Judgment : In Re.: C.A.N. 4056 of 2015 In this application the appellants-petitioners have prayed for stay of operation of the judgment and decree dated August 22, 2014 passed by the learned District Judge at Howrah in Title Appeal No. 149 of 2013 reversing the judgment and decree dated September 30, 2013 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) 2nd Court at Howrah dismissing the Title Suit No. 222 of 1997 and stay of all further proceedings in Misc. Case No. 337 of 2014 arising out of the Title Appeal No. 149 of 2013. The respondents filed Title Suit No. 222 of 1997 claiming, inter alia, decree for declaration, injunction and for cancellation of the deeds of gift dated July 09, 1985 and September 29, 1986 executed by one Pramila Sundari Mazumdar in favour of the defendants-appellants. The respondents/plaintiffs claimed that the suit property is a debuttor estate and the said Pramila Sundari Mazumdar had no title in respect of the property to execute the said deeds of gift. In the title suit, various interlocutory applications were filed and various orders were passed by the learned trial Court. Some of the orders passed by the learned trial Court in the title suit were carried in appeal before this Court and in the said appeal the Division Bench of this Court passed various orders. Ultimately, the title suit was dismissed by the learned trial Judge. The plaintiffs-respondents carried the said decree of the learned trial Court in appeal before the appellate Court. By the impugned judgment and decree, the lower appellate Court reversed the decree passed by the learned trial Judge and passed decree for declaration that the deeds of gift dated July 09, 1985 and September 29, 1986 are void ab initio, illegal, inoperative and not binding upon the plaintiffs-appellants. The lower appellate Court also passed a decree for declaration that the suit property is Debuttor property by virtue of Arpannama dated May 15, 1973 and the said deeds of gift dated July 09, 1985 and September 29, 1986 are void instruments and the same were declared to be cancelled. The lower appellate court further passed a decree for permanent injunction restraining the defendants-appellants, their men and agents from interfering with the management of the suit property and/or committing any act derogatory to the interest of the plaintiffs-respondents over the suit property. The lower appellate court further passed a decree for permanent injunction restraining the defendants-appellants, their men and agents from interfering with the management of the suit property and/or committing any act derogatory to the interest of the plaintiffs-respondents over the suit property. As mentioned above, in this application, the defendants-appellants have prayed for stay of operation of the above judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate court. On April 06, 2015 a Division Bench of this Court admitted the above second appeal after framing the substantial questions of law. 1. Whether the learned Judge of the First Appellate Court substantially erred in law in holding that the Donee Pramila Sundari Mazumdar had no title, in view of the property-in-suit having reverted back to the estate of the owner, i.e., Pramila Sundari Mazumdar, herself on the death of Gopal Bandhu Mazumdar, the residuary shebait prior to Pramila Sundari Mazumdar herself even as per the Arpannama-in-question? 2. Whether the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court is bad in law in reversing the well reasoned finding of the learned Trial Judge that the suit is time-barred, in view of the admitted knowledge of the Plaintiff-Shebait regarding the actual possession as well as collection of rent by the Appellants during the life time of Pramila Sundari Mazumdar, the alleged Shebait at the relevant period? 3. Whether the Learned Lower Appellate Court at best ought to have stayed the appeal pending before it under Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure during pendency of Title Appeal No. 162 of 1994, wherein substantially the same issues had been pending? Mr. Bhattacharyya, learned senior counsel, appearing for the appellants-petitioners strenuously urged that the second appeal has been admitted by the Division Bench of this Court after framing the aforementioned substantial questions of law and if the operation of the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned lower appellate Court is not stayed, the respondents shall render the second appeal infractuous by transferring the suit property to third party. Mr. Mr. Bhattacharyya further submitted that from the report of the Special Officer appointed by this Court on earlier occasion, as has been disclosed in the pleadings of their application, it is evident that the appellants-petitioners are in possession of the suit property and, as such, the interim order, as prayed for in this application, should be passed by this Court to protect the possession of the appellants-petitioners in respect of the suit property. However, Mr. Banerjee, learned senior counsel, appearing for the respondents submitted that the decree passed by the lower appellate Court has already been acted upon and it has already been recorded in the volume of the concerned Registrar of Assurance that the said deeds of gift dated July 09, 1985 and September 29, 1986 have been cancelled. Thus, according to him, there is no further scope to stay the operation of the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned appellate Court. Mr. Banerjee relied upon two orders passed by the Division Bench of this Court on September 23, 1997 and July 08, 2010 whereby the Division Bench specifically directed the respondents-plaintiffs to carry out the yearly seva puja of the deity at the suit property, but the appellants-defendants were not allowing to perform the seva puja of the deity at the suit property. He further submitted that the appellants are seeking to convert the temple of the deity in the suit property into a go-down. Accordingly, he prayed for rejection of the stay application filed by the appellants-petitioners. However, in reply, Mr. Bhattacharyya appearing for the appellants pointed out that the report of the Special officer appointed by this Court, as has been disclosed in the affidavit-in-reply, would substantiate that there is no temple of the deity in the suit property and, at the highest, this Court had directed the Special Officer to carry out the yearly seva puja at the suit property. He further submitted that after this application was served upon the respondents, they obtained deletion of the aforementioned deeds of gift from the books of the concerned Registrar of Assurance. After considering the averments made in the pleadings filed by the respective parties as also the submissions of both Mr. Bhattachryya and Mr. He further submitted that after this application was served upon the respondents, they obtained deletion of the aforementioned deeds of gift from the books of the concerned Registrar of Assurance. After considering the averments made in the pleadings filed by the respective parties as also the submissions of both Mr. Bhattachryya and Mr. Banerjee, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants and the respondents respectively, I am of the view that it is a fit case that an order of injunction be passed restraining both the appellants as also the respondents in the appeal from transferring the suit property. Accordingly, there shall be an order of injunction restraining the appellants and the respondents from transferring or alienating or encumbering or parting with possession of any portion of the suit property to any third party till the disposal of the appeal. The instant appeal has been admitted by a Division Bench of this Court after framing substantial questions of law and any act already done by the respondents on the basis of the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned lower appellate Court shall abide by the result of this appeal. The appellants and the respondents are also directed to maintain status quo with regard to their possession in respect of the suit property. With the aforesaid directions, the application, being C.A.N. 4056 of 2015, stands disposed of. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. Urgent certified website copies of this order, if applied for, be made available to the parties upon compliance of requisite formalities.