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2015 DIGILAW 769 (GUJ)

Patel Tushar Bharatkumar v. State of Gujarat

2015-08-06

J.B.PARDIWALA

body2015
JUDGMENT : J.B. Pardiwala, J. 1. Since the issues raised in the captioned writ-applications are more or less the same, those were heard analogously and are being disposed of by this common judgment and order. 2. RULE. Mr. Rohan Yagnik, the learned AGP waives service of notice of rule for and on behalf of the respondents. 3. By these writ-applications, the petitioners, seeking appointment as the Teachers (Shikshan Sahayak) in the registered Non-Government Granted Schools, have prayed for the following reliefs: "(A) The Honourable Court may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or certiorari or any other writ, order or direction, in the nature of mandamus or certiorari, quashing and setting-aside the impugned decision of the respondents which is declared by way of an advertisement also dated 12.05.2014 and further be pleased to direct the respondents to continue with the earlier process of recruitment by way of which rounds for recruitment were declared and to declare the further rounds for recruitment as required. (B) The Honourable Court may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or any other writ, order or direction, in the nature of mandamus or certiorari, directing the respondents to complete the recruitment process initiated by way of advertisement by adopting the established and legal process of recruitment which is conducted by various rounds of recruitment. (C) Pending admission, hearing and final disposal of the present petition, this Honourable Court may be pleased to stay the operation, implementation and execution of the impugned decision of the respondents which is declared by way of an advertisement also dated 12.5.2014. (D) To grant cost of the petition. (E) To pass such other further order as deemed fit in the facts and circumstances of the case." 4. The case of the petitioners may be summarised as under: The respondent No. 2 issued an advertisement inviting applications from the eligible candidates for the post of Teacher for the secondary and the higher secondary schools registered as Non-Government Granted Schools. The advertisement was issued for 1865 posts of Teacher. 5. The petitioners, being eligible, had applied on-line for the said posts. All the necessary documents were supplied and the requisite fees were also paid. The candidates were invited to give their options for the schools. The process of recruitment provides for the various rounds based on the merits of the candidates. 6. 5. The petitioners, being eligible, had applied on-line for the said posts. All the necessary documents were supplied and the requisite fees were also paid. The candidates were invited to give their options for the schools. The process of recruitment provides for the various rounds based on the merits of the candidates. 6. It appears that after two rounds of the recruitment process, all of a sudden, the respondent No. 2 issued a fresh advertisement dated 12th May 2014. The earlier process of recruitment was declared to have been concluded. 7. It is the case of the petitioners that a waiting list of 10% of the number of posts advertised was prepared. It is also the case of the petitioners that more than 500 seats remained vacant and, instead of undertaking a fresh recruitment process by a new advertisement, the respondents could have continued to fill up the seats. It is the case of the petitioners that if the third round of recruitment would have been undertaken, then probably the petitioners could have been appointed. 8. In such circumstances referred to above, it is prayed that the respondents should continue with the earlier process of recruitment and fill up the vacant seats. 9. In response to the notice issued by this Court, the respondents have appeared. On behalf of the respondent No. 2, the Joint Director and Member Secretary, Commissionerate of Schools, has filed an affidavit, inter alia, stating as under: "9. I say and submit that in the meeting of the selection for Gujarat State Secondary and Higher Secondary Education Staff Recruitment Selection Committee, constituted vide Teachers and Head Masters of Registered Private Secondary and Higher Secondary Schools (Procedure for Selection) Rules, 2011 dated 11.02.2011 No. GH/SH/2/BMS-1109-1906-G. It was decided in the meeting of the said committee dated 14.02.2014 and dated 06.05.2014 after due deliberation that the earlier rounds of selection process are required to be cancelled as certain representations were received from the candidates of reserved category, in which they have raised grievances to the effect that though they have been selected after considering their merits, they have not been given option to choose the school. I further respectfully say and submit that in the said meeting it was categorically decided to prepare waiting list amongst the meritorious candidates at the rate of 10%. 10. I further respectfully say and submit that in the said meeting it was categorically decided to prepare waiting list amongst the meritorious candidates at the rate of 10%. 10. I further respectfully say and submit that pursuant to the receipt of the aforesaid representations, the respondent No. 2 - Committee had considered the representations and in meeting dated 14.02.2014 and dated 06.05.2014, the committee has decided to cancel the earlier round of recruitment process as the candidates of reserved category have not been given the option to choose their respective category. 11. I respectfully say and submit that the meeting of the respondent committee held on 30.05.2014. I further respectfully say and submitted that the respondent committee has and others, the said representations have been rejected after taking into consideration the Rule-11(5) and 11(7) of the rules provided in the notification dated 11.02.2011. 12. I respectfully say and submit that the recruitment process followed by the recruitment committee is in consonance with notification dated 11.02.2011 and the waiting list is also prepared at the rate of 10% so the prayer for operation of the enhancement of the waiting list more than 10% cannot be accepted. 13. It is further submitted that the vacant post after completion of the recruitment process can effectively filled up through new recruitment process in accordance with the provisions of the notification dated 11.02.2011. 14. It is most humbly submitted that the advertisement dated 12.05.2014 was given after due consideration and decision of the selection committee in the meeting dated 06.05.2014 constituted as provided in notification dated 11.02.2011 and it is in consonance with the recruitment rules and hence, the decision of the committee is just and proper." 10. A further affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondent No. 2, inter alia, stating as under: "4. I respectfully say and submit that initially the advertisement was published on 24.08.2013 for filling up 2233 posts of teacher in non-Government granted Higher Secondary schools. I respectfully say and submit that the merit list of all the posts was prepared by the Selection Committee and out of these posts, 1506 posts belonging to candidate of open category as per the merits of different subject. I respectfully say and submit that the merit list of all the posts was prepared by the Selection Committee and out of these posts, 1506 posts belonging to candidate of open category as per the merits of different subject. While placing a candidate in the general list on the basis of only merits the system did not provide for giving an option to person belonging to reserved category to exercise his/her choice While preparing aforesaid list the candidate belonging to reserved category without being offered an opportunity to select the preference belonging to his/her category, a candidate of reserve category was placed in the general category without any option. 5. It is respectfully submitted that while preparing merit list round wise in the 1st round in all 1506 candidates belonging to general category were called for exercising their option for preference. It would be pertinent to note herein that out of 1506 candidates of general category 983 candidates only had exercised their option for preference. It would further be pertinent to point out at this stage that the aforesaid list also includes certain reserved category candidates having higher merit. It is also respectfully submitted that out of this 983 candidates who had exercised their choice of preference, the candidates belonging to reserved categories within this 983 candidates were given the choices of places belonging to general category only considering them to be candidates of general category. Therefore, the candidates of reserved categories in the general list of 983 candidates were not offered the places belonging to their respective category. 6. It is respectfully submitted that thereafter, at the end of the first round out of total 1506 candidates as only 983 candidates exercised their choices of preference a second round therefore, was organized for 523 vacancies (i.e. 1506-983) which were left out after the first round. In this round again without affording option to the candidates belonging to reserved category, the committee only on the basis of the merit of candidates offered place of choices to 232 candidates who had exercised their choice of preference out of 523 seats. 7. It is respectfully submitted that similarly third round was held for 291 vacancies (i.e. 523-232) was organized by the committee. 7. It is respectfully submitted that similarly third round was held for 291 vacancies (i.e. 523-232) was organized by the committee. Even in the third round the candidates of general category including that of reserved category on the basis of their merits were offered the places of general category without affording them a right to exercise their choice of place for reserved category. In the third round out of 291 vacancies 74 candidates exercised their option for preference. It is respectfully submitted that the selection committee met on 14.02.2014 and while considering the issues pertaining to appointment to be made, the committee felt that on account of making a provision to offer choices to the candidates belonging to reserved categories and considering the fact that some of the posts were cancelled on account of different reasons and thereby even the subjects were required to be changed and in order to see that there would not be legal complications, the committee felt appropriate to take assistance from the technical advisor INDEXTB and thereafter, to declare the result accordingly. 12. It is respectfully submitted that all the petitioners who have preferred the present petition are much below the waiting list and stand no chance to get selected except the petitioner No. 2 who has already exercised her choice of preference at Rajkot. The petitioners even if were in the waiting list had no indefeasible right to pray for issuance of writ of mandamus, in view of settled legal position. In the present case, there is no chance for the petitioner for being selected looking to their merits except petitioner No. 2. Therefore the present petition is not maintainable at the instance of the petitioners who have no indefeasible right." 11. One more affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondent No. 2, stating as under: "3. That following the developments are placed before this Hon'ble Court: 1. That State Government and its authorities have strictly gone on merits while preparing the select list. The merit list is prepared strictly in accordance with the rules. 2. That it is not even the case of the petitioners that the principle of merit is in any way violated or deviated, while preparing the merit list. 3. That State Government and its authorities have strictly gone on merits while preparing the select list. The merit list is prepared strictly in accordance with the rules. 2. That it is not even the case of the petitioners that the principle of merit is in any way violated or deviated, while preparing the merit list. 3. That the process of selecting 2233 posts of teachers is completed and the office of the respondent has allocated the teachers to different districts as per the preference of the posts keeping in view the principle of merit. 4. That none of the petitioners have found their place in the merit list in as much as none of the petitioner is finding place in merit list 2233 posts of teachers. 5. That only one petitioner's name was in the waiting list and i.e. petitioner No. 2 and she has already exercised her choice of preference at Rajkot. 6. That rest of the petitioners do not find their place even into the waiting list, which was to the effect of 10% of the total number of seats. 4. Therefore, taking any view of the matter, it is respectfully submitted that: 1. That none of the petitioners were finding their names in the merit list of 2233 teachers. 2. Except petitioner No. 2, none of the petitioner is even in the waiting list. 3. The process of selecting 2233 teachers pursuant to the advertisement dated 24.08.2013 is complete and the selection committee has allocated these teachers to different districts, who have exercised the option of a district as per their order of merit. 5. The aforesaid exercise is under taken in accordance with the Rules named as Teachers and Headmasters of Registered Private Secondary and Higher Secondary Schools (Procedure for Selection) Rules, 2011. 6. It is stated to this Hon'ble Court that the State Government gives 100% grant. Therefore, the State Government has framed Rules for selection of teachers u/s. 35 of the Gujarat Secondary and Higher Secondary Education Act, 1972. The teachers are selected and allotted by the State Government on the basis of the requisition of grant-in-aid schools. However, formal orders of appointment are given by respective school management. 7. The petitioners would be competent to apply afresh subject to their fulfilling other eligibility criteria." 12. Mr. The teachers are selected and allotted by the State Government on the basis of the requisition of grant-in-aid schools. However, formal orders of appointment are given by respective school management. 7. The petitioners would be competent to apply afresh subject to their fulfilling other eligibility criteria." 12. Mr. Jigar Gadhvi, the learned advocate appearing for the petitioners of the Special Civil Application No. 8079 of 2014 and Mr. Vijay Nangesh, the learned advocate appearing for the petitioner of the Special Civil Application No. 9230 of 2015, vehemently submitted that to the best of their knowledge more than 500 seats are vacant. If the respondents would have undertaken the third round of recruitment, then probably all the petitioners could have been appointed to the posts of Shikshan Sahayak. 13. The learned counsel for the respective petitioners submitted that he action on the part of the respondents in putting an end to the earlier recruitment process all of a sudden could be termed as arbitrary and unreasonable. 14. On the other hand, these writ-applications have been vehemently opposed by Mr. P.K. Jani, the learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the respondents. Mr. Jani submitted that no illegality could be said to have been committed issue of a fresh advertisement. He submitted that the petitioners have no indefeasible right to claim that since the seats were vacant the third round of recruitment should have been undertaken pursuant to the advertisement which was issued on 24th August 2013. 15. Mr. Jani invited the attention of the Court to the Teachers and Headmasters of Registered Private Secondary and Higher Secondary Schools (Procedure for Selection) Rules, 2011. He relied on Rules 9, 11 and 15 of the said Rules. 16. Mr. Jani further submitted that the process of selecting 2233 Teachers has been concluded and the selected Teachers have been allocated to the different districts according to their preference considering their merit. He submitted that none of the petitioners herein could find their place in the merit list. He submitted that only one petitioner who was in the waiting list i.e. the petitioner No. 2 has been appointed and has been posted at Rajkot. He clarified that the petitioners could not find their place even in the waiting list which was 10% of the total number of seats. He submitted that there being no merit in these writ-applications, the same be rejected. 17. He clarified that the petitioners could not find their place even in the waiting list which was 10% of the total number of seats. He submitted that there being no merit in these writ-applications, the same be rejected. 17. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is, whether the petitioners had acquired any indefeasible right to be appointed to the posts in question, when the decision taken by the respondent not to fill up all the vacancies is based on bonafide and appropriate reasons. 18. I may first look into the rules which have been referred to above. Rule 11 reads as under: "11. Preparation of select list:- (1)(a) The selection committee shall prepare a list on the basis of weightage of 70% marks of the marks secured by the concerned candidate in Teacher's Aptitude Test to be conducted atleast once in a year by Gujarat Secondary and Higher Secondary Education Board, Gandhinagar. (b) The marks secured by the concerned candidate in TAT will be valid for five years from the date of the result of the TAT. (c) The candidate who has secured at least 50% marks in TAT shall be considered as qualified candidate for TAT weightage. (d) A candidate shall be allowed maximum three attempts for TAT. If a candidate after availing the first attempt also avails second or third successive attempt within the period of five years from the date of the result of the first attempt, the average marks obtained by the candidate in such attempts shall be considered for preparation of the select list, as explained in Appendix II. (2) The Weightage of 30% will be given, out of the marks secured in the prescribed educational qualification for the concerned post. (Please see the example in Appendix II) (3) The maximum marks for the qualification for the purpose of Weightage of 30% shall be as prescribed in Appendix I. (4) The Selection Committee shall prepare subject-wise and category-wise lists on the basis of marks secured by the concerned candidates as provided in sub-rules (a) and (b) above. (Please see the example in Appendix II) (3) The maximum marks for the qualification for the purpose of Weightage of 30% shall be as prescribed in Appendix I. (4) The Selection Committee shall prepare subject-wise and category-wise lists on the basis of marks secured by the concerned candidates as provided in sub-rules (a) and (b) above. (5) The selection committee shall prepare a list of the successful candidates in the order of merit on the basis of aggregate marks finally awarded to each candidate as provided under sub-rule (d) above limited to the number of posts advertised by the selection committee. (6) The selection committee shall prepare a separate list of successful candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Socially and Educationally Backward Classes and women to the extent of the number of vacancies reserved for such categories. Provided that where the requisite number of candidates, belonging to Scheduled Casts, Scheduled Tribes Socially and Educationally Backward Class or, as the case may be Nomadic Tribes and Denotified Tribes, could not qualify on the basis of the qualifying aggregate marks fixed for general category, the selection committee may relax the qualifying aggregate marks to make up the deficiency in these reserved posts. (7) The selection committee shall prepare subject-wise and category-wise waiting lists, showing the names of the candidates of about 10% of the list of successful candidates so prepared under sub-rules (2) and (3) above. (8) The waiting lists referred to in sub-rule (7) shall be operative for a period of two years from the date of publication of the result or till the date of publication of the result of the next examination, which ever is earlier. (9) The waiting list may be operative in the following circumstances:- (i) If the post of Headmaster or Secondary teacher or higher secondary teacher is not filled up due to non-joining of the selected candidate in the prescribed time limit. (ii) If the selected candidate is disqualified for appointment for any of the reasons." 19. It appears from the materials on record, more particularly, the affidavit filed by the Assistant Deputy Director, Commissionerate of Schools, Gandhinagar, dated 10th June 2015, that almost 2233 posts of Teacher have been filled up according to the merit of each of the candidates. It appears that those Teachers have also been allocated to the different districts. It appears from the materials on record, more particularly, the affidavit filed by the Assistant Deputy Director, Commissionerate of Schools, Gandhinagar, dated 10th June 2015, that almost 2233 posts of Teacher have been filled up according to the merit of each of the candidates. It appears that those Teachers have also been allocated to the different districts. It also appears that the petitioners herein could not find place even in the waiting list. 20. I am not impressed by the submission of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners that the respondents should have undertaken the third round for filling up the posts, more particularly, when 500 odd seats were vacant. 21. Let me accept for the moment as true what has been submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners. In my view, the petitioners had not acquired any indefeasible right to be appointed to the posts in question when the respondent took the decision not to fill up all the vacancies and thought fit to issue a fresh advertisement. The respondent is also under no obligation or legal duty to fill up any or all of the vacancies and that the basis indicated by the respondent for pruning the indents cannot at all be categorized to be malafide or unreasonable. The law is well-settled. The Supreme Court has taken the same view in the following judgments: 22. In the State of Andhra Pradesh and another v. V. Sadanandam and others, : AIR (1989) SC 2060, the Supreme Court has observed as under: "The mode of recruitment and the category from which the recruitment to a service should be made are all matters which are exclusively within the domain of the executive. It is not for judicial bodies to sit in judgment over the wisdom of the executive in choosing the mode of recruitment or the categories from which the recruitment should be made as they are matters of policy decision falling exclusively within the purview of the executive. The question of filling up of posts by persons belonging to other local categories or zones is a matter of administrative necessity and exigency. When the rules provide for such transfers being effected and when the transfers are not assailed on the ground of arbitrariness or discrimination, the policy of transfer adopted by the Government cannot be struck down." 23. The question of filling up of posts by persons belonging to other local categories or zones is a matter of administrative necessity and exigency. When the rules provide for such transfers being effected and when the transfers are not assailed on the ground of arbitrariness or discrimination, the policy of transfer adopted by the Government cannot be struck down." 23. The Supreme Court, in a judgment rendered by a Constitution Bench in the case of Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India, : [1991] 3 SCC 47, observed as under: "Even if a number of vacancies are notified for appointment and adequate number of candidates are found fit, the successful candidates do not acquire any indefeasible right to be appointed against the existing vacancies. Ordinarily the notification merely amounts to an invitation to qualified candidates to apply for recruitment and on their selection they do not acquire any right to the post. Unless the relevant recruitment rules so indicate, the State is under no legal duty to fill up all or any of the vacancies. However, it does not mean that the State has the licence of acting in an arbitrary manner. The decision not to fill up the vacancies has to be taken bona fide for appropriate reasons. And if the vacancies of any of them are filled up, the State is bound to respect the comparative merit of the candidates as reflected at the recruitment test, and no discrimination can be permitted." 24. In the case of Union Territory of Chandigarh v. Dilbagh Singh and others, : [1993] 1 SCC 154, the Supreme Court has observed as follows: "A candidate who finds a place in the select list as a candidate selected for appointment to a civil post does not acquire an indefeasible right to be appointed in such post in the absence of any specific rule entitling him to such appointment. He could be aggrieved by his non-appointment only when the Administration does so either arbitrarily or for no bona fide reasons. Hence such candidate, even if he has a legitimate expectation of being appointed due to his name finding a place in the select list of candidates, cannot claim to have a right to be heard before such select list is cancelled for bona fide and valid reasons and not arbitrarily. Hence such candidate, even if he has a legitimate expectation of being appointed due to his name finding a place in the select list of candidates, cannot claim to have a right to be heard before such select list is cancelled for bona fide and valid reasons and not arbitrarily. In the instant case, when the Chandigarh Administration accepted the complaints and cancelled the select list it cannot be said to have acted either arbitrarily of without bona fide and valid reasons." 25. In the case of Babita Prasad and others v. State of Bihar and others, : [1993] Supp. 3 SCC 268, the Supreme Court held that a panel, as prepared in the said case, cannot be treated as conferring any vested or indefeasible right to the teachers to be appointed. The Supreme Court further held as follows: "The mere fact that the candidates who had been brought on the panel had been sent for training at the Government expense, would also not imply that any right had been created in their favour for appointment after they had completed their training because training was intended to confer eligibility on the candidates for being brought on the list." 26. In the case of the State of Haryana v. Subash Chander Marwaha & others, : [1974] 3 SCC 220, the Supreme Court has observed as under: "The existence of vacancies does not give a legal right to candidate to be selected for appointment. The examination is for the purpose of showing that a particular candidate is eligible for consideration. The selection for appointment comes later. It is open then to the Government to decide how many appointments shall be made. The mere fact that a candidate's name appears in the list will not entitle him to a mandamus that he be appointed. Indeed, if the State Government while making the selection for appointment had departed from the ranking given in the list, there would have been a legitimate grievance on the ground that the State Government had departed from the Rules in this respect. Indeed, if the State Government while making the selection for appointment had departed from the ranking given in the list, there would have been a legitimate grievance on the ground that the State Government had departed from the Rules in this respect. In order that mandamus may issue to compel an authority to do something it must be shown that the statute imposes a legal duty on that authority and the aggrieved party has a legal right under the statute to enforce its performance Since there was no legal duty on the State Government to appoint all the 15 persons who are in the list and the petitioners have no legal right under the rules to enforce its performance the petition was clearly misconceived." 27. In the case of U.P. Bhumi Sudhar Nigam Ltd. v. Shiv Narain Gupta, : [1994] Supp. 2 SCC 541, the Supreme Court has observed as under: ".......We are of the view that the High Court fell into patent error in issuing the mandamus in the facts and circumstances of this case. This Court has authoritatively laid down that even if a vacancy is available and the employer bona fide declines to make an appointment the candidate on the select list has no right whatsoever to claim appointment. In the present case, the post was abolished by the Board of Director in the year 1991. Shiv Narain Gupta in fact challenged before the High Court the action of the Corporation in abolishing the post. Neither the facts of this case nor the law on the subject warranted any interference by the High Court in the writ petition filed by Shiv Narain Gupta. The Constitution Bench judgment in Shankarsan Dash case was cited before the learned single Judge of the High Court. We are constrained to say that the learned Judge failed to appreciate the binding ratio of the said judgment." 28. The State as an employer has the right to fill up all the posts or not to fill them up. Unless the discrimination is made in regard to the filling up of the vacancies or an arbitrariness is committed, the concerned candidate will have no legal right for obtaining a writ of or in the nature of mandamus. 29. The State as an employer has the right to fill up all the posts or not to fill them up. Unless the discrimination is made in regard to the filling up of the vacancies or an arbitrariness is committed, the concerned candidate will have no legal right for obtaining a writ of or in the nature of mandamus. 29. It is now a settled law that a person can approach a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India if any of his legal or fundamental rights has been infringed by the action or inaction of a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. So far as the writ of Habeas Corpus or of the nature of Public Interest Litigation are concerned, a writ-petitioner can, however, espouse even the cause of others if their legal or fundamental rights are violated. 30. But Article 226 of the Constitution does not vest the High Court with the power to interfere when there exists no legal or fundamental right of a person over the subject-matter of the dispute alleged. In the case before me, it is not the case of the writ-petitioners that although they have the legal right to be considered conferred under the existing Rules for appointment to the posts concerned, the respondent is denying such right. 31. In the case of State of Haryana v. Subash Chander Marwaha, : (1974) 3 SCC 220 , the Supreme Court held as under: "The mere fact that a candidate's name appears in the list will not entitle him to a mandamus that he be appointed. Indeed, if the State Government while making the selection for appointment had departed from the ranking given in the list, there would have been a legitimate grievance on the ground that the State Government had departed from the rules in this respect... 11. It must be remembered that the petition is for a mandamus. This Court has pointed out in Dr. 11. It must be remembered that the petition is for a mandamus. This Court has pointed out in Dr. Rai Shivendra Bahadur v. Governing Body of the Nalanda College that in order that mandamus may issue to compel an authority to do something, it must be shown that the statute imposes a legal duty on that authority and the aggrieved party has a legal right under the statute to enforce its performance Since there is no legal duty on the State Government to appoint all the 15 persons who are in the list and the petitioners have no legal right under the rules to enforce its performance the petition is clearly misconceived." 32. In the case of Pitta Naveen Kumar v. Raja Narasaiah Zangiti, : (2006) 10 SCC 261 , the Supreme Court held as under: "...A candidate does not have any legal right to be appointed. He in terms of Article 16 of the Constitution of India has only a right to be considered therefor. Consideration of the case of an individual candidate although ordinarily is required to be made in terms of the extant rules but strict adherence thereto would be necessary in a case where the rules operate only to the disadvantage of the candidates concerned and not otherwise..." 33. In the case of State of Rajasthan & others v. Jagdish Chopra, : (2007) 8 SCC 161 , the Supreme Court held as under: "9. Recruitment for teachers in the State of Rajasthan is admittedly governed by the statutory rules. All recruitments therefore, are required to be made in terms thereof Although Rule 9(3) of the Rules does not specifically provide for the period for which the merit list shall remain valid but the intent of the legislature is absolutely clear as vacancies have to be determined only once in a year. Vacancies which arose in the subsequent years could be filled up from the select list prepared in the previous year and not in other manner. Even otherwise, in absence of any rule, ordinary period of validity of select list should be one year. In the case of State of Bihar v. Amrendra Kumar Mishra,: (2006) 12 SCC 561 , the Supreme Court opined in para 9 as under: "9. In the aforementioned situation, in our opinion, he did not have any legal right to be appointed. In the case of State of Bihar v. Amrendra Kumar Mishra,: (2006) 12 SCC 561 , the Supreme Court opined in para 9 as under: "9. In the aforementioned situation, in our opinion, he did not have any legal right to be appointed. Life of a panel, it is well known, remains valid for a year. Once it lapses, unless an appropriate order is issued by the State, no appointment can be made out of the said panel." It was further held in para 13 as under: "13. The decisions noticed hereinbefore are authorities for the proposition that even the wait list must be acted upon having regard to the terms of the advertisement and in any event cannot remain operative beyond the prescribed period." *** *** *** 11. It is well-settled principle of law that even selected candidates do not have legal right in this behalf. (See Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India, : (1991) 3 SCC 47 , and Asha Kaul v. State of J&K, : (1993) 2 SCC 573 )" 34. For the foregoing reasons, both these writ-applications fail and are hereby rejected. Ad-interim order, if any, stands vacated forthwith. Rule discharged. 35. After the order is pronounced, Mr. Jigar Gadhavi, the learned advocate appearing for the petitioners, prays for continuation of the interim order earlier granted. 36. In view of what has been stated above, the request is declined.