JUDGMENT Ram Surat Ram (Maurya), J. 1. Heard Sri S.C. Tripathi, for the petitioner, and Sri D.K. Pandey, for the contesting respondents-2 to 4. The writ petition has been filed against the order of Deputy Director of Consolidation dated 19.11.2014 passed in chak allotment proceeding under U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). 2. The dispute between the parties is for allotment of chak on plot 144 of village Alishahpur, tahsil and district Jaunpur, which is original holding of respondents-2 to 4. The petitioner has filed CH Form-2-A of plot 144, which shows that settlement area of plot 144 was 0.073 hectare. Out of which an area of 0.043 hectare was agricultural land and its valuation was determined and from the stage of Assistant Consolidation Officer, it was allotted in the chaks of respondents-2 to 4, while an area of 0.020 hectare was found as abadi and by the order of Consolidation Officer, dated 1.8.2013 it was directed to be recorded in the names of respondents-2 to 4. There is no whisper in respect of remaining area of 0.010 hectare, in CH Form-2-A. Ram Bachan (chak-358) (the petitioner) filed a time barred objection (registered as case No. 100) under section 20 of the Act, on 28.1.2014, claiming for allotment of plot 144 in his chak by deleting his chak on plots 151, 153 and 154 and shifting the chaks of respondents-2 to 4 on plots 140 and 141. The Consolidation Officer, by order dated 12.2.2014 allowed the objection of the petitioner, condoning delay and allotted plots 144 (area 0.059 hectare) and 146 (area 0.002 hectare) in chak of the petitioner and plots 151, 153 and 154, in the chaks of respondents-2 to 4. 3. Mata Gulam (respondent-2) filed a time barred appeal (registered as Appeal No. 643), Arvind Kumar (re-spondent-3) filed a time barred appeal (registered as Appeal No. 644) and Ravindra Nath (respondent-4) filed a time barred appeal (registered as Appeal No. 645), from the aforesaid order. The appeals were heard by Settlement Officer Consolidation, who by separate orders dated 28.8.2014 held that the order of Consolidation Officer was based on compromise between the parties as plot 144 was near the abadi of Ram Bachan while plot 151 was near the abadi of respondents-2 to 4 as such no interference was required. On these findings, the appeals were dismissed. 4. On these findings, the appeals were dismissed. 4. Mata Gulam (respondent-2) filed a revision (registered as Revision No. 1577/224/2013-14), Arvind Kumar (respondent-3) filed a revision (registered as Revision Nos. 1578/225/2013-14) and Ravindra Nath (respondent-4) filed a revision (registered as Revision Nos. 1579/226/2013-14), from the aforesaid orders. These revisions were consolidated and heard by Deputy Director of Consolidation, who by order dated 19.11.2014, held that respondents-2 to 4 were proposed chaks on plot 144, which was their original holdings. Consolidation Officer by order dated 12.2.2014 allotted an uran chak to respondents-2 to 4, on plots 151, 153 and 154. Plot 145 was original holding of the petitioner, on which he was allotted chak, which was sufficient for extension of his abadi, while his chak on plots 151, 153 and 154 were also on his original holding and there was no illegality in the chak of the petitioner. On these findings, the revisions were allowed and chaks of the petitioner and respondents-2 to 4 of stage of Assistant Consolidation Officer were restored. Hence this writ petition has been filed. 5. The Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the revisions were filed on 11.9.2014, which were directed to be registered on that day. Deena Nath, one of the opposite party in all the three revisions had already died before filing of the revisions. The order-sheet shows that on 18.11.2014, arguments were heard and spot inspection was made and on 19.8.2014, order was pronounced. There was no order, relating to summoning of Lower Court Record. Under section 48(1) of the Act, it was mandatory for Deputy Director of Consolidation to summon the Lower Court Record, before hearing the revision as held by this Court in Shankar v. ADC and others 1993 RD 5, Ram Naresh v. DDC and others 1997 (88) RD 389 and Writ-B No. 55253 of 2014, Ram Chandra v. DDC and others, (decided on 12.12.2014). Sequence of the order sheet dated 18.11.2014 as noted by Deputy Director of Consolidation, shows that arguments were heard first and then spot inspection was made. This Court in Ramdeo v. DDC and others 1980 RD 324, held that if after hearing the arguments, spot inspection was made, then hearing before spot inspection stands nullified, Deputy Director of Consolidation was required to hear fresh arguments after spot inspection. This Court in Ramdeo v. DDC and others 1980 RD 324, held that if after hearing the arguments, spot inspection was made, then hearing before spot inspection stands nullified, Deputy Director of Consolidation was required to hear fresh arguments after spot inspection. Deputy Director of Consolidation in the Spot Inspection Memo noted that western side of plot 144, respondents-2 to 4 have a tin shed construction and one hand pump and one Tullu pump. This new fact has been noticed and relied upon for passing the impugned order, without giving any opportunity to the petitioner to rebut/explain it. The principle of natural justice requires that the petitioner would have been given reasonable opportunity of rebuttal of new evidence/material. Deputy Director of Consolidation has not set aside the orders of Consolidation Officer and Settlement Officer Consolidation by the impugned, he merely allowed the revision. Division Bench of this Court, in Tirath v. JDC and others 1985 RD 276 (DB), held that unless the order of subordinate authorities are specifically set aside, revisional authority would not be entitled to give a different conclusion on merit. The aforesaid judgments are binding upon this Bench, if this Court does not agree with the aforesaid precedents, then judicial decorum and propriety requires to refer the issue for consideration of larger Bench as held by Supreme Court in Shri Bhagwan v. Ram Chand AIR 1965 SC 1767 . Order of respondent-1 is illegal and liable to be set aside. 6. I have considered the arguments of the Counsel for the parties and examined the record. The Courts are constituted to decide the dispute between the parties. The different statutes prescribe the norms and limit for exercising jurisdiction, of different Courts. Primary object of the Court is to ensure justice between the parties, within the limits of its jurisdiction. Writ jurisdiction of High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is an extraordinary supervisory jurisdiction. For exercising writ jurisdiction, High Court has to primarily satisfy as to whether there was miscarriage of justice against the petitioner. Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. District Judge Unnao AIR 1984 SC 1401 , and Roshan Deen v. Preeti Lal AIR 2002 SC 33 , held that the power conferred on the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is to advance justice and not to thwart it. Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. District Judge Unnao AIR 1984 SC 1401 , and Roshan Deen v. Preeti Lal AIR 2002 SC 33 , held that the power conferred on the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is to advance justice and not to thwart it. The very purpose of such Constitutional powers being conferred on the High Courts is that no man should be subjected to injustice by violating law. The look out of the High Court is, therefore, not merely to pick out any error of law through an academic angle but to see whether injustice has resulted on account of any erroneous interpretation of law. If justice become by-product of an erroneous view of law, the High Court is not expected to erase such justice in the name of correcting the error of law. In Mohammad Swaleh v. II Addl. District Judge and others AIR 1988 SC 94 , and Ramesh Chandra Sankla v. Vikram Cement (2008) 14 SCC 58 , it has been held that writ jurisdiction cannot be exercised for restoring illegal orders. 7. In light of aforementioned norms and limits, it has to be examined that what injustice has been done to the petitioner by the order of Deputy Director of Consolidation? Admittedly, plot 144 area (0.073 hectare) was original holding of respondents-2 to 4 on which from initial stage of Assistant Consolidation Officer, respondents-2 to 4 were allotted chaks. The petitioner did not file objection against the allotment within time prescribed under section 20 of the Act. The petitioner filed a highly time barred objection under section 20 of the Act, on 28.1.2014, which was allowed by the order of Consolidation Officer, dated 12.2.2014, condoning delay i.e. within 15 days. In the objection, the petitioner has stated that plot 144 was adjacent to his house while plots 140 and 141 were adjacent to the houses of respondents-2 to 4. Against it, Consolidation Officer allotted plots 151, 153 and 155 to respondents-2 to 4. Settlement Officer Consolidation, against the own case of the petitioner held that plots 151, 153 and 155 were adjacent to the houses of respondents-2 to 4. There is nothing on record to show that there was any compromise before Consolidation Officer but Settlement Officer Consolidation held that order of Consolidation Officer was based on compromise between the parties. Settlement Officer Consolidation, against the own case of the petitioner held that plots 151, 153 and 155 were adjacent to the houses of respondents-2 to 4. There is nothing on record to show that there was any compromise before Consolidation Officer but Settlement Officer Consolidation held that order of Consolidation Officer was based on compromise between the parties. Thus respondents-2 to 4 have been deprived on their original holding in most arbitrary and illegal manner. 8. Deputy Director of Consolidation, in Spot Inspection Memo, has noticed that plot 144 situated on Allahabad to Jaunpur, which is a State High Way. This fact has not been challenged by the petitioner. The petitioner only objects the fact of noticing of tin shed construction and one hand pump and one Tullu pump in plots 144 and belonging these things to respondents-2 to 4 but this denial is also false as from CH Form-2-A, filed by the petitioner, it is proved that respondents-2 to 4 had their abadi over an area of 0.020 hectare of plot 144. Thus plot 144 is a roadside land situate on a State High Way. It has been noticed that land situates on Highways have special commercial value, which cannot be equated with the other agricultural land of the village with its ratio value as determined for allotment of chaks. The Consolidation Commissioner issued a Circular for allotting roadside land to the original tenure holder or keeping it as chak out. This Court also, in Parvez Ahmad v. JDC 1995 (13) LCD 1183, Mukut Nath v. DDC 1998 RD 148, Dina Nath Tiwari v. DDC 2000 RD 385 (HC), Damodar v. DDC 2004 (96) RD 290, and several other cases have held that for allotting roadside land to the original tenure holder or keeping it as chak out. Ignoring the Circular of Consolidation Commissioner U.P. and settled principle in several judgments, Consolidation Officer and Settlement Officer Consolidation have deprived respondents-2 to 4 of their original holdings, abadi etc. on roadside land. Deputy Director of Consolidation has not committed any illegality in setting aside the orders of Consolidation Officer and Settlement Officer Consolidation and doing justice to respondents-2 to 4. Thus in view of judgments of Supreme Court, it is not proper for this Court to restore illegal and unjust order. 9. on roadside land. Deputy Director of Consolidation has not committed any illegality in setting aside the orders of Consolidation Officer and Settlement Officer Consolidation and doing justice to respondents-2 to 4. Thus in view of judgments of Supreme Court, it is not proper for this Court to restore illegal and unjust order. 9. Section 48(1) of the Act, which confers revisional jurisdiction to Deputy Director of Consolidation, relevant part of which, is quoted below "Section 48-Revision and Reference.--(1) Deputy Director of Consolidation may call for and examine the record of any case decided or proceedings taken by any subordinate authority for the purposes of satisfying himself as the regularity of the proceedings; or as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any order, other than interlocutory order, passed by such authority in the case or proceeding, may after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, make such order in the case or proceedings as he thinks fit." 10. In view of Explanation (3) to section 48 and also held by Supreme Court in Sheo Nand v. DDC and others AIR 2000 SC 1141 , and Gulzar Singh v. DDC and others (2009) 12 SCC 590 , Deputy Director of Consolidation is competent to re-appreciate entire evidence on record and record his own independent findings of fact. For exercising of jurisdiction under section 48, Deputy Director of Consolidation is required to call for and examine the record of any case decided or proceedings taken by any subordinate authority and allow the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard. Deputy Director of Consolidation, in the impugned order has noticed of examining village record and map. The orders of Consolidation Officer and Settlement Officer Consolidation have been filed along with memorandum of revision. For deciding chak allotment dispute, these were essential records, which were examined. The petitioner has not pointed out that due to non-consideration of any other document of record, illegal order was passed. In the absence of any material prejudice, being caused in this respect, this Court will not be justified to interfere in the matter and restore illegal orders. 11. Now arguments raised by the Counsel for the petitioner on the basis of case law in Ramdeo v. D.D.C. and others 1980 RD 324, has to be considered. The procedure for disposal of chak objection has been provided under section 21 of the Act. 11. Now arguments raised by the Counsel for the petitioner on the basis of case law in Ramdeo v. D.D.C. and others 1980 RD 324, has to be considered. The procedure for disposal of chak objection has been provided under section 21 of the Act. Section 21(3) of the Act, provides that the Consolidation Officer shall, before deciding the objections and the Settlement Officer Consolidation, may before deciding an appeal, make local inspection of the plots in dispute after notice to the parties concerned and the Consolidation Committee. Similar provision has been given under section 9-B(2) of the Act, for spot inspection for disposal of objections against Statement of Principles. Rules 24-D and 26(5) of U.P.C.H. Rules, 1954 provides that for deciding dispute relating to determination of exchange ratio of a plot or the valuation of a tree, well or other improvement existing on a plot, the Consolidation Officer shall make a local inspection of the plot concerned, prepare and inspection memo and place it on the concern file. By virtue of section 44-A of the Act, Deputy Director of Consolidation can also exercise these powers in his discretion. However this Court has taken view that there is no statutory compulsion for Deputy Director of Consolidation for spot inspection, while deciding the revision. 12. The purpose of local inspection is to properly appreciate the arguments of the parties made on the basis evidence already recorded during the trial and not to collect fresh evidence. In this case, the dispute between the parties was for allotment of chak on plot 144, which was claimed by the petitioner on the ground that it was adjacent to his house on plot 145 and will be useful for extension of his abadi, while respon-dents-2 to 4 claimed it on the ground that it was their original holding situated by the side of State High Way and they have also their abadi on it, which has already been recorded in CH Form-2-A. For verifying the aforesaid claims, spot inspection was necessitated and done. In this case arguments were heard by Deputy Director of Consolidation on 18.10.2014. On that very day he made spot inspection and fix 19.10.2014 for delivery of judgment. In this case arguments were heard by Deputy Director of Consolidation on 18.10.2014. On that very day he made spot inspection and fix 19.10.2014 for delivery of judgment. Although the petitioner objects the fact of noticing of tin shed construction and one hand pump and one Tullu pump in plots 144 and belonging these things of respondents-2 to 4 but this denial is false as from CH Form-2-A, filed by the petitioner, it is proved that respondents-2 to 4 had their abadi over an area of 0.020 hectare of plot 144. Nothing new was noticed/considered by Deputy Director of Consolidation at the time of spot inspection, which requires fresh hearing. Respon-dent-1, in his order found that the petitioner has sufficient land in plot 145 for extension of his abadi while chaks of respondents-2 to 4 on plots 151, 153 and 154 were uran chaks. This Court in Amarjit Singh v. Assistant Director of Consolidation and others1998 (89) RD 231, held that in case during spot inspection, no fresh material has been found/relied upon in the judgment by Deputy Director of Consolidation, then he was not require to hear the arguments afresh after spot inspection and ratio of Ramdeo v. D.D.C. and others 1980 RD 324, has been distinguished. 13. Similar provisions for spot inspection in other statute and the view of Apex Court in this respect may also be examined to appreciate the ratio of Ramdeo's Case (supra). Order XVIII Rule 18 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 contains provisions for local inspection by the Court as follows "Order XVIII Rule 18.--Power of Court to inspect.--The Court may at any stage of a suit inspect any property or thing concerning which any question may arise and where the Court inspects any property or thing it shall, as soon as may be practicable, make a memorandum of any relevant facts observed at such inspection and such memorandum shall form a part of the record of the suit." 14. Supreme Court in Ugamsingh and Mishrimal v. Kesrimal AIR 1971 SC 2540 , held that "the judgment in our view is not based solely on the result of personal inspection made by the Trial Judge, which inspection was for the purposes of understanding the evidence in the case and has been so used by the Trial Judge. Supreme Court in Ugamsingh and Mishrimal v. Kesrimal AIR 1971 SC 2540 , held that "the judgment in our view is not based solely on the result of personal inspection made by the Trial Judge, which inspection was for the purposes of understanding the evidence in the case and has been so used by the Trial Judge. We must therefore, reject the contention of the learned Advocate for the appellants that the finding in respect of the idol is vitiated." 15. Section 310 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 contains similar provision for spot inspection, which is quoted below "310. Local inspection.--(1) Any Judge or Magistrate may, at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding, after due notice to the parties, visit and inspect any place in which an offence is alleged to have been committed, or any other place which it is in his opinion necessary to view for the purpose of properly appreciating the evidence given at such inquiry or trial, and shall without unnecessary delay record a memorandum of any relevant facts observed at such inspection. (2) Such memorandum shall form part of the record of the case and if the prosecutor, complainant or accused or any other party to the case, so desires, a copy of the memorandum shall be furnished to him free of cost." 16. Supreme Court in State of H.P. v. Mast Ram 2004 (23) AIC 326 (SC) : AIR 2004 SC 5056 , has held that "apart, the local inspection envisaged under section 310 Cr.P.C. is for the purpose of properly appreciating the evidence already recorded during the trial. Memorandum of spot inspection recorded by the trial Judge has to be appreciated in conjunction with the evidence already recorded. Any omission and/or commission in the memorandum recorded by the trial Judge by itself would not constitute material irregularity, which would vitiate the prosecution case." 17. Supreme Court in Shadilal Gupta v. State of Punjab (1973) 1 SCC 680 , has held that "what is urged before us in this case is that as the report of the Treasury Officer, which we have already referred to earlier, was taken into consideration without showing it to the appellant he has been seriously prejudiced and the principles of natural justice have been violated insofar as he has not had an opportunity of making his representation in respect of that report. We find no substance in this contention. When Shri Banwari Lal wanted a local inquiry to be made he apparently wanted the representation made by the appellant to be checked up with the records and that is what has been done as is clear from a comparison of the allegations on the basis of which the charge-sheet was served on the petitioner, and the report of the Treasury Officer. We have carefully gone through it and it does not add one single instance more than what is already found in the allegations. It merely sets out the evidence in support of these allegations. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the appellant has not been in any way prejudiced by the Treasury Officer's report being taken into consideration before the order of punishment was passed against the petitioner. If before the Treasury Officer had sent his report he had associated the appellant in the inquiry he held it would not have been necessary to give him a copy of the report he sent. If the report had contained any material extraneous to the charges against the appellant, or any thing in addition to what is found in the original allegations against him then only he could be said to have been prejudiced. There is no question in this case of the Treasury Officer's report having prejudiced the punishing officer, Mr. D.D. Sharma. The application of the principles of natural justice is not a question of observance of a formula or a mere technicality. In essence it is meant to assure that the party concerned has an opportunity of being heard, the principle of audi alteram partem. Whether in any particular case it has been violated will depend on the facts and circumstances of that case. It is not to be considered that unless all the procedure of the Courts are observed it would mean failure to observe the principles of natural justice. We are of the opinion that no principles of natural justice have been violated in this case." 18. Thus view expressed in Ramdeo's case (supra) that if after arguments, spot inspection was made then earlier arguments stands nullified is contrary to principle laid down by Supreme Court, in aforementioned cases as the only purpose of spot inspection is to test the correctness of the arguments and to appreciate the evidence on record more properly. Thus view expressed in Ramdeo's case (supra) that if after arguments, spot inspection was made then earlier arguments stands nullified is contrary to principle laid down by Supreme Court, in aforementioned cases as the only purpose of spot inspection is to test the correctness of the arguments and to appreciate the evidence on record more properly. Violation of principles of natural justice cannot be inferred merely on the ground that Deputy Director of Consolidation has not heard arguments again after local inspection. In view of the contrary judgments of Supreme Court, the judgment in Ramdeo's case (supra) has no binding precedent. 19. A previous judgment of coordinate or larger Bench is binding precedent. The judicial decorum and propriety requires to follow the precedent. Another situation is where previous judgment of co-ordinate Bench of High Court is contrary to judgment of Supreme Court (previous and later both), then the judgment of Supreme Court has to be followed and not the contrary judgment of High Court. A Constitution Bench of Supreme Court in Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corpn. Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court 1990 (61) FLR 73 (SC), held that this reminds us of the words of Lord Hailsham of Marylebone, the Lord Chancellor, "in the hierarchical system of Courts which exists in this country, it is necessary for each lower tier... to accept loyally the decisions of the higher tiers". 20. Doctrine of "Per incuriam" has also been through out accepted. Larger Bench of Supreme Court in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak AIR 1988 SC 1531 : 1988 (25) ACC 448 (Sum.), held that "Per incuriam" are those decisions given in ignorance or forgetfulness of some inconsistent statutory provision, or of some authority binding on the Court concerned, so that in such cases some part of the decision or some step in the reasoning on which it is based, is found, on that account to be demonstrably wrong. In case any judgment is "Per-incuriam" then it has also no binding precedent. In V. Kishan Rao v. Nikhil Super Speciality Hospital (2010) 5 SCC 513 , it was held that when a judgment is rendered by ignoring the provisions of the governing statute and earlier larger Bench decision on the point such decisions are rendered per incuriam. 21. In case any judgment is "Per-incuriam" then it has also no binding precedent. In V. Kishan Rao v. Nikhil Super Speciality Hospital (2010) 5 SCC 513 , it was held that when a judgment is rendered by ignoring the provisions of the governing statute and earlier larger Bench decision on the point such decisions are rendered per incuriam. 21. So far as Division Bench judgment, in Tirath v. JDC and others 1985 RD 276 (DB), is concerned, in that case, the order dismissing the appeal as time barred was challenged, in the revision, which has been allowed on merit also. High Court held that in case, revision was allowed then matter ought to have been remanded to appellate Court for deciding the appeal on merit in stead of deciding the entire case on merit. This judgment has no application in this case. In this case, the appeals were dismissed on merit. So far as the arguments that orders of Consolidation Officer and Settlement Officer Consolidation were not specifically set aside is concerned, the revision was allowed and chaks of the parties of the stage of Assistant Consolidation Officer has been maintained. The orders of Consolidation Officer and Settlement Officer Consolidation are deemed to have been set aside. This is merely inadvertent mistake. Similarly, death of Deena Nath, a proforma party has also no effect. The petitioner was only contesting party and he has been fully heard as such no prejudice has been caused to him. In view of the aforesaid discussions, writ petitions has no merit and is dismissed.