to be sold by the respondent in favour of the appellant as per the alleged oral agreement. But deviating from his own case, the appellant in cross examination deposed "the agreement was entered into for transferring an area of 300 sq. ft. out of 600 sq. ft. in favour of the plaintiff. I have not issued any notice for getting 300 sq. ft. But deviating from his own case, the appellant in cross examination deposed "the agreement was entered into for transferring an area of 300 sq. ft. out of 600 sq. ft. in favour of the plaintiff. I have not issued any notice for getting 300 sq. ft. from the defendant as no construction work as yet been done." So, as evident from the above quoted answers the appellant on oath has himself given a go by not only to the case of existence of an oral agreement but also regarding sale of the suit property measuring 354.8 sq. ft of land as the alleged agreement according to the appellant was for construction of a building upon the suit property and not for any other purpose. 16. The other part of the statement in chief of P.W. 1 though an attempt was made to build up a case of oral agreement but failed during cross examination. Initially, the appellant was not sure as to whether his mother would be examined. However ultimately his mother Nanda Rani Chaudhuri was examined on commission. P.W. 2, Nanda Rani Chaudhuri, widow, aged 82 years having read up to class IV, asserted about her full knowledge of the contents of the said affidavit, prepared under Order 18, Rule 4 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 17. The respondent all along asserted that he had taken loan from his brother, the appellant did never enter into any agreement for sale of the suit property at Rs.2,80,000/-. The P.W. 2, his mother in Examination in Chief in paragraph 15 corroborated such case of the respondent, by stating "it is a fact that Debabrata took loan from Satyabrata" which supports the case of the respondent, although in Examination in Chief there were other statements of P.W. 2 corroborating the fact of oral agreement contended by the appellant. 18. The appellant is the youngest son and the respondent is the eldest son of the P.W. 2. Though P.W. 2 stated that the respondent was not in distress at the time of preparation of the documents, i.e. Exhibit-4 and Exhibit-5, but she deposed "my elder son is unemployed. He does not do anything. He got some money from his father. I also gave some money after selling 5 cottahs of land. I cannot say how he maintains his family. He does not do anything. He got some money from his father. I also gave some money after selling 5 cottahs of land. I cannot say how he maintains his family. I paid him money once." She also stated that her youngest son, i.e. the appellant is a businessman and she lives separately from her sons though under the same roof. This evidence shows that the appellant was much more solvent than the respondent. Though P.W. 2 in her affidavit statement-in-chief prepared under Order 18 Rule (4) of the Code of Civil Procedure corroborated about the alleged oral agreement as contended by the appellant but it again remained vague and indefinite for want of disclosure of any terms and conditions including the stipulated period or time by which the so called oral agreement was supposed to be executed. The fact of oral agreement has been rightly disbelieved by learned Trial Court for want of acceptable corroborative evidence, in view of the evidence both of P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 as noted, since the same is hit by was section 29 of the Indian Contract Act. 19. Needless to mention that the evidence of the respondent is found in tune with his own case which was not shaken despite cross examination. It is a settled law that pleadings are to be construed as a whole but a portion of evidence can well be dissected to take note of the departure, admission or otherwise for adjudicating the issue. Thus the judgment in Shankarlal Narayandas Mundade (supra) is of no assistance to the appellant, since the case of oral agreement has no leg to stand within the given evidence. 20. We have already discussed about the damage caused by none else than the P.W. 1 on the point of alleged oral agreement which is the very basis of the case of the appellant. Nonetheless, let us assume that on 11.8.2001 there was an oral agreement. In that case the respondent was the promiser and the appellant was the promisee. Every promise or each of the promises forming the consideration is deemed to be an agreement under section 2 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and "agreement" only enforceable by law is a contract. Nonetheless, let us assume that on 11.8.2001 there was an oral agreement. In that case the respondent was the promiser and the appellant was the promisee. Every promise or each of the promises forming the consideration is deemed to be an agreement under section 2 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and "agreement" only enforceable by law is a contract. Therefore, any agreement which is not enforceable by law at the option of one, or, more of the parties thereto but not at the option of the other, or others, is voidable contract vide section 2(g)(h)(i) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. So, the agreement, if any exists between the parties must be indicative with specific terms and conditions so that the same may be enforceable under law which is absent in the instant suit. 21. Mr. Giri throughout his argument tried to impress that Exhibits-4 and 5 were the documents prepared in continuity of the oral agreement. We have already discussed about the merit of the so-called oral agreement, a story till now is not acceptable to us. Be that as it may, on close scrutiny of the text of the two documents we failed to find out any text that Exhibit-4 or Exhibit-5 were prepared or executed in continuation of the oral agreement dated 11.8.2001. Exhibit-4 was prepared on a stamp paper of Rs.20/-. Just below the impression of the stamp of Rs.20/-, the date "11/08/2001" has been put which is alleged to be the date of the oral agreement and its item no. 1 shows that the respondent acknowledged receipt of one account payee cheque of Rs.30,000/- from the appellant on that very 11th day of August, 2001. But Exhibit-4 is silent regarding the number of plot or khatian. If any attempt to construct the text of such Exhibit-4 is made then it may be read in common parlance that total valuation of the alleged property was fixed at Rs. 2,80,000/- and the respondent realised Rs.1,85,000/- only allegedly for the purpose of sale of 354.8 sq. ft. of land out of 5 cottahs 3 chittaks and 27 sq. ft of land. But vagueness of such Exhibit-4 could not be removed in the absence of khatian or plot number to which such 354.8 sq. ft. was appertained. On the contrary as per evidence of P.W. 1, the so-called agreement being for 300 sq. ft. of land out of 5 cottahs 3 chittaks and 27 sq. ft of land. But vagueness of such Exhibit-4 could not be removed in the absence of khatian or plot number to which such 354.8 sq. ft. was appertained. On the contrary as per evidence of P.W. 1, the so-called agreement being for 300 sq. ft and the purpose of giving money being other than specific performance of contract, Exhibit-4 was rightly rejected by the Trial Court to accept as an agreement or in continuity of any agreement for any meaningful purpose of the suit. Though P.W. 2, the mother of the parties in examination deposed that Exhibit-4 and Exhibit-5 were created in her presence, curiously enough, the date under the signature of Nanda Rani Chaudhuri on Exhibit-4 appears as on "12.8.2001" on which no transaction took place between the parties. Therefore, the reason of putting the date "12.8.2001" under signature of PW 2 on Exhibit-4 remained obscure. Although the appellant claimed that by intervention of the friends and relatives there was an undertaking between the parties in continuation with the alleged oral agreement, but no third person was examined to corroborate the case of the appellant. On further examining Exhibit- 4, we found some unusual space also left in between the writings made against item no. 5 showing receipt of Rs.30,000/- and the signature obtained from P.W. 2, and on the reverse of such stamp paper after striking out the name of the actual purchaser of said stamp paper, the name of the appellant was incorporated. The stamp paper with such suspicious characteristics was used to demonstrate before the Court as a document of agreement in continuation of the so-called oral agreement which we refuse to accept. 22. Moreover, on examining the averments in the plaint, we could not find out any statement that the appellant had performed or was ready and willing to perform the essential terms of contract as required under section 16(c)(ii) of the Specific Relief Act,. Though the appellant under Order 18, Rule 4 (1) of the Code stated that he was always ready and willing to perform the terms of the agreement, it was the respondent who had been delaying in executing the deed in acceptance of the balance consideration money. Though the appellant under Order 18, Rule 4 (1) of the Code stated that he was always ready and willing to perform the terms of the agreement, it was the respondent who had been delaying in executing the deed in acceptance of the balance consideration money. But it is settled law, if evidence is led without asserting in the pleading, it must remain beyond consideration, and therefore the above noted statement made in examination-in-chief, being beyond pleading, is rejected. 23. Even perusing Exhibit-6, the letter dated 2nd September, 2002 under registered post with acknowledgement card issued by the appellant to the respondent, we have found that not a single sentence was incorporated which can be accepted as an assertion to prove that the appellant had performed or had always been ready and willing to perform the terms of the contract which were to be performed by him to overcome the bar under section 16(c)(ii) of the Specific Relief Act. So, from that angle, the relief sought for in the suit for specific performance of contract is also hit under the section 16 of the Specific Relief Act. Exhibit-4 also cannot be accepted as a transaction of sale as it is hit under section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. Exhibit-4, in fact, goes to show that the respondent received a sum of Rs.1,85,000/- by cheque and cash on 11.8.2001, 24.8.2001, 28.8.2001, 30.10.2001 and lastly on 27.12.2001, which was admitted by the respondent to have taken as loan from his brother appellant. 24. It is pertinent to mention that on examining the evidence of P.W. 1, P.W. 2 and D.W. 1, i.e. the respondent and examining the surreptitious characteristics of Exhibit-4, we are constrained to disbelieve the story of oral agreement which is the very basis of the suit. Therefore, once the case of oral agreement loses credibility, Exhibit-4 or Exhibit-5 cannot act as saviour. Though Exhibit-5 prepared on a plain paper, bears the signature of Nanda Rani Chaudhuri and bears the date "12.9.2001", however the parties signed it on 26.9.2001. So it is beyond comprehension as to how Nanda Rani Chaudhuri could be a witness to such Exhibit-5 by putting signature on 12.9.2001 while the document itself was executed by the parties fourteen days thereafter. So it is beyond comprehension as to how Nanda Rani Chaudhuri could be a witness to such Exhibit-5 by putting signature on 12.9.2001 while the document itself was executed by the parties fourteen days thereafter. Hence, either Exhibit 4 or Exhibit 5 do not give any expression of intention of any slightest nature to attract at least the rule of specific performance of contract. 25. Though the respondent pleaded that the appellant had obtained his signatures on some blank papers and those were reduced to Exhibit-4 or Exhibit- 5 this story also we disbelieve since onus on this score was also not discharged by the respondent. On the contrary, it has been established by evidence coupled with Exhibit-4 that the respondent had obtained a sum of Rs.1,85,000/- from the appellant. Therefore, Trial Court rightly rejected even to impound those two documents. 26. Though issue no. 6 has been framed in the suit as an additional issue as to whether the impugned document is a loan transaction or not but at the very outset we observed that the issue is not relevant for determination of the instant suit. The instant suit was filed with the prime prayer of specific performance of contract with alternative prayer for getting refund of the money paid by the appellant to the respondent which according to the case made out by the respondent was taken as loan. 27. Mr. Giri argued that the respondent could not produce any document of loan transaction. On scrutiny of the pleadings we found that the respondent nowhere asserted that there was ever any document of loan transaction in his possession. Therefore, the question of production of any document of loan from his custody does not arise. On the contrary, while examining the materials on record we find that Exhibit-4, which is impugned document for the purpose of the issue, is not at all an agreement of any kind far to speak of a document in continuation of the oral agreement which is not proved by legal evidence. Said Exhibit-4 can be at best accepted and rightly accepted by the Trial Court as a document of acknowledgement of Rs.1,85,000/- in five instalments by cheque and by cash by the respondent from the appellant. Virtually, issue no. Said Exhibit-4 can be at best accepted and rightly accepted by the Trial Court as a document of acknowledgement of Rs.1,85,000/- in five instalments by cheque and by cash by the respondent from the appellant. Virtually, issue no. 6 is relevant for a suit where determination is necessary in respect of a particular document where one party asserts about a document as an out and out sale deed and the rival party negates it claiming it to be a loan transaction. However, Exhibit-4 being also accepted by us as a document of mere acknowledgement of receipt of money amounting to Rs.1,85,000/- as admitted also by the respondent, the issue no. 6 being redundant for the suit is answered accordingly. 28. Although taking the ratio of the other decisions cited by him, Mr. Giri has submitted to send the case back on remand since the Trial Court did not consider at all the evidence of P.W. 2 and kept issue no. 6 undecided, but taking note of the cause of action and the prayers, including the alternative prayer made in the suit when the evidence as adduced by the parties are found by us to be sufficient to determine the case finally, we, being guided by Order 41, Rule 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure and taking note of each and every evidence and remaining conscious about scope of availability of the valuable right of the parties, if any, which may be stretched on the basis of legal and admissible evidence in the first appeal as per the guiding principle, we conclude that the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court does not suffer from any illegality. Therefore, the issue number 1, 2, 3 and 4 rightly been answered in the negative by the Trial Court. 29. In answering to the ground of appeal about the rate of interest allowed by the Trial Court we hold that the alternative money decree as passed by the Trial Court with 6% interest also requires no interference since the last loan transaction between the parties was held on 22.12.2001 and the suit, with the alternative prayer, was filed on 18.2.2003, i.e. well within the period of limitation. Thus, the alternative prayer of money decree answered by the Trial Court in favour of the appellant also requires no interference or modification. Thus, the alternative prayer of money decree answered by the Trial Court in favour of the appellant also requires no interference or modification. Thus answering to the three points as set out in the first appeal, the judgment and decree of Trial Court is upheld. 30. Though we have affirmed the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court, since the respondent had already deposited the decretal amount with interest in terms of the decree, Trial Court is directed to release the said amount in favour of the appellant on proper receipt and identification after realising the requisite court fees over the decretal sum as on the date of the suit if not already deposited by the appellant by this time. 31. The appeal thus, stands dismissed, however, in view of relationship of the parties without any order as to costs. 32. After judgment being delivered, Mr. Giri, learned advocate for the appellant prays for stay of operation of the judgment and also prays for an order of status quo in respect of the suit property which is strongly opposed by Mr. R.N. Dutta, learned advocate for the respondent. 33. In view of the observations and findings in our judgment, the prayer is refused. Appeal dismissed.