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Rajasthan High Court · body

2015 DIGILAW 755 (RAJ)

Banwari Lal Kushwaha v. State of Rajasthan

2015-04-03

M.N.BHANDARI

body2015
Hon'ble BHANDARI, J.—By this petition, following prayers have been made, which are quoted hereunder for ready reference: “(1) By issuing an appropriate writ, or order or direction, respondents may kindly be directed to allow petitioner to participate in the Assembly IV session for Budget 2015 by escorting him in custody for the purpose of participating in the proceedings in the Assembly. (2) The Hon'ble Court may kindly pass such other order or a direction, which it may deem just, proper and expedient in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Any other appropriate relief to which the appellant/petitioner is found entitle may also be granted.” 2. Learned counsel submits that petitioner is an elected representative of Legislative Assembly. He is behind bars pending trial for the offence under Section 302 & 120B IPC. The petitioner has right to attend the Assembly and participate in the proceedings as per Article 194 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner has not been permitted to attend the Assembly proceedings. It can be allowed under custody. The prayer aforesaid was made by the petitioner but having not been accepted or exceeded to, present petition was filed. 3. Learned counsel for petitioner made a reference of judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Nalin Soren vs. State of Jharkhan in Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl) No.5859/2013, decided on 18.7.2013. Therein, permission to attend the assembly proceedings was granted. The petitioner is entitled to the similar relief. In absence of it, representation of the particular Constituency of the Assembly could not be made, moreso when it is a budget session. The grievance of the people needs to be brought before assembly, thus prayer is made to allow the petitioner to attend the proceedings. 4. Learned Additional Advocate General Shri J.M. Saxena submitted that the petitioner is behind bars pending trial. He has no right to attend the assembly proceedings even under custody. An application can be filed before the Speaker, if a right exist. 5. The petitioner has claimed right under Article 194 of the Constitution of India. It does not deal with the situation as exist herein. If one is behind bars, would not be entitled to the privileges which exist in the House of Legislatures or to its Members. Article 194 provides about rights of the member and immunity to whatever is transacted on the floor. It does not deal with the situation as exist herein. If one is behind bars, would not be entitled to the privileges which exist in the House of Legislatures or to its Members. Article 194 provides about rights of the member and immunity to whatever is transacted on the floor. It cannot be taken to be right even for a representative, who is facing trial or detained for certain reasons under the lawful order. If intention of the framer of the constitution would have been to give immunity in case of lawful detention, it could have made provisions accordingly. In view of the above and in absence of any provision giving right to the petitioner to attend the assembly proceedings during the period of custody, prayer made in this petition may not be granted. A reference of judgment of Apex Court in the case of Oriental Bank of Commerce vs. Sunder Lal Jain & Anr., reported in AIR 2008 SC 1339 has been given to show as to under what limitation, the court should pass order. Prayer is accordingly made to dismiss the petition. 6. I have considered the rival submissions made by the parties and perused the record. 7. It is not in dispute that petitioner is an elected representative of Legislative Assembly and facing trial for the offence under Sections 302 & 120B IPC. He is behind bars during trial. The question for my consideration is as to whether he has a right to participate in the assembly proceedings, more specifically in the budget session. A reference of Article 194 of the Constitution has been given, which is quoted thus: “194. Powers, privileges, etc, of the House of Legislatures and of the members and committees thereof.-(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and to the rules and standing orders regulating the procedure of the Legislature, there shall be freedom of speech in the Legislature of every State. (2) No member of the Legislature of a State shall be liable to any proceedings in any court in respect of anything said or any vote given by him in the Legislature or any committee thereof, and no person shall be so liable in respect of the publication by or under the authority of a House of such a Legislature of any report, paper, votes or proceedings. (3) In other respects, the powers, privileges and immunities of a House of the Legislature of a State, and of the members and the committees of a House of such Legislature, shall be such as may from time to time be defined by the Legislature by law, and, until so defined, shall be those of that House and of its members and committees immediately before the coming into force of Section 26 of the Constitution Forty fourth Amendment) Act, 1978. (4) The provisions of clauses (1), (2) and (3) shall apply in relation to persons who by virtue of this Constitution have the right to speak in, and otherwise to take part in the proceedings of a House of the Legislature of a State or any committee thereof as they apply in relation to members of that Legislature.” 8. Perusal of Article 194 of the Constitution of India reveals certain rights of the members and privileges to whatever is transacted on the floor of the assembly. A member has freedom of speech in the assembly of the State. Article 194 gives powers as well as privileges to the members of the House of Legislatures and committees. It is basically to safeguard what is spoken and decided in the assembly. In view of the aforesaid, a member is having right and immunity on the floor of the assembly and for committees. It does not, however, provide that even if one is detained or behind bars, would have right to attend the assembly proceedings. Learned counsel for petitioner submitted that Article 194 does not bar to attend the assembly. If this court commands or issue direction to allow the petitioner to attend the assembly proceedings though facing trial and behind bars, it would mean to legislate or make a provision, which does not exist in the constitution. The court has to be conscious while passing order. It can pass order, if constitution or statute provides for some benefit and has not been extended. The court is not having powers to legislate or make provision. 9. In absence of any provision under Article 194 to provide right to attend the assembly even if one is facing trial and is behind bars, a direction cannot be given. Article 194 applies and can be enforced in the manner given therein without separation or addition. The court is not having powers to legislate or make provision. 9. In absence of any provision under Article 194 to provide right to attend the assembly even if one is facing trial and is behind bars, a direction cannot be given. Article 194 applies and can be enforced in the manner given therein without separation or addition. A provision could have been added by the framer of the Constitution to give benefit to those, who face criminal case and are behind bars or any such situation. Since it has not been provided, this court cannot pass order for it. 10. The question is raised that in absence of presence of representative of the area, representation would not be made in the budget session. It is true that in absence of presence of the petitioner, representation of the area would not be made. The court cannot pass an order to have representation through the MLA, who is behind bars. There may be fortuitous situation where representation cannot be made and one is existing in the instant case. 11. In the case of Nalin Soren vs. State of Jharkhan (supra), Hon'ble Apex Court issued direction to allow participation of Member of Legislative Assembly in no confidence motion. The order aforesaid is quoted hereunder for ready reference: “This matter was mentioned in the morning by Mr. Vivek Tankha, learned senior counsel on behalf of a sitting M.L.A. of Jharkhand Legislative Assembly, Mr. Nalin Soren, against whom certain criminal proceedings appear to have been taken. Mr. Tankha had submitted that a Vote of Confidence is to be taken in the Assembly today in Ranchi at 2.00 p.m. and that the petitioner, if arrested, will be prevented from casting his vote in the Confidence Motion. We had, therefore, requested either Mr. Atul Jha or Mr. Tapesh Singh, learned Advocates, to be present when the matter was taken up. Pursuant thereto, Mr. Tapesh Singh is present when the matter is taken up. Having regard to the urgency, we dispose of the matter by directing that the petitioner may surrender to the police authorities forthwith and if he is taken into custody, he shall be escorted to the Assembly in custody for the purpose of participating in the proceedings in the Assembly. Thereafter, the petitioner will remain in custody and may proceed to take other steps, as he may be advised. Thereafter, the petitioner will remain in custody and may proceed to take other steps, as he may be advised. The special leave petition which is directed against the order dated 17th July, 2013, passed in I.A. No.4908 of 2013 in Writ Petition (Crl.) No.103 of 2012, passed by the Jharkhand High Court, is disposed of accordingly. Let a copy of this order be made available immediately to learned counsel for both the parties, who will ensure that it is communicated to the Speaker of the Assembly immediately.” 12. The perusal of the order of Hon'ble Apex Court does not show that as a right, every member of Legislative Assembly should be allowed to participate in the meetings even if he is facing trial and is behind bars. It seems to address the situation as was obtaining and existing then. This court has limited jurisdiction to issue commands in regard to proceedings of the Legislative Assembly or Parliament, as the case may be. 13. The judgment in the case of K. Anandan Nambiar & Anr. vs. Chief Secretary, Government of Madras & Ors., reported in AIR 1966 SC 657 is relevant. Paras 11 to 21 of the said judgment are quoted hereunder: “11. These constitutional rights, according to Mr. Setalvad, are to be found in several Articles of the Constitution. Mr. Setalvad’s argument begins with Art. 79. This article deals with the constitution of Parliament; it provides that Parliament of the Union shall consist of the President and two Houses to be, known respectively as the Council of States and the House of the People. Article 85(i) provides, inter alia, that the President shall from time to time summon each House of Parliament to meet at such time and place as he thinks fit. In accordance with the provisions of this article, when the President decides to call for the session of Parliament summons are issued under his directions asking all Members of Parliament to attend the ensuing-session. The Detitioner Ananda Nambiar received such a summons issued on the 9th January, 1965 Article 86(i) gives the President the right to address either House of Parliament or both Houses assembled together, and it Provides that for that purpose, the President shall require the attendance of members. Mr. The Detitioner Ananda Nambiar received such a summons issued on the 9th January, 1965 Article 86(i) gives the President the right to address either House of Parliament or both Houses assembled together, and it Provides that for that purpose, the President shall require the attendance of members. Mr. Setalvad argues that when a summons is issued by the President requiring the member to attend the ensuing session of Parliament, it is not only his right, but his constitutional obligation to attend the session and hear the speech of the President. Article 100(i) refers to the voting in the Houses, and it provides that save as otherwise provided in this Constitution, all questions at any sitting of either House or joint sitting of the Houses shall be determined by a majority of votes of the members present and voting, other than the Speaker or person acting as Chairman or Speaker. Article 101(4) provides that if for a period of sixty days a member of either House of Parliament is, without permission of the House, absent from all meetings thereof, the House may declare his seat vacant. It is common ground that if a member is detained or otherwise prevented from attending the session of the House for personal reasons, as asks for permission of the House and usually, such permission is granted’. Article 105 deals with the powers, privileges and immunities of Parliament and its Members. Mr. Setalvad strongly relies on the provisions of sub-articles (1) & (2) of Art. 105 which deal with the freedom of speech inside the House of Parliament, and confer ,absolute immunity on the Members of Parliament in respect of their speeches and votes. If the order of detention prevents a Member of Parliament from attending the, session of Parliament, from participating in the debate and from giving his vote, that amounts to a violation of his constitutional rights; that, in substance, is Mr. Setalvad’s argument. 12. Mr. Setalvad also relied on the fact that this right continues to vest in the Member of Parliament during the life of the Parliament unless he is disqualified under Art.102 or under s.7(b) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (No. 43 of 1951). Article 84 deals with the qualification for membership of Parliament. Setalvad’s argument. 12. Mr. Setalvad also relied on the fact that this right continues to vest in the Member of Parliament during the life of the Parliament unless he is disqualified under Art.102 or under s.7(b) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (No. 43 of 1951). Article 84 deals with the qualification for membership of Parliament. With the provisions of this article we are not concerned in the present proceedings, because we are dealing with the rights of persons who have already been elected to the Parliament in ,other words, who possess the qualifications prescribed by Art. 84. Article 102 prescribes disqualifications for membership; it provides, inter alia, that a person shall be disqualified for being a member of either House of Parliament if his case falls under any -of its clauses (a) to (e). This disqualification applies for being chosen or for being a member of either House of Parliament. In other words, if a person incurs the disqualification prescribed by the relevant clauses of Art.102(1) after he is elected to either House of Parliament, he will cease to be such a Member as a result ,of the said disqualification. If a disqualification is not incurred as prescribed by Art. 102(1), he is entitled to continue to be a member of the House during its life. Section 7 of the Representation ,of the People Act prescribes disqualifications for membership of Parliament or of a St-ate Legislature. S. 7 (b) is relevant for our purpose. It provides that a person shall be disqualified for being -chosen as, and for being, a member of either House of Parliament if, whether before or after the commencement of the Constitution, be has been convicted by a Court in India of any offence and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than two years, unless a period of five years, or such less’ period as the Election Commission may allow in any particular case, has elapsed since his release. The argument based on the provisions of s 7 is the same as the -argument based on the provisions of Art. 102. If a Member of Parliament incurs a disqualification, he may cease to be such member, but if he continues to be qualified to be a member, his constitutional rights cannot be taken away by any law or order. 13. If a Member of Parliament incurs a disqualification, he may cease to be such member, but if he continues to be qualified to be a member, his constitutional rights cannot be taken away by any law or order. 13. It will be noticed that in substance the claim made is one of exemption from arrest under a detention order and, prima facie, such a claim would normally and legitimately fall under Art. 105(3) of the Constitution. Art. 105(3) deals with the powers, privileges and immunities of Parliament and its Members, and it provides that in other respects, the powers, privileges and immunities of each House of Parliament, and of the members and the committees of each House, shall be such as may from time to time be defined by Parliament by law, and until so defined, shall be those of the House of Commons of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, and of its members and committees, at the commencement of this Constitution. But Mr. Setalvad expressly stated before us that he did not rest his case on the provisions of Art. 105(3) and that obviously is for the very good reason that freedom from arrest under a detention order is not recognised as a privilege which can be claimed by Members of House of Commons in England. It is because such a claim cannot be based on the provisions of Art. 105(3) that Mr. Setalvad has been driven to adopt the ingenious course of suggesting that the rights of the Members of Parliament to participate in the business of Parliament is a constitutional and even a fundamental right which cannot be contravened by any law. The narrow question which thus falls to be considered on this contention is : if a claim for freedom from arrest by a detention order cannot be sustained under the privileges of the Members of Parliament, can it be sustained on the ground that it is a constitutional right which cannot be contravened? Before dealing with this point, it is necessary to indicate broadly the position about the privileges of the members of the Indian Legislatures, because they will materially assist us in determining the validity of the contention raised before us by Mr. Setalvad. Before dealing with this point, it is necessary to indicate broadly the position about the privileges of the members of the Indian Legislatures, because they will materially assist us in determining the validity of the contention raised before us by Mr. Setalvad. It is common ground that the privileges, powers and immunities of the members of the Indian Legislatures are the same as those of the members of the House of Commons as they existed at the commencement of the Indian Constitution. Let us, therefore, see what was the position about the privileges of the members of the House of Commons in regard to freedom from arrest by a detention order? 14. The position about the privileges of the Members of the House of Commons in regard to preventive detention is well settled. In this connection, Erskine May observes : "The privilege of freedom from arrest is limited to civil causes, and has not been allowed to interfere with the administration of criminal justice or emergency legislation."(1) 15. In early times the distinction between "civil" and "criminal" was not clearly expressed. It was only to cases of "treason, felony and breach (or surety) of the peace" that privilege was explicitly held not to apply. Originally the classification may have been regarded as sufficiently comprehensive. But in the case of misdemeanours, in the growing list of statutory offences, and, particularly, in the case of preventive detention under emergency legislation in times of crisis, there was a debatable region about which neither House had until recently expressed a definite view. The development of privilege has shown a tendency to confine it more narrowly to cases of a civil character and to exclude not only every kind of criminal case, but also cases which, while not strictly criminal, partake more of a criminal than of a civil character. This development is in conformity with the principle laid down by the Commons in a conference with the Lords in 1641 : "Privilege of Parliament is granted in regard of the service of the Commonwealth and is not to be used to the danger of the Commonwealth". 16. The last statement of May is based on the report of the Committee of Privileges of the House of Commons which dealt with the case of the detention of Captain Ramsay under Regulation 18B of the Defence (General) Regulations, 1939. Cap. 16. The last statement of May is based on the report of the Committee of Privileges of the House of Commons which dealt with the case of the detention of Captain Ramsay under Regulation 18B of the Defence (General) Regulations, 1939. Cap. Ramsay who had been detained under the said Regulation, urged before the Committee of Privileges that by reason of the said detention, a breach of the privileges of the House had been committed. This plea was rejected by the Committee of Privileges. The Committee found that Reg. 18B under which Cap. Ramsay had been detained, had been made under section 1(2)(a) of the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939. It examined the question as to whether the arrest and detention of Cap. Ramsay were within the powers of the Regulation and in accordance with its provisions; and it was satisfied that they were within the powers of the Regulation and in accordance with its provisions. The Committee then examined several precedents on which Cap. Ramsay relied, and it found that whereas arrest in civil proceedings is a breach of privilege, arrest on a criminal charge for an indictable offence is not. The Committee then examined the basis of the privilege and the reason for the distinction between arrest in a civil suit and arrest on a criminal charge. It appeared to the Committee that the privilege of freedom from arrest originated at a time when English Law made free use of imprisonment in civil proceedings as a method of coercing debtors to pay their debts; and in order to enable the Members of Parliament to discharge their functions effectively, it was thought necessary to, grant them immunity from such arrest, because they were doing King’s business and should not be hindered in carrying out their business by arrest at the suit of another subject of the King. Criminal acts, however, were offences against the King, and the privilege did not apply to arrest for such acts. In this connection, the Committee emphasised the fact that consideration of the general history of the privilege showed that the tendency had been to narrow its scope. The Committee recognised that there was a substantial difference between arrest and subsequent imprisonment on a criminal charge and detention without trial by executive order under the Regulation or under analogous provisions in the past. The Committee recognised that there was a substantial difference between arrest and subsequent imprisonment on a criminal charge and detention without trial by executive order under the Regulation or under analogous provisions in the past. It, however, observed that they have this in common that the purpose of both was the protection of the community as a whole, and in that sense, arrest in the course of civil proceedings, on principle, was wholly different from arrest on a criminal charge or arrest for the purpose of detention. It is on these grounds that the Committee came to the conclusion that the detention of Cap. Ramsay did not amount to any infringement of his privilege of freedom of speech. 17. A similar question had arisen in India in 1952. It appears that in the early hours of the morning of the 27th May, 1952, Mr. V.G. Deshpande, who was then a Member of Parliament,. was arrested and detained under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 the House was then in session; and a question was raised that the said arrest and detention of Mr. Deshpande, when the House was in session, amounted to a breach of the privilege of the House. The question thus raised was referred to the Committee of Privileges for its report. On the 9th July, 1952, the report made by the said Committee was submitted to the House. The majority view of the Committee was that the arrest of’ Mr. Deshpande under the Preventive Detention Act did not constitute a breach of the privilege of the House. In coming to this conclusion, the majority view rested itself primarily on the decision of the Committee of Privileges of the House of Commons in the case of Cap. Ramsay. It is thus plain that the validity of the arrest of the petitioners in the present proceedings cannot be provisions of Art. 105. That is why Mr. Setalvad naturally did not and could not press his case under the said Article. 18. What then is the true legal character of the rights on which’ Mr. Setalvad has founded his argument? They are not rights which can be properly described as constitutional rights of the Members of Parliament at all. The Articles on which Mr. Setalvad has rested his case clearly bring out this position. 18. What then is the true legal character of the rights on which’ Mr. Setalvad has founded his argument? They are not rights which can be properly described as constitutional rights of the Members of Parliament at all. The Articles on which Mr. Setalvad has rested his case clearly bring out this position. Article 79 deals with the constitution of Parliament and it has nothing to do with the individual rights of the Members of Parliament after they are elected. Articles 85 and 86 confer on the President the power to issue summons for the ensuing session of Parliament and to address either House of Parliament or both Houses as therein specified. These Articles cannot be construed to confer any right -as such on individual Members or impose any obligation on them. It is not as if a Member of Parliament is bound to attend the session, or is under an obligation to be present in the House when the President addresses it. The context in which these Articles appear shows that the subject-matter of these articles is not the individual rights of the Members of Parliament, but they refer to the right of the President to issue a summons for the ensuing session of Parliament or to address the House or Houses. 19. Then as to Art. 100(1) : what it provides is the manner in which questions will be determined; and it is not easy to see how the provision that all questions shall be determined by a majority of votes of Members present and voting, can give rise to -a constitutional right as such. The freedom of speech on which Mr. Setalvad lays considerable emphasis by reference to Art. 105(1) & (2), is a part of the privileges, of the Members of the House. It is no doubt a privilege of very great importance and significance, because the basis of democratic form of Government is that Members of Legislatures must be given absolute freedom of expression when matters brought before the Legislature are debated. Undoubtedly, the Members of Parliament have the privilege of freedom of speech, but that is only when they attend the session of the House and deliver their speech within the chamber itself. It will be recalled that in Cap. Ramsay’s case, what had been urged before the Committee of Privileges was that the detention of Cap. Undoubtedly, the Members of Parliament have the privilege of freedom of speech, but that is only when they attend the session of the House and deliver their speech within the chamber itself. It will be recalled that in Cap. Ramsay’s case, what had been urged before the Committee of Privileges was that the detention of Cap. Ramsay had caused a breach of privilege of his freedom of speech, and this plea was rejected by the Committee. We are, therefore, satisfied that on a close examination of the articles on which Mr. Setalvad has relied, the whole basis of his argument breaks down, because the rights which he calls constitutional rights are rights accruing to the Members of Parliament after they are elected, but they are not constitutional rights in, the. strict sense, and quite clearly, they are not fundamental rights at all. It may be that sometimes in discussing the significance or importance of the right of freedom of speech guaranteed by Art. 105 (1) & (2), it may have been described as a fundamental right; but the totality of rights on which Mr. Setalvad relies cannot claim the status of fundamental rights at all, and the freedom of speech on which so much reliance is placed, is a part of the privileges falling under Art. 105, and a plea that a breach has been committed of any of these privileges cannot, of course, be raised in view of the decision of the Committee of Privileges of the House of Commons to which we have just referred. Besides, the freedom of speech to which Art. 105 (1) and (2) refer, would be available to a Member of Parliament when he attends the session of the Parliament. If the order of detention validly prevents him from attending a session of Parliament, no occasion arises for the exercise of the right of freedom of speech and no complaint can be made that the said right has been invalidly invaded. 20. There is another aspect of this problem to which we would like to refer at this stage. Mr. Setalvad has urged that a Member of Parliament is entitled to exercise all his constitutional rights as such Member, unless he is disqualified and for the relevant disqualifications, he has referred to the provisions of Art. 102 of the Constitution and S. 7 of the Representation of the People Act. Mr. Setalvad has urged that a Member of Parliament is entitled to exercise all his constitutional rights as such Member, unless he is disqualified and for the relevant disqualifications, he has referred to the provisions of Art. 102 of the Constitution and S. 7 of the Representation of the People Act. Let us take a case falling under S. 7(b) of this Act. It will be recalled that S. 7(b) provides that if a person is convicted of any offence and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than two years, he would be disqualified for membership, unless a period of five years, or such less period as the Election Commission may allow in any particular case, has elapsed since his release. If a person is convicted of an offence and sentenced to less than two years, clearly such conviction and sentence would not entail disqualification. Can it be said that, a person who has been convicted of an offence and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for less than two years, is entitled to claim that notwithstanding the said order of conviction and sentence, he should be permitted to exercise his right as a legislator, because his conviction and sentence do not involve disqualification? It is true that the conviction of a person at the end of a trial is different from the detention of a person without a trial; but so far as their impact on the alleged constitutional rights of the Member of Parliament is concerned, there can be no distinction. If a person who is convicted and sentenced, has necessarily to forgo his right of participating in the business of the Legislature to which he belongs, because he is convicted and sentenced, it would follow that a person who is detained must likewise forgo his right to participate in the business of the Legislature. Therefore, the argument that so long as the Member of Parliament has not incurred any disqualification, he is entitled to exercise his rights as such Member, cannot be accepted. 21. Therefore, the argument that so long as the Member of Parliament has not incurred any disqualification, he is entitled to exercise his rights as such Member, cannot be accepted. 21. Besides, if the right on which the whole argument is based is not a fundamental right, it would be difficult to see how the validity of the Rule can be challenged on the ground that it permits an order of detention in respect of a Member of Parliament and as a result of the said order the Member of Parliament cannot participate in the business of Parliament. It appears that a similar question had arisen before the Madras and the Calcutta High Courts, and the decisions of these High Courts are in accord with the view which we are inclined to take in the present proceedings. In Pillalamarri Venkateswarlu vs. The District Magistrate, Guntur and Another (1), it was held by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court that a Member of the State Legislature cannot have immunity from arrest in the case of, a preventive detention order. Similarly, in the case of K. Ananda Nambiar (1), it was held by the Madras High Court that once a Member of a Legislative Assembly is arrested and lawfully detained, though without actual trial, under any Preventive Detention Act, there can be no doubt that under the law as it stands, he cannot be permitted to attend the sittings of the House. The true constitutional position, therefore, is that so far as a valid order of detention is concerned, a Member of Parliament can claim no special status higher than that of an ordinary citizen and is as much liable to be arrested and detained under it as any other citizen.” 14. The case was decided on the same arguments as has been raised herein. It was in reference to pari materia provision for Parliamentarian. Article 105 provides similar powers and privileges as provided under Article 194 of Constitution. The judgment gives complete answer to the question. 15. Looking to the aforesaid and in absence of any statutory provision or the provision in the Constitution to address the situation, as is obtaining herein, the direction sought by the petitioner cannot be given. The petition is accordingly dismissed.