1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 19.09.2008, passed by the learned Single Judge in WP (C) No. 2384/2008 dismissing the proceeding on holding that the judgment dated 08.04.2008, rendered by the Assam Board of Revenue, Guwahati in Case No. 46RA(DBR/06) does not suffer from any infirmity. 2. We have heard Mr. T.C. Khatri, learned Sr. Counsel assisted by Mr. P. Mahanta, learned counsel for the appellants and also heard Mr. B. Chakravarty, learned counsel for the respondents. 3. The facts necessary for disposal of the present appeal, in short, are that, Nidhi Rani Khullar (since deceased), predecessor in interest of respondent No. 1 to 11, purchased 2 plots of land with separate registered deeds, such deeds being deed dated 16.12.1946 and deed dated 08.06.1953. On the strength of aforesaid sale deeds, Nidhi Rani Khullar instituted a suit in the court of District Judge, Dhubri seeking partition and Khas possession of the suit property therein, area of same being 2 kathas only. Such suit was numbered as T.S. No. 10/1975. 4. The said suit was initially dismissed as not maintainable one for which plaintiff therein, she being Nidhi Rani Khullar, preferred an appeal before this court which was registered as FA No. 88/1979. This court on hearing the learned counsel for the parties by its judgment dated 03.08.1987 held that suit is maintainable and thus, remanded the case for adjudication in accordance with law. 5. Pursuant to such order, learned District Judge, Dhubri on hearing the learned counsel for the parties was pleased to decree the suit allowing the partition in respect of aforesaid 2k of land and in that connection, he also drew a preliminary decree vide judgment dated 14.11.1988. The decree holder, thereafter, on 19.02.1992 filed a petition before the Revenue Authority for affecting partition in terms of the decree passed by the Civil Court in T.S No. 10/1975. 6. On the basis of such a petition, partition case No. 3/1992-93 was registered by Collector, Dhubri and same was subsequently came to be transferred to the Settlement Officer for necessary action. Settlement Officer, in turn, forwarded the same to Assistant Settlement Officer (in short ASO) for doing further needful in terms of decree passed by the Civil Court in the suit aforesaid. 7. Settlement Officer, in turn, forwarded the same to Assistant Settlement Officer (in short ASO) for doing further needful in terms of decree passed by the Civil Court in the suit aforesaid. 7. It is on record that the name of Nidhi Rani Khullar was mutated in the relevant Records of Right as the legal owner of the plots of land aforesaid. After her death, her legal heirs who are respondents herein had also got their names mutated in place of said Nidhi Rani Khullar in the relevant Records of Right. 8. It has been contended that Assistant Settlement Officer by his order dated 27.05.1993 passed in Partition Case No. IP 3/1992-93 granted partition and made such partition effective from 1994. Such an order was said to have been passed under Regulation 116 of the Assam Land & Revenue Regulation, 1886 (in short, the Regulation, 1886). 9. It is alleged that concern Revenue Officer instead of performing the partition in letter and spirit of relevant law as well as the direction in the preliminary decree by putting the decree holder (s) in actual physical possession of the land, and, if necessary, by evicting the occupants, if any, from such land adopting coercive measure (s), only issued the order on 27.05.1993 showing granting of perfect permission. In that connection, our attention has been drawn to the provision of Section 116/116 A of the Regulation, 1886. 10. In the aforesaid circumstances, the respondents herein preferred an application u/s 151 of the Regulation of 1886 before the Assam Board of Revenue and prayed for giving effect to the partition in respect of land in question by handing over physical possession of the land to them as required under Rule 116/116 A of the Regulation. On the basis of such application case No. 46RA (DBR/06) was registered. 11. In such an appeal, a further prayer was made before the Assam Board of Revenue stating that land in question is a land, situated in urban area and as such, Khatian could not have been issued to such land and therefore, the Assam Board of Revenue was requested to cancel Rayati Khatian No. 856 which was granted in the name of Lt. Atowari Kumarani who was arraigned as respondent No. 7 in the appeal before the Board and who was said to be predecessor in interest of appellants herein. 12. Atowari Kumarani who was arraigned as respondent No. 7 in the appeal before the Board and who was said to be predecessor in interest of appellants herein. 12. On the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the Assam Board of Revenue upon hearing the parties and on considering the materials on record, was pleased to pass the judgment dated 08.04.2008 requiring the Deputy Commissioner-cum-Collector, Dhubri to dispose the partition prayer of the applicants in terms of decree dated 14.11.1988 passed in T.S. No. 10/1975. By the same judgment, the Board of Revenue was also pleased to cancel the Khatian No. 856 since such Khatian was not issued in accordance with the prescription of law. 13. Being aggrieved, the respondents in case No. 46RA (DBR/06) preferred the revision petition contending that in view of provisions in section 54, Order 20, Rule 18(1) and (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure (in short, the CPC) that no order could have been passed by the learned Board of Revenue to give effect to the preliminary decree passed in T.S. No. 10/1975. Such a contention was oppose to by Mr. Chakravarty, learned counsel for the respondents in WP(C) No. 2384/2008 contending that writ petition is not maintainable for reasons more than one. 14. In that connection, it has been pointed out that the decree dated 14.11.1988, having not been challenged in any forum whatsoever, became final and same cannot be questioned, now, in view of prohibition in Section 97 of the CPC. However, not being able to question it in accordance with prescription of law, the petitioners in the aforesaid writ proceeding has taken resort to Article 226 of the Constitution of India in order to frustrate the decree aforesaid which was rendered totally in accordance with the prescription of law. 15. It has further been contended that of Assistant Settlement Officer having rendered the order date 30.03.1993 in Case No. IP 3/1992-93 had partially implemented the decree, passed by the Civil Court although under the law, he was to have implemented it fully in terms of Rule 116A of the Regulation 1886. 15. It has further been contended that of Assistant Settlement Officer having rendered the order date 30.03.1993 in Case No. IP 3/1992-93 had partially implemented the decree, passed by the Civil Court although under the law, he was to have implemented it fully in terms of Rule 116A of the Regulation 1886. Since it was not done, the respondents herein rightly approached the learned Board of Revenue U/r 151 of the Regulation 1886 seeking a direction to concern Revenue Authority to act strictly in terms of Rule 116 A of the Regulation 1886 and having granted relief, so sought for, learned Board of Revenue, committed no error whatsoever. 16. It is also the case of the respondents herein that the decree in question though apparently temporary, there remains nothing for the Collector to decide in regard to matter covered by such a decree since under the decree, the Collector is to do the duty only of ministerial nature in order to effect the partition in terms of decree, rendered in Title Suit aforementioned. 17. It has also been contended that since an application seeking execution of preliminary decree is not an application under Article 181/182 of the Indian Limitation Act, such an application seeking implementation of preliminary decree which was made in 1992 does not come under the mischief of law of limitations. In support of such contention, decision of the Bombay High Court in AIR 1945 BOM-338 has been relied on. 18. Regarding the contention of the appellants herein that only the proprietor or land holder can be evicted summarily in execution of a process initiated under Article 116A of the Regulation, and not others, and writ petitioners, not being land holders or proprietor, in the land aforesaid, cannot be evicted in exercise of power under Article 116/116A of the Regulations, it has been argued that Article 116A of the Regulation 1886 nowhere states that it is applicable only to the land holders and proprietors, and not to others, meaning thereby that aforesaid provision of law can be made applicable to any illegal occupant who is found in possession of land, partitioned. Therefore, such contention cannot come in the way of Revenue Authorities evicting the appellants herein from the land in question. 19. On hearing both the parties, learned Single Judge was pleased to dismiss the appeal in the following, manner: --- “11. Therefore, such contention cannot come in the way of Revenue Authorities evicting the appellants herein from the land in question. 19. On hearing both the parties, learned Single Judge was pleased to dismiss the appeal in the following, manner: --- “11. As noticed above, the learned District Judge, Dhubri by his judgment and decree passed on 14.11.1998 in Title Suit No. 10/75 granted the partition in respect of the share of land of the plaintiff. The said judgment and decree has attained its finality there being no challenge to the same. Thereafter, the Assistant Settlement Officer by his aforesaid order dated 27.05.1993 granted the partition making the same effective from 1st April, 1994. The order was passed under Regulation 116 of the Regulation notifying the partition. The said order has also attained its finality there being no challenge to the same. The present petitioners were very much party to the said proceeding. 12. The applications before the Assam Board of Revenue was filed for effective implementation of the partition. The Board of Revenue in appreciation of the facts and circumstances involved has allowed the prayer of the applicants/respondents with the direction to the Deputy Commissioner, Dhubri, to act upon the partition as per law and according to the judgment and decree dated 18.11.1988 passed in Title Suit No. 10/75. The land in question having been partitioned, the Khatian issued in respect of the same subsequent to the judgment and decree and the order passed by the Assistance Settlement Officer has also been cancelled. 13. The decision on which Mr. Khatri, learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance, has no application to the facts and circumstances involved in this case. In the said decision, i.e., Hasham Abbas Sayyad, the Apex Court held that it is the final decree and not the preliminary decree, unless and unless the final decree is a part of the preliminary decree, can only be executed. The short question which arose for consideration of the Apex Court was as to whether the property in suit would be put to auction sale without initiating a formal final decree proceeding. The short question which arose for consideration of the Apex Court was as to whether the property in suit would be put to auction sale without initiating a formal final decree proceeding. It was in such circumstances the Apex Court having noticed that the possession of the property had not been delivered to the auction purchaser and that the suit property was a residential house held that the auction sale was wholly illegal and that the auction purchaser could otherwise be compensated on monetary terms. 14. In the aforesaid case before the Apex Court, a preliminary decree was passed. An application, purportedly a special 'darkhast' was filed by the Respondent No. 1 who had filed the suit for partition. The Respondent No. 2 was his brother. The advocate Commissioner appointed was of the opinion that the property was made impartible. Thereafter, a proposal was mooted that the property be put on sale in between the co-sharers. There was objection to the report. The learned trial Judge held that it was not necessary to initiate the final decree proceeding and the special 'darkhast' filed by the Respondent No. 1 was treated to be an application therefore. It was in such circumstances, the short question which arose before the Apex Court was as to whether the property in suit could be put on auction sale without initiating by formal final decree proceeding. The Apex Court held that what can be executed is a final decree and not the preliminary decree, unless and until the final decree is a part o the preliminary decree. 15. The 'decree' has been defined in Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure as follows:-- “2(2) 'decree means the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Courts expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within Section 144, but shall not include - (a) Any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order, or (b) Any order of dismissal for default. Explanation - A decree is preliminary when further proceeding have to be taken before he suit can be completely disposed of. Explanation - A decree is preliminary when further proceeding have to be taken before he suit can be completely disposed of. It is final when such adjudication completely disposes of the suit. It may be partly preliminary and partly final.” 16. Section 54 of the Civil Procedure Code. Read as follows:-- “54- Partition of estate or separation of share.- Where the decree is for the partition of an undivided estate assessed to the payments of revenue to the Government, or for the separate possession of a share of such an estate, the partition of the estate or the separation of the share shall be made by the Collector or nay gazetted subordinate of the Collector deputed by him in this behalf, in accordance with the law (if any) for the time being in force relating to the partition, or the separate possessions of shares, of such estate.” 17. Order 20 Code of Civil Procedure provides as to when a judgment is said to be pronounced. Rule 7 thereof provides that a decree, although prepared at later date, shall relate back to the date of the judgment. A civil Court, is a suit for partition, may pass a preliminary decree in terms of Order 20 Rule 18 of the Civil Procedure Code, which is read as follows: “Decree in suit for partition of property or separate possession of a share therein.- Where the Court passes a decree for the partition of property or for the separate possessions of share therein, then- (1) If an insofar as the decree relates to an estate assessed to the payment of revenue to the Government, the decree shall declare the rights of the several parties interested in the property, but shall direct such partition or separation to be made by the Collector, or any gazetted subordinate of the Collector deputed by him in this behalf, in accordance with such declaration and with the provisions of Section 54; (2) If and insofar as such decree relates to any other immovable property or to movable property, the Court may, if the partition or separation cannot be conveniently made without further inquiry, pass a preliminary decree declaring the rights of the several parties interested in the property and giving such further directions as may be required.” 18. In the instant case, unlike the aforesaid case before the Apex Court, the preliminary decree drawn by the learned District Judge was in the form of final decree. The suit was instituted by the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents, inter alia, for partition of her share in respect of the land in question. While answering the issue framed in the suit, the learned District Judge held that the plaintiff had the right, title and interest to the extent of 2 kathas of land. As regards the claim for partition of her share of the land, repelling the contention of the contesting defendants that the suit for partition did not lie as per the provision of the Assam Land & Revenue Regulation, the learned District Judge, upon a reference to the judgment of this Court in aforesaid FA No. 88/1979 in which it was held that the jurisdiction was with the learned District Judge, held that the plaintiff was entitled to a decree of partition in respect of her share of land forming subject matter of the present dispute. It is in this context, the judgment and decree dated 14.11.1988 passed in Title Suit No 10/75 will have to be understood. 19. As notices above, the said judgment and decree has attained its finality and the respondents approached the authority under the Assam Land & Revenue Regulation for effecting the partition. As per the said judgment and decree, although order for effecting partition was passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer vide his order dated 27.05.1993 but there being no effective follow up action, the respondents approached the Assam Board of Revenue by filling the application under Regulation 151 of the Regulation praying for the aforementioned direction. Entertaining the application, the Assam Board of Revenue has passed the impugned judgment and order in terms of the orders already holding the field. Although the Assistant Settlement Officer issued the proclamation of partition in terms of the aforesaid judgment and decree, but there being no action under Regulation 116A, the applicants/respondents approached the Assam Board of Revenue for compliance with the provisions of Regulation 116A. Regulation 116A reads as follows:-- “116. Although the Assistant Settlement Officer issued the proclamation of partition in terms of the aforesaid judgment and decree, but there being no action under Regulation 116A, the applicants/respondents approached the Assam Board of Revenue for compliance with the provisions of Regulation 116A. Regulation 116A reads as follows:-- “116. Proclamation of partition.- On completion of a partition the Deputy Commissioner shall publish a proclamation of the fact at this office and at some conspicuous place on each of the new estates or in the estate of which they originally formed part, and the partition shall take effect from the beginning of the agricultural year next after the date of the proclamation. 116A. Procedure to be followed by Deputy Commissioner in giving effect to the partition. As soon as may be after the date on which the partition takes effect under the last preceding section, the Deputy Commissioner shall deliver to the several sharers possession of the separate lands allotted to them, and for this purpose may, if necessary, summarily eject any proprietor of landholder who may refuse to vacate the same. “......A preliminary decree passed, whether it is in a mortgage suitor a partition suit, not a tentative decree but must, in so far the matters dealt with by it are concerned, be regarded as conclusive. No doubt, in suits which contemplates the making of two decrees a preliminary decree and a final decree- the decree which would be executable would be the final decree. But the finality of the decree of a decision does not necessarily depend upon its being executable. The Legislature in its wisdom has thought that suits of certain types should be decided in stages and though the suit in such cases can be regarded as fully and completely decided only after a final decree is made the decision of the Court arrived at the earlier stage also has a finality attached to it. It would be relevant to refer to Section 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides that where a party aggrieved by preliminary does not appeal from it, he is precluded from disputing its correctness in any appeal which may be preferred from the final decree. This provision thus clearly indicates that as to the matters covered by it, a preliminary decree is regarded as embodying the final decision of the court passing that decree” 23. This provision thus clearly indicates that as to the matters covered by it, a preliminary decree is regarded as embodying the final decision of the court passing that decree” 23. In the instant case, the decree passed in 1988 has attained its finality. The applicants/respondents sought for implementation of the same by approaching the authority prescribed under the Regulation. Although the Assistant Settlement Officer issued proclamation under Regulation 116, no action having been taken towards effective implementation as provided for under Regulation 116A, they approached the Assam Board of Revenue by filing application for appropriate direction. The Board of Revenue appreciating the facts and circumstances has issued the aforesaid direction to the Deputy Commissioner, Dhubri which cannot be said to be opposed to law. 24. The direction of the Assam Board of Revenue is in terms of the finality arrived at by virtue of the aforesaid judgment and decree. The question for determination before the Board was as to whether the applicants/respondents were entitled to execution of partition under Regulation 116A on the basis of the judgment and decree passed in the aforesaid title suit and as to whether Khatian No. 816 issued in the name of Atowari Kumarani was liable to be cancelled. The Board upon a detail discussion of the matter has passed the impugned judgment and order directing the Deputy Commissioner, Dhubri, to act as per the provisions of the Regulation. It has also cancelled the Khatian which even otherwise could not have been granted at a time when the judgment and decree and the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer were in operation.” 20. It may be stated that learned counsel for the parties repeated their arguments which they had advanced before the learned Single Judge. However, before we could proceed further, certain well established principles of law which have huge bearings on the dispute in the present appeal are required to be stated here. They are as follows:- (1) Where a party aggrieved by a preliminary decree does not choose to prefer an appeal from such preliminary decree, he shall be precluded from disputing its correctness in any appeal which may be preferred from the final decree. (2) An application for implementation of preliminary decree, being not an application for execution of decree, is not governed by Article 181 or 182 of the Indian Limitation Act. (2) An application for implementation of preliminary decree, being not an application for execution of decree, is not governed by Article 181 or 182 of the Indian Limitation Act. Being so, application for implementation of preliminary decree may be preferred at any point of time. In that connection, decision of Full Bench of Bombay High Court in the case of Ramabai Govind Vs Anant Daji, reported in AIR 32, 1945 Bombay 338 relied on. We peruse the same and found reason to concur with the ratio in such a decision. The relevant part is reproduced below: --- “When the Court passes a preliminary decree under Sub-rule (2), it appoints a Commissioner under Order XXVI, Rule 13, to effect a partition, after receiving his report, the Court is to pass a final decree under Order XX, Rule 14(3). There is no corresponding provision in the Code that after making a partition the Collector should report to the Court in order that it may pass a final decree. In fact no other final decree is ever passed, after a decree is once passed Under Order XX, Rule 18(1) A preliminary decree cannot for ever remain a preliminary decree, but contemplates a final decree upon which the decree-holder may take out execution, a term which in decrees for partition of property must include delivery of possession. The Collector cannot pass a final or indeed any other decree in a civil suit for partition, and yet the Civil Court is not required by the Code to pass any further decree or to make its decree final at any stage. Upon this footing the first and only decree to be parsed by the Court would be a final decree. As pointed out by Beaumont C.J. in Jacinto v. Fernandez, when an order in the form prescribed in Order XX, Rule 18(2), is made, the Court's duties, are finished, though, as held in Dev Gopal Savant v. Vasudev Vithal Savant (1887) I.L.R. 12 Bom. 371, 376, the Court is not deprived of its judicial control of its decree. But that control is very limited. It is only if the Collector contravenes the decretal order, or transgresses the law or otherwise acts ultra vires, or refuses to carry out the decree, that his action is liable to be controlled and corrected by the Court which passed the decree. But that control is very limited. It is only if the Collector contravenes the decretal order, or transgresses the law or otherwise acts ultra vires, or refuses to carry out the decree, that his action is liable to be controlled and corrected by the Court which passed the decree. Apart from this limited control the Collector can give effect to the partition made by him, without waiting for confirmation by the Court, and deliver possession of the shares to the respective sharers. Thus the Court having nothing further to do 'with the decree passed by it Under Order XX, Rule 18(2), Beaumont C.J., in Jacinto v. Fernandez, (at p. 922), described the order directing the partition of the lands assessed to Government revenue to be effected by the Collector as a final decree. 12. If on this line of reasoning the decree be regarded as final, it must be recalled that not every final decree is capable of execution. A merely declaratory decree, though final, is by its very nature, incapable of execution. So, too, is a decree under Order XX, Rule 18(2), of the Code of Civil Procedure. It merely declares what are the shares of the parties in the suit lands assessed to Government revenue, and by whom the partition is to be effected, but it does not embody a direct order to the Collector or to the judgment-debtor to do anything. From this point of view it is merely declaratory. It is true that Section 54 appears in the Civil Procedure Code under the heading "Procedure in execution." That section may have been placed there only to show that such a decree is incapable of execution by the Court, and that if a party wants a partition effected as directed by the decree, it is only the Collector who can effect it. For that purpose he must request the Court to send the decree to the Collector. The sending of the decree to the Collector is only a ministerial act and not execution of the decree. Mr. Desai's argument that the Collector is an officer appointed by Section 54 to receive applications for the execution of such decrees under Order XXI, Rule 10, of the Code of Civil Procedure, is not tenable. The officer contemplated by that rule is an officer like the Clerk of the Court or Nazir, authorised by the Court to receive applications. Mr. Desai's argument that the Collector is an officer appointed by Section 54 to receive applications for the execution of such decrees under Order XXI, Rule 10, of the Code of Civil Procedure, is not tenable. The officer contemplated by that rule is an officer like the Clerk of the Court or Nazir, authorised by the Court to receive applications. The effecting of partition by the Collector carrying out an order already passed by the Court is not "execution of the decree" as contemplated by that expression in the first column of Article 182 of the first schedule to the Indian Limitation Act. Even if the decree be regarded as final, this article will not avail the appellant, and there is no reason to doubt the correctness of the view taken in Jacinto v. Fernandez that an application to send the decree to the Collector for effecting a partition, being only a request to the Court to do a ministerial act, is not governed by the said Article 182. 13. Nor is such an application governed by Article 181, whether the decree is taken to be. preliminary or final. If the decree be regarded as preliminary, then as pointed out by Engineer J. in Jesinglal v. Gangadhar (1937) 40 Bom. L.R. 507 it is only in the case of preliminary decrees in mortgage suits that an application for making it final is expressly required by Order XXXIV. He says that provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure in respect of partition and partnership suits are different and refers to various provisions which require the Court passing the preliminary decree in such suits to take the necessary-steps suo motu. But there is no provision which requires an application to be made to the Court to send a decree under Order XX, Rule 18(2), to the Collector, and, therefore, Article 181 is not applicable to such an application. 14. If, on the other hand, the decree be regarded as final, it is not executable by the Court, as already pointed out, and as the Code does not provide for an application to have it sent to the Collector, such an application, even if made in the form of a darkhast application, is not governed by Article 181 or any other article of the Indian Limitation Act.” (3). Regulation 116 of the Assam Land Revenue Regulation, 1886 requires the Deputy Commissioner to publish a proclamation on the completion of a partition by affixing such publication at his office as well as at some conspicuous place on each of the new estates or in the estate of which they originally formed part. (3A). Under Regulation 116A, the Deputy Commissioner after effecting partition, is duty bound to deliver the separate shares to the person/persons who are granted partition and if necessary by ejecting the proprietor or landholder who refused to vacate the same. For ready reference such provisions are reproduced below: --- “116. Proclamation of partition-On completion of a partition the Deputy Commissioner shall publish a proclamation of the fact at his office and at some conspicuous place on each of the new estates or in the estate of which they originally formed part, and the partition shall take effect from the beginning of the agricultural year next after the date of proclamation. 116-A. Procedure to be followed by Deputy Commissioner in giving effect to the partition. As soon as may by after the date on which the partition takes effect under the last preceding section, the Deputy Commissioner shall deliver to the several sharers possession of the separate lands allotted to them, and for this purpose may, if necessary, summarily eject any proprietor or landholder who may refuse to vacate the same.” 21. Coming back to our case, we have found that the prayer for the partition of the suit property was granted by District Judge, Dhubri by its decree dated 14.11.1988, rendered in T.S. No. 10/1975. Said preliminary decree had never been challenged by the respondents therein before any higher forum whatsoever. Such a revelation was also not disputed by appellants herein who are predecessors in interest of the respondents in T.S. No. 10/1975. Therefore, in terms of Section 97 of the CPC, appellants who are predecessors in interest of the respondents in T.S. No. 10/1975 are precluded from challenging the correctness of the preliminary decree rendered in T. S. No. 10/1975. 22. We have found that decree in T.S. No. 10/1975 was rendered on 14.11.1988. However, application seeking implementation of such preliminary decree was admittedly made in 1992. 22. We have found that decree in T.S. No. 10/1975 was rendered on 14.11.1988. However, application seeking implementation of such preliminary decree was admittedly made in 1992. But then, since the application seeking implementation of preliminary decree is not governed by Article 181 or 182 of the Limitation Act, there is no infirmity in seeking implementation of the preliminary decree by the predecessor of respondents herein in 1993. 23. We have already found that the Revenue Authority entrusted with the duty of effecting partition is duty bound to put the decree holder in the possession of land, partitioned, and, if necessary, by summarily evicting occupants therein who refuses to vacate the land, so partitioned. 24. However, in our instant case, there is no dispute over the fact that the Revenue Authority symbolically put the decree holders in the possession of land partitioned without putting them in actual physical possession of such ---although---- under the law, Revenue Authority is duty bound to put such decree holder in actual physical possession of such land, and, if necessary, by evicting the appellants herein from such land as required under the Law. 25. In such a situation, when the respondents herein approached the Revenue Board having filed an application under Regulation 151 of the Regulations of 1886 and when Revenue Board on receipt of such application and on hearing the parties ordered the District Revenue Authority to put the respondents herein in actual physical possession of the land in question on invoking the provision of Article 116A of the Regulation 1886 in letter and spirit, and, if necessary, by evicting appellants from the land so partitioned, one cannot find fault with the order passed by the learned Revenue Board in Case No. IP 46 RA (DBR) 06 on 8.4.2008 requiring the District Revenue Authority to act in accordance with prescription of law vis-à-vis the application filed by respondents herein in 1992. 26. Viewed from the above angle, learned Single Judge committed no wrong whatsoever in refusing to interfere with the order so passed in Case No. 46 RA (DBR) 06 on 8.4.2008. 27. Consequently, we find no merit in the present appeal and same is accordingly dismissed. No Cost.

Amar Nath Kumar & Ors. v. Mrinal Kanti Khullar & Ors.