Research › Search › Judgment

Andhra High Court · body

2015 DIGILAW 746 (AP)

Errabelli Dayakar Rao v. Talasani Srinivas Yadav

2015-09-28

DILIP B.BHOSALE, S.V.BHATT

body2015
JUDGMENT : Dilip B. Bhosale, J. 1. The question of law that falls for our consideration is ‘whether the High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, can issue mandatory direction to the Speaker of a State Legislative Assembly to dispose of a disqualification petition within a time frame?. 2. The facts, that are relevant for addressing the question, are taken from W.A.No.158 of 2015 arising from W.P.No.630 of 2015. This writ petition was filed by the appellants against four respondents including the Speaker of the State Assembly with the prayer that procedural facet, which defeats the substantial rights, is required to be interdicted by the process of judicial review by this Court and, in support, a strong reliance was placed upon the observations of the Supreme Court in Mayawati v. Markandeya Chand and others (1998) 7 SCC 517 ). Further, the petitioner prayed for a direction to the Speaker to decide the pending disqualification petitions filed by him under the provisions of the A.P. Legislative Assembly (Disqualification on Ground of Defection) Rules, 1986 (for short “Defection Rules”) on the next date of hearing, that may be fixed by this Court and conduct the proceedings on day-to-day basis if necessary. The petitioner also prayed for withdrawal of disqualification petitions and decide the same in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Rajendra Singh Rana and others v. Swamy Prasad Maurya and others (2007) 4 SCC 270 ), if this Court is satisfied that the Speaker would not comply the directions to dispose them of within time frame. The learned counsel for the petitioner, however, did not press this prayer. 2.1 The petitioner is a member of A.P. State Legislative Assembly and leader of Telugu Desam Party (for short “TDP”). Respondent Nos.1 to 3 are also members of the Legislative Assembly and primary members of the TDP, which is a recognized political party. They all got elected as members of the Legislative Assembly in the name of TDP and on the ‘B-FORM’ issued by them from different constituencies. 2.2 The petitioner has filed disqualification petitions bearing D.P.Nos.5/2014, 6/2014 and 7/2014 seeking disqualification of respondent Nos.1 to 3 alleging that they have committed acts attracting their disqualification on the ground of defection, which clearly falls under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India. 2.2 The petitioner has filed disqualification petitions bearing D.P.Nos.5/2014, 6/2014 and 7/2014 seeking disqualification of respondent Nos.1 to 3 alleging that they have committed acts attracting their disqualification on the ground of defection, which clearly falls under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India. The petitioner filed disqualification petitions under the provisions of Defection Rules on 24th November, 2014. According to the petitioner, after filing of the separate disqualification petitions against respondent Nos.1 to 3, notices were issued to them on 5th December, 2014, and since then till today they have neither filed counters nor there is any progress with reference to adjudication of disqualification petitions. The petitioner claims that he made efforts by making application for early disposal of disqualification petitions but no orders are passed nor the petitions are heard till this date. The respondents in Writ Petition Nos.7679 and 7217 of 2015 and the respondents in the instant appeal are similarly placed members of the Legislative Assembly. 2.3 The petitioner, therefore, approached this Court for the reliefs as aforementioned under Article 226 of Constitution of India. The writ petitions were heard and disposed of by common order dated 10.02.2015 holding that the petitions, for the prayers as made therein, are not maintainable. As a matter of fact the learned Judge has only considered the question ‘whether the writ petitions are maintainable principally in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachilluhu (1992 SUPP (2) SCC 651). 2.4 This Court had issued notices to respondent Nos.1 to 3 on 03.03.2015 and to the Speaker on 23.07.2015. The speaker, however, refused to accept the notice. 3. In this backdrop, we have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and with their assistance gone through the impugned orders and other materials placed before the Court and so also the judgments relied upon by them in support of their contentions. The speaker, however, refused to accept the notice. 3. In this backdrop, we have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and with their assistance gone through the impugned orders and other materials placed before the Court and so also the judgments relied upon by them in support of their contentions. Sri Ravi Shankar Jandhyala, learned counsel for the petitioners, at the outset, submitted that in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Speaker, Haryana Vidhan Sabha v. Kuldeep Bishnoi and Ors ( AIR 2013 SC 120 ) and Speaker, Orissa Legislative Assembly v. Utkal Keshari Parida (2013) 11 SCC 794 ) this Court can, in exercise of its powers of judicial review, issue mandatory directions to the Speaker of a State Assembly to dispose of a disqualification petition within a specified time. He submitted that in these cases the Supreme Court had issued such direction and, therefore, it cannot be stated that the High Court in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot issue such directions. He further submitted that since last about nine months the Speaker has not taken any further steps in order to hear and decide the disqualification petitions, overlooking the Defection Rules and also constitutional mandate as reflected in the Tenth Schedule thereof. Lastly, he invited our attention to the relevant Defection Rules and submitted that the Speaker ought to have decided the disqualification petitions within reasonable time and that in any case the reasonable time would not be as long as taken by the Speaker from the date of the disqualification petitions. In support, he also placed reliance upon the Full Bench judgment of this Court in Karanam Bala Rama Krishna Murthy v. Gottipati Hanumantha Rao 1996 (2) ALT 799 (F.B). In this case, the Full Bench took a view that not exercising jurisdiction by the Speaker gives an opportunity to any person to move this Court for appropriate orders in exercise of this Court’s jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India to proceed in accordance with law and to complete necessary inquiry within a reasonable time. 4. 4. On the other hand, Sri K. Rama Krishna Reddy, learned Advocate General for the State of Telangana, as an Amicus Curiae, invited our attention to the judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Kihoto Hollohan (supra) and submitted that the writ petitions are not maintainable and are liable to be dismissed in the light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the said judgment. He submitted that in this judgment the Supreme Court held that the judicial review is available only against the orders passed by a Speaker and not prior to the making of a decision by the Speaker. He also invited our attention to Article 212 of the Constitution and submitted that validity of any proceedings in the Legislature of a State cannot be called in question on the ground of any alleged procedural irregularity, based on Defection Rules or otherwise. He submitted that about 10 disqualification petitions have been filed and are pending before the Speaker and that recently he has granted time to the respondent-members of the Legislative Assembly, against whom the disqualification petitions are filed, for filing their counters. He, therefore, submitted that it is not correct to state that the Speaker is not taking any steps to consider and decide the disqualification petitions. He submitted that scope of a judicial review is very limited in terms of the judgment in Kihoto Hollohan (supra) by the Constitution Bench. He also submitted that reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mayawati (supra) is misplaced. 5. We would like to have a close look at the judgments in Utkal Keshari Parida and Kuldeep Bishnoi (supra) on which a heavy reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners in support of the prayers made in the writ petitions and in the light of contentions urged by him before this Court. 6. In Utkal Keshari Parida (supra) the Supreme Court was dealing with an appeal filed by the Speaker of Orissa Legislative Assembly. There were 4 elected members of National Congress Party in Orissa Legislative Assembly. They all joined the Biju Janata Dal (BJD), which was the ruling party in the State. On account of such defection, Sri Utkal Keshari Parida, President of the State Unit of National Congress Party, filed 4 separate disqualification petitions. There were 4 elected members of National Congress Party in Orissa Legislative Assembly. They all joined the Biju Janata Dal (BJD), which was the ruling party in the State. On account of such defection, Sri Utkal Keshari Parida, President of the State Unit of National Congress Party, filed 4 separate disqualification petitions. Even after completing all preliminary formalities, hearing of the disqualification petitions was delayed and hence Utkal Keshari Parida filed writ petition before the High Court, inter alia, for a direction to the Speaker of the Assembly to dispose of the disqualification petitions expeditiously. Before the Division Bench an objection was taken regarding maintainability of the writ petition filed by Utkal Keshari Parida, who, though being the President of State Unit of National Congress Party, was not a member of the Legislative Assembly. This objection was taken in the light of the language employed in sub-rule (2) of Rule 6 of the Member of Orissa Legislative Assembly (Disqualification on Ground of Defection) Rules, 1987 (for short “1987 Rules”). The Division Bench dismissed the writ petition holding that it was not maintainable at the instance of Utkal Keshari Parida since he was not a member of the Legislative Assembly. 7. The Supreme Court, while dealing with the question ‘whether the petition was maintainable filed by Utkal Keshari Parida’, after referring to its judgments in Rajendra Singh Rana and Others v. Swami Prasad Maurya and Others [ (2007) 4 SCC 270 ], Prakash Singh Badal v. Union of India [ AIR 1987 P&H 263 ] and so also in Kihoto Hollohan (supra) and after considering in depth the Tenth Schedule and 1987 Rules, held that disqualification petition filed by Utkal Keshari Parida is maintainable. The Supreme Court did not consider the question ‘whether the writ petition seeking a direction to the Speaker of Legislative Assembly to dispose of disqualification petition expeditiously is maintainable’ and accordingly dismissed the appeal filed by the Speaker upholding the judgment of the High Court. 7.1 We have also perused the judgment of the High Court in Utkal Keshari Parida (supra). The High Court principally dealt with the question ‘whether disqualification petition at the instance of Utkal Keshari Parida was maintainable’ and held that it was maintainable under Rule 6 of 1987 Rules. 7.1 We have also perused the judgment of the High Court in Utkal Keshari Parida (supra). The High Court principally dealt with the question ‘whether disqualification petition at the instance of Utkal Keshari Parida was maintainable’ and held that it was maintainable under Rule 6 of 1987 Rules. It is pertinent to note that the High Court framed only one question for consideration, viz., whether the disqualification petition filed by the petitioner (Utkal Keshari Parida) under Article 191 read with para.2 of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution read with Rule 6 of the Rules before the learned Speaker is maintainable?. In other words, the question ‘whether High Court in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can issue directions to Speaker of State Legislative Assembly is maintainable? Was not framed or considered. In concluding paragraph, the High Court, after having noticed the averments made on behalf of the Speaker that steps had been taken by him for disposal of the petition, issued direction to expedite hearing of the said petition and dispose of the same within time frame. Thus, it is clear that neither the High Court nor the Supreme Court in Utkal Keshari Parida (supra) considered the question as has been framed in the instant proceedings. 8. In Kuldeep Bishnoi (supra) the Supreme Court dealt with an appeal filed by the Speaker of Haryana Vidhan Sabha against the judgment and order of the Punjab and Haryana High Court. By the said judgment, the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the appeal confirming the directions issued by learned single Judge to the Speaker to decide the petition for disqualification of 5 MLAs within a period of 4 months and pending such decision disqualified the members of Legislative Assembly, against whom disqualification petitions were filed, from effectively functioning as members of Vidhan Sabha. In this backdrop, the Supreme Court framed five questions for consideration. We are concerned with only two questions, to which our attention was specifically invited by learned counsel for the petitioners. In this backdrop, the Supreme Court framed five questions for consideration. We are concerned with only two questions, to which our attention was specifically invited by learned counsel for the petitioners. The first question was whether the High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, has the jurisdiction to issue directions of an interim nature to a Member of the House while a disqualification petition of such Member is pending before the Speaker of a State Legislative Assembly under Article 191 read with the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution of India?; and the second was whether even in exercise of its powers of judicial review, the High Court, as a constitutional authority, can issue mandatory directions to the Speaker of a State Assembly, who himself is a constitutional authority, to dispose of a disqualification petition within a specified time?. 8.1 The arguments before the Supreme Court were mainly on the first question. The Supreme Court in para 40 of the judgment observed that “in the instant case, we are really required to consider whether the High Court was competent to pass interim orders under its powers of judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution when the disqualification proceedings were pending before the Speaker”. As observed earlier, by the interim order that was passed by the High Court, 5 MLAs were disqualified from effectively functioning as members of Vidhan Sabha, pending decision of disqualification petition. 8.2 The Supreme Court also considered the question, as reflected in paragraph 41 of the judgment, whether the question of disqualification on account of merger, which had been accepted by the Speaker, could have been entertained by the Speaker under paragraph 4 of the Tenth Schedule, when such powers were vested exclusively in the Speaker under paragraph 6 thereof. Then the Supreme Court in paragraph 43 observed that “the main challenge to the impugned decision of the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court is with regard to the competence of the Speaker of the Assembly to decide the question of disqualification of the Members of the Haryana Janhit Congress (BL) Party on their joining the Indian National Congress Party on the basis of the letters written by the five Members of the former legislature party. Incidentally, the learned single Judge held that the issue would have to be decided by the Speaker himself while considering the disqualification petitions under paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution. What is important, however, is the question as to whether such a decision could be arrived at under paragraph 4 of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution whereunder the Speaker has not been given any authority to decide such an issue. Paragraph 4 merely indicates the circumstances in which a Member of a House shall not be disqualified under sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 2. One of the circumstances indicated is where the original political party merges with another political party and the Member claims that he and any other Member of his original political party had become Members of such other political party, or, as the case may be, of a new political party formed by such merger. 8.3 The Supreme Court in this backdrop observed that “for the purpose of subparagraph (1) of paragraph 2, the merger of the original political party of a Member of the House, shall be deemed to have taken place if, and only if, not less than two-thirds of the Members of the legislature party concerned agree to such merger”. Then after considering the scheme of the Tenth Schedule, in paragraphs 44, 45, 47 and 48, the Supreme Court observed thus:- “44. The scheme of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution indicates that the Speaker is not competent to take a decision with regard to disqualification on ground of defection, without a determination under paragraph 4, and paragraph 6 in no uncertain terms lays down that if any question arises as to whether a Member of the House has become subject to disqualification, the said question would be referred to the Speaker of such House whose decision would be final. The finality of the decisions of the Speaker was in regard to paragraph 6 since the Speaker was not competent to decide a question as to whether there has been a split or merger under paragraph 4. The said question was considered by the Constitution Bench in Rajendra Singh Rana’s case (supra). The finality of the decisions of the Speaker was in regard to paragraph 6 since the Speaker was not competent to decide a question as to whether there has been a split or merger under paragraph 4. The said question was considered by the Constitution Bench in Rajendra Singh Rana’s case (supra). While construing the provisions of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution in relation to Articles 102 and 191 of the Constitution, the Constitution Bench observed that the whole proceedings under the Tenth Schedule gets initiated as a part of disqualification proceedings. Hence, determination of the question of split or merger could not be divorced from the motion before the Speaker seeking a disqualification of the Member or Members concerned under paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule. Under the scheme of the Tenth Schedule the Speaker does not have an independent power to decide that there has been split or merger as contemplated by paragraphs 3 and 4 respectively and such a decision can be taken only when the question of disqualification arises in a proceeding under paragraph 6. It is only after a final decision is rendered by the Speaker under paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution can be invoked. 45. We have to keep in mind the fact that these appeals are being decided in the background of the complaint made to the effect that interim orders have been passed by the High Court in purported exercise of its powers to judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, when the disqualification proceedings were pending before the Speaker. In that regard, we are of the view that since the decision of the Speaker on a petition under paragraph 4 of the Tenth Schedule concerns only a question of merger on which the Speaker is not entitled to adjudicate, the High Court could not have assumed jurisdiction under its powers of review before a decision was taken by the Speaker under paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution. It is in fact in a proceeding under paragraph 6 that the Speaker assumes jurisdiction to pass a quasi-judicial order which is amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. It is in such proceedings that the question relating to the disqualification is to be considered and decided. It is in fact in a proceeding under paragraph 6 that the Speaker assumes jurisdiction to pass a quasi-judicial order which is amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. It is in such proceedings that the question relating to the disqualification is to be considered and decided. Accordingly, restraining the Speaker from taking any decision under paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule is, in our view, beyond the jurisdiction of the High Court, since the Constitution itself has vested the Speaker with the power to take a decision under paragraph 6 and care has also been taken to indicate that such decision of the Speaker would be final. It is only thereafter that the High Court assumes jurisdiction to examine the Speaker’s order. 47. The appeal filed by the Speaker, Haryana Vidhan Sabha, against the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court, is not, therefore, capable of being sustained and the Appeal filed by the Speaker is accordingly dismissed. The other Appeals preferred by the five disqualified MLAs have, therefore, to be allowed to the extent of the directions given by the learned Single Judge and endorsed by the Division Bench that the five MLAs would stand disqualified from effectively functioning as Members of the Haryana Vidhan Sabha till the Speaker decided the petitions regarding their disqualification, within a period of four months. 48. In our view, the High Court had no jurisdiction to pass such an order, which was in the domain of the Speaker. The High Court assumed the jurisdiction which it never had in making the interim order which had the effect of preventing the five MLAs in question from effectively functioning as Members of the Haryana Vidhan Sabha. The direction given by the learned Single Judge to the Speaker, as endorsed by the Division Bench, is, therefore, upheld to the extent that it directs the Speaker to decide the petitions for disqualification of the five MLAs within a period of four months. The said direction shall, therefore, be given effect to by Speaker. The remaining portion of the order disqualifying the five MLAs from effectively functioning as Members of the Haryana Vidhan Sabha is set aside. The said direction shall, therefore, be given effect to by Speaker. The remaining portion of the order disqualifying the five MLAs from effectively functioning as Members of the Haryana Vidhan Sabha is set aside. The said five MLAs would, therefore, be entitled to fully function as Members of the Haryana Vidhan Sabha without any restrictions, subject to the final decision that may be rendered by the Speaker in the disqualification petitions filed under paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution.” (Emphasis supplied) 8.4 In this backdrop, the Supreme Court in the concluding paragraph observed that “The Speaker shall dispose of the pending applications for disqualification of 5 MLAs in question within a period of three months from the date of communication of this order.” The Advocate General submitted that it is pertinent to note that the writ petition in Kuldeep Bishnoi (supra), under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, was filed against the orders dated 09.11.2009 and 10.11.2009 passed by the Speaker of the Assembly whereby the Speaker decided the question of disqualification on account of merger. Rightly or wrongly, the Speaker had passed the orders, which at that stage, till the position of law was made clear by the High Court and Supreme Court, he submitted that it was in the nature of final order. To test this, we asked specific question to the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that if the orders of the Speaker were not challenged whether it was necessary for the Speaker to proceed with the hearing of the applications/petitions for disqualification and his answer was in the negative. In other words, after the orders, which were impugned in the writ petitions, the question of deciding the disqualification petitions did not arise. He then invited our attention to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kihoto Hollohan (supra) and submitted that the writ petition (in Kuldeep Bishnoi), at that stage, filed against the order of the Speaker before High Court of Punjab and Haryana was maintainable since it was against the order in the nature of final decision. As against this, he submitted that the instant writ petition is not against any order as such and, therefore, it is not maintainable in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court. 9. As against this, he submitted that the instant writ petition is not against any order as such and, therefore, it is not maintainable in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court. 9. In this backdrop, we would like to have a look at the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kihoto Hollohan (supra). In this case, the constitutional validity of Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India introduced by the Constitution (Fifty-Second Amendment) Act, 1985, was assailed. While dealing with the challenge, the Supreme Court in depth considered the scheme of Tenth Schedule and upheld the constitutionality of the said Act. For our purpose, the observations made by the Supreme Court in paragraphs 109 to 111 are relevant, which read thus:- “109. In the light of the decisions referred to above and the nature of function that is exercised by the Speaker/Chairman under Paragraph 6, the scope of judicial review under Articles 136 and 226 and 227 of the Constitution in respect of an order passed by the Speaker/Chairman under Paragraph 6 would be confined to jurisdictional errors only vi., infirmities based on violation of constitutional mandate, mala fides, non-compliance with rules of natural justice and perversity. 110. In view of the limited scope of judicial review that is available on account of the finality clause in paragraph 6 and also having regard to the constitutional intendment and the status of the repository of the adjudicatory power i.e. Speaker/Chairman, judicial review cannot be available at a stage prior to the making of a decision by the Speaker/Chairman and a quia timet action would not be permissible. Nor would interference be permissible at an interlocutory stage of the proceedings. Exception will, however, have to be made in respect of cases where disqualification or suspension is imposed during the pendency of the proceedings and such disqualification or suspension is likely to have grave, immediate and irreversible repercussions and consequence. 111. In the result, we hold on contentions (E) and (F) : That the Tenth Schedule does not, in providing for an additional grant for disqualification and for adjudication of disputed disqualifications, seek to create a non-justiciable constitutional area. The power to resolve such disputes vested in the Speaker or chairman is a judicial power. That Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule, to the extent it seeks to impart finality to the decision of the Speakers/Chairmen is valid. The power to resolve such disputes vested in the Speaker or chairman is a judicial power. That Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule, to the extent it seeks to impart finality to the decision of the Speakers/Chairmen is valid. But the concept of statutory finality embodied in Paragraph 6(1) does not detract from or abrogate judicial review under Articles 136, 226 and 227 of the Constitution in so far as infirmities based on violations of constitutional mandates, mala fides, non-compliance with Rules of Natural Justice and perversity, are concerned. That the deeming provision in Paragraph 6(2) of the Tenth Schedule attracts an immunity analogous to that in Articles 122(1) and 212(1) of the Constitution as understood and explained in Keshav Singh's Case (Spl. Ref. No. 1, [1965] 1 SCR 413) to protect the validity of proceedings from mere irregularities of procedure. The deeming provision, having regard to the words "be deemed to be proceedings in Parliament" or "proceedings in the Legislature of a State" confines the scope of the fiction accordingly. The Speaker/Chairmen while exercising powers and discharging functions under the Tenth Schedule act as Tribunal adjudicating rights and obligations under the Tenth Schedule and their decisions in that capacity are amenable to judicial review. However, having regard to the Constitutional Schedule in the Tenth Schedule, judicial review should not cover any stage prior to the making of a decision by the Speakers/Chairman. Having regard to the constitutional intendment and the status of the repository of the adjudicatory power, no quia timet actions are permissible, the only exception for any interlocutory interference being cases of interlocutory disqualifications or suspensions which may have grave, immediate and irreversible repercussions and consequence.” (Emphasis supplied) 9.1 From the observations made by M.N. Venkatachaliah, J, as he then was, speaking for himself, K. Jayachandra Reddy and S.C. Agarwal, J.J, the judicial review should not cover any stage prior to making of a decision by the Speaker/Chairman. The Speaker while exercising powers and discharging functions under the Tenth Schedule acts as Tribunal adjudicating rights and obligations under the Tenth Schedule and their decisions in that capacity are amenable to judicial review. Thus, having regard to the constitutional intendment and the status of the repository of the adjudicatory power, no quiatimet actions are permissible at any stage prior to the making of a decision by the Speaker. Thus, having regard to the constitutional intendment and the status of the repository of the adjudicatory power, no quiatimet actions are permissible at any stage prior to the making of a decision by the Speaker. It is also pertinent to note that in any case, scope of judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution in respect of an order passed by the Speaker/Chairman under paragraph 6 would be confined to jurisdictional errors only viz., infirmities based on violation of constitutional mandate, mala fides, non-compliance of rules of natural justice and perversity. 10. In the case before the Supreme Court [in Kuldeep Bishnoi (supra)] rightly or wrongly the orders were passed by the Speaker and they were carried to High Court and ultimately those orders were set aside having noticed jurisdictional error committed by the Speaker. Such is not the situation in the present case. Before the Speaker, as Tribunal adjudicating rights and obligations under the Tenth Schedule, renders his decision, the judicial review is clearly impermissible as held by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Kihoto Hollohan (supra). 11. We are unable to uphold the contentions urged by Sri Ravi Shankar Jandhyala, learned counsel for the petitioners, that violation of Defection Rules or not following the said Rules amounts to violation of constitutional mandate. The Defection Rules have been framed to regulate the procedure that is to be followed by the Speaker for exercising the power conferred on him under subparagraph (1) of paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution. The Disqualification Rules are, therefore, procedural in nature and any violation of the same would amount to an irregularity in procedure, which is immune from judicial scrutiny in view of sub-paragraph (2) of paragraph 6 as construed by the Supreme Court in Kihoto Hollohan (supra). Moreover, the field of judicial review, as observed by the Supreme Court in Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India (1994 SUPP (2) SCC 641) in respect of the orders passed by the Speaker under sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 6 as construed by the Supreme Court in Kihoto Hollohan (supra) is confined to breaches of the constitutional mandates, mala fides, non-compliance with Rules of natural justice and perversity. The Defection Rules have been framed by the Speaker in exercise of the powers conferred under paragraph 8 of the Tenth Schedule and, therefore, they have a status subordinate to the Constitution and cannot be equated with the provisions of the Constitution. In any case, the Defection Rules cannot be regarded as constitutional mandate and any violation of the Disqualification Rules would not afford a ground for judicial review. 12. Thus, in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kihoto Hollohan (supra), the appeal and the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed. Order accordingly. No order as to costs. 13. Though we have dismissed the appeal and writ petitions, before we part, we observe, having regard to the principles of democracy and the intent of the Parliament in introducing the Tenth Schedule in the Constitution to strengthen the faith, trust and confidence in the system, we hope and trust that the Speaker shall decide the disqualification petitions expeditiously. 14. Miscellaneous petitions pending in these cases, if any, also stand disposed of.