ORDER : Heard Mr. GP Bhowmik, the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner/plaintiff. Also heard Mr. R. Barpujari, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent Nos.4 & 5 (defendant Nos.4 & 5) in the Title Suit No.72/2007 (originally the Title Suit No.37/1998), now pending in the Court of learned Munsiff No.2, Dibrugarh. However the Municipal Board of Dibrugarh (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Municipal Board’) and their Chairman/Vice-Chairman (defendant Nos.3, 4 & 5) are not participating in this proceeding. 2. In his suit, the petitioner claimed that the land covered by the Site No.25 of New Market, Ward No.11 owned by the Municipal Board was leased out to the plaintiff’s grandfather, through the Deed No.778/1939 dated 24.7.1939 and on the said leased land of the Municipal Board, the lessee Biswanath Prasad Agarwala constructed a house containing several rooms, suitable for commercial purpose. The lessee let out some of the shop rooms and retained one room for his own use. The lease period was subsequently extended by the Municipal Board and the last extension in respect of the Site No.25 was valid for 20 years from 1995 to 2015. 3. Since one of the lessee’s tenant, Somrathi Lal Mina sold away a portion of Site No.25 through the Sale Deed No.1896/1977 to the respondent Nos.4 & 5 and the Municipal Board recognized the right of the purchasers by curving out a new site i.e. Site No.25(A) from the Site No.25, the plaintiff applied for declaratory reliefs for cancellation of the Lease Deed No.2449/1995 and also the Sale Deed No.1896/1977 in respect of the shop house measuring 30 ft. x 24.4 ft. (Total 610 sq. ft.). 4. In their joint written statement (W.S.), the defendant Nos.4 & 5 however contended that the Municipal Holding No.234 of Ward No.11 was leased to Beni Madhab Prasad Agarwalla which was completely burnt down in 1994 and the same was reconstructed by the sons of the vendor Samarthilal Meena and accordingly they claimed that the vendor had legal right to transfer the property to the defendants. 5. After pleadings were exchanged and issues were framed, the plaintiff filed his evidence in affidavit as PW.1 but he is still to be cross-examined by the defendants. At that stage, the plaintiff’s engaged senior counsel Mr. I. Sarma expired and thus the suit was dismissed for default on 7.5.2008. 5. After pleadings were exchanged and issues were framed, the plaintiff filed his evidence in affidavit as PW.1 but he is still to be cross-examined by the defendants. At that stage, the plaintiff’s engaged senior counsel Mr. I. Sarma expired and thus the suit was dismissed for default on 7.5.2008. The newly engaged lawyer then took steps for restoration of the suit and at that stage he noticed that consequential relief of recovery of khas possession was not prayed in the case. 6. Therefore an application was filed on 16.3.2010 (Annexure-D) by the plaintiff for amendment of the prayer-‘c’ to seek recovery of possession of part of Site No.25 (re-numbered as Site No. 25(A), by evicting the defendants. 7. However the learned Trial Judge through the impugned order dated 18.8.2010 (Annexure-F) rejected the plaintiff’s application by declaring that the proposed amendment is not essential for adjudicating the real controversy and that the alteration will change the nature and character of the suit filed by the plaintiff. 8.1. Assailing the legality of the impugned decision, Mr. GP Bhowmik, the learned senior counsel argues that the Court committed a fundamental error by observing that the proviso to Order 6, Rule 17 of the C.P.C., as amended in 2002, does not apply to the suit as it was filed in 1998. 8.2. The senior counsel refers to the proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 to contend that unless consequential relief is sought by the plaintiff, in the event of cancellation of the Sale Deed/Lease Deed, the plaintiff will not be able to recover khas possession from the defendants and accordingly it is argued that the proposed amendment was a legal necessity which will help to avoid multiplicity of proceeding. 9. On the other hand Mr. R. Barpujari, learned counsel submits that if the prayer for recovery of khas possession is permitted to be incorporated by amendment of the prayer in the plaint, the Court should also examine whether such relief is barred by limitation. The counsel relies on Revajeetu Builders and Developers vs. Narayanaswamy and sons reported on (2009) 10 SCC 84 to project that as a general rule, the Court should decline amendments if a fresh suit on the amended claims would be barred by limitation, on the date of application. 10. The counsel relies on Revajeetu Builders and Developers vs. Narayanaswamy and sons reported on (2009) 10 SCC 84 to project that as a general rule, the Court should decline amendments if a fresh suit on the amended claims would be barred by limitation, on the date of application. 10. Under the C.P.C., the pleadings can be amended at any stage of the proceeding but when the trial has commenced, unless the Court concludes that the applicant has been diligent, the amendment of pleadings may not be permitted by the Court. In this case, the plaintiff’s engaged counsel died during the proceeding for which the suit came to be dismissed for default. Thereafter it was restored through efforts made by the newly engaged lawyer, who realized that consequential relief of recovery of khas possession was not prayed in the suit, although the plaintiff did specifically challenged the right of the defendants, to occupy the shop room under the renumbered Site No.25 (A). Therefore the belated application can’t entirely be attributed to want of diligence of the applicant. 11. When parties apply for amendment of pleadings, a liberal approach is the norm but the respondents have cited Revajeetu Builders and Developers (Supra) to argue that since the suit for recovery of possession is barred by limitation, the amendment of the prayer can’t be allowed. In the present matter, the right to recover khas possession of the suit premises covered by Site No.25 (A) is largely dependent on whether the plaintiff can establish his own legal right and whether the Site No.25 (A) is part of Site No.25 leased out by the Municipal Board in favour of the plaintiff’s grandfather. Therefore without further probe into the merit of the claim, it can’t be said whether the additional relief applied for by the plaintiff, is barred by limitation. This aspect will have to be decided by framing one additional issue on limitation bar, for the new prayer. 12. Moreover, under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, the plaintiff is legally obliged to seek further relief consequent upon the declaratory relief being granted in the suit and when he omits to apply for the necessary relief at appropriate stage, the law will operate against him. In such circumstances, the application for amendment of the prayer is found to be consistent with the requirement of the Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. 13. In such circumstances, the application for amendment of the prayer is found to be consistent with the requirement of the Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. 13. In so far as the argument of prejudice is concerned, the amendment application of the plaintiff was filed at a stage when the PW.1 was still to be cross-examined and the defendants’ evidence is not yet adduced. Therefore if the amendment is allowed, it is unlikely to cause any real prejudice to the defendants as the nature of the suit will not change significantly. More importantly the defendant Nos.3 & 4 were certainly aware of the type of the challenge made by the plaintiff and the additional relief sought through amendment is consequential to the declaratory relief already applied for in the suit against the defendants. 14. But at the same time, if the plaintiff is allowed to amend his prayer to additionally pray for recovery of khas possession, the Trial Court is obliged to examine whether the consequential relief is within the period of limitation or outside. Therefore I feel that another issue on the supplementary prayer should be framed by the Court and the parties must be given the opportunity to adduce their respective evidence/counter evidence, for the additional issue. 15. Considering all the facts and circumstances as discussed above, I feel that the learned Court failed to act within jurisdiction by disallowing the amendment of the prayer in the suit and consequent upon this finding, the impugned order dated 18.8.2010 (Annexure-F) in the Title Suit No.72/2007, rendered by the learned Munsiff No.2, Dibrugarh is set aside and quashed. Thus the plaintiff’s petition No.313/2010 is granted and the Court should therefore allow him to file the amended plaint, within four weeks of receipt of this order. To proceed with the suit, the two contesting parties are directed to appear before the learned Trial Court on 27.7.2015. However the Court should issue fresh notice on the Municipal Board of Dibrugarh and their Chairman/Vice-Chairman (respondent Nos. 1, 2 & 3), as they are not participating in this proceeding. With this order, the case stands allowed to the extent indicated. 16. In view of the above decision, the Registry should immediately send a copy of this order to the Court of the Munsiff No.2, Dibrugarh.