Neeti Development and Leasing Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India
2015-07-22
ALOK ARADHE
body2015
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : ALOK ARADHE, J. 1. In this writ petition, the petitioners have, inter alia, assailed the validity of the notifications dated 25-5-2012 and 4-1-2013 issued under sections 3A and 3-D of the National Highways Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the "1956 Act") respectively. The petitioners also seek quashment of notice dated 15-10-2012 issued by the competent authority, by which, the petitioner has been asked to appear on 17-10-2012 for consideration of objection preferred by him. The petitioner has also assailed the order dated 17-10-2015, by which, objection preferred by the petitioner has been rejected. In order to appreciate the petitioner's challenge to the impugned notifications and notice, few facts need mentioned which are stated infra. The petitioners No. 1 to 10, which are companies and are registered under the provisions of Companies Act had purchased land admeasuring 98.76 acres in village Itaura and Saristal, Tahsil Raghuraj Nagar, District Satna vide registered sale deeds. The petitioner No. 11, which is also registered under the provisions of Companies Act is a colonizer. The petitioner's No. 1 to 10 have entered into joint venture agreement to carry out different construction work for residential and commercial complex. The petitioners got the land diverted and paid a sum of Rs. 21,51,155/- as one time diversion premium. Thereafter, the petitioners were granted colonizer licence as well as permission to undertake development work vide order dated 28-2-2006. The Joint Director, Town and Country Planning by order dated 28-1-2011 approved the lay out plan, pursuant to which, the petitioners commenced construction work on the site. 2. A notification under section 3-A of the 1956 Act was issued, pursuant to which, the petitioners submitted their objections. The competent authority by notice dated 15-10-2012 informed the petitioner that objection shall be heard on 17-10-2012. The objection preferred by the petitioners were rejected by the competent authority, namely, Sub Divisional Officer by order dated 18-10-2012 and thereafter the notification under section 3-D of the Act was issued on 4-1-2013. In the aforesaid factual background the petitioners have approached this Court. 3. Learned senior counsel for the petitioners submitted that section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short "1894 Act") as well as section 3-C of the 1956 Act are pari materia provisions. It is also submitted that section 3-C of the 1956 Act is mandatory in nature.
In the aforesaid factual background the petitioners have approached this Court. 3. Learned senior counsel for the petitioners submitted that section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short "1894 Act") as well as section 3-C of the 1956 Act are pari materia provisions. It is also submitted that section 3-C of the 1956 Act is mandatory in nature. In support of aforesaid submission, reference has been made to decision in the case of Malwa I. T. Park Ltd. and Others Vs. State of M. P. and Others, (2009) ILR (MP) 2863 : (2010) 1 MPLJ 451 . It was further submitted that no notice of hearing, which was allegedly held on 17-10-2012, was received by the petitioners nor its representative was present on the said date before Sub Divisional Officer. It is further submitted that notification under section 3-D of the 1956 Act has been issued in violation of section 3-C of the Act inasmuch as objections preferred by the petitioners have been decided in perfunctory manner without affording any opportunity of hearing to them. It is further submitted that Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue) has not filed any affidavit in support of his submission that the petitioners' representative was present on 17-10-2012, but the Reader has filed the affidavit, which cannot be relied upon. In support of aforesaid submission, reference has been made to the decision in the case of Swaroop Chand Jain Vs. The District Superintendent of Police and Others, (1973) CriLJ 1038 : (1973) JLJ 236 : (1973) 18 MPLJ 219. While inviting the attention of this Court to the award which has been passed, it is argued that, in fact, no award has been passed in the case of the petitioners. It is further submitted that petitioners had submitted an offer for alternative land which was not considered by the respondent No. 4-M.P. Road Development Corporation. 4. Learned senior counsel for respondent No. 4 while refuting the contention made on behalf of petitioners submitted that section 5-A of the 1894 Act and section 3-A of the 1956 Act are pari materia provisions has submitted that scope of submission of objection under the 1956 Act is limited as the person concerned can only object to the use of the land.
It is further submitted that petitioners in their objections, submitted to the respondent No. 4, had made a prayer for diversion of Satna-Rewa by-pass road so that the land of the petitioners can be saved in entirety. The aforesaid objections are outside purview of section 3-C of the Act. It was further submitted that affidavit of Reader was filed only in support of the contention that representative of the petitioners was heard on 17-10-2012. It was further submitted that objections preferred by the petitioners were duly considered and rejected by ascribing cogent reasons. It was also pointed out that award has already been passed on 18-3-2013 and compensation has been determined by the competent authority. In support of aforesaid submission, learned counsel has placed reliance on decision in the cases of Union of India (UOI) Vs. Dr. Kushala Shetty and Others, (2011) 12 SCC 69 and Competent Authority Vs. Barangore Jute Factory and Others, (2005) 9 SCALE 493 : (2005) 13 SCC 477 as well as order dated 10-2-2014 passed by the Division Bench in Writ Petition No. 14063/2011. 5. I have considered the rival submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. The relevant extract of section 5-A of 1894 Act reads as under:-- "5-A Hearing of objections.--(1) Any person interested in any land which has been notified under section 4, sub-section (I) as being needed or likely to be needed for a public purpose or for a company may, [within thirty days from the date of the publication of the notification], object to the acquisition of the land or of any land in the locality, as the case may be." Section 3-C(1) of the 1956 Act reads as under:-- "3-C. Hearing of objections.--(1) Any person interested in the land may, within twenty-one days from the date of publication of the notification under sub-section (1) of section 3-A, object to the use of the land for the purpose or purposes mentioned in that sub-section." From perusal of section 5-A of the 1894 Act it is evident that objection can be raised with regard to acquisition of land whereas under section 3-C of 1956 Act objection can be raised only with regard to use of the land. Thus, the scope of submission of objection under section 3-C of 1956 Act is limited.
Thus, the scope of submission of objection under section 3-C of 1956 Act is limited. Thus, section 5-A of 1894 Act and section 3-C of 1956 Act cannot be said to be pari materia provisions. 6. From perusal of the notice dated 15-10-2012, it is evident that the same was issued to the representative of petitioners, namely, Ajay Pandey. The order-sheet dated 17-10-2012 recorded by the Sub Divisional Officer states that even though the notices issued to the objectors, namely, petitioners have not been served, yet the representative of the petitioner is present. The competent authority heard the representative of the petitioners and thereafter by order dated 18-10-2012 rejected the objections preferred by the petitioners on the ground that change in alignment of by-pass road is not possible as the land held by the other landowners shall be affected due to which primary survey work would be required to be carry out again. The fact that representative of the petitioners had remained present before the Sub Divisional Officer on 17-10-2012 stands forfeited by the affidavit sworn by Assistant Grade-III in the Office of Sub Divisional Officer i.e. competent authority. The aforesaid affidavit of Reader was filed for limited purpose for showing that representative of petitioners was present. 7. Even assuming for the sake of argument that even if the petitioners' representative was not present on 17-1-2012 before the competent authority, then also no prejudice has been suffered by the petitioners as their objections were outside the purview of section 3-C of the 1956 Act as in their representations the petitioners had only made the prayer for diversion of Satna-Rewa by-pass and the competent authority by assigning valid and cogent reasons rejected the same. In other words the petitioners had sought relief of re-alignment of Satna-Rewa bypass road which beyond the purview of section 3-C of the 1956 Act. Thus, on admitted facts the enquiry into the objections at the instance of the petitioners would have been empty formality. [See: Viveka Nand Sethi Vs. Chairman, J and K Bank Ltd. and Others, (2005) 5 SCC 337 : (2005) SCC(L&S) 689] 8. It has been held by Supreme Court in Dr. Kushala Shetty (supra) that National Highway Authority of India (for brevity "NHAI") is a professionally managed statutory body having expertise in the field of development of maintenance of National Highway and widening and development of the existing highways.
It has been held by Supreme Court in Dr. Kushala Shetty (supra) that National Highway Authority of India (for brevity "NHAI") is a professionally managed statutory body having expertise in the field of development of maintenance of National Highway and widening and development of the existing highways. The NHAI prepares and implements projects relating to development and maintenance of national highways after thorough study by experts in different fields and detailed project reports are prepared keeping in view the relative factors including intensity of heavy vehicular traffic and larger public interest. The Courts are not at all equipped to decide upon viability and feasibility of the particular project and whether particular project and whether particular alignment would sub-serve the larger public interest. In such matter the scope of judicial review is very limited. In view of aforesaid enunciation of law, no fault can be found with the order dated 18-10-2012 by which objections preferred by the petitioners with regard to re-alignment of Satna-Rewa by-pass road has been rejected. 9. In pursuance of an order passed by a Bench of this Court on 21-4-2015, the Sub Divisional Officer has produced the record. From perusal of the record it is evident that an award has already been passed on 18-3-2013, which is not under challenge in this writ petition. From perusal of the award, it is evident that compensation in respect of land of the petitioners has also been assessed by the competent authority. In the absence of any challenge to the award in this writ petition, no relief can be granted to the petitioner. 10. As far as contention of learned senior counsel for petitioners in respect of offer made by petitioners for alternative site is concerned, it is pertinent to mention that Satna-Rewa by-pass road is being constructed by the National Highway Authority of India after carrying out the survey and thereafter me decision has been taken to acquire the land for the purpose of construction of bypass road. Therefore, no fault can be found with the action of respondent No. 4 in not acceding to the prayer made by petitioners for acquisition of alternative land. 11.
Therefore, no fault can be found with the action of respondent No. 4 in not acceding to the prayer made by petitioners for acquisition of alternative land. 11. Taking any view of the matter and in public interest as well as the fact that out of 98.76 acres of land of the petitioners only the land admeasuring 0.429 hectares has been acquired for the purpose of construction of Satna-Rewa bypass road i.e. for public project, I am not inclined to interfere in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which otherwise is discretionary in nature. In view of preceding analysis, the writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed.