Research › Search › Judgment

Jharkhand High Court · body

2015 DIGILAW 763 (JHR)

Binod Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand

2015-07-06

RONGON MUKHOPADHYAY

body2015
Order : The petitioner in this writ application has prayed for quashing the District Order No. 2240 of 2001 issued under Memo No. 2167 dated 27.09.2001 passed by the respondent no. 3 whereby and whereunder the petitioner had been dismissed from service. The petitioner has further prayed for quashing the order as contained in Memo No. 1972 dated 09.09.2003 by which the respondent no. 2 had dismissed the appeal preferred by the petitioner against his order of dismissal. 2. On or about 31.10.1997, the petitioner was appointed on the post of constable in the District Police Force, West Singhbhum, Chaibasa. Sometimes, in August 2000, the petitioner was sent for training for a period of 9 months at Chaibasa. On the complaint made by the Subedar Major (Samadeshak) to the Police Training Centre, Chaibasa against the petitioner and one Bhola Rai, the respondent no. 3 passed an order directing the suspension of the petitioner and Bhola Rai and for issuance of charge-sheet against them. In terms of District Order No. 1256 of 2001 dated 22.05.2001, the petitioner was put under suspension and thereafter by virtue of office order as contained in Memo No. 1293 dated 28.05.2001, a charge-sheet was submitted upon the petitioner by which the charges which were levelled against him were as follows: I. On 18.05.2001 at 4 P.M. after training was over, the petitioner is alleged to have shown indisciplined behaviour by going out on bare foot and in civil dress. II. He used to press 'Samadeshak' (Subedar) to grant leave to the Police personnel. III. Due to his alleged disturbance, the officials imparting training as well as the Police persons were affected due to which he was cautioned. 3. An explanation was submitted by the petitioner on 05.06.2001 denying the charges levelled against him. In the inquiry which was conducted by the Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Chakradharpur, an adverse finding was recorded and the Inquiry Officer submitted the report before the respondent no. 3. A second show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner to show-cause as to why the petitioner should not be dismissed from the service on the basis of charge nos. 2 & 3 to which the petitioner gave a reply and thereafter in terms of the order as contained in Memo No. 2167 dated 27.09.2001 issued by the respondent no. 3, the petitioner was dismissed from service. 2 & 3 to which the petitioner gave a reply and thereafter in terms of the order as contained in Memo No. 2167 dated 27.09.2001 issued by the respondent no. 3, the petitioner was dismissed from service. An appeal was preferred by the petitioner, but in terms of the order contained in Memo No. 1972 dated 09.09.2003, respondent no. 2 dismissed the appeal. 4. Heard Mr. A. K. Sahani, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mrs. Rakhi Rani, learned J.C. to Sr. S. C. II. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the charges which had been levelled against the petitioner were itself vague in nature and there is no mention about any specific incident so as to substantiate the charges. It has further been submitted that the inquiry report was never served upon the petitioner and since it was the mandatory requirement under the law, non-submission of inquiry report to the petitioner had caused serious prejudice in controverting the findings of the inquiry report and in such circumstances, the disciplinary authority could not have passed the order of dismissal against the petitioner. It has further been submitted that even the Appellate Authority did not take into consideration this aspect of the matter. Mr. A. K. Sahani, learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the Appellate Order as contained in Memo No. 1972 dated 09.09.2003 is cryptic and non-speaking order without taking into consideration the contentions raised by the petitioner. Continuing with his argument, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that similarly situated person who was charge-sheeted along with the petitioner namely, Bhola Rai has been exonerated from the same charges whereas a major punishment of dismissal had been passed against the petitioner which is a clear case of discrimination. Mr. A. K. Sahani, learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that the order of punishment is not in commensuration with the charges levelled against him. 6. Mrs. Rakhi Rani, learned J.C. to Sr.S.C. II, on the other hand has submitted that the petitioner has failed to show as to what prejudice was caused to him for non-supply of the inquiry report. It has further been submitted that the petitioner cannot equate his case with that of Bhola Rai as would be apparent from the inquiry report itself. Moreover, according to the learned J.C. to Sr. It has further been submitted that the petitioner cannot equate his case with that of Bhola Rai as would be apparent from the inquiry report itself. Moreover, according to the learned J.C. to Sr. S. C. II, the petitioner did not cross-examine the main witness Bhupendra Singh. She further submits that the charges which were levelled against the petitioner were serious in nature and the act of the petitioner was unbecoming of a person of disciplined force like the police and in such circumstances, the order of dismissal cannot be said to be excessive or too harsh. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner has stressed much on the vagueness of charges levelled against the petitioner; and that the incident/incidents which led to the initiation of the departmental proceedings were not specific and definite. In this context, learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to the case of “Anant R. Kulkarni Vs. Y. P. Education Society” reported in (2013) 6 SCC 515 , wherein while considering the repercussion of a vague charge, it was held as follows: “16. Where the charge-sheet is accompanied by the statement of facts and the allegations are not specific in the charge-sheet, but are crystal clear from the statement of facts, in such a situation, as both constitute the same document, it cannot be held that as the charges were not specific, definite and clear, the enquiry stood vitiated. Thus, nowhere should a delinquent be served a charge-sheet, without providing to him, a clear, specific and definite description of the charge against him. When statement of allegations are not served with the charge-sheet, the enquiry stands vitiated, as having been conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice. The evidence adduced should not be perfunctory; even if the delinquent does not take the defence of, or make a protest that the charges are vague, that does not save the enquiry from being vitiated, for the reason that there must be fair play in action, particularly in respect of an order involving adverse or penal consequences. What is required to be examined is whether the delinquent knew the nature of accusation. The charges should be specific, definite and giving details of the incident which formed the basis of charges and no enquiry can be sustained on vague charges. What is required to be examined is whether the delinquent knew the nature of accusation. The charges should be specific, definite and giving details of the incident which formed the basis of charges and no enquiry can be sustained on vague charges. (Vide State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao, Sawai Singh v. State of Rajasthan, U.P. SRTC v. Ram Chandra Yadav, Union of India v. Gyan Chand Chattar and Anil Gilurker v. Bilaspur Raipur Kshetriya Gramin Bank).” 8. The charge-sheet which was submitted to the petitioner consisted of 3 charges and the first charge was specific inasmuch as, on 18.05.2001 at 4:00 P.M. the petitioner had shown an indisciplined act by disobeying the direction of the Trainer. However, charge no. 1 in course of inquiry was found to be not proved. So far as charge nos. 2 and 3 are concerned neither any specific date nor any specific incident had been highlighted to drive home such charge of indiscipline and indiscretion on the part of the petitioner. 9. So far as the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the order passed by the Appellate Authority is vague, cryptic and devoid of any reasons, he has referred to the judgment in the case of “Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation of India and others Vs. A. Masilamani” reported in (2013) 6 SCC 530 , wherein it was held as follows: “19. The word “consider” is of great significance. The dictionary meaning of the same is, “to think over”, “to regard as”, or “deem to be”. Hence, there is a clear connotation to the effect that there must be active application of mind. In other words, the term “consider” postulates consideration of all relevant aspects of a matter. Thus, formation of opinion by the statutory authority should reflect intense application of mind with reference to the material available on record. The order of the authority itself should reveal such application of mind. The appellate authority cannot simply adopt the language employed by the disciplinary authority and proceed to affirm its order. (Vide Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. v. Santosh Kumar and Bhikhubhai Vithlabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat).” 10. Admittedly, the inquiry report was never served upon the petitioner and which fact has been much harped upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner. However, as has been argued by the learned J.C. to Sr. (Vide Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. v. Santosh Kumar and Bhikhubhai Vithlabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat).” 10. Admittedly, the inquiry report was never served upon the petitioner and which fact has been much harped upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner. However, as has been argued by the learned J.C. to Sr. S. C. II that no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner in non-supply of the inquiry report, it has to be gathered from the facts and circumstances of the present case as to whether the petitioner was prejudiced for such non-supply of the inquiry report. It is now no more res-integra that mere non-supply of the inquiry report will vitiate the entire departmental proceeding. It is to be seen as to whether such non-supply of the inquiry report would prejudice the case of the petitioner or not. In this case, the show-cause notice as contained in Memo No. 1977 dated 30.08.2001 itself depicts in very clear terms the findings of the Inquiry Officer as well as the gist of the statement of the witnesses and in such circumstances it cannot be concluded that the petitioner was not aware of the findings of the inquiry officer as also the basis on which the inquiry officer had come to such finding. Moreover, the petitioner has nowhere been able to make out a case that non-supply of the inquiry report has caused a great deal of prejudice to him. In this context, it would be apt to refer to the judgment in the case of “Sarva U. P. Gramin Bank Vs. Manoj Kumar” reported in (2010) 3 SCC 556 , wherein it was held as follows: “38. We have examined the factual situation in this case elaborately to see as to whether any prejudice has been caused to the respondent. We are unable to accept the submissions of the learned counsel for the respondent that any prejudice has been actually caused. We are of the considered opinion that there has been no failure of justice in the facts and circumstances of this case by non-supply of the enquiry report to the respondent.” 11. We are unable to accept the submissions of the learned counsel for the respondent that any prejudice has been actually caused. We are of the considered opinion that there has been no failure of justice in the facts and circumstances of this case by non-supply of the enquiry report to the respondent.” 11. No doubt, it is true that supply of a copy of the inquiry report is a part and parcel of the principles of natural justice, but the non-supply of the same does not automatically extinguish the principles of natural justice as the same has to be seen in the context as to whether such non-supply caused prejudice to the delinquent employee. 12. In such circumstances, therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner with respect to non-supply of inquiry report is disagreed for the reasons given above. The learned counsel for the petitioner in course of his argument had tried to equate his case with one Bhola Rai, but as would be apparent from the evidence given by the Sergeant Major (Parichari Pravar) in the departmental proceeding of Bhola Rai, he has not levelled any allegation against him of disobeying or misbehaving with him which is not similar to what has been stated by the Sergeant Major in the disciplinary proceeding initiated against the petitioner. 13. Since charge nos. 2 and 3 as has been held above are itself vague, no significance can be attached with the statement given by the Sergeant Major, as from the second show-cause notice it appears that with respect to the vague charge, the reply given by the Sergeant Major is also vague. As has been held in the case of “Anant R. Kulkarni Vs. Y. P. Education Society” (supra), the charges should be specific, definite and giving details of the incident which form the basis of charges and no inquiry can be sustained on vague charges. As would be apparent and as has been discussed above, charge no. 1 seems to be specific, but the same was not proved against the petitioner, whereas the charge nos. 2 and 3 which were proved in course of departmental proceedings and which form the basis of dismissal of the petitioner from service are definitely vague and in such circumstances, the entire departmental proceedings get vitiated. Since the charges more specifically charge nos. 2 and 3 which were proved in course of departmental proceedings and which form the basis of dismissal of the petitioner from service are definitely vague and in such circumstances, the entire departmental proceedings get vitiated. Since the charges more specifically charge nos. 2 and 3 have already been held to be vague and had not been accompanied by any statement of allegation or any details thereof, the departmental inquiry based on the said charges is not in accordance with law. 14. As a consequence to what has been discussed above, the order of dismissal as contained in Memo No. 2167 of 2001 passed by the respondent no. 3 dated 27.09.2001 as also the Appellate Order as contained in Memo No. 1972 dated 09.09.2003 passed by the respondent no. 2 are hereby quashed and set aside. 15. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner in service along with all the consequential benefits admissible in law. 16. This writ application is allowed.