Rameshwar Singh Malik, J.:- 1. Present application under Section 378(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure ('Cr.P.C.' for short) seeking leave to appeal, is directed against the judgment of acquittal dated 24.3.2012 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Rohtak, whereby complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, ('N.I. Act' for short), filed by the present applicant-complainant, was dismissed and the accused-respondent was acquitted. 2. Shorn of the detailed factual background, it would suffice to note that respondent-Amarjeet Singh entered into a loan agreement dated 18.11.2003, with the applicant for an amount of Rs. 8,25,000/-, for purchase of vehicle Tata LPT2515. The borrower-respondent had been paying the loan amount by way of instalments, as mutually agreed between the parties. However, borrower-respondent allegedly defaulted in making the payment and consequently, he issued cheque dated 18.7.2005 drawn at State Bank of Patiala, for an amount of Rs. 1,91,230/- with a view to discharge his existing liability. The cheque was presented by the complainant, which was received vide memo dated 19.7.2005 with remarks "Account Closed". The applicant issued the legal notice dated 1.8.2005 through postal receipt, demanding the cheque amount but the accused did not pay the same. Thereafter, complaint was filed. 3. After recording preliminary evidence, learned trial court summoned the accused vide order dated 1.10.2005. Accused put appearance. Notice of accusation was served upon the accused to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. In order to prove its case, the complainant examined its witnesses and tendered affidavit as CW1/A, besides cheque dated 18.7.2005 for Rs. 1,91,230/- as Ex. C-1, return memo dated 19.7.2005 as Ex. C2, Ex. C3 legal notice dated 1.8.2005, Ex. C4 postal receipts dated 1.8.2005, Ex. C5 loan agreement, Ex. C6 statement of account and Ex. C7 power of attorney. 4. After closure of evidence of the complainant, statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was recorded. He categorically denied the allegations and opted to lead defence evidence. Accused further stated that at the time of taking the loan, his entire cheque book was got signed by the complainant. He stated that he had never executed any cheque, while he was informed that the signed blank cheques were taken only as a formality. He next stated that the complainant bank got registered a criminal case against him, which was cancelled. He stated that he had never executed any cheque, while he was informed that the signed blank cheques were taken only as a formality. He next stated that the complainant bank got registered a criminal case against him, which was cancelled. In his defence evidence, the accused examined DW-1 VKB Kashyap, Handwriting and Fingerprint Expert, Jhajjar, who placed on record his affidavit as Ex. DW1/A. He also placed on record his report Ex. DW-1/B and photographs as Ex. DW-1/C to Ex. DW1/H. Thereafter, accused closed his evidence. 5. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and going through the evidence, learned trial court came to the conclusion that complainant has failed to discharge his initial onus. Complainant evidence was duly rebutted by the accused. Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed and accused was acquitted, vide impugned order dated 24.3.2012. Hence this application under Section 378(4) Cr.P.C. seeking leave to appeal. 6. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that applicant has duly proved its case, by leading cogent and well convincing evidence, which was sufficient to record conviction. However, learned trial court misdirected itself, while not appreciating true facts as well as evidence available on record, in the correct perspective. He further submits that once the accused has defaulted in making the payment of loan amount, he issued the cheque in question, with a view to discharge his existing liability. Since the statutory presumption was against the accused and in favour of the applicant, learned trial court ought to have drawn statutory presumption against the accused. He prays for allowing the present application. 7. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent submits that a concocted and made up story was put forth in the complaint. He further submits that complainant failed to discharge its initial onus. The case of the complainant was self contradictory. There was no occasion for the accused to issue the cheque in question. Once, as per the account statement Ex. C6, it was shown that at the time of issuing alleged cheque by the accused, an amount of Rs. 7,79,230.79 paise was outstanding as liability against the accused, then issuance of cheque for an amount of Rs. 1,91,230 as Ex C-1 does not appeal to reason. He also submitted that the accused has successfully rebutted the statutory presumption, which is always a rebuttable presumption. 7,79,230.79 paise was outstanding as liability against the accused, then issuance of cheque for an amount of Rs. 1,91,230 as Ex C-1 does not appeal to reason. He also submitted that the accused has successfully rebutted the statutory presumption, which is always a rebuttable presumption. He concluded by submitting that complainant failed to examine any expert evidence, with a view to falsify the expert evidence led by the accused. He prays for dismissal of the application. 8. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties at considerable length, after careful perusal of the record of case and giving thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions raised, this Court is of the considered opinion that present one is not a fit case, warranting interference at the hands of this Court. To say so, reasons are more than one, which are being recorded hereinafter. 9. After careful examination of the case, this Court has found that the applicant has been changing its stand as per its suitability. Applicant was contradicting itself to such an extent that it was not possible to be reconciled. As per the statement of account, an amount of Rs. 7,79,230.79 paise was shown to be an outstanding amount against the accused. In such a situation, issuing a cheque for an amount of Rs. 1,91,230/- on 18.7.2005 by the accused does not appeal to reason at all. 10. Further, as per the bank record, once account of the accused stood closed much earlier, i.e. on 5.4.2005, there was no occasion for the accused to issue the alleged cheque in favour of the complainant as late as on 18.7.2005. When confronted by the court with both the abovesaid material aspects of the matter, learned counsel for the applicant had no answer and rightly so, because it was the matter of record. Having said that, this Court feels no hesitation to conclude that learned trial court committed no error of law, while passing the impugned order and the same deserves to be upheld. 11. Applicant did not lead any contrary evidence, to the expert evidence led by the accused, by producing DW-1 VKB Kashyap Hand writing and Fingerprint expert, Jhajjar. The evidence led by the fingerprint expert in the form of Ex. DW1/A, Ex. DW1/AB, DW1/AC to Ex. DW1/H has gone unrebutted on record. 11. Applicant did not lead any contrary evidence, to the expert evidence led by the accused, by producing DW-1 VKB Kashyap Hand writing and Fingerprint expert, Jhajjar. The evidence led by the fingerprint expert in the form of Ex. DW1/A, Ex. DW1/AB, DW1/AC to Ex. DW1/H has gone unrebutted on record. In this view of the matter, it can be safely concluded that the learned trial court was fully justified on facts as well as in law, while passing the impugned judgment of acquittal and the same deserves to be upheld, for this reason also. 12. It is the settled proposition of law that whenever two views are possible, the view which goes in favour of the acquittal is to be adopted by the courts, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Arulvelu & anr. v. State represented by the Public Prosecutor and anr. 2009 (4) RCR (Crl.) 638. Under these circumstances, it is unhesitatingly held that the learned trial court committed no error of law, while passing the impugned judgment and the same deserves to be upheld for this as well. 13. The law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Arulvelu (supra), has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its numerous later judgments including in the cases of Rathinam @ Rathinan v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2011 (11) SCC 140 , Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta and others v. State of Maharashtra, 2010 (13) SCC 657 and Upendra Pradhan v. State of Orissa (Criminal Appeal No. 2174 of 2009 decided on 28.4.2015). The relevant observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 10 and 11 of its judgment in Upendra Pradhan's case (supra), which can be gainfully followed in the present case, read as under:-- "Taking the First question for consideration, we are of the view that in case there are two views which can be culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. It has been recognized as a human right by this Court. In Narendra Singh and Another v. State of M.P., (2004) 10 SCC 699 , this Court has recognized presumption of innocence as a human right and has gone on to say that: "30. It is now well settled that benefit of doubt belonged to the accused. It has been recognized as a human right by this Court. In Narendra Singh and Another v. State of M.P., (2004) 10 SCC 699 , this Court has recognized presumption of innocence as a human right and has gone on to say that: "30. It is now well settled that benefit of doubt belonged to the accused. It is further trite that suspicion, however grave may be, cannot take place of a proof It is equally well settled that there is a long distance between 'may be' and 'must be'. 31. It is also well known that even in a case where a plea of alibi is raised, the burden of proof remains on the prosecution. Presumption of innocence is a human right. Such presumption gets stronger when a judgment of acquittal is passed. This Court in a number of decisions has set out the legal principle for reversing the judgment of acquittal by a Higher Court (see Dhanna v. State of M.P., Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana and Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.) which had not been adhered to by the High Court. xxxx 33. We, thus, having regard to the post-mortem report, are of the opinion that the cause of death of Bimla Bai although is shrouded in mystery but benefit thereof must go to the appellants as in the event of there being two possible views, the one supporting the accused should be upheld." (Emphasis Supplied) 11. The decision taken by this Court in the aforementioned case, has been further reiterated in State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram, (2003) 8 SCC 180 , wherein this Court observed thus: "Generally the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. The paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate court to reappreciate the evidence in a case where the accused has been acquitted, or the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed any offence or not. (see Bhagwan Singh v. State of MP.) The principle to be followed by the appellate court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable, it is a compelling reason for interference." (Emphasis Supplied) Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the High Court has erred in reversing the acquittal of accused appellant, stands good. The Additional Sessions Judge was right in granting him benefit of doubt. The view which favours the accused/appellant has to be considered and we discard the opposite view which indicates his guilt. We are also of the view that the High Court should not have interfered with the decision taken by the Additional Session Judge, as the judgment passed was not manifestly illegal, perverse, and did not cause miscarriage of justice. On the scope of High Court's revisional jurisdiction, this Court has held in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, (2002) 6 SCC 650 , "that in absence of any manifest illegality, perversity and miscarriage of justice, High Court would not be justified interfering with the concurrent finding of acquittal of the accused merely because on re-appreciation of evidence it found the testimony of PWs to be reliable whereas the trial Court had taken an opposite view." This happens to be the situation in the matter before us and we are of the view that the High Court was wrong in interfering with the order of acquittal of Upendra Pradhan passed by the Additional Sessions Judge." 14. During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the applicant could not point out any jurisdictional error or patent illegality in the order passed by the learned trial court, so as to convince this Court to take a different view than the one taken by the learned trial court. During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the applicant could not point out any jurisdictional error or patent illegality in the order passed by the learned trial court, so as to convince this Court to take a different view than the one taken by the learned trial court. In fact, learned trial court has discussed each and every relevant aspect of the matter, before arriving at a judicious conclusion that the complainant has failed to prove its case under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. In such a situation, no interference is warranted at the hands of this Court and the impugned judgment deserves to be upheld, for this reason as well. 15. No other argument was raised. 16. Considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case noted above, coupled with the reasons aforementioned, this Court is of the considered opinion that present application is misconceived, bereft of merit and without any substance. Thus, it must fail. No case for interference is made out. 17. Resultantly, present application stands dismissed, however, with no order as to costs.