JUDGMENT : T.B. Radhakrishnan, J. 1. This appeal by the State stands with an application seeking condonation of delay of 2555 days in filing the appeal; that is to say, a delay of seven years. The plaintiff sued for damages suffered to body and property as a result of certain violent incidents on a day which is alleged to be one when there were illegal and unholy exercises, sweetly christened as "bundh". The first defendant State is the appellant. Under the impugned decree, the trial court mulcted it with half of the responsibility to compensate and the remaining half was fastened on the organisation which had called for that illegal activity. 2. For one thing, the affidavit filed in support of the application seeking condonation of delay does not contain even a syllable worth acceptance as cause, much less sufficient cause, to condone the inordinate delay of seven years in instituting this appeal. All that the said affidavit contains is the ceremonial rendition of the dates on which the files moved up and down the track of the administration. We are not persuaded by such ritualistic expressions to be satisfied that there is sufficient cause to condone the delay. 3. Be that as it may, the defence set up by the first defendant State included the plea that Kallumoodu Junction where the alleged incident is stated to have taken place is not a busy area and that it could not gather information that violence would occur in that area. The State stood accusing the plaintiff of having acted negligently in taking his family out on the "bundh" day, fully knowing that there is possibility of violence. Such plea by the State is nothing short of institutional and constitutional shame and is infra dig and infringes the basic tenets and doctrines of the constitutional protections to life and liberty of citizens as enunciated by the law laid by the Apex Court in relation to the illegal activities held under the name 'bundh' or 'hartal'. It also grossly erodes the basic human rights, including of those who are not Indian citizens but are in the territory of India when such inhuman activities take place. Life and liberty of any citizen and the basic rights of even a person, who is not a citizen, to life, are sacrosanct and are to be zealously guarded from unconstitutional and unlawful deprivation. Life and liberty of any citizen and the basic rights of even a person, who is not a citizen, to life, are sacrosanct and are to be zealously guarded from unconstitutional and unlawful deprivation. (See for support, the decisions in Bharat Kumar vs. State of Kerala, 1997 (2) KLT 287 (F.B.) and George Kurian vs. State of Kerala, 2004 (2) KLT 758 (F.B.). Such rights are precious, or even more precious, than the collective right to demonstrate and bargain. These, clearly, emanate out of a conjoint reading of the pearls of wisdom embedded in the fundamental rights particularly the right to life enshrined in Article 21 and the fundamental duties of the citizens alerted through the Constitution of India, along with the different provisions in the Directive Principles of State Policy in Part-IV of the Constitution of India and covenants and declarations of the human rights governing management of human right issues in the international domain. Such protections are inexcusable components of any civilized society. The State Government and its Police are required to be alert on these issues. Whatever be the other issues raised, we may also note that the first defendant State did not adduce any evidence to show that the Police were alert or any due action had followed in relation to the incident in question. May be in the light of its pleadings noted above, it did not have any evidence to adduce at all in that regard. This way also, we see nothing on the merits of the appeal as well. In the result, the C.M. Application and the appeal are dismissed in limine.