JUDGMENT : Heard the learned Counsel for the plaintiffs and the learned Counsel for the defendants. 2. The petition for grant of probate of the Will of late Mrs. Pattamada Bhojamma Chengappa (hereinafter referred to as 'Mrs. Chengappa', for brevity), is converted into a testamentary suit, in view of the respondents having entered caveat. The first plaintiff was the eldest daughter of late Mrs. Chengappa and the second plaintiff was her husband. Mrs. Chengappa is, said to have died on 3-6-2001, at No. 3, John Armstrong Road, Richards Town, Bengaluru. A copy of the death certificate is produced. The writing annexed and marked with the letter 'A' to the plaint is claimed to be the last Will and testament of Mrs. Chengappa dated 22-5-1998 and is stated to be duly executed by her in the presence of witnesses, whose names appear at the foot of the Will. In the Will, the plaintiffs are appointed as executors of the Will. Mrs. Chengappa was married to one P.M. Chengappa, who died as on 11-11-1970. Mrs. Chengappa was the owner of property bearing No. 3, John Armstrong Road, Bengaluru and was living in the said property even during the lifetime of her husband and resided there till her death. She had two daughters and a son namely, Cauvery Belliappa-the first plaintiff herein, Saraswathi and P.A. Chengappa-the third defendant. Saraswathi was no more as she had died in a road accident in April 1997. She had one son by name B.B. Chengappa and a daughter by name Harini. Saraswathi was residing in her matrimonial home with his husband B.C. Bopanna after her marriage dated 28-4-1961. They were residing at Kutta in Coorg and Bopanna had an estate of his own. The first plaintiff along with her husband, had started residing with Mrs. Chengappa after retirement of plaintiff 2 from service with the Indian Railways from the year 1984 onwards. The plaintiffs had two children Urmila and Arjun. Urmila's husband Ganapathy was a squadron leader and he had died in the year 1977 and their children Karthik and Pavan were aged 3 and 2 years, respectively, at that point of time. The children stayed along with the plaintiffs and their great grandmother, Mrs. Chengappa in the above property. Since their mother had abandoned them and migrated to United States of America and was not heard of, the children were taken care of by Mrs. Chengappa. The children stayed along with the plaintiffs and their great grandmother, Mrs. Chengappa in the above property. Since their mother had abandoned them and migrated to United States of America and was not heard of, the children were taken care of by Mrs. Chengappa. The first defendant is B.B. Chengappa was the husband of Saraswathi, the daughter of Mrs. Chengappa. Saraswathi was no more, as she along with her daughter Harini had died in a car accident. Harini had two children, Kanchana and Ashish. Kanchana had also died in the same car accident. The genealogical tree, annexed to the plaint, is as follows: It is the case of the plaintiffs that Mrs. Chengappa, under a Will, had appointed them as the executors. She was the owner of the above mentioned property and there were certain ICICI Savings Bonds valued at Rs. 5,000/- standing in the joint names of Mrs. Chengappa and the first plaintiff and apart from it, there were certain movables. In her Will, she had provided that property bearing No. 3, John Armstrong Road, Richards Town, be disposed of within five years from the date of her death and out of the proceeds, 35% was to be given to the first plaintiff, 33% to her son P.A. Chengappa, the third defendant, 16% to her grandson B.B. Chengappa, the first defendant and 16% to her great grandchildren, Karthik and Pavan, defendants 4 and 5. She had further bequeathed her investments, which were in the joint names and in respect of which, there was a nomination to her daughter, the first plaintiff. The Will is duly executed and attested by two witnesses namely, Mr. Anthony Da Costa and Keith D' Souza. After the death of Mrs. Chengappa a copy of the Will is said to have been sent to all the family members to keep them informed, at which point of time, B.B. Chengappa and I.C. Bopanna had disputed the Will and contended that Mrs. Chengappa had executed a Will dated 17-11-1971 and a codicil dated 24-11-1983, according to which, she had bequeathed the immovable property in favour of her children, namely, the first plaintiff, the third defendant, and the deceased Saraswathi equally. Chengappa had executed a Will dated 17-11-1971 and a codicil dated 24-11-1983, according to which, she had bequeathed the immovable property in favour of her children, namely, the first plaintiff, the third defendant, and the deceased Saraswathi equally. On behalf of the first plaintiff, a letter dated 4-12-2001 was addressed to defendants 1 and 2 through her Counsel denying the existence or execution of such codicil and further, seeking a copy of the said Will, to which defendants 1 and 2 through their Counsel, had replied contending that the Will dated 17-11-1971 was in the custody of M/s. State Bank of India (hereinafter referred to as the 'SBI' for brevity), St. Marks Road Branch, Bengaluru and had sent a copy of the codicil dated 24-11-1983. The plaintiffs however denied the execution of such a Will or codicil and in any event, the Will dated 22-5-1998 being the last Will and testament, it was contended that the last Will and testament dated 22-5-1998 superseded any other Will and takes effect upon her death. Since in view of the objection raised by the defendants, the plaintiffs had no choice, but to seek probate of the Will dated 22-5-1998 while declaring that insofar as the tax saving bonds referred to earlier were concerned, the same had been transferred to the first plaintiff and have been redeemed as on 24-3-2003. It was further stated that the value of the assets do not exceed in the aggregate a sum of Rs. 1 Crore and the net value of the said assets after deducting all the items which the executor was entitled in law to deduct, was under value of Rs. 1 Crore. The plaintiffs undertook to duly administer the property and credits of Mrs. Chengappa and to make a full and true inventory thereof and exhibit the same before this Court within a period of six months from the date of grant of probate. Respondents 1 and 2 have filed statement of objections. The respondents contended that the Will set up by the plaintiffs was fabricated one and it was not in dispute that the petitioners and the respondents were closely related. In that, the mother of respondent 1, plaintiff 1, and respondent 3 were the children of Mrs. Chengappa. The first respondent claimed that he had come to Bengaluru on 16-1-1977 and was staying with Mrs. Chengappa and her husband and was attending school. In that, the mother of respondent 1, plaintiff 1, and respondent 3 were the children of Mrs. Chengappa. The first respondent claimed that he had come to Bengaluru on 16-1-1977 and was staying with Mrs. Chengappa and her husband and was attending school. After Mrs. Chengappa passed away in the year 1970, Harini, the sister of the first respondent is said to have joined them at Bengaluru and started living with Mrs. Chengappa and she was also attending school. The first respondent and Harini joined Clarence High School, which was opposite the house of Mrs. Chengappa and during school vacation, Mrs. Chengappa would accompany her grandchildren namely, B.B. Chengappa and Harini to Kutta to spend vacation with her daughter's family. After the death of her husband, Mrs. Chengappa even became closer to the first respondent's family and would spend long vacations with her daughter Saraswathi's family. It is claimed that after the death of the husband of Mrs. Chengappa, she had executed a Will dated 17-11-1971, which finds reference in the codicil dated 24-11-1983. The father of the first respondent was B.C. Bopanna, who was more close to Mrs. Chengappa and she had reposed utmost faith in him and she would divulge and discuss all financial and family matters and B.C. Bopanna was staying in his estate at Kutta, Coorg District. She had expressed her desire and intention to execute a codicil on her visit to Kutta and it was in that background, that a codicil was executed to be along with her original Will, in safe custody with SBI, St. Marks Road Branch, Bengaluru. After the execution of the codicil, which was kept in safe custody, the Manager, SBI, Bengaluru, had written a letter to Mrs. Chengappa acknowledging receipt of codicil along with its enclosures. Later, B.C. Bopanna instructions from Mrs. Chengappa, had handed over a sale deed to be SIC in safe custody in the Bank along with the Will. A provisional receipt was issued by SBI, acknowledging receipt of the sale deed kept in the safe custody. It was stated that the codicil dated 24-11-1983 provides for certain arrangements to be made in respect of the property. Chengappa, had handed over a sale deed to be SIC in safe custody in the Bank along with the Will. A provisional receipt was issued by SBI, acknowledging receipt of the sale deed kept in the safe custody. It was stated that the codicil dated 24-11-1983 provides for certain arrangements to be made in respect of the property. It is evident that in the codicil, the testatrix desired that the bungalow, namely, No. 3, John Armstrong Road, Bengaluru be offered to the first plaintiff as a first option purchase and if in the event she is not willing, offer be made to her son P.A. Chengappa, also known as Thammi and if he refuses, then the offer should be made to the mother of the first respondent-Saraswathi Bopanna. The price was to be fixed by the executor in relation to the reasonable market price and if none of her children desire to purchase the bungalow, it should be sold in open market and the amount distributed towards her son and daughters equally. It was stated that Mrs. Chengappa was seriously ill in the year 1997 and she was admitted to St. Martha's Hospital, Bengaluru. She was suffering from respiratory problems and was very weak and was not in a position to recognise people or understand things. It is at that point of time that Saraswathi, her daughter and her husband had come from Coorg and with the assistance of Dr. Bopanna and Smt. Harini, she was shifted to St. Martha's Hospital, Bengaluru and Saraswathi Bopanna stayed back and nursed her mother and only thereafter, she had left for Coorg. The first respondent regularly visited Mrs. Chengappa and on all such visits, he would take Ashish, the orphaned son of Harini and Mrs. Chengappa would, on each occasion, become emotional on seeing Ashish. And in any event, after her illness in the year 1997, her physical and mental condition deteriorated and till her death, there was no sign of improvement. The second respondent, as already stated, was orphaned after his father, mother and sister died in a road accident and as per the Will of Mrs. Chengappa and her third codicil, the property was to be divided equally between the daughters and son, in which event, respondent 1, Ashish would have been entitled to the share of his grandmother Saraswathi. The second respondent, as already stated, was orphaned after his father, mother and sister died in a road accident and as per the Will of Mrs. Chengappa and her third codicil, the property was to be divided equally between the daughters and son, in which event, respondent 1, Ashish would have been entitled to the share of his grandmother Saraswathi. However, by virtue of the present Will set up by the plaintiffs, he is deprived of a share that could have fallen to him. It was therefore the case of the defendants that the plaintiffs had manipulated and created the said last Will and testament set up by them, which was cleverly engineered to deprive Ashish of his legitimate share, which he would have got in terms of the earlier Will and codicil of Mrs. Chengappa. It is emphasised by the respondents that the Will is fabricated and is not genuine. This is also evident from the fact that Mrs. Chengappa equally loved all her children and showered her affection on them and especially towards the second respondent after the tragic death of his mother, grandmother, grandfather and his sister and therefore she had been drawn to the child on account of his helpless state and therefore the said Ashish being completely disinherited in the Will now set up by the plaintiffs, is unnatural and suspicious and clearly points to the mischievous act on the part of the plaintiffs in having taken advantage of the failing mental and physical health of Mrs. Chengappa in having got such Will executed. It is in this vein that the plaint averments are sought to be denied and refuted. On the basis of these pleadings, this Court had framed the following issue. - "(i) Whether the plaintiffs prove that Mrs. Pattamada Bojamma Chengappa while she was in a sound state of mind, duly executed the Will dated 22-5-1998 and that it is the last Will executed by her and that the plaintiffs are entitled to probate as sought for in the suit?" Since no counter claim was made seeking probate on the basis of the Will dated 17-11-1971 and codicil dated 24-11-1983, this Court did not deem it fit to frame the issues on the basis of the contentions taken in the written statement of the defendants. The evidence having been tendered on the part of the plaintiffs as well as the defendants, the Counsel for the parties were heard at length. The learned Counsel for the plaintiffs would point out that insofar as the proof of Will is concerned, the Court is required to embark on the same inquiry as in the case of proof of any other document. The propounder would be required to show by satisfactory evidence that the Will was signed by the testator, that the testator at the relevant point of time was in a sound and disposing state of mind, that he or she understood the nature and effect of dispositions and has put her signature to the document of her own free Will and as long as such evidence adduced in support of the Will is satisfactory and sufficient to prove the sound and disposing state of the testatrix's mind and her signature, as required by law, there is no impediment in finding in favour of the propounder. In other words, the onus on the propounder can be taken to be discharged on proof of the essential facts, as indicated. In the present case on hand, he would point out that the Will being duly signed Mrs. Chengappa is not in dispute. The Will is attested by two witnesses namely, Dr. Keith D'Souza, who was admittedly the family physician of late Mrs. Chengappa and by the scribe himself, who has acted as the second attesting witness. Both these witnesses have been examined and they are independent witnesses with unimpeachable integrity. The scribe, who was an Advocate and notary public, has stated the circumstances under which his services as an Advocate were drawn by Mrs. Chengappa, who had discussed the terms of the Will and on her instructions, a draft having been prepared and the same having been approved, was later finalised and duly executed by her in the presence of two attesting witnesses who had affixed their signature in the presence of each other and in the presence of the testatrix. This is stated in expressed terms under the Will and the witnesses having endorsed the same before the Court is adequate proof of the Will and the requirement of law is satisfied by the said evidence. This is stated in expressed terms under the Will and the witnesses having endorsed the same before the Court is adequate proof of the Will and the requirement of law is satisfied by the said evidence. Notwithstanding that this Court has not chosen to frame any issues on the basis of contentions, taken by the defendants, as regards the existence of yet another Will of the year 1971 and a codicil of the year 1983, the fact remains that with the execution of the last Will and testament and the same having been proved, it is well-settled that any earlier Will and codicil would stand effaced by the last such Will and testament and in the present situation, there is no requirement in law that the last Will and testament should refer to any such earlier Will and codicil by date and subsequent revocation of the same. The last Will and testament now produced in so many express words has indicated that all the former Wills and codicils and testamentary dispositions stand replaced and revoked by the last Will and testament now sought to be probated and therefore would submit that the probate be granted notwithstanding the several objections raised or so-called suspicious circumstances sought to be alleged. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the defendants would point out that several suspicious circumstances which are canvassed would require to be removed by the propounder notwithstanding the claim that the Will is proved in accordance with law. Even insofar as the proof of the Will is concerned, he would point out that Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 requires a Will to be attested by two witnesses. In the present case on hand, it cannot be said that the Will is attested by two witnesses. Though Dr. Keith D'Souza has acted as an attesting witness the notary Anthony Da Costa was not acting as an attesting witness but was a merely a scribe. It is well-settled that a scribe cannot act as an attesting witness. In the present case on hand, it cannot be said that the Will is attested by two witnesses. Though Dr. Keith D'Souza has acted as an attesting witness the notary Anthony Da Costa was not acting as an attesting witness but was a merely a scribe. It is well-settled that a scribe cannot act as an attesting witness. In this regard, the learned Counsel places reliance on two decisions, namely, N. Kamalam (dead) v. Ayyaswamy AIR 2001 SC 2802 : (2001 )7 SCC 503 and Janki Narayan Bhoir v. Narayan Namdeo Kadam AIR 2003 SC 761 : (2003) 2 SCC 91 , to assert that an attesting witness must be proven by evidence to have animo attestandi or animus or intent to attest and only then the signature of such witness stand up as a complete attestation of the Will and therefore, a scribe merely attesting his signature to the Will would not make it that of an attesting witness. Therefore, it is contended that it cannot be said that the Will has been proved in accordance with law in the absence of a second attesting witness to the Will, which is a mandatory requirement in law. Nextly, it is pointed out that there is no dispute that there was an earlier Will of the year 1971 and several codicils to the Will including the one effected in the year 1983. It is also not in dispute that the same were kept in safe custody with SBI. It is also brought on record that the said Will and codicil were removed from the safe custody of SBI by plaintiff 2 and he has duly signed the acknowledgement on receipt of the said codicil and Will. However, there is no reference made to the codicil and Will in the plaint and there is no reference to the same having been withdrawn from the safe custody of the bank and the circumstances under which such withdrawal had taken place. When the witness was confronted with the evidence of such endorsements issued to the bank in receiving the documents from the safe custody, the plaintiff had feigned ignorance, but had not denied that he had taken back such Will and codicil. When the witness was confronted with the evidence of such endorsements issued to the bank in receiving the documents from the safe custody, the plaintiff had feigned ignorance, but had not denied that he had taken back such Will and codicil. This was clearly a suspicious circumstance which has gone unnoticed in the plaintiffs having willfully concealed the existence of an earlier Will and codicil and which was a clear pointer to the plaintiff seeking to set up the present Will and testament in the place of the earlier Will and testament, which clearly deprives some of the beneficiaries under the earlier Will and codicil of properties of late Mrs. Chengappa. Further, even if the Will and codicil now set up by the plaintiffs is to be accepted, the suspicion that arises is the non-mentioning of the earlier Will and codicil. As seen from the tenor of the earlier codicil, Mrs. Chengappa was particular, by referring to the Will and earlier codicils made and it would be expected that in the latest Will and testament now set up by the plaintiffs, there would be reference to and reasons for revoking the earlier Will and codicil and in the absence of any such explanation, the summary revocation of the earlier Will and codicil, raises a serious suspicion about the genuineness and the clear intention of the testatrix, unless she was compelled by undue influence brought upon her by the plaintiffs, who admittedly were residing along with Mrs. Chengappa for 17 long years much against her wish and intention. Nextly, it is pointed out that it is admitted in evidence that plaintiff 2 had taken active part in Mrs. Chengappa executing the so-called last Will and testament and Exhibit P. 3 is said to be a note made by Mrs. Chengappa in her own hand, indicating the changes that she would like to make to her earlier Will and codicils, which according to plaintiff 2, was not immediately acted upon, but after several months, when he had visited P.W. 3, who in turn had expressed that he would contact Mrs. Chengappa in her own hand, indicating the changes that she would like to make to her earlier Will and codicils, which according to plaintiff 2, was not immediately acted upon, but after several months, when he had visited P.W. 3, who in turn had expressed that he would contact Mrs. Chengappa and obtain instructions from her in preparing the last Will and testament and since the last Will and testament now prepared is also not in consonance with the written instructions, Exhibit P. 3, there was clearly mischief afoot in the plaintiffs having exercised undue influence in having taken advantage of the old age and infirmity of Mrs. Chengappa in having got the Will executed to their benefit. Therefore, active participation in having got the Will prepared and the major benefit which the plaintiffs derive is clearly a suspicious circumstance of Mrs. Chengappa being made to act against her original intention, as disclosed in her earlier Will. Further, dispositions made under the Will are also unnatural. It was clear that she equally loved all her children and grandchildren and she would want equitable distribution of her estate amongst all her children and the sudden change in her in having deprived especially Ashish, her grandson, who was orphaned and towards him, she had extreme mental attachment, is wholly unnatural and is not explained. Therefore, it is evident that the last Will and testament, even if duly signed by late Mrs. Chengappa, was without she being aware of the actual dispositions in variance with what she desired in the first instance. By way of reply, the learned Counsel for the plaintiffs would point out that insofar as the contention that Anthony Da Costa, Advocate and Notary having acted as a scribe and therefore not being an attesting witness, is not the correct interpretation. On the other hand, he has been examined as a witness and it is evident that he was fully aware of the intentions of Mrs. Chengappa and he had directly obtained instructions insofar as the preparation of the Will is concerned and has in so many words endorsed that after approval of the final draft and preparation of the document, he had instructed plaintiff 2 to secure an attesting witness, since the Will required two attesting witnesses. And Mr. Chengappa and he had directly obtained instructions insofar as the preparation of the Will is concerned and has in so many words endorsed that after approval of the final draft and preparation of the document, he had instructed plaintiff 2 to secure an attesting witness, since the Will required two attesting witnesses. And Mr. Keith D'Souza was identified as the other attesting witnesses and they had both joined in the execution of the Will as attesting witnesses. This has been stated in his evidence. The two decisions referred to and relied upon by the learned Counsel for the defendants were both cases where there were attesting witnesses, but an attesting witness had not been examined and a scribe who had affixed his signature to the Will was sought to be examined as a witness and it is in that context that the Courts had held that a scribe could not be treated as the same as an attesting witness and the question of animus or intention to act as an attesting witness not being readily present in such circumstances, cannot be running as a parallel to the present case on hand, as in the present case on hand, the animus or intention on the part of the scribe no doubt, to act also as an attesting witness, is plain and evident. Hence, there is no difficulty in accepting the circumstance that Anthony Da Costa had acted as an attesting witness. In this regard, reliance is placed on a decision in the case of Mathew Oommen v. Suseela Mathew 2006(2) Kar.L.J. 80 (SC): 2006(2) AIR Kar. R. 79 (SC): AIR 2006 SC 786 : (2006)1 SCC 519 : 2006 AIR SCW 208, wherein in a similar circumstance, the Apex Court has held that when one of I the attesting witnesses is only a scribe and is not an attesting witness, there was no requirement in law that a scribe cannot be an attesting witness when the person concerned has appeared as a witness and has stated that he was I the scribe of the Will as well as an attesting witness, and that would meet the I requirement of law for attestation. What is required is an intention to attest, I which is clear from the statement of the person. What is required is an intention to attest, I which is clear from the statement of the person. So also in the present case on I hand, it is pointed out that though Anthony Da Costa was a scribe, he having acted as an attesting witness and having declared this aspect of the matter in evidence before the Court, there was adequate satisfaction of the law in indicating that the Will was duly attested by two witnesses. Insofar as the further contention that the propounder has taken active part in the Will and that the plaintiffs had received substantial benefit under the Will so set up, is concerned, the learned Counsel has drawn reference to a catena of decisions which are as follows: 1. Smt. Malkani v. Jamadar and Others, AIR 1987 SC 767 : (1987)1 SCC 610 , 2. Mahesh Kumar (dead) by L.Rs v. Vinod Kumar and Others, (2012)4 SCC 387 : 2012 AIR SCW 2347; 3. Savithri and Others v. Karthyayani Amma and Others, AIR 2008 SC 300 : (2007)11 SCC 621 ; 4. Pentakota Satyanarayana and Others v. Pentakota Seetharatnam and Others, AIR 2005 SC 4362 : 2005 AIR SCW 5085 : (2005)8 SCC 67. It is contended that in the present case on hand, it is pointed out that since the year 1984, the plaintiffs had come to live with Mrs. Chengappa as she was alone and though the plaintiffs were well provided for and had their own residence in Bengaluru, had chosen to move in with Mrs. Chengappa and had also categorically spelt out that they would pay for their own upkeep and had even got executed a document in this regard at Exhibit P. 4, declaring that they would pay for their expenses while living along with Mrs. Chengappa at her residence. Therefore, she was depending on them for her day-to-day activities. There was nothing unnatural of she having sought the assistance of plaintiff 2 either in getting the Will prepared through Anthony Da Costa or in having taken his assistance in receiving the Will and codicil, which was in deposit, from the safe custody of her banker, SBI. Therefore, she was depending on them for her day-to-day activities. There was nothing unnatural of she having sought the assistance of plaintiff 2 either in getting the Will prepared through Anthony Da Costa or in having taken his assistance in receiving the Will and codicil, which was in deposit, from the safe custody of her banker, SBI. In having changed her intentions and having revoked the earlier Will and codicil, she did not owe an explanation to any person and the last Will and testament declaring that all earlier Will and testamentary dispositions stood revoked is sufficient satisfaction in law of having revoked such documents and therefore the same having been taken back, would not create any suspicion. In any event, when the documents were said to be in the safe custody of the banker of Mrs. Chengappa, the bank would not part with the documents without the authority issued by Mrs. Chengappa. Though plaintiff 2 had been cross-examined as to the documents having been received by him from the safe custody of the banker, it ought not to raise a suspicion and for it could only be done under the authority of Mrs. Chengappa and he had, with all innocence, taken back the documents on her instructions and there is no suspicion that flows from the said conduct. Plaintiff 2 merely having received documents by itself does not create suspicion of having prepared a Will to benefit the plaintiffs by such influence allegedly brought on Mrs. Chengappa. The Will having been attested by two independent persons, namely, a trusted family doctor and legal Counsel who would have no motive or intention to support or aid the plaintiffs in any such mischievous act of bringing about or creating a document against the true intentions of Mrs. Chengappa, does not give rise to any kind of suspicion. The further allegation that Ashish being totally deprived of any benefit under the Will, could not be held to be a suspicious circumstance though there is much endeavour on the part of the Counsel for the defendants to claim that since Ashish had lost his parents and near ones at a very young age, Mrs. The further allegation that Ashish being totally deprived of any benefit under the Will, could not be held to be a suspicious circumstance though there is much endeavour on the part of the Counsel for the defendants to claim that since Ashish had lost his parents and near ones at a very young age, Mrs. Chengappa had developed great mental attachment with Ashish and that therefore when the original grandmother of Ashish, Saraswathi was sought to be conferred with a major portion of the share of the property and the same being deprived of in the last Will and testament now set up by the plaintiffs, was also a circumstance that is sought to be canvassed in the air. There is no basis that Mrs. Chengappa had emotional attachment with Ashish and that the plaintiffs had managed to exercise undue influence to persuade Mrs. Chengappa to disinherit Ashish, is purely conjecture and cannot be accepted merely on the basis of the claims or allegations of the defendants. On the other hand, it is brought on record that the father of Ashish, Dr. Icy Bopanna and Harini, the mother of Ashish were not on good terms. In that, it transpires that Harini had miscarried on several occasions and was against bearing any children, but Icy Bopanna had insisted that she have more children and this had lead Harini seeking the assistance of the first plaintiff in ensuring that she underwent sterilisation with the assistance of the first plaintiff and on account of such ill-treatment by Icy Bopanna, Mrs. Chengappa had developed cold attitude towards Bopanna and there was hardly any interaction between the families. In that, it is also brought on record that when the naming ceremony of Ashish was held, Mrs. Chengappa was not even present and later when there was birthday celebration of the sister of Ashish, there was none present because none was informed. Therefore all was not well between the family of Harini and Mrs. Chengappa. The exclusion of Ashish therefore cannot be said to be unnatural as he was otherwise well provided for since both his father and grandfather owned estates. On the other hand, the two grandchildren, Karthik and Pavan were unfortunate in their father having died at a young age and their mother having abandoned them having migrated to the United States of America. And therefore, Mrs. On the other hand, the two grandchildren, Karthik and Pavan were unfortunate in their father having died at a young age and their mother having abandoned them having migrated to the United States of America. And therefore, Mrs. Chengappa having chosen to give a share of the property to those children, cannot be characterised as being unnatural. Insofar as the further contention that in the year 1997, Mrs. Chengappa had fallen ill with Pneumonia and was admitted in a hospital for 24 long days and it was Harini and her husband, who took care of her is also not wholly correct. Incidentally, they were present in Bengaluru when she was admitted in a hospital, to have assisted the plaintiffs in taking care of Mrs. Chengappa on occasion and in having brought food. This by itself did not indicate that the plaintiffs had abandoned Mrs. Chengappa and it was Harini and her husband who had come to her rescue. There is no such material on record. Therefore, the so-called suspicious circumstances sought to be canvassed are not evident from the material on record. There is no unnatural disposition as sought to be made out. The earlier Will and codicil seeking to dispose of her properties equally between her two daughters and son was not relevant as on the date of the present last Will and testament. There were several events that had occurred in Saraswathi having died along with her daughter and granddaughter and her husband and Pavan and Karthik having been abandoned by their mother on they having lost their father etc., which had prompted Mrs. Chengappa to alter the terms of the Will of her own Will and intention and has conveyed to an independent Counsel, who has endorsed the Will as an attesting witness and has deposed before this Court in this regard. And closely supported by the family doctor who again has no ill intentions of ensuring any undue benefit being conferred on the plaintiffs. The learned Counsel for the plaintiffs would submit that there is no case made out of any suspicious circumstances and all such suspicious circumstances which are alleged are ill-founded for the above reasons. Given the above circumstance, insofar as the Will not being proved in accordance with law, on the footing that the scribe could not act as the attesting witness, is the proposition which is incorrectly sought to be applied. Given the above circumstance, insofar as the Will not being proved in accordance with law, on the footing that the scribe could not act as the attesting witness, is the proposition which is incorrectly sought to be applied. In a situation where there were attesting witnesses, but the attesting witnesses not having been tested, but a scribe who had also affixed his signature to the Will being examined, has been frowned upon by the Court. The said two decisions, cited by the learned Counsel for the respondents would not advance the case of the respondents as to the Will not being proved in accordance with law. In the present case on hand, the Advocate and Notary Public, who has prepared the Will has also signed as an attesting witness. This was after instructing plaintiff 2 to secure the presence of Dr. Keith D'Souza as the other attesting witness, he has affixed his signature as an attesting witness. This has been endorsed by him by appearing in Court and tendering evidence in this regard. Therefore, in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Mathew Oommen's case, the Will is duly attested as required in law and the same is free from suspicion insofar as the execution of the Will by Smt. Chengappa. The fact remains that the defendants do not deny the signatures of Mrs. Chengappa on the Will and the same having been duly attested ought to be given credence. Therefore, the Will having been executed is proved in accordance with law. Insofar as the dispositions made in the Will creating any suspicion cannot also be accepted. For the several reasons as already discussed and the reasoning afforded by the learned Counsel for the plaintiffs insofar as the several suspicious circumstances are concerned, would necessarily have to be accepted. There is no such suspicious circumstance which stands established. Even as regards the sound state of mind of the testatrix as on the date of the Will, though it is sought to be canvassed that she was failing in her health both mentally and physically and therefore was not capable of expressing her Will is not established. There is no such suspicious circumstance which stands established. Even as regards the sound state of mind of the testatrix as on the date of the Will, though it is sought to be canvassed that she was failing in her health both mentally and physically and therefore was not capable of expressing her Will is not established. Especially in the light of the evidence of the Medical Practitioner who was her Physician and who has acted as the attesting witness clearly endorsing that she was not suffering from any such infirmity and that she was not confined to bed. Even according to the defendants, she had remained active though with the assistance of others. That by itself could not create any suspicious circumstances. Further, the allegations of undue influence having been brought on the testatrix by the propounders of the Will, would clearly place the burden on the defendants, as laid down in the following decisions of the Supreme Court: 1. Daulat Ram and Others v. Sodha and Others, AIR 2005 SC 233 : (2005)1 SCC 40 : 2004 AIR SCW 6523; 2. Pentakota Satyanarayana's case; 3. Sridevi and Others v. Jayaraja Shetty and Others, 2005(2) Kar.L.J. 159 (SC): AIR 2005 SC 780 : 2005 AIR SCW 605 : (2005) 2 SCC 784 . In this regard, the defendants have not tendered any such evidence which would indicate that Mrs. Chengappa was susceptible to such influence being brought on the plaintiffs, on the other hand, it is the case of the defendants that Mrs. Chengappa remained a strong willed woman and would have her ways with every one, including the plaintiffs and it was not possible for others to influence her. If that being so, it was for the defendants to establish the date or time from which that occurred deterioration in the sate of mental and physical health of Mrs. Chengappa. Therefore, there is no case made out by the defendants insofar as the allegations are concerned. Consequently, the suit is allowed. The issue framed by this Court is answered in the affirmative. The probate shall be granted to have effect throughout the State of Karnataka. It is on record that plaintiff 1 is no more. Therefore, plaintiff 2 shall administer the property and credits of late Mrs. Consequently, the suit is allowed. The issue framed by this Court is answered in the affirmative. The probate shall be granted to have effect throughout the State of Karnataka. It is on record that plaintiff 1 is no more. Therefore, plaintiff 2 shall administer the property and credits of late Mrs. Chengappa and shall make full and true inventory thereon and exhibit the same before the Court within a period of six months from the date of grant of probate and render true account of the property and credits within one year from the date of grant of probate.