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2015 DIGILAW 751 (GUJ)

Pavankumar Jain v. Priyavadan Ambalal Patel

2015-07-31

ABDULLAH GULAMAHMED URAIZEE, M.R.SHAH

body2015
JUDGMENT : M.R. Shah, J. 1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 12-9-2013, passed in Special Civil Application No. 7662 of 2013, by which, the learned Single Judge has dismissed the said Special Civil Application preferred by the appellants herein-original petitioners (hereinafter referred to as the "petitioners") confirming the order passed by the Joint Charity Commissioner passed in exercise of powers conferred upon him under Sec. 41A of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the "Trust Act") issuing directions for undertaking procedure for revoking or rescinding the Resolution dated 6-1-2013 of the Trust and till the same is revoked, suspending the same, original petitioners have preferred the present Letters Patent Appeal. The facts leading to the present Letters Patent Appeal in nutshell are as under: "1.1. That the petitioner and the respondent No. 1 herein are the trustees in the trust called "Petrochemicals Township Devasthan Trust", duly registered as public charitable trust and governed by the provision of Trust Act. That the respondent No. 1 herein is one of the Trustees and in addition thereto, functioning as Secretary of the Trust and discharging duties as such. That Resolution dated 6-1-2013 came to be passed suspending respondent No. 1 from acting as a Trustee, Secretary and prohibiting him from entering into the premises of the temple complex, pending the inquiry about reported incident alleged to have been occurred on 3-1-2013, wherein respondent No. 1 herein-original applicant was attributed with an action of assault on other office-bearers. That being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid action/resolution, respondent No. 1 herein-original applicant approached the Joint Charity Commissioner for appropriate directions in exercise of powers under Sec. 41A of the Trust Act. That the Joint Charity Commissioner issued the directions vide its order dated 30-3-2013, by which, in exercise of powers conferred upon him under Sec. 41A of the Trust Act directed the Trust/Trustees of the Trust to act as per the Constitution of the Trust/as per the Public Trust Act and directed to stay implementation, operation and execution of the Resolution dated 6-1-2013 till appropriate further steps are taken in consonance with/accordance with the Constitution of the Trust and Trust Act. 1.2. 1.2. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid order passed by the Joint Charity Commissioner dated 30-3-2013 passed in exercise of powers conferred upon him under Sec. 41A of the Trust Act, the appellants herein - original petitioners preferred aforesaid Special Civil Application No. 7662 of 2013 before this Court." 2. It was mainly contended on behalf of the petitioners that order passed by the Joint Charity Commissioner was beyond the scope and ambit of Sec. 41A of the Trust Act. It was submitted that, therefore, the order passed by the Joint Charity Commissioner was not within his jurisdiction. It was further submitted that the Joint Charity Commissioner had no jurisdiction under Sec. 41A of the Act to consider the legality and validity of the resolution, more particularly, with respect to suspension of the Trustee/Secretary. It was also submitted before the learned Single Judge that even the Resolution dated 6-1-2013 suspending the respondent No. 1 as a Trustee/Member/Secretary in a given situation like one on hand, was absolutely just and proper and in accordance with the provisions of the Trust-Deed and the prevalent provision of law. Therefore, it was submitted that the action of the Trust passing the Resolution dated 6-1-2013 cannot be treated to be as open to scrutiny at the end of either Charity Commissioner or Joint Charity Commissioner in exercise of powers under Sec. 41A of the Trust Act. 2.1. On the other hand, it was contended on behalf of the respondent No. 1 that the Resolution dated 6-1-2013 was absolutely in contravention of the provision of Trust-Deed and absolutely illegal and mala fidely, and therefore, for proper administration and management of the Trust as per the Trust-Deed and the provision of Trust Act, the Joint Charity Commissioner was absolutely justified in issuing the direction while passing the order dated 30-3-2013 in exercise of powers under Sec. 41A of the Trust Act. 2.2. That on appreciation of evidence and considering the provisions of the Act, more particularly, Sec. 41A of the Trust Act and decisions cited at the Bar, by impugned judgment and order the learned Single Judge has rejected/dismissed the aforesaid Special Civil Application confirming the order passed by the Joint Charity Commissioner dated 30-3-2013. 2.3. 2.2. That on appreciation of evidence and considering the provisions of the Act, more particularly, Sec. 41A of the Trust Act and decisions cited at the Bar, by impugned judgment and order the learned Single Judge has rejected/dismissed the aforesaid Special Civil Application confirming the order passed by the Joint Charity Commissioner dated 30-3-2013. 2.3. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge in dismissing the petition and confirming the order passed by the learned Joint Charity Commissioner dated 30-3-2013 passed in exercise of powers under Sec. 41A of the Trust Act, the appellants herein - original petitioners have preferred present Letters Patent Appeal. 3. Shri Y.N. Oza, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellants - original petitioners has submitted that the controversy in the present appeal is whether the Charity Commissioner/Joint Charity Commissioner was right in exercising powers vested in him under Sec. 41A of the Trust Act, while passing order dated 30-3-2013. It is submitted that in the present case Joint Charity Commissioner in exercise of powers under Sec. 41A of the Act has stayed and suspended the order of suspension passed by the appellants herein - original petitioners passed against the contesting respondent No. 1. 3.1. It is submitted that the learned Single Judge has materially erred in dismissing the aforesaid petition and confirming the order passed by the Joint Charity Commissioner dated 30-3-2013, impugned in the main petition. 3.2. It is vehemently submitted by Shri Y.N. Oza, learned Senior Advocate for the appellants-original petitioners that the learned Single Judge has materially erred in observing and holding that the Charity Commissioner/Joint Charity Commissioner has jurisdiction and/or authority to pass such order in exercise of powers under Sec. 41A of the Trust Act, and/or to issue such direction as issued by passing order dated 30-3-2013 while exercising the powers under Sec. 41A of the Trust Act. 3.3. Shri Oza, learned Senior Advocate for the appellants - original petitioners has vehemently submitted that Sec. 41A of the Trust Act does not vest any power in the Charity Commissioner/Joint Charity Commissioner to entertain such dispute, more particularly, with respect to suspension of Trustee/Member/Secretary. It is submitted that on plain reading of Sec. 41A of the Act, it gives power to the Charity Commissioner/Joint Charity Commissioner to decide the questions mentioned in Sec. 41Aof the Act and not beyond that. It is submitted that on plain reading of Sec. 41A of the Act, it gives power to the Charity Commissioner/Joint Charity Commissioner to decide the questions mentioned in Sec. 41Aof the Act and not beyond that. It is submitted that as such in exercise of powers under Sec. 41A of the Act the Charity Commissioner is empowered to issue direction in respective matters falling under Secs. 32 to 41 of the Trust Act only. It is submitted that as observed by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Syedna Mohamed Burhanuddin v. Charity Commissioner, Gujarat State, reported in 1992 (1) GLH 331 , more particularly, in Para 36, only purpose, which therefore, Sec. 41A of the Trust Act serves is to empower the Charity Commissioner to issue direction in respect of the matters falling under Secs. 32 to 41 only. It is submitted that therefore, an effort by the contesting respondent to read in Sec. 41A of the Act the word "direction" in the widest possible meaning also is not permissible in light of the above mentioned decision of the Division Bench in the case of Syedna Mohamed Burhanuddin, [ 1992 (1) GLH 331 ]. It is submitted that thus, those directions mentioned in Sec. 41A of the Trust Act cannot be read beyond its application with regard to Secs. 32 to 41. It is submitted that in the aforesaid decision, the Division Bench has interpreted Sec. 41A of the Trust Act as a whole, and thereafter, has observed and held that in exercise of powers conferred under Sec. 41A of the Trust Act, the Charity Commissioner can issue the directions in respect of the matters falling under Secs. 32 to 41 of the Trust Act only. It is submitted, that therefore, the contention on behalf of the respondent No. 1 that the Charity Commissioner in exercise of powers under Sec. 41A of the Trust Act can issue the directions to ensure that such Trust is properly administered will run counter to the interpretation made by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Syedna Mohamed Burhanuddin, (supra). 3.4. 3.4. It is further submitted by Shri Oza, learned Senior Advocate for the appellants - original petitioners that in exercise of powers under Sec. 41A of the Trust Act, Charity Commissioner has no jurisdiction to decide either lis or the dispute or the controversy, more particularly, the dispute with respect to suspension of a trustee or a member or a secretary, as observed and held by the Division Bench in the aforesaid decision in the case of Syedna Mohamed Burhanuddin, [ 1992 (1) GLH 331 ]. It is submitted that to give a decision that suspension is wrong on any ground whatsoever is a decision which decides either the lis or the dispute or the controversy. It is submitted that as such the lis is a widest term as interpreted and explained by three law dictionaries i.e. Webster, Law Lexicon and Black. In support of his above submissions, Shri Oza, learned Senior Advocate for the appellants has heavily relied upon the observations made by the Division Bench in the case of Syedna Mohamed Burhanuddin, [ 1992 (1) GLH 331 ] made in Para 41. Therefore, it is submitted that the order dated 30-3-2013 passed by the Joint Charity Commissioner in exercise of powers under Sec. 41A of the Act is, absolutely illegal, wholly without jurisdiction and beyond the scope and ambit of powers conferred upon the Charity Commissioner under Sec. 41A of the Trust Act. 3.5. Shri Oza, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellants has stated that the appellants did not go into the validity or otherwise the order of suspension, since it has not been argued before the authority nor in the present Letters Patent Appeal and the issue in the present Letters Patent Appeal is confined to the jurisdiction and/or authority of the Charity Commissioner/Joint Charity Commissioner to issue direction under Sec. 41A of the Trust Act only. Shri Oza, learned Senior Advocate for the appellants has also relied upon the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case rendered in L.P.A. No. 168 of 2010, more particularly, observations made by the Division Bench in Para 16 that the adjudication of various dispute between the parties, particularly, election dispute may be beyond the purview of such powers. 3.6. 3.6. Shri Oza, learned Senior Advocate for the appellants has further submitted that as such remedy available to the respondent No. 1 would be under Sec. 50 of the Trust Act and to file a suit and/or initiate appropriate proceedings challenging the Resolution dated 6-1-2013. Making above submissions and relying upon the above decisions, it is requested to allow the present Letters Patent Appeal. 4. Present Letters Patent Appeal is opposed by Shri Salil Thakore, learned Advocate for the respondent No. 1 herein and Shri Utkarsh Sharma learned A.G.P. appearing on behalf of respondent No. 2 herein - Joint Charity Commissioner. 4.1. It is vehemently submitted by Shri Thakore, learned Advocate for the respondent No. 1 herein that the every members and the trustees of the Trust are required to act as per the Trust-Deed and in accordance with provision of the Trust Act, and provisions contained in Trust-Deed. It is submitted, that therefore, whenever it is found by the Charity Commissioner/Joint Charity Commissioner that the members/trustees of the Trust are not acting as per the provision of the Trust-Deed and/or provisions of the Act and/or whenever it is found that any action/resolution of the Trust is per se illegal and/or contrary to the provision of the Trust-Deed, the Charity Commissioner would have jurisdiction or authority to issue any direction in the interest of the Trust and can issue the direction directing the Trustees/Trust to administer or manage the Trust and/or to act as per the provisions of the Trust-Deed and/or provisions of the Trust Act. It is submitted, that therefore, for proper management of the Trust, the Charity Commissioner/Joint Charity Commissioner would have a wide discretion to issue directions in exercise of powers under Sec. 41A of the Trust Act. It is submitted that such powers conferred under Sec. 41A of the Act cannot be restricted to the direction with respect to and/or which will fall under Secs. 32 to 41 of the Trust Act. It is submitted that such powers conferred under Sec. 41A of the Act cannot be restricted to the direction with respect to and/or which will fall under Secs. 32 to 41 of the Trust Act. It is submitted, that therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case when it has been found by the Joint Charity Commissioner that resolution passed by the Trust dated 6-1-2013 was not in conformity with the provision of the Trust-Deed and when it has been found that by passing such a resolution the trustees have not acted as per the provision of the Trust Deed and the directions have been issued for proper administration and management of the Trust and directions have been issued directing the Trustees/Trust to administer and manage the Trust as per the provision of the Trust-Deed, as rightly held by the learned Single Judge that same cannot be said to be beyond the scope and ambit of Sec. 41A of the Trust Act. 4.2. It is further submitted by Shri Thakore, learned Advocate for the respondent No. 1 that administration of Trust means administration by body which under the Trust-Deed is required to administer the same. It is submitted that the illegal suspension of even one trustee (in this case, the trustee secretary) results in a situation where the Trust is administered not by the body which under the Trust-Deed is required to administer the Trust but by a different body. It is submitted that if the Trust is being administered not by the body which is appointed to administer the Trust, it is a matter that directly affects the Administration of the Trust and such a Trust can never be said to be 'properly administered'. It is submitted that in the case of Navsari Taluka Halpati Shikshan Prachar Sangh v. Joint Charity Commissioner, in L.P.A. No. 2 of 2004, after considering the decision of the Division Bench in the case of Syedna Mohamed Burhanuddin, [ 1992 (1) GLH 331 ], upon which much reliance has been placed by the learned Advocate for the appellants, in Para 7, the Division Bench has observed that power of the Charity Commissioner (under Sec. 41A of the Trust Act) to issue directions to ensure that the Trust is properly administered, the Charity Commissioner shall have a very wide power. It is further submitted that in the aforesaid decision, it is further observed by the Division Bench that administration of Trust would mean administration by body which under the Trust-Deed is required to administer. It is submitted that in the present case illegal suspension of respondent No. 1 (Trustee - Secretary) has resulted in a situation where the Trust is not being administered by the body which under the Trust-Deed is required to administer the trust, and is therefore, not being 'properly administered'. 4.3. It is further submitted by Shri Thakore, learned Advocate for the respondent No. 1 herein-original applicant that Secs. 32 to 41 of the Act cast certain obligations on the trustees and empower the Charity Commissioner to give certain directions to the trustees. It is submitted that obligations under the aforesaid provisions are to be complied with by the body of trustees appointed under the Trust-Deed and the Charity Commissioner can give directions to the said body of trustees. It is submitted that if the Trust is not administered by the body which is to administer the same, the obligations under Secs. 32 to 41 of the case can never be complied with for they are to be complied with by the body appointed under the Trust-Deed. It was further submitted that if the Trust is not administered by the body of trustees appointed under the Trust-Deed, the directions that the Charity Commissioner is empowered to issue, can never be issued to the body of trustees appointed under the Trust-Deed and can never be complied with by that body. It is submitted that Sec. 32 provides that every trustee shall keep regular accounts. If the trust is administered by a body of trustees under the Trust-Deed, this obligation is to be complied with that body of trustees. It is submitted, that however, if the trust is not administered by the body appointed under the Trust-Deed, the obligations under Sec. 32will not be complied with as even if the accounts are maintained, they are not being maintained by the body of trustees appointed under the Trust-Deed. Similar is the position with respect to Secs. 33 to 35. 4.4. It is further submitted that under Sec. 36, previous permission of the Charity Commissioner is required to be taken before alienating immovable property. Similar is the position with respect to Secs. 33 to 35. 4.4. It is further submitted that under Sec. 36, previous permission of the Charity Commissioner is required to be taken before alienating immovable property. If the trust is not being administered by the body appointed under the Trust-Deed, it is not clear who will seek such permission from the Charity Commissioner, and it is not clear to whom the Charity Commissioner can give such permission, for such permission cannot be sought by or given to anyone other than the body of trustees appointed under the Trust-Deed. Sec.36 is incapable of being complied with. It is further submitted that different sub-secs. under Secs. 32 to 41 of the Act empower the Charity Commissioner to give directions to trustees for different matters. It is not clear to whom the Charity Commissioner will give such directions if the Trust is not being administered by the body appointed under the Trust-Deed. 4.5. It is submitted, that therefore, it is clear that if the administration of the Trust is not by the body of trustees who is to administer the same under the Trust-Deed, the proper and lawful implementation, enforcement and compliance of Secs. 32 to 41 of the Public Trusts Act is seriously affected/rendered impossible. It is further submitted that if any direction is given under Secs. 32 to 41 by the Charity Commissioner to the 'suspended trustee' alone, he will never be able to comply with the same as he has been 'suspended'. This will once again result in a situation where the provisions will not be complied with. 4.6. It is further submitted by Shri Thakore, learned Advocate for the respondent No. 1 herein - original applicant that it would be misreading of decision of the Division Bench in the case of Syedna Mohamed Burhanuddin, (supra), that the Charity Commissioner in exercise of powers under Sec. 41A of the Trust Act can issue directions in respective matters falling under Secs. 32 to 41 of the Trust Act only. 32 to 41 of the Trust Act only. It is submitted that if the judgment of the Division Bench in the case of Syedna Mohamed Burhanuddin, (supra), is read as a whole and in its entirety and if the observations made by the Division Bench of this Court in the aforesaid decision are considered with respect to the issue/controversy in the matter, it cannot be said that the Division Bench has laid down the absolute proposition of law that the Charity Commissioner in exercise of powers under Sec. 41A of the Trust Act can issue the directions in respect of the matters falling under Secs. 32 and41 of the Trust Act alone/only. It is submitted that judgment of the Division Bench in the case of Syedna Mohamed Burhanuddin, (supra), if read as a whole and in its true perspective does not hold that Sec. 41A is restricted to Secs. 32 to 41 of the Trust Act only. It is further submitted that in the above case, the religious head of a community challenged vires of Sec. 41A of the Trust Act on the ground that it violated his religious rights under Arts. 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India. This is clear from Paras 1, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11 and 12 of the judgment. It is submitted that the entire discussion from Paras 13 to 36 is on the question as to whether Sec. 41A violates religious freedoms guaranteed under Arts. 25 and 26 of the Constitution? The scope and width of Sec. 41A for the purposes of exercising purely administrative powers (whether powers under Sec. 41A are restricted to matters contained in Secs. 32 to 41) was neither required to be decided or had been decided. The observations in Para 36 are made in context of the question before the Court (whether Sec. 41A violates Arts. 25 and 26) and not in context of a question never before the Court (whether powers under Sec. 41A are restricted to matters contained in Secs. 32 to 41). 4.7. The observations in Para 36 are made in context of the question before the Court (whether Sec. 41A violates Arts. 25 and 26) and not in context of a question never before the Court (whether powers under Sec. 41A are restricted to matters contained in Secs. 32 to 41). 4.7. It is further submitted that the Division Bench in the case of Navsari Taluka Halpati Shikshan Prachar Sangh, L.P.A. No. 2 of 2004 has after reading down the Division Bench judgment in Syedna's case, (supra), in its entirety, in its true perspective and considering the observations in light of the questions before the Court, correctly held that the Division Bench has not held in Syedna's case (supra) that powers under Sec. 41A cannot be exercised in any context other than Secs. 32-41 of the Act. Reference may be made to Para 3 - 6 of the said judgment. The said judgment correctly interprets and explains the Division Bench judgment in Syedna's case (supra) and there is absolutely no conflict between the two Division Bench judgments. The said judgment further holds that even if a narrow view that the provisions of Sec. 41A can be invoked only in the context of Sec.32 to 41 is taken into consideration, it is obvious that without a validly elected administrative body, even the matters falling under Secs. 32 to 41 would warrant a direction on the part of the Charity Commissioner and that the power of the Charity Commissioner to issue directions to ensure that the Trust is properly administered is by its very nature a wide power and that administration of a Trust would mean administration by a body which under the Trust-Deed is required to administer the same. 4.8. It is further submitted that several learned Single Judges of this Hon'ble Court have also, after reading the Division Bench judgment in Syedna's case, (supra), in its entirety, in its true perspective and considering the observations in light of the questions before the Court, have correctly held that the Division Bench has not held in Syedna's case, (supra), that powers under Sec. 41A cannot be exercised in any context other than Secs.32 to 41 of the Act and have correctly held that there is no conflict between the judgments of the two Division Benches of this Hon'ble Court. It is submitted that reference may be made to the following judgments: "(a) Acharyashree M. R.B. Mandir Trust v. C.R. Chandulal, 1997 (1) GLH 16 (Single Judge) (Paras 5, 8, 11, 12 and 13) (b) Devkrushnadasji Guru Dharmadasji v. State of Gujarat, 2008 (1) GLH 427 : [ 2008 (3) GLR 1981 ] (Single Judge) (Paras 13-16, 18-24) (c) Balvantbhai Jinabhai Dhami v. Shantilal Kantibhai Ratanpara, Spl. C.A. No. 9819 of 2009 and other cognate matters (Single Judge) (Paras 18.1, 18.2, 23, 23.1, 29-31) (d) Ratilal Hansraj Gajjar v. Kamleshbhai Narsibhai Kharechha, 2011 (0) GLHEL-HC 224834 (Single Judge) (Pages 9-11) (e) Shree Laxminarayan Dev Temple Board v. Jasubhai Bhailalbhai Patel, Spl. C.A. No. 4069 of 2012 (Single Judge) (Para 14-15) (f) Gopinath Dev Mandir Trust v. State of Gujarat, Spl. C.A. No. 11706 of 2012 (Pages 31-35). It may be noted that this judgment has been confirmed by the Division Bench in L.P.A. No. 479 of 2013 (Para 9-11)." 4.9. It is further submitted that it is clear from what is stated above that powers under Sec. 41A can be and ought to be exercised by the Charity Commissioner in a situation where an elected trustee is illegally removed or suspended de hors the Trust-Deed i.e. when there is no power to take such a step. It is submitted that in the present case, the powers were required to be exercised in order to ensure that the Trust is administered by the body which is to administer the Trust as per the Trust-Deed and have been correctly exercised in the present case. 4.10. It is further submitted by Shri Thakore, learned Advocate for the respondent No. 1 that contention on behalf of the appellants that Charity Commissioner could not have exercised powers under Sec. 41A as he cannot adjudicate any lis under Sec. 41A is misconceived. It is submitted that the object of Sec. 41A of the Public Trusts Act, is to give directions to ensure that the Trust is properly administered. It is submitted that the object of Sec. 41A of the Public Trusts Act, is to give directions to ensure that the Trust is properly administered. It is submitted that the object of Sec. 41A is not to adjudicate a lis, however while taking a decision on whether or not directions ought to be issued to ensure that the trust is properly administered or to find out if any directions need to be given to remedy a particular situation or to prevent immediate detriment to the administration of the trust, the Charity Commissioner will necessarily have to make some inquiry and do some decision-making. Therefore, The same will never partake the character of an adjudication or a lis in as much as the Charity Commissioner, under Sec. 41A or never does a final determination of the rights of parties, one of the principal characteristics of 'adjudication of a lis'. It is submitted that while the Charity Commissioner cannot adjudicate a lis, it does not mean that he cannot touch upon a dispute or come to a prima facie finding on it. It is submitted that if Sec.41A is interpreted to mean that the Charity Commissioner cannot even touch upon a dispute, it will result in a situation where the Charity Commissioner will be rendered powerless in most situations because most of the times, there will be some dispute or the other. It is submitted that reference can be made to few illustrations: "Illustration No. 1 : There are 5 trustees elected by a general body of trustees for 5 years. One day after the election, the 5 trustees delegate their powers to X, a third party for the next 5 years. X starts administering the trust. Some interested persons approach the Charity Commissioner under Sec. 41A praying for a direction that the trust be administered by the 5 elected trustees and not by X. X and the 5 trustees take a defence that under the Trust-Deed, they have the power to delegate their powers. The Charity Commissioner, on the face of it, finds that the Trust-Deed contains no such power. In such a situation, the Charity Commissioner, having found that there is, on the face of it, no power to delegate, will most certainly have the power to issue appropriate directions. The Charity Commissioner, on the face of it, finds that the Trust-Deed contains no such power. In such a situation, the Charity Commissioner, having found that there is, on the face of it, no power to delegate, will most certainly have the power to issue appropriate directions. He will not be rendered powerless merely because an argument is taken that there is a dispute on whether or not there is a power to delegate. Illustration No. 2 : There are 7 trustees. 1 trustee ("Y") by use of force stops the remaining 6 trustees from entering the trust premises and thereby stops them from taking part in the administration of the trust. Before the Charity Commissioner, Y contends that under the Trust-Deed he has the power to obstruct the other 6 trustees. The Charity Commissioner finds that there is, on the face of it, no power with Y to obstruct or remove other trustees. He can issue directions. The position would be the same if Y was to pass a resolution removing the 6 trustees." It is further submitted that under Sec. 41A, the Charity Commissioner can issue directions atleast in one situation : where on the face of it he finds that the action is de hors the Trust-Deed or where on the face of it he finds that there exists absolutely no power for taking the action that has been taken. It is submitted that by holding that the action is, on the face of it, beyond the powers, the Charity Commissioner is not making any adjudication. In this context, an analogy could be drawn from a winding-up petition under the Companies Act, 1956. The High Court never adjudicates the dispute and does not entertain a petition where the respondent raises a dispute. However, where the High Court finds that the dispute raised by the respondent is, on the face of it, no dispute i.e. not a bona fide dispute, the Court entertains the petition. Therefore, while the Court will not adjudicate the civil dispute, the Court is still empowered to hold that the dispute is not a bona fide dispute and can entertain the petition. Similarly, atleast in a situation where the Charity Commissioner finds that, on the face of it, there is no power, the Charity Commissioner can give/issue directions. 4.11. Therefore, while the Court will not adjudicate the civil dispute, the Court is still empowered to hold that the dispute is not a bona fide dispute and can entertain the petition. Similarly, atleast in a situation where the Charity Commissioner finds that, on the face of it, there is no power, the Charity Commissioner can give/issue directions. 4.11. It is further submitted that the present case is one where, on the face of it, it is clear that trustees have no power under the Trust-Deed to remove or suspend a Trustee and their action is de hors the Trust-Deed. If the Charity Commissioner finds that, on the face of it, there is no power to remove or suspend, he is empowered to give directions. It is submitted that by doing so, he is not doing any final determination of rights and is not adjudicating any lis. It is submitted that the Charity Commissioner has the power to issue the directions he has issued in the present case and the impugned order does not require any interference. It is submitted that the present case being one where the action was, on the face of it, de hors the Trust-Deed and beyond the powers of the appellants and respondent No. 1 is not making any submissions on what would be the powers of the Charity Commissioner in situations where he finds that the action is de hors the Trust-Deed or illegal, etc. (other than on the face of it). It is submitted that assuming, he would have the power to issue directions even in such a situation, he would still not be adjudicating a lis as he would not be making any final determination of rights. Each case may have to be governed in the facts and circumstances then arising keeping in mind the object of Sec.41 A, the wide nature of the language used therein and the object of the Act as reflected in the Preamble. 4.12. It is further submitted by Shri Thakore, learned Advocate for the respondent No. 1 herein-original applicant that even if Sec. 41A is construed to empower the Charity Commissioner to issue directions only in connection with matters contained in Secs. 32 to 41, the exercise of powers under Sec. 41A in the present case is valid. 4.13. 4.12. It is further submitted by Shri Thakore, learned Advocate for the respondent No. 1 herein-original applicant that even if Sec. 41A is construed to empower the Charity Commissioner to issue directions only in connection with matters contained in Secs. 32 to 41, the exercise of powers under Sec. 41A in the present case is valid. 4.13. It is submitted that the illegal suspension of respondent No. 1 (trustee-secretary) de hors the Trust-Deed has resulted in a situation where the Trust is not being administered by the body appointed to administer the same, which is a matter that seriously affects the implementation, enforcement and compliance of Secs. 32 to 41 of the Public Trusts Act as explained above. It is submitted that in view of that, even if Sec.41A is construed to empower the Charity Commissioner to issue directions pertaining to only matters contained in Secs. 32 to 41, the exercise of powers under Sec. 41A in the present case is valid. It is further submitted that apart from the above, it may be noted that Sec. 37 of the Public Trusts Act empowers the Charity Commissioner "to call for or inspect any extract from any proceedings of the trustees of any public trust and any books of accounts or documents in the possession, or under the control, of the trustees or any person on behalf of the trustees" and "to call for any return, statement, account or report which he may think fit from the trustees or any person connected with a public trust". If upon seeing the extracts from any proceedings of the trustees, the Charity Commissioner finds that something de hors the trust-deed and affecting the administration of the trust has been done or that what has been done results in a situation where the trust is not 'properly administered', the Charity Commissioner can issue directions to ensure that the trust is 'properly administered'. Such direction under Sec. 41A would be valid even if Sec.41A is construed to empower the Charity Commissioner to issue directions only in connection with matters contained in Secs. 32 to 41, as such direction would be a direction under Sec. 41A read with Sec. 37. Such direction under Sec. 41A would be valid even if Sec.41A is construed to empower the Charity Commissioner to issue directions only in connection with matters contained in Secs. 32 to 41, as such direction would be a direction under Sec. 41A read with Sec. 37. It is further submitted that reference may again be made to the observations made by the Division Bench in the unreported judgment in Navsari Taluka Halpati Shikshan Prachar Sangh, [L.P.A. No. 2 of 2004], which holds that administration of a trust means administration by a body which under the Trust-Deed is required to administer the same and that without a validly appointed administrative body, even matters falling under Secs. 32-41 would warrant a direction on the part of Charity Commissioner. 4.14. It is further submitted that even if it is held that the illegal suspension of respondent No. 1 does not affect the implementation, enforcement and compliance of Secs. 32 -41 of the Public Trusts Act, the exercise of powers under Sec. 41A in the present case is valid as powers under Sec. 41A are not restricted to matters falling under Secs. 32 to 41 and can be exercised in any case to ensure that the Trust is 'properly administered'. 4.15. It is submitted that if the Legislature had intended to restrict the exercise of the Charity Commissioner's powers under Sec. 41A to matters contained under Secs. 32 to 41 only, the Legislature could have framed Sec. 41A in the following or other similar manner: "For ensuring the effective compliance of matters contained under Secs. 32 to 41 of this Act, the Charity Commissioner may, from time to time, issue directions to any trustee of a public trust or any person connected therewith." OR "The Charity Commissioner may, from time to time, issue directions to any trustee of a public trust or any person connected therewith for the purposes of the matters contained under Secs. 32 to 41 of this Act." 4.16. 32 to 41 of this Act." 4.16. It is submitted that the Legislature, however, chose to frame Sec. 41A in the following manner: "(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Charity Commissioner may, from time to time, issue directions to any trustee of a public trust or any person connected therewith to ensure that such trust is properly administered and the income thereof is properly accounted for or duly appropriated and applied to the objects and for the purposes of the trust. (2) It shall be the duty of every such trustee and person to comply with a direction issued to him under sub-sec. (1)." It is submitted that if the legislature had intended to restrict the exercise of the Charity Commissioner's powers under Sec. 41A to matters contained in Secs. 32 to 41 only, there was absolutely no reason for the Legislature to have provided under Sec. 41A the categories of situations under which the powers can be exercised. It is submitted that the fact that Sec. 41A enumerates the situations in which powers can be exercised ("to ensure that such trust is properly administered and the income thereof is properly accounted for or duly appropriated and applied to the objects and for the purposes of the trust") itself shows that Sec. 41A is a provision that stands by itself and that directions can be given under Sec. 41A as long the same are given for the matters specified in the said provision i.e. in Sec. 41A. The presence of the words "Subject to other provisions of this Act, the Charity Commissioner may issue..." can only mean that the Charity Commissioner cannot issue directions that may violate or run contrary to some other provisions of the Act and can never mean that Sec. 41A is restricted to the matters contained in Secs. 32 to 41 only. It may also be noted that the opening portion of Sec.41A quoted above is in connection with all the provisions of the Act and not merely Secs.32 to 41. It is submitted that there is no reason to read into Sec. 41A any artificial restrictions when the Legislature has not restricted the scope of Sec. 41A and more so when a Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court has held the said power to be 'a wide power'. It is submitted that there is no reason to read into Sec. 41A any artificial restrictions when the Legislature has not restricted the scope of Sec. 41A and more so when a Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court has held the said power to be 'a wide power'. Further, considering that the Public Trusts Act is an "An Act to regulate and to make better provision for the administration of public religious and charitable trusts..." and considering that the Act has been enacted considering that "it is expedient to regulate and to make better provision for the administration of public religious trusts and charitable trusts in the State of...", any artificial restriction on the powers of the Charity Commissioner would defeat the purpose of the Act apart from being contrary to the language of the provision itself. 4.17. It is farther submitted by Shri Thakore, learned Advocate for the respondent No. 1 that the contention on behalf of the appellants that the respondent No. 1 could have filed a suit under Sec. 50(iii) read with sub-clause (b) of the Trust Act and could not have resorted to Sec. 41A is misconceived. It is submitted that a suit under Sec. 50 can only be filed by the Charity Commissioner or by two or more persons having any interest in the Trust after taking permission from the Charity Commissioner. It is submitted that therefore, respondent No. 1 being one individual, he could not have filed a suit under Sec. 50 of the Trust Act. It is submitted that even otherwise under sub-clause (b) a suit can be filed "to obtain a decree for any of the reliefs mentioned in sub-clause (b), including removal of any trustee or manager. It is submitted, that therefore, under sub-clause (b), a suit can be filed to obtain a decree for removal of any trustee (i.e. by persons intending to remove a trustee) and not by a trustee who has been removed or suspended to challenge his removal or suspension. It is submitted that Sec. 50 is in fact the provision the appellants have to resort if they want to remove respondent No. 1. It is submitted that appellants cannot take law into their own hands by removing or suspending a trustee when they have no power to do so. It is submitted that Sec. 50 is in fact the provision the appellants have to resort if they want to remove respondent No. 1. It is submitted that appellants cannot take law into their own hands by removing or suspending a trustee when they have no power to do so. It is submitted that Sec. 41A is the provision to take resort to, to prevent immediate detriment to the Trust and to ensure that appropriate directions are immediately issued to ensure that the Trust is properly administered. 4.18. It is further submitted that even otherwise and in any case as the authority whose order has been challenged namely the Joint Charity Commissioner, Vadodara not having been joined in the petition, the petition was not maintainable, and consequently, the Letters Patent Appeal is also not maintainable. It is submitted that it may be noted that the Joint Charity Commissioner, Vadodara is a distinct and separate authority under the Act. The Joint Charity Commissioner, Vadodara has been appointed by way of a notification issued by the State of Gujarat under Sec. 3Aof the Gujarat Public Trusts Act, 1950 and whereunder he has been conferred with all the powers of the Charity Commissioner with respect to matters of the district of Vadodara and certain other surrounding districts. It is submitted that Joint Charity Commissioner, Vadodara is not a delegate of the Charity Commissioner because it is not the Charity Commissioner who has delegated his powers to him. It is submitted that it is the State Government which has, under Sec. 3A of the Gujarat Public Trusts Act, 1950, appointed and empowered him. It is submitted that he is an independent authority having jurisdiction for certain areas. It is submitted that order under challenge in the petition has been passed by the Joint Charity Commissioner, Vadodara and the said order is an order of the Joint Charity Commissioner, Vadodara alone and no one else. It is submitted that the order under challenge not being an order of the Charity Commissioner, State of Gujarat, his being joined as a party in the petition and the appeal is a matter of absolutely no consequence and does not solve the defect in the petition, namely, non-joinder of authority whose order is under challenge. It is submitted that therefore, present Letters Patent Appeal is not maintainable and deserves to be rejected. It is submitted that therefore, present Letters Patent Appeal is not maintainable and deserves to be rejected. Making above submissions and relying upon the above decisions, it is requested to dismiss the present Letters Patent Appeal. 5. Shri Sharma, learned Assistant Government Pleader has adopted the submissions made by Shri Thakore, learned Advocate for the respondent No. 1. He has further submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case Joint Charity Commissioner has rightly exercise the powers under Sec. 41A of the Act. He has also submitted that the submission on behalf of the appellants with respect to direction which can be issued by the Charity Commissioner under Sec. 41A of the Act, and narrow interpretation cannot be accepted. It is submitted that if the powers of the Charity Commissioner in exercise of power under Sec. 41A of the Trust Act are considered with respect to subject falling under Secs. 32 to 41 only, it will take away the powers of the Charity Commissioner to issue direction for proper administration and management of the Trust, which are conferred under Sec. 41A of the Trust Act. It is submitted that therefore, such narrow interpretation cannot be accepted. Making above submissions, it is requested to dismiss the present Letters Patent Appeal. 6. Heard the learned Advocates for the respective parties at length. A short but interesting question of law posed for consideration of this Court is the powers of Charity Commissioner to issue directions in exercise of powers under Sec. 41A of the Trust Act. 6.1. At the outset, it is required to be noted that it is the case of the appellants-original petitioners that the Charity Commissioner can issue the directions in exercise of powers under Sec. 41A of the Trust Act in respect of matters falling under Secs. 32 to 41 of the Trust Act only. In support of his above case, learned Counsel for the appellants has heavily relied upon the decision of the Division Bench in the case of Syedna Mohamed Burhanuddin, [ 1992 (1) GLH 331 ]. 6.2. While considering the aforesaid question/issue first of all relevant provisions of the Trust Act are required to be referred, more particularly, Secs. 32 to 41 and Sec. 41A of the Trust Act, which are as under: "32. Maintenance of accounts: (1) Every trustee of a public trust shall keep regular accounts. 6.2. While considering the aforesaid question/issue first of all relevant provisions of the Trust Act are required to be referred, more particularly, Secs. 32 to 41 and Sec. 41A of the Trust Act, which are as under: "32. Maintenance of accounts: (1) Every trustee of a public trust shall keep regular accounts. (2) Such accounts shall be kept in such form as may be approved by the Charity Commissioner and shall contain such particulars as may be prescribed. 33. Balancing and auditing of accounts: (1) The accounts kept under Sec. 32 shall be balanced each year on the thirty-first day of March or such other day, as may be fixed by the Charity Commissioner. (2) The accounts shall be audited annually in such manner as prescribed and by a person who is a chartered accountant within the meaning of the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949, (38 of 1949) or by such persons as may be authorised in this behalf by the State Government. (3) Every auditor acting under sub-sec. (2) shall have access to the accounts and to all books, vouchers, other documents and records in the possession of or under the control of the trustee. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the preceding sub-secs.: (a) the Charity Commissioner may direct a special audit of the accounts of any public trust whenever in his opinion such special audit is necessary. The provisions of sub-secs. (2) and (3) shall, so far as may be applicable, apply to such special audit. The Charity Commissioner may direct the payment of such fee as may be prescribed for such special audit; and (b) State Government may, by general or special order, exempt any public trust or class of public trusts from the provisions of sub-sec. (2), subject to such conditions as may be specified in the order. 34. Auditor's duty to prepare balance sheet and to report irregularities, etc.: (1) It shall be the duty of every auditor auditing the accounts of a public trust under Sec. 33 to prepare a balance-sheet and income and expenditure account and to forward a copy of the same to the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner of the region or sub-region or to the Charity Commissioner, if the Charity Commissioner required him to do so. (2) The auditor shall in his report specify all cases of irregular, illegal or improper expenditure or failure or omission to recover moneys or other property belonging to the public trust or of loss or waste of money or other property thereof and state whether such expenditure, failure, omission, loss or waste was caused in consequence of breach of trust, or misapplication or any other misconduct on the part of the trustees, or any other person. 35. Investment of public trust money: (1) Where the trust property consists of money and cannot be applied immediately or at any early date to the purposes of the public trust the trustee shall be bound notwithstanding any direction contained in the instrument of the trust [to deposit the money in any Scheduled Bank as defined in the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 (2 of 1934), in the Postal Savings Bank or in a Co-operative Bank approved by the State Government for the purpose or to invest it in public securities]: Provided that such money may be invested in the first mortgage of immovable property situate in any part of India if the property is not leasehold for a term of years and the value of the property exceeds by one-half the mortgage money: Provided further that the Charity Commissioner may by general or special order permit the trustee of any public trust or classes of such trusts to invest the money in any other manner. (2) Nothing in sub-sec. (1) shall effect any investment or deposit already made before the coming into force of the Bombay Public Trusts (Amendment) Act, 1954 (Bom. 59 of 1954) in accordance with a direction contained in the instrument of the trust: Provided that any interest or dividend received or accruing from such investment or deposit on or after the coming into force of the said Act or any sum so invested or deposited on the maturity of the said investment of deposit shall be applied or invested in the manner prescribed in sub-sec. (1). 36. (1). 36. Alienation of immovable property of public trust: (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the instrument of trust - (a) no sale, mortgage, exchange or gift of any immovable property, and (b) no lease for a period exceeding ten years in the case of agricultural land or for a period exceeding three years in the case of non-agricultural land or a building belong to a public trust, shall be valid without the previous sanction of the Charity Commissioner. (2) The decision of the Charity Commissioner under sub-sec. (1) shall be communicated to the trustees and shall be published in such manner as may be prescribed. (3) Any person aggrieved by such decision may appeal to the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal within thirty days from the date of its publication. (4) Such decision shall, subject to the provisions of sub-sec. (3) be final. 37. Power of inspection and supervision: (1) The Charity Commissioner, the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner or any officer authorised by the State Government by a general or special order shall have power - (a) to enter on and inspect or cause to be entered on and inspected any property belonging to a public trust. (b) to call for or inspect any extract from any proceedings of the trustees of any public trust and any books of accounts or documents in the possession, or under the control, of the trustees or any person on behalf of the trustees; (c) to call for any return, statement, account or report which he may think fit from the trustees or any person connected with a public trust: Provided that in entering upon any property belonging to the public trust the officers making the entry shall give reasonable notice to the trustee and shall have due regard to the religious practices or usages of the trust. (2) It shall be the duty of every trustee to afford all reasonable facilities to any officer exercising any of the powers under sub-sec. (1) and the trustees and person referred to in sub-sec. (1) shall comply with any order made or direction issued by such officer in exercise of the power conferred upon him by or under sub-sec. (1). 38. (1) and the trustees and person referred to in sub-sec. (1) shall comply with any order made or direction issued by such officer in exercise of the power conferred upon him by or under sub-sec. (1). 38. Explanation on report of auditor:-- On receipt of a report of the auditor under Sec. 34 or of a report, if any, made by an officer authorised under Sec. 37 the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner to whom the report is submitted shall require the trustee or any other person concerned to submit an explanation thereon within such period as he thinks fit. 39. Report to Charity Commissioner:-- On considering the report referred to in Sec. 38, and the accounts and explanation, if any, furnished by the trustees or any other person, and after holding an inquiry in the prescribed manner, the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner shall record his finding as to whether the trustees or any other person have been guilty of gross negligence, a breach of trust, misapplication or misconduct which has resulted in loss to the public trust and make a report thereof to the Charity Commissioner. 40. Decision of Charity Commissioner on report under Sec. 3 : The Charity Commissioner shall, after considering the report of the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner, giving an opportunity to the person concerned and holding such inquiry as he thinks fit, determine:-- (a) the amount of loss caused to a public trust; (b) whether such loss was due to any gross negligence, breach of trust, misapplication or misconduct on the part of any person; (c) whether any of the trustees, or any other person was responsible for such loss; (d) the amount which any of the trustees or any other person is liable to pay to the public trust for such loss. 41. Order of surcharge: (1) If the Charity Commissioner decides that any person is liable to pay to the public trust any amount for the loss caused to the trust, the Charity Commissioner may direct that the amount shall be surcharged on the person. (2) Subject to the provisions of Sec. 72, the order of the Charity Commissioner under sub-sec. (1) shall be final and conclusive. 41A. (2) Subject to the provisions of Sec. 72, the order of the Charity Commissioner under sub-sec. (1) shall be final and conclusive. 41A. Power of Charity Commissioner to issue directions to trustees and other persons: (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Charity Commissioner may, from time to time, issue directions to any trustee of a public trust or any person connected therewith to ensure that such trust is properly administered and the income thereof is properly accounted for or duly appropriated and applied to the objects and for the purposes of the trust. (2) It shall be the duty of every such trustee and person to comply with a direction issued to him under sub-sec. (1)." 6.3. While considering the issue/question involved in the present Letters Patent Appeal i.e. with respect to scope and ambit of powers conferred upon the Charity Commissioner to issue directions under Sec. 41A of the Trust Act and the reliance placed upon the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Syedna Mohamed Burhanuddin, [ 1992 (1) GLH 331 ], which has been heavily relied upon by Shri Oza, learned Counsel for the appellants, the issues/questions raised in the aforesaid decision are required to be considered in light of the controversy/issue/lis in the matter. 6.4. While considering the issue/question posed for consideration of this Court referred to hereinabove, the resolution passed by the Trust, of which, the grievance was made by the original applicant - one of the Trustee/Secretary of the Trust for which the learned Charity Commissioner has issued the direction under Sec. 41A of the Act, which was subject-matter before the learned Single Judge as well as this Court is also required to be considered, which reads as under: "Resolution: Resolved that considering the report of Shri Bhagirath Solanki, Treasurer, P.T.D.T. and seriousness of the matter, an independent Inquiry Officer be appointed to inquire into and investigate about the reported incidence and give detailed report and recommendations and further resolved that the President be and is hereby fully empowered and authorized to take an appropriate action on behalf of the Trust to appoint suitable independent Inquiry Officer and to take decision based on the said report. It is hereby further resolved that till the inquiry/investigation is completed and report is submitted and final decision is taken by the President Shri Priyavadan Ambalal Patel is hereby suspended as Member as well as Trustee (Secretary) and he shall restrain himself from entering into the premises of the temple complex and he shall handover all the documents/records/keys of the P.T.D.T. to the President, immediately and without prejudice to this it is further resolved that in terms of Clause 10 of the scheme also, he shall not be entitled to enter into the temple complex." 7. It cannot be disputed that me administration and management of the Trust can always be as per the provisions contained in me Trust-Deed and in accordance with provisions of the Act and Rules. Therefore, considering me provision of Sec. 41A of the Trust Act whenever it is found by the Charity Commissioner that the Trust and/or its trustees are not managing the affairs of the Trust as per the provision contained in Trust-Deed and/or as per the provisions of me Act and Rules, me Charity Commissioner can in exercise of powers under Sec. 41A of the Act issue direction for appropriate administration and management of the Trust. However, it is the case of the appellants relying upon the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Syedna Mohamed Burhanuddin, [ 1992 (1) GLH 331 ], that even while exercising the powers under Sec. 41A of the Trust Act, the Charity Commissioner can issue direction only in respect of the matter falling under Secs. 32 to 41 of the Trust Act. However, considering the aforesaid decision of the Division Bench in detail and the observations made by the Division Bench with respect to question posed before the Division Bench in the case of Syedna Mohamed Burhanuddin, [ 1992 (1) GLH 331 ], we are of the opinion that as such there is no absolute proposition of law laid down by the Division Bench in the said decision that in exercise of powers conferred under Sec. 41A of the Trust Act, the Charity Commissioner can issue the direction in respect of the matters falling under Secs. 32 to 41 of the Trust Act only. 32 to 41 of the Trust Act only. In the case before the Division Bench while challenging the certain directions issued by the Charity Commissioner, Gujarat State, under Sec. 41A of the Trust Act, vires of Sec.41A of the Trust Act also were challenged on the ground that it violates Arts. 25 and 26of the Constitution of India. Before the Division Bench the petitioner challenged the constitutional validity of Sec. 41A of the Trust Act mainly on the following grounds/contentions: "(1) Sec. 41A of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, insofar as it applies to trusts of religious denominations, is ultra vires Arts. 25and 26 of the Constitution. (2) Sec. 41A is not ultra vires Arts. 25 and 26, the impugned directions are wholly beyond the purview of Sec. 41A and are in conflict with Arts. 25 and 26. (3) Such directions cannot be issued without hearing the party affected thereby either on the ground of principles of Natural Justice if they are quasi-judicial or on the ground of principles of Fair-Play if they are purely executive or administrative in character." While dealing with the aforesaid contentions, this Court also noted/considered sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 41A of the Trust Act and firstly observed that sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 41A of the Trust Act empowers the Charity Commissioner to issue direction only for the following purpose and no others : (a) Proper administration of a public trust; (b) Proper accounting of its income; (c) Due appropriation and application of the income to the objects and for the purpose of trust. While dealing with the contention on behalf of the petitioners that Sec. 41A of the Trust Act impinge upon any fundamental fight of a person or religious denomination and suffers from constitutional infirmity, the Court observed that Sec. 41A of the Trust Act is merely enabling and ancillary provision intended to make implementation and enforcement of provisions of Secs. 32 to 41 more effective. It is to be noted that there was no controversy before the Division Bench that whether the powers of the Charity Commissioner to issue direction shall confine in respect of matters falling under Secs. 32 to 41 only. It will be misreading of decision of the Division Bench if it is read like that. 32 to 41 more effective. It is to be noted that there was no controversy before the Division Bench that whether the powers of the Charity Commissioner to issue direction shall confine in respect of matters falling under Secs. 32 to 41 only. It will be misreading of decision of the Division Bench if it is read like that. On the contrary, in the aforesaid decision, it is further observed that by enacting Sec. 41A, the Legislature has not introduced any new principle which is not there elsewhere but has merely filled in the lacuna for effective implementation of the provision of Act. 7.1. Even it could not have been the intention of the Legislature to restrict the powers of the Charity Commissioner while issuing the direction under Sec. 41A of the Trust Act in respect of matters under Secs. 32 to 41 of the Act only. If the legislature had intended to restrict the exercise of the Charity Commissioner's powers under Sec. 41A to only matters contained in Secs. 32 to 41, there was absolutely no reason for the Legislature to have provided under Sec. 41A the categories of situations under which the powers can be exercised. The fact that Sec. 41A enumerates the situations in which powers can be exercised i.e. to ensure that such Trust is properly administered and the income thereof is properly accounted for or duly appropriated and applied to the objects and for the purposes of the Trust, itself shows that Sec. 41A is a provision that stands by itself and that directions can be given under Sec. 41A as long the same are given for the matters specified in the said provision i.e. in Sec. 41A. If such a restrictive meaning as sought to be contended on behalf of the appellants is accepted, it will negate that part of the Sec.41A which confers power upon Charity Commissioner to issue direction from time to time, to ensure that such trust is properly administered, however subject to provision of the Trust Act. The presence of the words "subject to other provisions of this Act, the Charity Commissioner may issue..." can only mean that the Charity Commissioner cannot issue directions that may violate or run contrary to some other provision of the Act and can never mean that Sec. 41A is restricted to the matters contained in Secs. 32 to 41only. 7.2. The presence of the words "subject to other provisions of this Act, the Charity Commissioner may issue..." can only mean that the Charity Commissioner cannot issue directions that may violate or run contrary to some other provision of the Act and can never mean that Sec. 41A is restricted to the matters contained in Secs. 32 to 41only. 7.2. As observed hereinabove, there was no controversy before the Division Bench in the aforesaid decision that whether the powers of the Charity Commissioner to issue direction under Sec. 41A of the Trust Act, shall be restricted to matters in respect of Secs. 32 to 41 only. Therefore, if the judgment of the Division Bench in the case of Syedna Mohamed Burhanuddin, [ 1992 (1) GLH 331 ], if read as a whole and its true perspective, as such it does not hold that Sec. 41A is restricted to Secs. 32 to 41 only. As such, in the aforesaid decision, the Division Bench has not restricted the powers under Sec. 41A of the Trust Act to the matters contained in Secs. 32 to 41 of the Trust Act only. As per the catena of decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, more particularly in the case of Zee Telefilms Limited v. Union of India, reported in AIR 2005 SC 2677 (Para 275-278); in the case of Natural Resources Allocation, in Re. Special Reference No. 1 of 2012, reported in 2012 (10) SCC 1 (Para 73) and in the case of Mehboob Dawood Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, reported in 2004 (2) SCC 362 (Para 12), a judgment is to be read as a whole and that it is not a precedent for a question that was not before the Court. Under the circumstances and for the reasons stated above, we are of the opinion that the Division Bench in the case of Syedna Mohamed Burhanuddin, [ 1992 (1) GLH 331 ], does not hold that powers conferred under Sec. 41A of the Trust Act to issue direction by the Charity Commissioner is restricted to Secs. 32 to 41 of the Trust Act only. 8. 32 to 41 of the Trust Act only. 8. On the contrary, in the case of Navsari Taluka Halpati Shikshan Prachar Sangh, [L.P.A. No. 2 of 2004] after considering the aforesaid decision of the Division Bench in the case of Syedna Mohamed Burhanuddin, [ 1992 (1) GLH 331 ], more particularly, the observations made in Paras 41 and 42 in decision of Syedna Mohamed Burhanuddin (supra), it is held that the Charity Commissioner can exercise the powers under Sec. 41Aof the Act in connection with the matters falling under the Act for proper administration of the Trust and are not restricted to the matters falling under Secs. 32 to 41 of the Act only. It is further observed and held by the Division Bench in the said decision the power of the Charity Commissioner to issue directions to ensure that the Trust is properly administered is itself by very nature a wide power. It is further observed that Administration of Trust would mean administration by a body which under the Trust-Deed is required to be administered the same. It is further observed that in absence of proper elected body as required under the Trust-Deed, a proper administration of the Trust cannot be ensured. It is further observed that the Administration of the Trust would include various aspects, which would fall under the provisions of the Act and in absence of a properly constituted administrative body, the affairs of the Trust can hardly be conducted in furtherance of its objects. Thereafter, it is held that the direction to hold election of the trustee in consonance with the terms of the Trust-Deed would clearly fall within the ambit of Sec. 41A of the Act. Thereafter, it is held that the direction to hold election of the trustee in consonance with the terms of the Trust-Deed would clearly fall within the ambit of Sec. 41A of the Act. It is required to be noted that after the aforesaid decision of the Division Bench in the case of Navsari Taluka Halpati Shikshan Prachar Sangh, [L.P.A. No. 2 of 2004] in the following decisions, the learned Single Judges of this Court have categorically observed and held that in exercise of powers under Sec. 41A of the Act, the Charity Commissioner can issue direction for better administration of trust: "(a) Acharyashree M. R.B. Mandir Trust v. C.R. Chandulal, 1997 (1) GLH 16 (Single Judge) (Paras 5, 8, 11, 12 and 13) (b) Devkrushnadasji Guru Dharmadasji v. State of Gujarat, 2008 (1) GLH 427 : [ 2008 (3) GLR 1981 ] (Single Judge) (Paras 13-16, 18-24) (c) Balvantbhai Jinabhai Dharni v. Shantilal Kantibhai Ratanpara, Spl. C.A. No. 9819 of 2009 and other cognate matters (Single Judge) (Paras 18.1, 18.2, 23, 23.1, 29-31) (d) Ratilal Hansraj Gajjar v. Kamleshbhai Narsibhai Kharechha, 2011 (0) GLHEL-HC 224834 (Single Judge) (Pages 9-11) (e) Shree Laxminarayan Dev Temple Board v. Jasubhai Bhailalbhai Patel, Spl. C.A. No. 4069 of 2012 (Single Judge) (Paras 14-15) (f) Gopinath Dev Mandir Trust v. State of Gujarat, Spl. C.A. No. 11706 of 2012 (Pages 31-35). It may be noted that this judgment has been confirmed by the Division Bench in L.P.A. No. 479 of 2013. (Paras 9-11)." 9. For the reasons stated above and considering the scheme of the Trust Act and object and purpose for which Sec. 41A of the Trust Act is enacted, restricted meaning as canvassed on behalf of the appellant that in exercise of powers under Sec. 41A of the Trust Act, the Charity Commissioner can issue the directions only in respect of the matters under Secs. 32 to 41 of the Act cannot be accepted. As observed hereinabove, the Legislature has never intended to confer such narrow powers to the Charity Commissioner. 32 to 41 of the Act cannot be accepted. As observed hereinabove, the Legislature has never intended to confer such narrow powers to the Charity Commissioner. The Charity Commissioner can issue the directions in exercise of powers under Sec. 41A of the Act with respect to (a) proper administration of a public trust; (b) proper accounting of its income; (c) due appropriation and application of the income to the objects and for the purpose of trust however, subject to provisions of the Act and Rules how even as observed in the case of Syedna Mohamed Burhanuddin, [ 1992 (1) GLH 331 ] and other decisions, while issuing direction under Sec. 41A of the Act Charity Commissioner has no adjudicatory powers and cannot decide lis between the parties. Therefore, subject to the aforesaid rider, for administration of the Trust, the Charity Commissioner can issue the directions to the Trust/Trust-Deed and can issue the directions to them to act as per the scheme of the Trust or provision of the Trust-Deed and/or Trust Act. 10. The contention on behalf of the appellant that aggrieved person in the present case respondent No. 1 had remedy to challenge the resolution of the Trust by which he has been suspended pending inquiry under Sec. 50 of the Act, has no substance. If provision of Sec. 50 of the Act is considered, it confers power upon the Charity Commissioner, to approach the Civil Court and/or more than two persons interested in the Trust to approach the Charity Commissioner for permission to institute the suit with respect to dispute mentioned in Sec. 50 only. Under the circumstances, in the present case, Sec. 50of the Act would not be applicable as sought to be contended on behalf of the appellant herein. 11. Now, so far as direction issued by the Charity Commissioner in the present case, which is reproduced hereinabove is considered in light of what is observed and held, firstly it can be said that same is absolutely in consonance with the provisions of Sec.41A of the Act and the directions are issued for proper administration of the Trust as per the provision of Trust-Deed. By the aforesaid direction, the Joint Charity Commissioner has never adjudicated the dispute between the parties and has not decided any lis between the parties and even has not considered the legality and validity of the resolution passed by the Trust. By the aforesaid direction, the Joint Charity Commissioner has never adjudicated the dispute between the parties and has not decided any lis between the parties and even has not considered the legality and validity of the resolution passed by the Trust. Under the circumstances, direction issued by the Joint Charity Commissioner which was impugned in the petition, cannot be said to be in any way contrary to the powers conferred under Sec. 41A of the Act. Therefore, the learned Single Judge has rightly dismissed the petition preferred by the appellants herein and has rightly confirmed the direction issued by the Joint Charity Commissioner. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the learned Single Judge dismissing the petition and confirming the direction, passed by the Joint Charity Commissioner. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, appeal fails and same deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to cost. FURTHER ORDER: After the pronouncement of the above judgment and order, Mr. Y.N. Oza, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellants has requested to continue the interim relief in terms of Para 6(A) of Civil Application No. 10109 of 2013, which was in operation during the pendency and final disposal of the present Letters Patent Appeal, meaning thereby, to stay the execution, operation and implementation of the order passed by the Joint Charity Commissioner, which has been confirmed by this Court now, so as to enable the appellants to approach the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The request is opposed by Mr. Salil M. Thakore, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 1, by submitting that once the order passed by the Joint Charity Commissioner issuing directions under Sec. 41A of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 has been confirmed by this Court, still to continue the interim relief would be against the interest of the Trust. Considering the fact that the interim relief has been operated through out during the pendency and final disposal of the present Letters Patent Appeal, the interim relief granted in terms of Para 6(A) in Civil Application No. 10109 of 2013 and subsequently modified, is hereby directed to be continued till 7th September, 2015. Appeal dismissed.